equally to all children similarly situated." Thus in the case of People v Weis, a township high school act which allowed certain townships to organize township high schools was held invalid, both as a special law in contravention of section 22 of article 4 and because such an act violated the requirements of uniformity contained in section 1 of article 8, since by virtue of this act "some may be denied the privilege of organizing the territory in which they reside into a township high school district, and thus be denied the opportunity to receive a free education at such an institution." (See discussion article 4, section 22, subheading, "Management of the common schools").

This requirement of uniformity has also been applied in holding that colored children cannot be segregated in the schools. It is held that colored children can not be excluded from the schools nearest their homes, even though equal educational facilities are given in more distant schools.

It has been held that this section of the constitution prevents the exclusion of children from the public schools because of their refusal to be vaccinated, but in a case of existing or threatened epidemic children who have not been vaccinated may be excluded during the period of the epidemic.9 The Supreme Court has several times declined to sanction a rule making vaccination a prerequisite, under all circumstances, to public school attendance.1

10

Section 2. All lands, moneys, or other property, donated, granted or received for school, college, seminary or university purposes, and the proceeds thereof, shall be faithfully applied to the objects for which such gift or grants were made.

The primary purpose of this section is to prevent the use, for purposes other than school purposes, of school lands, granted to the state by the federal government. In the case of Grosse v People," the court said: "From an inspection of this section it is apparent that it applies only to gifts or grants made prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1870. Its language plainly indicates that lands, money and other property had been theretofore donated, granted and received for schools, colleges, seminary and university purposes, and directs that such gifts or grants shall be faithfully applied to the objects for which they were made; and when it is considered that the federal government had, prior to the adoption of the constitution 1870, granted section 16 in each township, or lands equivalent thereto, to the state for the use of the inhabitants of such township for the use of schools, and had also granted lands and donated funds to the State for the establishment and maintenance of a state college or university and for the founding and support of a state seminary, it becomes apparent that the section of the constitution had reference primarily to these gifts and grants from the federal government. It manifestly does not extend to gifts or grants made subsequent to the adoption of the constitution."

This section finds its principal application in the rule that certain school property is exempt from taxation, since to tax such property would divert it to purposes other than school purposes. While school property in general is

6 People v C. & N. W. Ry. Co.. 286 I11. 384 (1919).

7275 Ill. 581 (1916).

8 People v Mayor of Alton, 193 Ill. 309 (1901); People v Board of Education. 101 Ill. 308 (1882): Chase v Stephenson, 71 I11. 383 (1874); People v Board of Education, 127. Ill. 613 (1889).

Potts v Breen, 167 Ill. 67 (1897); Hagler v Larner. 284 Ill. 547 (1918). 10 People v Board of Education, 234 Ill. 422 (1908); Lawbaugh v Board of Education. 177 Ill. 572 (1899); Hagler v Larner, 284 Ill. 547 (1918).

not exempt from taxation under this section of the constitution,12 the Supreme Court has held that school lands which are part of the original federal grants for school purposes, or which were purchased with the proceeds of such grants, are exempt, under the provisions of this section, from both general taxation and special assessment.13 It has also been held that a tax can not be assessed upon the rents received from these lands since such rents are "proceeds" of the grants within the language of this section." However, this section was intended to secure only gifts made for public school purposes and has no reference to private donations to educational institutions, which are not a part of the public school system. Thus, land granted by individuals to the University of Chicago is subject to special assessments, since the Unversity of Chicago is not a part of the public school system of the state.15 In this connection it may be noted that section 3 of article 9 authorizes the General Assembly to exempt from taxation property used exclusively for school purposes. (See discussion article 9, section 3, subheading, "Power of

General Assembly.")

In the case of Cravener v Board of Education1 it was contended that this section of the constitution would prevent the board of education of the city of Chicago from assuming control of valuable school lands in the town of Lake upon the annexation of that town to the city of Chicago. But the court held that this section did not prevent the General Assembly from vesting legal title in a different agency, provided that the lands were to be devoted to school purposes.

The Attorney General has held that an act permitting the use of the proceeds or rents of school lands, (part of the original federal grants for school purposes), to pay for draining such lands, is in violation of this section of the constitution.17

Section 3. Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school district or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of land, money, or other personal property ever be made by the State, or any such public corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian purpose.

In the case of County of Cook v Industrial School,18 decided in 1888, it was held that this section prohibited the payment of money to sectarian institutions for the care of delinquent children committed to such schools by the courts of this state. However, in Dunn v Chicago Industrial School,1o decided in 1917, the court held that such payments might be made to sectarian schools where it appeared that the amount paid was less than the cost of the actual care of the children. The court took the view that where the amount

12 Grosse

People, 218 Ill. 342 (1905); City of Chicago, v City of Chicago, 207 Ill. 37 (1904).

13 City of Chicago v People, 80 Ill. 384 (1875); People v Trustees, 118 Ill.

52 (1886).

14 People v City of Chicago. 216 Ill. 537 (1905).

15 University of Chicago v People, 118 Ill. 565 (1886).

16 133 Ill. 145 (1890).

17 Report Attorney General 1908, p. 61.

18 125 Ill. 540 (1888); see County of McLean v Humphreys, 104 111. 378 (1882). 1 280 Ill. 613 (1917).

paid was less than the amount required to maintain the children in a state institution, it could not be said that a donation had been made for a sectarian purpose. The decision has been followed in later cases.20

It has been held that this section does not prohibit a church from erecting a church building on a poor farm, since such an arrangement results in a gift of the building, by the church, to the county, rather than any gift by the county to the church.21

It has also been held that this section does not prevent the use of a public school house for religious meetings, since this use in no way interferes with the use of the building for school purposes and is consistent with the faithful application of the property to school purposes."

This section is frequently construed in connection with section 3 of article 2, which provides that no preference shall be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship. (See discussion article 2, section 3.)

Section 4. No teacher, State, county, township, or district school officer shall be interested in the sale, proceeds or profits of any book, apparatus or furniture, used or to be used, in any school in this State, with which such officer or teacher may be connected, under such penalties as may be provided by the General Assembly.

(See article 4, sections 15, 25.)

Section 5. There may be a County Superintendent of Schools in each county whose qualifications, powers, duties, compensation, and time and manner of election, and term of office, shall be prescribed by law.

It has been held that the provision of this section that the "time and manner of election" of the county superintendent of schools "shall be prescribed by law" does not give the General Assembly the power to fix the qualifications of electors so as to permit women to vote for that officer.28 (See discussion article 7, section 1, subheading, "Woman suffrage.")

Since 1870, the county superintendent of schools has been elected by popular vote. It has been suggested, however, that this section does not necessarily require a popular election. Some have thought that an election

of the county superintendent of schools by the county board would suffice to satisfy this section of the constitution. There is, however, no authoritative construction as to this.

The Attorney General has said that women might be permitted, by statute, to hold the office of county superintendent of schools, since the General Assembly has the power to fix the qualifications of that officer.2+

20 Dunn v Addison School, 281 Ill. 352 (1917): Trost v Ketteler Manual Training School, 282 Ill. 504 (1918); St. Hedwig's School v Cook County, 289 Ill. 432 (1919).

21 Reichwald v Catholic Bishop. 258 Ill. 44 (1913).

23 Nichols v School Directors, 93 Ill. 61 (1879).

23 People v English, 139 Ill. 622 (1892); but see Scown v Czarnecki, 264 Ill. 305 (1914).

ARTICLE IX-REVENUE

Section 1. The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property-such value to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise; but the General Assembly shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, merchants, commission merchants, showmen, jugglers, innkeepers, grocery-keepers, liquor-dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph and express interests or business, venders of patents, and persons or corporations owning or using franchises and privileges, in such manner as it shall, from time to time, direct by general law, uniform as to the class upon which it operates.

The general property tax. The first clause of this section and sections 9 and 10 of article 9 establish the general property tax in this state. This section relates to state taxes and sections 9 and 10 refer to municipal taxes.

In General.

The basic principle of the general property tax is that all property, irrespective of its character, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, shall be taxed at the same rate and in proportion to its value. The general property tax was established in this state by the constitution of 18181 (article 8, section 20), and the principle was carried forward into the constitution of 1848 (article 9, section 2) and the present constitution. In construing the section of the constitution of 1870 now under consideration the Supreme Court has said: "Under section 1 of article 9 of the constitution we think it is plain that the burdens of taxation were intended to be cast equally upon all the property of the state, of every description. Where revenue was needed a tax is required to be levied, on a valuation, so that every person and corporation shall be required to pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property. Uniformity of taxation on all property was the cardinal principle of that section of the constitution

Under the last clause of this section of the constitution the General Assembly is given the power to tax occupations and persons or corporations owning or using franchises and privileges "in such manner as it shall from time to time direct by general law uniform as to the class upon which it operates". The constitution of 1848 contained a similar provision but the constitution of 1818 did not confer any such power upon the General As

1 Sawyer v City of Alton, 4 Ill. 127 (1841). Although the framers of the first constitution contemplated the establishment of the general property tax there was no serious attempt to apply that system of taxation until 1839. In that year, however, the General Assembly passed a law which fully established the general property tax in this state. See Rhinehart v Schuyler. 7 Ill. 473 (1843).

2 Loan and Homestead Association v Keith, 153 Ill. 609 (1894).

sembly. Since 1848 the General Assembly, with respect to occupations, franchises and privileges has been empowered to impose taxes otherwise than in proportion to the value of property, although the principle of uniformity as to class is expressly enjoined upon the taxing authorities. This clause has given rise to much litigation and it is not an easy matter to reconcile all of the judicial decisions on this subject. (See discussion subsequent subheading, "Taxation of occupations, franchises and privileges.")

In recent years there has been much criticism of the general property tax in this and in other states. Many states have already abandoned the principle of the general property tax. The proposed tax amendment of 1916, would have permitted the General Assembly of this state to classify property for the purposes of taxation-that is, would have authorized the General Assembly to provide for the taxation of personal property otherwise than in proportion to value, or, at least, on a different basis than real estate.

(For a discussion concerning the history and criticisms of the general property tax, see Constitutional Conventions in Illinois, Second Edition, pp. 76-89; Constitutional Convention Bulletin No. 4, pp. 220-244).

Property subject to taxation.

Obviously real estate and tangible personal property, such as furniture and farm implements, are property within the meaning of the constitutional provisions relating to taxation. And while it has been contended that intangible personal property, such as notes, mortgages and bonds, is not subject to taxation, the courts have declined to adopt that view. "The word property is not alone used in our language to denote tangible things, but is properly applied to denote intangible rights of value. One may have a property in a patent right or a copy right, which is as much ideal as is a right of action. We may safely assume that it was the policy of the convention which framed this clause of the constitution, that each person pay a direct tax in proportion to the pecuniary interests which he has in the state, and to be protected and defended by the laws."

A person who loans money to another must pay taxes on the money loaned by him. If a note and mortgage are taken to secure the purchase price of a tract of land both the note and the land are subject to taxation." Leasehold estates in state lands, city warrants and certificates of purchase at mortgage foreclosure sales are taxable. The capital stock and franchise of a corporation are property within the meaning of the constitution and, as such, are subject to taxation. The General Assembly also has the power to provide for the taxation of shares of stock in the hands of the stockholder. And, in Huck v Chicago and Alton Railroad Company' it was held that, under the peculiar facts in that case, railroad lines leased by a railroad company were taxable in the hands of the lessee.

Coal rights are taxable either as a part of the land or separately. If the same person owns both the land and the coal rights it is proper, in assessing the land, to add thereto the value of the coal rights. But if the land and the coal rights are owned by different persons then each should be assessed and taxed separately.10

3 People v Worthington, 21 Ill. 171 (1859).

4 People v McConnell, 12 Ill. 138 (1850).

5 People v Worthington, 21 Ill. 171 (1859); see, also, People v Rhodes, 15 Ill. 305 (1853).

6 Carrington v People, 195 Ill. 484 (1902); Easton v Board of Review, 183 Ill. 255 (1899); Wedgbury v Cassell, 164 Ill. 622 (1897).

Porter v R. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co., 76 Ill. 561 (1875); Ottawa Glass Co. v McCaleb. 81 Ill. 556 (1876).

8 Ottawa Glass Co. v McCaleb. 81 Ill. 556 (1876); Danville Banking and Trust Co. v Parks, 88 III. 170 (1878): In re St. Louis L. & I. Co. 194 Ill. 609 (1902); Illinois National Bank v Kinsella 201 Ill. 31, (1903); First National Bank of Urbana v Holmes. 246 Ill. 362 (1910).

986 Ill. 352 (1877).