Election district. The Supreme Court has said that the words "election district" have acquired no settled meaning. Sometimes these words are used to designate a voting precinct and at times they are used to describe a larger or a smaller district than a voting precinct."7 In the case of People v Markiewicz18 it was held that for the purposes of town elections, the entire town is to be considered as one voting district as respects the qualifications, of voters, although there may be several polling places in the town. A voter who has resided in the town for thirty days and who has all the other qualifications necessary to make him a legal voter may vote in the town, regardless of the fact that he has not resided in the particular election district or voting precinct for that period. The reasoning of the court in this case was that it was never intended that any voter should be qualified to take part in a town meeting and not be qualified to assist in the election of town officers.

Unnaturalized aliens. The clause giving the suffrage to persons who were electors in this state on the first day of April, 1848 was inserted to provide for the cases of certain unnaturalized aliens, who were permitted to vote under the constitution of 1848. Under the constitution of 1818 citizenship was not a requisite to suffrage.1 Under that constitution, an unnaturalized alien, with the requisite residential qualifications might vote. When the constitution of 1848 (article 6, section 1) made citizenship a qualification for suffrage it provided that unnaturalized aliens who were residents of the state at the time of the adoption of that constitution (April 1, 1848) might vote and this provision was carried forward into the constitution of 1870. However, it has been held that persons who were foreign born, minor children of such unnaturalized alien electors on April 1, 1848 may not vote under this provision of the constitution, since these minors were not electors on that date.20

Naturalization in county courts. When the constitutional convention of 1869-70 assembled, some doubt existed as to whether naturalization certificates which had been granted by county courts were effectual. The provision giving the suffrage to those who had obtained certificates of naturalization before any court of record in the state before January 1, 1870 was adopted to remove this doubt so far as the right of these persons to vote was concerned. (Debates, p. 1289.) But in 1875 it was held that naturalization before a county court was valid and legal for all purposes without reference to this provision of the constitution.21

Woman Suffrage. The provision of this section limiting the suffrage to male citizens is held to apply only to officers created by, or elections prescribed by the constitution. The General Assembly may authorize women to vote for all other officers and in all other elections. In 1891 the General Assembly passed an act authorizing women to vote for any school officer elected under the general or special school laws of the state. In People v English" it was held that this act could not constitutionally give women the right to vote for county superintendents of schools, since

17 People v Markiewicz, 225 Ill. 563 (1907); Report Attorney General 1916, p. 780. 18 225 Ill. 563 (1907); but see Fahey v City of Bloomington 268 Ill. 386 (1915); People v Simpson 168 Ill. 127 (1897).

19 Spragins v Houghton. 3 Ill. 377 (1840).

20 Beardstown v Virginia. 76 Ill. 34 (1875).

21 People v McGowan, 77 I11. 644 (1875): but see Knox County v Davis. 63 Ill. 405 (1872); Beardstown v Virginia 76 Ill. 34 (1875)

22 139 Ill. 622 (1892).

that officer was named in section 5 of article 8 of the constitution and, must therefore be elected by the male electors prescribed in section 1 of article 7 of the constitution. In the case of Plummer v Yost,23 decided in 1893, it was held that this act was valid insofar as it gave women the right to vote for a member of the board of education, since that office is purely a creation of the General Assembly and is not mentioned in the constitution. In 1913 the General Assembly passed an act providing that women might vote for presidential electors, members of the state board of equalization, clerk of the appellate court, county collector, county surveyor, members of the board of assessors, members of the board of review, sanitary district trustees, and for all officers of cities, villages and towns (except police magistrates), and upon all questions or propositions submitted to a vote of the electors of such municipalities or other political subdivisions of the state. The same act provided that women might vote for the following township officers: supervisor, town clerk, assessor, collector and highway commissioner, and might also participate and vote in all annual and special town meetings. In the case of Scown v Czarnecki2+ this act was upheld insofar as it concerned the qualifications of electors for the several officers named, since these officers are not mentioned in the constitution. But the court held that the provision authorizing women to vote upon all questions or propositions submitted to a vote of the electors of municipalities or political subdivisions of the state was invalid insofar as it purported to give women the right to vote in referendum elections prescribed by the constitution, such as the division of a county or the removal of a county seat. As to referendum elections not prescribed by the constitution the act was held valid. Later it was held that women were not entitled under this act to vote for judges of city courts or judges of the municipal court of Chicago, since the creation of these offices is authorized by the constitution. It will thus be seen that while women may be authorized to vote for the officers named in the act of 1913, they may not be authorized to vote for constitutional officers, such, for example, as the Governor, and members of the General Assembly.

In the case of People v Byers the Supreme Court held that the woman suffrage act did not authorize women to vote for delegates to national nominating conventions or party committeemen, although it might well have done so, under the constitution.

As previously noted, the woman suffrage act of 1913 gives women the right to vote for presidential electors. The General Assembly has the power to give women this right, since the constitution of the United States prescribes that presidential electors shall be chosen in such manner as the several state legislatures shall direct. (United States Constitution, article 2, section 2). However, women may not be authorized to vote for United States Senators or members of the federal House of Representatives since these officers must be elected by electors, having the "qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures." (United States Constitution, article 1, section 2, and the seventeenth amendment.)

Section 2. All votes shall be by ballot.

The essential right guaranteed by this section is not written or printed ballots, but secrecy in voting. It is therefore held that a statute providing for voting machines does not violate this section, since this method of voting

23 144 Ill. 68 (1893).

24 264 Ill. 305 (1914).

25 Franklin v Westfall, 273 Ill. 402 (1916); Wells v Robertson, 277 JII. 534 (1917).

preserves the essential element of secrecy." It has been held, however, that the production of ballots for the inspection of a grand jury does not violate the secrecy of the ballot required by this section of the constitution since this provision does not contemplate secrecy after the ballots have been deposited in the ballot box.28

Section 3. Electors shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at elections, and in going to and returning from the same. And no elector shall be obliged to do military duty on the days of election, except in time of war or public danger.

Section 4. No elector shall be deemed to have lost his residence in this State by reason of his absence on the business of the United States, or of this State, or in the military or naval service of the United States.

In the opinion of the Attorney General this section does not prevent a government employee who desires to abandon his residence in the state and acquire a residence elsewhere from doing so. It merely provides that the fact of his absence on government or military service shall not in itself operate as an abandonment of residence in this state.29

The Attorney General has also suggested that the absentee voting law for soldiers and sailors may be justified under this section.30 (See discussion article 7, section 1, subheading, "Absentee voting law.")

Section 5. No soldier, seaman or marine in the army or navy of the United States, shall be deemed a resident of this. State in consequence of being stationed therein.

Section 6. No person shall be elected or appointed to any office in this State, civil or military, who is not a citizen of the United States, and who shall not have resided in this State one year next preceding the election or appointment.

31

Except as otherwise provided in the constitution, this section fixes the qualifications of all officers provided for in that instrument. The Supreme Court has held that this provision is a limitation upon the power of the

27 Lynch v Malley, 215 Ill. 574 (1905); but see Veto Message No. 10.

28 People v Lueders, 269 Ill. 205 (1915).

29 Report Attorney General 1916. p. 830.

30 Report Attorney General 1918, pp. 300. 345.

31 See People v Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9 (1906).

General Assembly and that body has no power or authority except as otherwise provided in the constitution to add any further qualifications for constitutional officers. Thus, in the case of People v McCormick it was held that a statute, requiring a person elected county commissioner of Cook County to have been a resident of the county for five years preceding his election, violated this section of the constitution, since it imposed additional qualifications for a constitutional office. (See discussion article 6, section 17; article 10, section 6; article 4, section 3, subheading, "Qualifications of members of the General Assembly".)

The Attorney General has taken the view that a license to practice law is not a necessary qualification for the office of state's attorney, since that officer is a constitutional officer, and his sole qualifications are those specified by this section.33

34

When an office is created by statute, however, it is wholly within the power of the General Assembly and additional qualifications may be imposed by that body. However, the Attorney General has ruled that statutory officers must have the qualifications of citizenship and residence mentioned in this section. Thus the Attorney General has held that notaries public, and overseers of the poor must have these qualifications.35

Section 7. The General Assembly shall pass laws excluding from the right of suffrage persons convicted of infamous crimes.

This section is a limitation upon the power of the General Assembly and that body has no power to exclude any qualified elector from the right of suffrage except for the cause mentioned in this section,-conviction for an infamous crime.30

In pursuance of this provision of the constitution, the General Assembly has passed laws excluding from the right of suffrage persons convicted of infamous crimes. (Hurd's Revised Statutes 1917, chap. 38, sec. 279; chap.

46, sec. 70) 37

32 261 Ill. 413 (1914).

33 Report Attorney General 1900. p. 233; but see Report Attorney General 1916. p. 762.

34 People v McCormick, 261 Ill. 413 (1914).

35 Report Attorney General 1900, p. 237; Report Attorney General 1915, p. 593; Report Attorney General 1918, p. 109; but see State Public Utilities Commission v Early, 285 Ill. 469 (1919).

36 Sanner v Patton, 155 Ill. 553 (1895); Christie v People, 206 Ill. 337 (1907). 37 See Report Attorney General 1916, p. 831; Report Attorney General 1914, p. 721 Report Attorney General 1912, p. 1266.

ARTICLE VIII-EDUCATION

Section 1. The General Assembly shall provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this. State may receive a good common school education.

In general. A common school education may include a high school course1 and the fact that foreign languages, the higher mathematics, and the sciences are taught in the high school does not change its character from that of a common school. But a school "devoted exclusively to teaching advanced pupils in the classics, and in all the higher branches of study usually included in the curriculum of the colleges" is not a common school.3

Power and duties of the General Assembly. The provision of this section that the General Assembly shall provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools gives the General Assembly a broad discretion as to the manner in which it will carry out the duty thus enjoined. In the case of Plummer v Yost the court said: "The mode in which the system of free schools, prescribed by the constitution is to be organized is left entirely to the discretion of the legislature."

Section 22 of article 4, provides that the General Assembly shall not pass special laws relating to the management of the common schools, but it has been held that the broad grant of power given to the General Assembly by the section now under discussion limits the effect of section 22 of article 4 strictly to a denial of the power to pass special laws relating to the management of the common schools. This is illustrated by the case of Land Commissioners v Kaskaskia Commons. In that case it was urged that an act authorizing the sale of the Kaskaskia commons and the use of the proceeds for school purposes on the island of Kaskaskia was a special law in violation of section 22 of article 4. But the court held that the more comprehensive language of section 1 of article 8 limited the scope of section 22 of article 4 to laws relating strictly to the management of the common schools and that this act in no sense related to the management of the schools.

The power given the General Assembly to create a system of free schools is qualified, however, by the provision that the system created must be a system "whereby all children of this state may receive a good common school education". This qualification requires that the legislative plan for the creation of the school system must be uniform in its operation. "The same privileges of attendance upon the schools must in all cases be extended

1 Cook v Board of Directors. 266 III. 164 (1914): Richards v Raymond. 92 Ill. 612 (1879); Russell v High School Board, 212 Ill. 327 (1904); People v C. & N. W. Ry. Co.. 286 Ill. 384 (1919).

2 People v Moore. 240 Ill. 408 (1909).

3 Powell v Board of Education, 97 Ill. 375 (1881); but see Boehm v Hertz, 182 Ill. 154 (1899).

144 Ill. 68 (1893).

5249 Ill. 578 (1911); Fuller v Heath, 89 Ill. 296 (1878); Speight v People. 87 Ill. 595 (1877); Boehm v Hertz, 182 Ill. 154 (1899).