right to a writ of error direct from the Supreme Court to the trial court. As has been suggested, (see discussion preceding subheading, "Appellate jurisdiction"), the General Assembly may require any one or more or all of these cases to be taken first to the appellate court.53 On the other hand when one of these four cases, such as a criminal case, is required to be taken first to the appellate court, a writ of error from the Supreme Court to the appellate court to obtain a review of the latter courts' decision, is a constitutional writ of right and must be allowed when claimed. Moreover, it has been intimated by the Supreme Court that the provisions of section 11 of this article deny to the General Assembly the power to provide for any method, other than that of writ of error or appeal, of bringing one of these four classes of cases up from the appellate court to the Supreme Court, for review. Nevertheless, the General Assembly may provide that a writ of certiorari may issue from the Supreme Court to the appellate court for the purpose of determining whether or not one of these four classes of cases merits review, when the writ actually awarded to bring up the record, after the case is deemed worthy of review, is a writ of error.55

It should be noted that a constitutional right to a writ of error does not include a right to have the writ of error made a supersedeas.50

Although sections 8 and 19 of this article have often been referred to by the court, the principal basis for the determination of the question as to when a writ of error from the Supreme Court was available, in the great majority of the cases, has been, not the constitution, but the common law, as modified by statute. That is, the constitutional provisions authorize the use of writs of error as a means of obtaining a review of cases by the Supreme Court, but, except in the four classes of cases of which mention has been made, the actual availability of a writ of error in a particular case has been determined, not by the constitution, but by the common law, as extended or changed by legislation.57

Very little has been said, in this note, with reference to sections 8 and 19 of this article. Section 8 appears to have been intended merely to require that appeals and writs of error, which were available because of some body of law other than that section, should be taken to the Supreme Court in the particular grand division in which the trial court was located, unless the parties agreed otherwise. That is, that section probably was not intended to have any bearing upon the question as to when a writ of error from the Supreme Court was or was not available in a particular case. Rather, it appears to have been inserted in the constitution for the purpose of directing to which grand division cases should be sent for review. The three grand divisions, however, were abolished, the state as a whole constituted one grand division, and the Supreme Court required to meet at Springfield, by an act of 1897.58 Perhaps it may be said that since the enactment of that statute, section 8 is inoperative. There has been but one case in which the Supreme Court has really discussed the meaning, insofar as writs of error are concerned, of section 19. In that case the court said: "Plainly, this does not confer the right to a writ of error from this court in all cases decided by the county court. Whether the case shall be taken, by appeal or by writ of error, to this court, or to some other court, must be provided by law. It is but a direction to the General Assembly to prescribe, by law, how appeals and writs of error shall be allowed from final determinations of county courts

9959

Young v Stearns. 91 III. 221 (1878); George v George, 250 Ill. 251 (1911); Public Utilities Commission v C. & W. T. Ry. Co., 275 Ill. 555 (1916).

54 Smith v People, 98 Ill. 407 (1881); Gallagher v People, 207 Ill. 247 (1904). 55 Freitag v U. S. Y. Co., 262 Ill. 551 (1914).

56 Public Utilities Commission v C. & W. T. Ry. Co., 275 Ill. 555 (1916). 57 Haines v People, 97 Ill. 161 (1880); Hart Bros. v West Chicago Park Commissioners, 186 Ill. 464 (1900); George v George, 250 Ill. 251 (1911); Sweeney v Chicago Telephone Co., 212 Ill. 475 (1904); Peak v People, 76 Ìll. 289 (1875); Kingsbury v Sperry, 119 Ill. 279 (1887); Loomis v Hodson, 224 Ill. 147 (1906); Hall v Thode, 75 Ill. 173 (1874).

58 Hurd's Revised Statutes, 1917, chap. 37, secs. 2-3d. 59 Kingsbury v Sperry, 119 Ill. 279, 282 (1887).

Section 3. No person shall be eligible to the office of judge of the Supreme Court unless he shall be at least thirty years of age, and a citizen of the United States, nor unless he shall have resided in this State five years next preceding his election, and be a resident of the district in which he shall be elected.

Section 4. Terms of the Supreme Court shall continue to be held in the present grand divisions at the several places now provided for holding the same; and until otherwise provided by law, one or more terms of said court shall be held, for the Northern Division, in the City of Chicago, each year, at such times as said court may appoint, whenever said city or the county of Cook shall provide appropriate rooms therefor, and the use of a suitable library, without expense to the State. The judicial divisions may be altered, increased or diminished in number, and the times and places of holding said court may be changed by law.

The three grand divisions were abolished, the state as a whole constituted one grand division, and the Supreme Court was required to sit at Springfield, by an act of 1897.60

Section 5. The present grand divisions shall be preserved, and be denominated Southern, Central and Northern, until otherwise provided by law. The State shall be divided into seven districts for the election of judges, and, until otherwise provided by law, they shall be as follows:

First District-The counties of St. Clair, Clinton, Washington, Jefferson, Wayne, Edwards, Wabash, White, Hamilton, Franklin, Perry, Randolph, Monroe, Jackson, Williamson, Saline, Gallatin, Hardin, Pope, Union, Alexander, Pulaski and Massac.

Second District-The counties of Madison, Bond, Marion, Clay, Richland, Lawrence, Crawford, Jasper, Effingham, Fayette, Montgomery, Macoupin, Shelby, Cumberland, Clark, Greene, Jersey, Calhoun and Christian.

Third District-The counties of Sangamon, Macon, Logan, Dewitt, Piatt, Douglas, Champaign, Vermilion, McLean, Livingston, Ford, Iroquois, Coles, Edgar, Moultrie and Tazewell.

Fourth District-The counties of Fulton, McDonough, Hancock, Schuyler, Brown, Adams, Pike, Mason, Menard, Morgan, Cass and Scott.

Fifth District-The counties of Knox, Warren, Henderson, Mercer, Henry, Stark, Peoria, Marshall, Putnam, Bureau, LaSalle, Grundy and Woodford.

Sixth District-The counties of Whiteside, Carroll, Jo Daviess, Stephenson, Winnebago, Boone, McHenry, Kane, Kendall, DeKalb, Lee, Ogle and Rock Island.

Seventh District-The counties of Lake, Cook, Will, Kankakee and DuPage.

The boundaries of the districts may be changed at the session of the General Assembly next preceding the election for judges therein, and at no other time; but whenever such alterations shall be made, the same shall be upon the rule of equality of population, as nearly as county boundaries will allow; and the districts shall be composed of contiguous counties; in as nearly compact form as circumstances will permit. The alteration of the districts shall not affect the tenure of office of any judge.

Grand divisions. The three grand divisions were abolished, the state as a whole constituted one grand division, and the Supreme Court was re quired to sit at Springfield, by an act of 1897.61

Changes in Supreme Court districts. Under the provisions of section 6 of this article, five Supreme Court judges are elected at one time, one at another time, and one at still another time. (See discussion article 6, sec tion 6).

It has been held that the General Assembly is empowered by the provi sions of the last paragraph of this section and those of section 6 of this arti cle, construed together, to change the boundaries of a particular Supreme Court district at the session which convenes next preceding the election of a judge in that district, even though that change results incidentally in the alteration of the boundaries of other districts in which no judges are to be elected that year. Moreover, the General Assembly is authorized by these two sections to change the boundaries of any one or more of the five districts in which judges of the Supreme Court are elected at the same time, at the session which convenes next preceding that election, even though such change or changes may result incidentally in the alteration of the boundaries of other districts in which no judges are to be elected that year. The Supreme Court has denied that the section under consideration necessarily requires all seven districts to be changed at the time of the election of the five judges. The Supreme Court will not review the discretion of the General Assembly as to the equality of population, or the compactness or contiguity of the territory of the new districts, if it can see that any attempt at all was made to comply with these requirements. (See article 6, section 13; and discus sion, article 4, section 6.)

62

(As to whether an act creating new circuits or changing boundaries of circuits may be made to go into effect prior to the first day of July, without the necessity of an emergency clause and a two-thirds vote, see discussion article 4, section 13, subheading, "Date of going into effect.")

Section 6. At the time of voting on the adoption of this Constitution, one judge of the Supreme Court shall be elected by the electors thereof, in each of said districts numbered two, three, six,

61 Hurd's 'Revised Statutes 1917, chap. 37. secs. 2-3d.

62 People v Rose, 203 Ill. 46 (1903).

and seven, who shall hold his office for the term of nine years from the first Monday of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy. The term of office of judges of the Supreme Court, elected after the adoption of this Constitution, shall be nine years; and on the first Monday of June of the year in which the term of any of the judges in office at the adoption of this Constitution or of the judge then elected, shall expire, and every nine years thereafter, there shall be an election for the successor or successors of such judges, in the respective districts wherein the term of such judges shall expire. The Chief Justice shall continue to act as such until the expiration of the term for which he was elected, after which the Judges shall choose one of their number Chief Justice.

On May 13, 1870, when the Constitution of 1870 was adopted by the constitutional convention, the Supreme Court consisted of three judges. The term of one of these three judges expired on the first Monday in June, 1870. Section 2 of article 6 of the new constitution provided that "The Supreme Court shall consist of seven judges." The section under consideration provided for the election of the four new judges on July 2, 1870, when the question of the ratification of the new constitution was submitted to the people. (See, also, section 7 of the schedule.) Five judges, therefore, were elected in 1870, and, pursuant to this section, five judges are to be elected every nine years thereafter, on the first Monday in June. The terms of the other two judges in office at the time of the adoption of the constitution of 1870 by the constitutional convention, expired, respectively, in 1873 and 1876. Therefore, under the provisions of this section, one Supreme Court judge is to be elected every nine years after 1873 and 1876, respectively, on the first Monday in June. Thus, elections for judges of the Supreme Court are held every three years. The provisions of the present statute are as follows: "The judges of the Supreme Court shall hereafter be elected as follows, to-wit: In the first, second, third, sixth and seventh districts on the first Monday of June, in the year of our Lord 1879, and every nine years thereafter. In the fourth district, on the first Monday of June, in the year of our Lord 1876, and every nine years thereafter. In the fifth district, on the first Monday of June, in the year of our Lord 1873, and every nine years thereafter." 63

Section 7. From and after the adoption of this Constitution, the judges of the Supreme Court shall each receive a salary of four thousand dollars per annum, payable quarterly, until otherwise provided by law. And after said salaries shall be fixed by law, the salaries of the judges in office shall not be increased or diminished during the terms for which said judges shall have been elected.

(As to the meaning of the last sentence of this section, see discussior article 4, section 21, subheading "Judicial officers.")

63 People v Rose, 203 Ill. 46 (1903); Hurd's Revised Statutes, 1917, chap

Section 8. Appeals and writs of error may be taken to the Supreme Court, held in the grand division in which the case is decided, or, by consent of the parties, to any other grand division.

(See discussion article 6, section 2, subheading, "Appeals and writs of error.")

Section 9. The Supreme Court shall appoint one reporter of its decisions, who shall hold his office for six years, subject to removal by the Court.

Section 10. At the time of the election for representatives in the General Assembly, happening next preceding the expiration of the terms of office of the present clerks of said court, one clerk of said court for each division shall be elected, whose term of office shall be six years from said election, but who shall not enter upon the duties of his office until the expiration of the term of his predecessor, and every six years thereafter one clerk of said court for each division shall be elected.

The three grand divisions were abolished, the state constituted one grand division, the Supreme Court required to sit at Springfield, and the election of but one Supreme Court clerk provided for, by an Act of 1897.**

Section 11. After the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four, inferior Appellate Courts, of uniform organization and jurisdiction, may be created in districts formed for that purpose, to which such appeals and writs of error as the General Assembly may provide, may be prosecuted from Circuit and other courts, and from which appeals and writs of error shall lie to the Supreme Court, in all criminal cases, and cases in which a franchise, or freehold, or the validity of a statute is involved, and in such other cases as may be provided by law. Such Appellate Courts shall be held by such number of Judges of the Circuit Courts, and at such times and places, and in such manner, as may be provided by law; but no Judge shall sit in review upon cases decided by him; nor shall said Judges receive any additional compensation for such services.

(As to the meaning of the clause of this section, "and from which appeals and writs of error shall lie to the Supreme Court, in all criminal cases,

64 Hurd's Revised Statutes 1917, chap. 37, secs. 2-3d.