Section 25. The General Assembly shall provide, by law, that the fuel, stationery, and printing paper furnished for the use of the State; the copying, printing, binding and distributing the laws and journals, and all other printing ordered by the General Assembly shall be let by contract to the lowest responsible bidder; but the General Assembly shall fix a maximum price; and no member thereof, or other officer of the State, shall be interested, directly or indirectly, in such contract. But all such contracts shall be subject to the approval of the Governor, and if he disapproves the same there shall be a re-letting of the contract, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. (See article 4, section 15; article 8, section 4). Section 26. The State of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity. Suits against the state in its own name. The state cannot be made a party defendant in a proceeding to levy a special assessment to defray the cost of constructing a local improvement, even though it owns property that will be benefited by the improvement. It is improper for the Attorney General to file a cross petition in a condemnation proceeding because a cross petitioner in such a proceeding is in effect a defendant; and this seems to be true even though it has been held proper to require the state to pay the costs in an abandoned condemnation proceeding in which it was the petitioner. But it is entirely proper for a defendant in a suit in equity brought by the state to file a cross bill." a Suits against state officers. As long as a State officer is acting within the scope of his authority, a suit against him is a suit against the state and cannot be maintained. Thus, a suit cannot be maintained against the penitentiary commissioners to recover damages for breach of a contract to furnish convict labor, or to compel performance thereof." Nor can a suit for damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the falling down grandstand at the state fair grounds be maintained against the state board of agriculture. But a state officer who attempts to transcend his authority, may be restrained by the courts. An officer who attempts to enforce the collection of fees under an improper interpretation of a statute, or who is about to pay out money under an unconstitutional statute,10 may be enjoined by the courts. A state officer, who attempts to deprive an individual of the free enjoyment of his property cannot set up as a defense to an injunction suit against him the fact that the suit against him is in effect a suit against the state, for by his actions in interfering with the use of another's property he is transcending his authority." And a civil service employee 3 In re City of Mt. Vernon, 147 Ill. 359 (1893); Report Attorney General 1900, p. 191; see, also, City of Chicago v City of Chicago, 207 Ill. 36 (1904). 4 People v Sanitary District of Chicago, 210 Ill. 171 (1904). 5 Deneen v Unverzagt, 225 Ill. 378 (1907). 7 People v Dulaney, 96 Ill. 503 (1880). 8 Minear v State Board of Agriculture, 259 Ill. 549 (1913); but see State Board of Agriculture v Brady, 266 Ill. 592 (1915). G. A. Insurance Co. v Van Cleave, 191 Ill. 410 (1901). 10 Burke v Snively, 208 Ill. 328 (1904). who has been discharged without cause is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the Auditor of Public Accounts to issue a warrant for the salary justly due him for the time that he was illegally prevented from performing the duties of his position.12 (See discussion article 3, subheading, “Independence of departments"). Claims against the state. This section does not prevent the General Assembly from appropriating money to pay just claims against the state.13 (See discussion article 4, section 16, subheading, "Private laws"). Section 27. The General Assembly shall have no power to authorize lotteries or gift enterprises, for any purpose, and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets in this State. Section 28. No law shall be passed which shall operate to extend the term of any public officer after his election or appointment. 14 While a constitutional amendment may have the effect of extending the term of a public officer after his election, the General Assembly has no power to add seven months to the terms of the county superintendents of schools then in office.15 Nor can the General Assembly pass a law providing for the election in 1902 of a successor to a judge whose term of office expired in 1899.16 Section 29. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pass such laws as may be necessary for the protection of operative miners, by providing for ventilation, when the same may be required, and the construction of escapement shafts, or such other appliances as may secure safety in all coal mines, and to provide for the enforcement of said laws by such penalties and punishments as may be deemed proper. 18 This section applies only to operative miners and not to a carpenter employed to work on buildings outside of a mine.17 The purpose of this section is to protect the operative miner while he is working in a mine, and not after he has left it. And it relates not to the health of the miner but to his protection from personal injury while he is in the mine. With respect to protection from personal injury, legislation for miners as a class is permitted by the constitution but beyond that the General Assembly may not go. Legislation for miners on other subjects is void unless it applies to all persons similarly situated.19 Thus, the miner's wash room act was 12 People v Stevenson, 272 Ill. 215 (1916). 13 Fergus v Russel, 277 Ill. 20 (1917). 14 People v Board of Supervisors, 100 I11. 495 (1881). 15 Report Attorney General 1913, p. 35. 16 People v Knopf, 198 Ill. 340 (1902); Veto Message Senate Journal 1873, p. 413; but see Crook v People, 106 Ill. 237 (1883). Rogers v Carterville Coal Co., 254 Ill. 104 (1912). 18 Starne v People, 222 Ill. 189 (1906). 19 Millett v People, 117 I11. 294 (1886); Harding v People, 160 Ill. 459 (1896); Cook v Big Muddy Mining Co., 249 Ill. 41 (1911). held void as special legislation because it did not apply to foundry men and others engaged in employments in which contact with grease and dirt is unavoidable.20 Contributory negligence is no defense to an action for damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of a wilful violation of a statute passed pursuant to the command of this section of the constitution.21 And mine owners may be required to pay fees for inspection services rendered by the state.22 Section 30. The General Assembly may provide for establishing and opening roads and cartways, connected with a public road, for private and public use. It was held by the Supreme Court that under the constitution of 1848 the General Assembly had no power to provide for the establishment of a private roadway over the lands of another without his consent.23 This section of the constitution was adopted for the purpose of overcoming the court's previous holding. (Debates, p. 889). Section 31. The General Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners of lands to construct drains, ditches and levees for Agricultural, Sanitary or mining purposes, across the lands of others, and provide for the organization of drainage districts, and vest the corporate authorities thereof, with power to construct and maintain levees, drains and ditches, and to keep in repair all drains, ditches and levees heretofore constructed under the laws of this State, by Special Assessments upon the property benefited thereby. 2+ 24 In general. This section was amended in 1878. It was held that under the original section, drainage districts could not be vested with power to levy special assessments.25 The purpose of the amendment was to give the General Assembly the power to authorize drainage districts to levy special assessments. (See discussion article 9, section 9, subheading, "Municipalities that may be authorized to make local improvements by special assessments or by special taxation"). While this section is not self-executing or mandatory upon the General Assembly to pass laws providing for the organization of drainage districts,26 it is a general grant of power to the General Assembly, and confers upon that body, by implication, all other powers necessary to make the general 20 Starne v People, 222 Ill. 189 (1906); People v Solomon, 265 Ill. 28 (1914). 21 Carterville Ccal Co. v Abbott, 181 Ill. 495 (1899); Brunnworth v Kerens Coal Co., 260 I11. 202 (1913). 23 C. W. & V. Coal Co. v People, 181 Ill. 270 (1899). 23 Nesbitt v Trumbo, 39 Ill. 110 (1866); Crear v Crossly, 40 Ill. 175 (1866). 24 As amended by the first amendment to the constitution. The amendment was proposed by resolution of the General Assembly in 1877. It was ratified by the voters on November 5, 1878, and proclaimed adopted on November 29, 1878. The section as it originally appeared is as follows: "Section 31. The General Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners or occupants of lands to construct drains and ditches, for agricultural an sanitary purposes, across the lands of others." 25 Updike v Wright, 81 Ill. 49 (1876). grant effective.27 The power of the General Assembly with reference to drainage districts is practically unlimited. The General Assembly "has the right at all times to regulate and control them, their franchises and their funds, and to alter, modify of abolish them at pleasure so [provided] that their property is not diverted from the uses and objects for which it was given or purchased."28 The General Assembly may authorize the annexation of unorganized lands benefited by the necessary drains of an organized district," and it may require an upper district to contribute toward the cost of an outlet drain, constructed by a lower district, but used by both districts.30 Laws may be passed creating special districts,31 or directing the corporate authorities of cities, or highway commissioners, to act as drainage commissioners for a district comprised of the territory embraced within the limits of the municipality or political subdivision in which they have jurisdiction. (See discussion subsequent subheading, "Corporate authorities"). 33 This section of the constitution probably does not deprive the General Assembly of the power to authorize the formation of drainage districts, with power to construct drains, ditches and pumping plants by general taxation.34 As a matter of fact, a city which is organized as a drainage district, while it may install a pumping plant under a special assessment proceeding, cannot levy special assessments to defray the cost of the operation and maintenance thereof, but must do so by general taxation.35 The ordinary drainage district, however, may levy special assessments to pay the cost of operating and maintaining a pumping plant. The distinction is that a city has the power of levying general taxes, while an ordinary drainage district, under the law authorizing its creation, generally has no power to levy general taxes. 36 A drainage district may be given the power to acquire its right of way for ditches and drains by eminent domain proceedings." (See article 2, section 13). Corporate authorities. It is well settled that, under the provisions of sections 9 and 10 of article 9, only the corporate authorities of a municípal corporation may levy taxes for its needs, and that the corporate authorities of a municipality are those persons who are either elected by the people of the municipality or selected in some mode assented to by them. In the earlier drainage cases, the court took the view that this rule did not apply to drainage districts, and that unless the General Assembly deemed it necessary, there was no need that the corporate authorities of such districts should be elected by the people or selected in some mode to which the people had assented. It must be admitted, however, that the court, in those cases was influenced by the view that, in the drainage law then under consideration, a drainage district could not be organized except on a petition of a majority of the land owners in the proposed district.39 The court apparently was of the opinion that the assent of the people in a drain 38 27 Kilgour v Drainage Commissioners, 111 III. 342 (1884). 28 People v Bowman, 247 Ill. 276 (1910); see also, Hollenbeck v Detrich, 162 Ill. 388 (1896); City of Chicago v Town of Cicero, 210 Ill. 290 (1904). 29 People v Swearingen, 273 Ill. 630 (1916). 30 Drainage Commissioners v Rector Drainage District, 266 Ill. 536 (1915). See People v Block, 276 Ill. 286 (1916). 31 Owners of Lands v People. 113 Ill. 296 (1885); Herschbach v Kaskaskia Sanitary District, 265 Ill. 388 (1914). 32 Village of Hyde Park v Spencer, 118 Ill. 446 (1886). 33 Kilgour v Drainage Commissioners, 111 Ill. 342 (1884); see, also, Huston v. Clarke, 112 Ill. 344 (1884). 34 Wilson v Board of Trustees, 133 Ill. 443 (1890). 35 McChesney v Village of Hyde Park, 151 Ill. 634 (1894). 36 Brooks v Hatch, 261 Ill. 179 (1913). 37 C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v Polecat Drainage District, 213 Ill. 83 (1904); see, also, Veto Messages 1917, p. 9. 38 Huston v Clarke, 112 Ill. 344 (1884); Owners of Lands v People, 113 Ill. 296 (1885); Sny Island Drainage District v Shaw, 252 Ill. 142 (1911). 39 Owners of Lands v People, 113 Ill. 296 (1885). age district with reference to the appointment of its corporate authorities, was obtained when a majority of the land owners petitioned for the organization of the district. In Herschbach v Kaskaskia Sanitary District,1o and Funkhouser v Randolph," special acts creating drainage districts were held void, because no provision was made for the election or appointment of the corporate authorities in a manner approved by the people; and the earlier cases were expressly distinguished on the ground that the drainage law involved in those cases permitted the organization of a drainage district only on the petition of a majority of the land owners in the proposed district. 43 Assessments and benefits. Under this section, the General Assemoly has the power to authorize the levy of special assessments against all property in a drainage district which is benefited thereby. The constitution does not limit such assessments to assessments against lands only.12 But the assessments must not exceed the benefits, and the owner of property assessed must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question whether his property is assessed more than it is benefited." However, benefits other than those of an agricultural or sanitary nature, may be considered in spreading a special assessment.45 A district organized prior to 1878, may not levy special assessments to pay its outstanding obligations. It may levy such assessments for the construction and maintenance of new levees, drains and ditches and "to keep in repair all drains, ditches and levees heretofore constructed under the laws of this state," but that is the full extent of the power conferred.46 (See discussion article 9, section 9). Section 32. The General Assembly shall pass liberal Homestead and Exemption laws. Section 33. The General Assembly shall not appropriate out of the State treasury, or expend on account of the new capitol grounds, and construction, completion, and furnishing of the State House, a sum exceeding, in the aggregate, three and a half millions of dollars, inclusive of all appropriations heretofore made, without first submitting the proposition for an additional expenditure to the legal voters of the State, at a general election; nor unless a majority of all the votes cast at such election shall be for the proposed additional expenditure. The phrase "new capitol grounds" is not limited to such grounds as the state had at the time of the adoption of the constitution. It was intended "to cover and include all grounds belonging to the capitol without regard to when they were purchased." 40 265 Ill. 388 (1914). 41 287 Ill. 94 (1919). 2947 42 Spring Creek Drainage District v E. J. & E. Ry. Co., 249 Ill. 260 (1911). 43 Winkleman v M. & I. L. Drainage District, 170 Ill. 37 (1897); People v Whitesell, 262 Ill. 387 (1914). 44 People v Brown, 253 Ill. 578 (1912); People v Schwartz, 284 Ill. 159 (1918). 45 Commissioners of Highways v Drainage Commissioners, 127 Ill. 581, (1889); Vandalia Drainage District v Vandalia R. R. Co., 247 Ill. 114 (1910). 40 Winkleman v M. & I. L. Drainage District, 170 Ill. 37 (1897). |