further gratuitous concessions, either in lieu of the stipends, or in addition to them, in order the better to gratify the Nepaulese chiefs, and leave them in a disposition to execute and maintain the treaty when signed.

In the meantime the Raj Gooroo Gujraj Misur came down again from Khatmandoo, and signed the treaty according to the original draft. This was done at Segoulee, on the 28th of November, 1815. The Supreme government, on being apprised of the event, fired the usual salutes, and ratified the treaty on the 9th of December with due solemnity. It was determined, notwithstanding, to make the further concessions contemplated; and it was considered fortunate that the execution of the treaty without them, would yet more decidedly mark the act as a gratuitous bounty towards a fallen and suppliant foe. The conciliatory effect of the boon on the Sirdars would likewise, it was conceived, be enhanced by their not feeling themselves indebted for it to their own obstinacy, either in war or negociation.

In the confidence of its own liberal views towards the Nepaulese, the British government never doubted the sincerity of the enemy. The very earnestness of their opposition in the course of the negociation seemed to show that the acceptance of the proffered terms was the deliberate act of the Court, and though their assent was unwilling, and tardy in the extreme, still this seemed to be fully accounted for by being attributed to the reluctance with which they entered into engagements they felt to be inviolable.

Adopting this view, the Governor-General reckoned that so soon as his further intentions for the benefit of the nation should be made known, the partial discontent which existed would give place to general satisfaction, and that all parties would be thankful for the restoration of peace. In this impression, the government hesitated not to suspend the preparations which had hitherto been actively making for a second campaign; and the commissariat officers, in their zeal for economy,

went beyond the bounds of due discretion, and discharged a great part of the establishments which had been entertained for the transport of stores, selling also much of the grain which had been collected in the frontier depôts.

Of this precipitancy there was soon reason to repent. It was a stipulation of the treaty

that the ratification under the red seal should be delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw in

fifteen days. The period expired, and no ratification came; moreover, it was ascertained in the course of the month of December, that, after several very animated discussions at the Court of Khatmandoo, the war faction had again prevailed over that which favoured the Gooroo and his late negociations. Hence a renewal of hostilities was all that could be looked for, though it was of course expected to be the policy of the Nepaulese to waste as much of the season of action as possible by amusing us with fresh offers to negociate.

In order to anticipate such an attempt, and to show the serious light in which the past

conduct of the court of Khatmandoo was regarded. Sir David Ochterlony was forthwith ordered into the field, and every possible exertion was made to furnish the stores and establishments requisite to give efficiency to his army. A letter was also written to the Rajah of Nepaul complaining of his want of faith, and warning him of the approach of the British army. He was told, however, that the consequences might yet be averted, by sending the treaty, duly ratified, to meet the General in the Turai.

A word or two may be required in order to explain the motives which seemed, at this time, to influence the Nepaulese councils. The non-ratification of the treaty of Segoulee has not ordinarily been attributed to any settled plan of deceit practised on the British Government, but it must be admitted that the time of the Raj Gooroo's signing, which was just that at which the army would otherwise have taken the field, is a very suspicious circumstance. There seems reason, however, to believe

that the Raj Gooroo was himself sincere, and that the disavowal of his act was the result of a divided sentiment amongst the chiefs, part of whom strenuously advocated the necessity of accepting the terms offered, while others as violently opposed the measure.

The veteran, Umur Sing, and his sons who had recently arrived at the capital were amongst the warmest partizans of the war. Some notion of the proud spirit which actuated this chief be formed from the intercepted may letter written by him in March 1815, when he himself was closely beset on every side by the army of Sir David Ochterlony, against which he felt he could make no head. As the document is highly characteristic and shows the hopes which buoyed up the war faction in their determination to persevere rather than submit to what they deemed the first step to subjection. It may not be out of place to give it at length, though it has already been more than once before the public.