We the grandeur or extent of the Coliseum at Rome, nor ceased its fire upon the foreign policy of the government? can it even vie with the Plaza de Toros at Madrid; Is it from the conviction that it is patriotic and just? I but it is commodiously arranged with pit, boxes, and am incredulous. Is it that the old hatred of France still gallery, all open to the blue concave of the sky. survives and rankles? This may be true, but not suffiMuch of the scenery consisted of artificial trees, and cient. May it not be rather that the tories see in a quarsometimes the real ones of the promenade were rel with France, and in an alliance with the eastern brought into use. The whole edifice is surrounded powers, a policy so akin to their own, that they welcome by lofty trees, which rise far above the highest row it as an abdication of whigism? May they not see in it of spectators. The arena is the summer theatre of an ebb of that popular tide which bore liberal principles Pressburg, and is the only one open during this sea- and the lovers of liberal government to office? son of the year. In the winter it is not used, and the consult merely national interests and pride in Syria, and town theatre then takes its place. There is an ad- if the French attack us, they are in the wrong. But if vantage (if indeed it be so) that the arena possesses there be war, it cannot be a little one, either in sentiment over an in-doors theatre, which I should not omit to or in operation. A foe's hatred of constitutional France, mention that of affording an opportunity to smoke. and an ally's love of absolutist Russia, will come to blend Nearly all the gentlemen are supplied with pipes or with it, in despite of us; and the people of England, excigars, and the ladies sit and inhale the curling cited as all nations are by war and its contingencies, will clouds or incense.' The price of admittance is very lapse into that hatred to the French and to their demomoderate, being only eightpence to the first division cratic feeling which the whigs cannot share in. It reof the parterre, fivepence to the second, and to the quires good haters to make fierce and successful war. other places in proportion." At least people will think so; and they may imagine in consequence, that the tories are much fitter than the whigs for carrying on a continental war with France. I fear that all this is at the bottom of the Duke of Wellington's 'and Sir Robert Peel's tacit approbation of a policy which sets us in contrariety with France? Should not this give us pause? "GERMANIC TITLES. "Speaking of poor noblemen, the captain of the Arpad steamer told me he had a sailor amongst his crew who had that highly-prized monosyllable von' prefixed to his name, in token of his aristocratic birth. An English gentleman, or even tradesman, nay, even a mechanic, has little cause to envy many of these men of title. To illustrate how much the inhabitants of this part of the world are addicted to the use of high-sounding appellations, I may mention, that the people of my inn at Vienna wrote at the head of my bill, für seiner gnaden,' (or for his grace,') not a little to my amusement." "CHEAPNESS OF UPPER AUSTRIA. There is another reason which operates in the same way. Of all the parties which pretend to govern France, the Louis Philippist is that, certainly, most inclined to keep France within bounds of ambition and in harmony with England. Louis Philippe's throne and that of his children, cannot but be shaken by war. We know this; we know that he feels it; and we calculate, in consequence, that he will do his best, and risk even unpopularity to avoid a war. But by this policy, too, he endangers his throne. Is it fair to push the king of the French into this cruel dilemma, and to place him between the alternate menace of armed Europe on one side, and his restless people on the other. Here is a strong argument for gentleness. "In speaking of the country through which I am travelling, I must not omit to mention its cheapness. At Lambach, I supped, breakfasted, dined, supped again, and spent two nights for three shillings and sixpence English! The fare from Lambach to SalzBut how separate Louis Philippe from his spirited and burg, in that slow conveyance the stellwagen, was somewhat arrogant country? How give up Syria to four shillings and eightpence: a breakfast of coffee France, in order not to disturb the repose of Louis Phion the road cost less than threepence-halfpenny; and lippe? How submit to French dictation in transmarine my dinner amounted to eightpence, including a hand-affairs, backed by their threat of outnumbering and desome fee to the pretty handmaiden-for which, in fying our fleet? And, in fine, how back out of a solemn her simplicity, she thought the hand of the giver de-treaty, which we have signed with the other powers after six months' consideration, and of long warning to France? served a kiss." FRANCE AND SYRIA. From the Examiner of 9th August. ers. A change, however, has come over the state of things in Syria. Ibrahim Pacha has succeeded in allaying the insurrection. How or at what price does not appear very certain; nor does it yet appear whether calm or subjection have been definitely restored; but, at all [The Examiner is entirely ministerial; but its French events, it materially changes the plans of the four powcorrespondent, whose articles we copy, is independent.] tive, and the sending of another Turkish expedition idle. A blockade of the coast of Syria becomes ineffecI must own myself staggered, in common with several The divan at Constantinople refused to treat, and disliberals of my acquaintance, at the new tone assumed by missed Mehemet's envoy, solely on the ground that the the tory press with regard to the eastern policy of the four powers were to support the Syrian insurrection, and government. I am not about to question that policy. to humble the pacha; but now the four powers must It must be for the interest of England, where men of agree upon some new mode of coercion. This is not to such various opinions, and temperament, and views, as be agreed upon in a day. The divan will grow impathe members of the present cabinet where eastern affairs tient, and the efforts of France and Egypt will be exare concerned, could unite at once in a resolve which erted to induce the divan and the sultan to come to an must necessarily irritate France to enmity, if not to war. agreement with the pacha against the will of the four But whence comes it that the tory press has at once powers. It would be all very well for these if they could MUSEUM OCT. 1840. -- 24 task. delay, and hold the sword of the quadruple convention | Palmerston's speech, and drew from it the conclusion over the head of Mehemet Ali; but there is a weak point that he was not only most anxious for their alliance, and at Constantinople, where M. Pontois may resume his ready to make any concessions for it, but that he would ascendency, if the Syrian insurrection be really put at once give up the treaty and throw Austria, Prussia, down. The difficulties then remain of agreeing upon and Russia overboard, to gratify the good will or appease some coercive measures, effective without being violent, the resentment of France, without France ceding an iota. and of keeping the screw firm at Constantinople until On inquiry, however, the French found that this was not these measures be resolved and ready. This is no easy the case; that, on the contrary, our foreign secretary saw, in the maintenance and execution of the treaty, no just cause for exciting either the wordy or the warlike resistance of France; and that the four powers had seen no reason for departing from the treaty or waiving the fulfilment of its stipulations. Hence the French minisand each other. And one of them, having sung too terial journals have been obliged to correct themselves loudly the hymn of peace and satisfaction, was called to order and contradicted by a more official organ, the Mo From the Examiner of 16th August. niteur itself. A free and representative government brings too many great and manifest blessings to need their enumeration, so that the warmest liberal need not fear to pass for a maligner of such form of government in pointing out their defects. One disadvantage, certainly, is the partiThe coercive measures contemplated by the treaty of cipation of the ill-informed and inflammable mass in intricate questions of foreign policy, of which the people of the coast of Syria, which, in the event of the Syrian July the 15th consist, it is well known, of the blockade are always for cutting the Gordian knots with the sword. In England we are very exemplary in this respect; we insurrection having lasted, would have been quite suffi But even in the event are always ready to admit that government knows far cient to humble the pacha. more than any one else on such subjects, and that the of the Syrian insurrection having subsided, a permawisest way is to trust to government as long and as far nent blockade of the Syrian coast would be sufficient, as possible, without bringing in the terrible engine of the it is thought, to render Mehemet's hold of the country popular voice to impel or control it. In fact, the Eng- impossible. The Egyptian, army in Syria requires conlish are an old and experienced people in politics. The stant supplies from Egypt. Without these it must starve French are, on the contrary, a people young to freedom, and rot in Syria, or, by advancing into Asia Minor, call and so proud to possess and to use it, that they must for another mode of repression by military force, foreseen meddle and mix up their national spirit with every thing. by the treaty. Now the blockade is of all things dreadThe English have left the eastern question to the go- ed by the French government. They must either vernment. The French people,have taken their policy respect it, and by so doing run the risk of being overwith regard to the east into their own hands, and, with-thrown by public opinion, or they must break it, and by out listening to, or taking count of, any contrary argu- not to be brought to the alternative; yet brought to it so doing endanger European peace. They are desirous ments or expediency, have driven king, minister, and a chamber into a direct collision with all Europe. It is this they will be, unless some middle term, some compromise, that alarms Austria and Prussia. They see an irrational be proposed. France might be got to accept Egypt as and democratic mass bursting into the domain of diplo- hereditary-Syria for life to the pacha. The four powmacy with the sword, and rudely menacing war at the ers cannot consent to any such arrangement, for this least contradiction. Pacific England has two powers to deal would be for them to cede all, and France none. with, whose foreign policy is under not merely the conas you all are in England, I do not see the possibility of trol but the guidance of public opinion-these are France a compromise; nor do I see the possibility of not blockand the United States; and monstrously difficult has it ading; nor do I think it likely that the French will become to deal with them. When the German powers respect the blockade. All countries are driven on by a have representative governments, and Italy too, with power that none can resist. I do think that all will sucSpain awakened to its force, we shall have the menace ceed in finally avoiding the enormous absurdity of war, of war every six months, unless the Teutonic good sense but most certainly all will drive very close to the preprevail over the headlong tendencies of the Celtic Roman cipice. race. The accounts from Syria represent the only resistance to the Egyptians to have been offered by the demimountain districts, at no great distance from the sea, and between Beriout and Seide. The Deir El Kammer seems to have been the seat and nucleus of the insurrection, which not having thoroughly stirred, the fine mountainrace was easily put down. A blockade might resuscitate it at once and far more seriously. The envoy of Mehemet Ali had returned from Constantinople. Our next tidings will no doubt bring word how the pacha will receive the summons of the four powers, made by virtue of the treaty of July 15. A Parisian periodical, not illinformed, declares the pacha will be advised to make M. Thiers is beginning to be much blamed for his premature and needless appeal to the martial spirit of a population, already too much irritated and irascible. If ever there was a question for diplomacy alone to settle, it was this Syrian question. But by appealing to the masses, and trumpeting to arms, Louis Philippe and M. Thiers have abdicated their royal and ministerial lead. They have called the comitia, and referred the matter from the senate to the people. Such conduct renders it more incumbent on the rest of the European powers not to yield. It has converted a purely enstern question into one of European dignity, security, and independence. It is no longer a question, whether it was right to form counter-propositions. a league against Mehemet Ali in the first instance. The point is, whether it would not now be most pernicious to recede. There exists very little difference of opinion as to the latter point. From the Examiner of 23d August. The French government has published an account of The French were at first highly pleased with Lord the negociations which have taken place within the last ་ year on the eastern question, drawn up, it is said, by the pen of M. Mignet. Nothing can be more temperate or more clear, and if it is one-sided, this is done more by omission than by misrepresentation. Thus it passes over the important commencement of the negociation, when France joined the other powers in forbidding the porte to cede to Mehemet Ali, or treat directly with him, the five powers taking it upon them to procure the sultan better terms. Omitting this altogether, it commences after the period when France turned round, recalled Admiral Roussin, and sent another envoy, M. de Pontois, with contrary instructions-viz., to withdraw from all conference, have no connection with the envoys of the other powers, and to labour to bring about a direct accommodation between the sultan and the pacha, on such terms as the latter would be likely to cede, in order merely to conciliate the sultan. This attempt on the part of France went to erase altogether the wishes and the influence of both Russia and England in the question. It was completely setting them aside, and consequently gave rise to a considerable degree of umbrage both in London and at St. Petersburg. So much was this the case, that M. Guizot, French envoy in London, warned M. Thiers, that if he persisted in hastening an immediate arrangement between the sultan and pacha, by means of intrigues in the divan, and setting aside England and Russia, England and Russia would be forced to retaliate and set France aside. M. Thiers took no note of M. Guizot's advice, and what the latter had foretold actually happened. There is not one word of all this in M. Mignet's narrative. He begins by saying, truly enough, that England offered, on the part of the sultan, to the pacha, the hereditary possession of Egypt, and the possession for life of the southern portion of Syria bounded by Mount Carinel and the Dead Sea. Marshal Soult refused, and the English government afterwards offered to include Acre, which is outside Mount Carmel, as a frontier fortress for Mehemet. M. Thiers, who had succeeded Marshal Soult, would not hear of this; for Mehemet insisted on keeping the line of the Taurus, and not only Syria, but a province of Asia Minor, the old Cilicia, which he pleased to call "the key of his house." Mehemet's keeping the line of the Taurus implied that he was to be master of all Arabia and the course of the Euphrates, as well as of the holy cities, which M. Mignet allows to be the source of "the great moral influence in the east." In other words, by this arrangement Mehemet Ali became caliph, and the sultan a mere emir. The latter, deprived of all natural sources of strength, must henceforth be dependent on Russia, its nearest neighbour, whilst the new caliph, with his new eastern empire, extending from the Persian Gulf to the mouth of the Archipelago-for he was also to keep Candia, "the queen of the Mediterranean," was elevated, under the immediate patronage of France, into an oriental, a territorial, and maritime rival of Great Britain; a rival, too, happily posted to intercept all communication between the two extremities of the British empire. Could any state of things be more menacing or more embarrassing to a British minister? And how to negociate ? France and Egypt affected to be independent of each other. M. Mignet says, "France made no proposal whatever." True enough: and when any proposition was made to her, for instance, that of limiting Mehemet to South Syria, the French government declared that it had no objection, provided Mehemet Ali was satisfied, and provided coercive measures were not required. All that France could do was to ask Mehemet's opinion and offer him advice. There was consequently little use in negociating with France. On the other hand, Mehemet Ali was assured, that, whatever he insisted on, France would at least oppose his being coerced; consequently his best plan was to yield nothing. Thus the English negociator was pitched like a shuttlecock from France to Egypt and from Egypt to France. France declaring that she would yield nothing that the pacha did not consent to yield, and the pacha declaring that he would yield nothing at all because France would not let her be coerced. Through all this juggle it was impossible not to see that there remained for England but two alternatives. These were, either to yield every thing to France and Egypt (for to yield the line of the Taurus is to yield every thing), or to come to an agreement with the other powers of Europe, and to decide the question fairly with those who remained friends to the sultan, leaving France in the position which it had taken, that of being the uncompromising ally of Egypt. The latter plan was adopted. But France had fair warning. She knew of the first propositions of M. Brunow. She was told that they were far from being rejected, although all decision respecting them was suspended from the month of March to the month of June. M. Thiers, however, made no effort to come to a compromise. M. Bulow and the Austrian envoy had indeed some idle talk with M. Guizot, which led the latter to suppose, he says, that were France and the pacha to agree to accept Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life, Austria and Prussia would force Lord Palmerston to accept their terms. It is plain that General Bulow and Prince Esterhazy were merely sounding, after the fashion of diplomacy, what were the real instructions of M. Guizot and the ultimatum of France; and that M. Guizot allowed himself to be deceived by casual remarks, made merely for the purpose of drawing out the French envoy. The French plead that they were led to expect these proposals. If so, they were certainly never led to expect them by Lord Palmerston as a British minister; for never was statesman more resolute in his opinion, or more frank in declaring it, than our foreign minister on this occasion. M. Guizot complains, moreover, that the treaty was not signified to him for two days after its signature. This is to be regretted, for most certainly no profit and great disadvantage can accrue from a want of courtesy to such a country as France. Nor does there seem to have been any object in the delay of communicating the treaty, since it was not ratified for some time after, and seemed destined to receive no part of its execution till after ratification. The past, however, is not what is most important to consider in this business. Whichever country, France or England, really desires to have an open quarrel, there is cause and pretext enough. There has been a deviation from the alliance on both sides; and the true reason is, that the interests of the countries are diametrically opposite. France feels herself oppressed by the superior maritime force of Great Britain, and she is making a bold effort to be mistress of the whole south and east coast of the Mediterranean, from Ceuta to where the Taurus dips into the sea. She may talk of Mehemet being independent, of his making part and parcel of the Ottoman empire, and supporting its integrity; but this is all nonsense, and she knows it. The new joint empire of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, exists by French support, and cannot refuse a French command. And this empire stands astride the Red Sea and the Euphrates, now the the English scarcely at all. The French funds (their three per cents,) very nearly approached the rate of ours a fortnight back; they were upwards of 86. The other day they were down to 77, a fall of nine per cent. In England our analogous stock has been long fixed about 90; the threatening menace of French official menaces and ordonnances brought it down a quarter per cent., at most a half. We have too much equanimity for greater pulsations. This is not because we are more rich, more phlegmatic, or less given to speculation, but simply because, more guided by that common sense which proclaims the tremendous absurdity of war, we cannot bring ourselves to believe that we are serious in risking, or the French serious in menacing it. only modes of communication with the east. M. Lamar-pulse, the French have been deadly shaken by late events, tine said in January last, in the debate of the French chamber, "England will wage a war of a hundred years, and spend her last shilling, rather than suffer this." M. Lamartine knows both England and the Levant. For my part, long as I have cherished the idea of a French and English alliance, I believe this alliance impossible as long as France holds the pretensions and the views she does in the Levant. As for the views of England, she cannot waive them, for they are identical with her very existence. And France not abandoning those views, then a war, and a fierce war, with a full trial of the ma ritime strength of the two countries, becomes inevitable, sooner or later. French statesmen are fully aware of this, and no doubt regret it. They would willingly content themselves with preventing England or any power from monopolising the shores of the Mediterranean, without seeking to seize influence there for France, directly or indirectly. But public opinion in France has espoused the pacha, seeing nothing less than a Frenchman in him; and ministers and chambers, in obedience to a general opinion so vaguely founded, have not only renounced the English alliance, but converted England into a foe. In the mean time, what are the actual views of the French government? Some would have us believe that it not only contemplates war, but has fixed the point whereon it shall carry it. The treaty, signed on the 15th of July, for the settlement of the Syrian question, met with the approbation of the tory prints and leaders. This with us formed a very serious objection to the treaty, and we did not shrink from expressing it. But the tories have changed their minds, and the Times attacks Lord Palmerston and his treaty. We have, therefore, good reason to conclude that there must be something good in it, something genuinely liberal and wise. Whatever be its character, it has at least this good and singular effect, it has produced from the French government a somewhat clear explanation of its intentions and its views. Up to the time of the treaty, the French government stood, like a higgler The Post has frightened, or endeavoured to frighten, at a fair, anxious to make a bargain, but so very cunning the poor English abroad, by telling them they shall all that it would never name a price. The French governbe robbed and have their throats cut. Such a report was ment never, until August 1840, would state what condino doubt a good quiz for sending home the terrified emi- tions might content it in the affairs of the east. Unfortugrants of England; and it has had its effect, there being nately, the French government did not state these cona monstrous demand for passports. Others tell us that ditions until, the treaty having been ratified, its decisions France is preparing an expedition for some Mediterra- had been forwarded to the pacha, and the admirals of the nean islands, Candia or Minorca. It is possible. Our allied powers ordered and empowered to follow up the restless-minded neighbours will agitate a hundred pro-rejection of an offer by the pacha, by certain measures of jects; but for the present moment the views and hopes of Louis Philippe and M. Thiers are bent with much more anxiety towards Konigswart and Dresden than towards Toulon. The king of Prussia there meets Prince Metternich and others. It is, in fact, a congress of all that is at once pacific and influential in Europe, the principals two of the pacific party, whilst those powers bent on extreme resolutions are merely represented by envoys. M. Thiers is said to have proposed himself to this assembly as mediator in the eastern affair. The idea is palpably absurd for so interested a party to expect to be taken as mediator; but, however, something may come of it. We do not see how Austria or Prussia can go back from a treaty solemnly concluded. France, however, may there make final concession, more satisfactory than any she has yet ventured. Let us wait the account from Dresden ere we make up our minds to an immediate break up of the peace of Europe. coercion. Notwithstanding the forwarding of our ultimatum to Mehemet Ali, and of these orders to the fleets, great exertions have undoubtedly been made at Windsor to bring the French to some kind of understanding with the four powers. King Leopold took the matter in hand with the moderation and wisdom that have ever marked his character, and, in obedience to his suggestion, M. Guizot came over from the royal residence of Eu, with all the concessions that the French thought they could make. After several days' conference the king of the Belgians returned to his capital, M. Guizot to his town residence, whilst our ministers have scattered, as is their custom in August, in the direction of the four winds of heaven. With the exception of Lord Melbourne, who preserves his family hankering for the metropolis, all have vanished. From such pleasurable movements of statesmen after so solemn a debate on the great question of peace or war, one cannot infer that war, or any thing likely to lead to war, has been decided on. The Duke of Wellington, too, was called to this solemn council, and the voice of the veteran was said to have been not for war, It would be very false in one sense of the word, and yet for all those measures considered likely to produce withal unjust, to call the French children, there being in it. We readily believe this, there not being any very virility and courage no braver race of men. But they great consistency of late years in the duke's opinions on seem very children in their impressions; all for war to- different though connected points of policy. But what day, all for peace to-morrow; moved by every wind did M. Guizot offer? Any thing less than Syria for angry they can scarcely tell why, appeased none can say Mehemet? or any demarcation of Syria which would wherefore. They have a political tertian ague, with al-remove Mehemet from occupying those summits of the ternate fits of furious fever, and anon of ague and pros- Taurus from which a general can survey and command tration. If the Bourse can be considered as the national Asia Minor? M, Guizot, we fear, made no offer of the From the Examiner of 30th August. FRANCE AND SYRIA. kind. Had M. Guizot come to say that France thought | Molé, as well as by a large portion of the legitimists; so much sufficient for the pacha, and that in case of his and, notwithstanding the accord with which the liberal rejecting it France would sign the treaty, or a treaty, press supports the contrary opinion, there are symptoms against him, reducing him to those dimensions, and gua- already of the French public growing more enlightened ranteeing that he should conquer no more. Had the on the subject, and of its finally consenting to some fair French envoy held such language as this, the British and honourable compromise. minister would have gone very far to meet him; but M. Guizot could not go so far. The result, therefore, of the conference of Windsor has been no final agreement which immediately settles the difference; but it has produced a much better understanding, and much mutual concession and explanation with regard to final views. And this has blunted the acrimony of the quarrel. Thus the four powers are ready to take engagements as public and as solemn as may be required, that they will neither look to nor accept any territorial aggrandisement arising out of any result of their interference in this Syrian quarrel. France gains this security. And then French ministers have all along expressed no objection to Mehemet's ambition and empire being limited, provided the means employed to limit them did not excite the jealousy or susceptibility of their nation. France, therefore, cannot object to the coercive measures about to be Ministers have been forced to break silence-but only employed; measures which, we trust, will bring Mehemet Ali to his senses, without giving umbrage to to a very limited extent on the state of our foreign France, and without endangering the peace of Europe. In the mean time the question is beginning to be dis- affairs. Mr. Hume moved on Thursday evening, that "an humble address be presented to her majesty praying cussed in France with less partiality, and with some exceptions to those one-sided views and statements, which that she would graciously be pleased to direct to be laid have set the French, like a pack of hounds in full cry, before the house copies of any conventions entered into after some object of which they have a vague scent, but between the three great powers-namely, Austria, Ruswhich they cannot descry or define. M. de Lamartine sia, Prussia, and this country, with reference to the afdared to oppose the general cry, and to point out, in an fairs of Turkey." The motion, of course, was withable political essay, that there is nothing whatever to be drawn; Mr. Hume's object being simply to elicit, if posgained by the French in supporting Mehemet Ali, and sible, an explanation from Lord Palmerston. One part every thing to lose. M. Lamartine, having been in Sy- of the secretary's statement was gratifying." He could ria, has, like many persons who have visited that country, assure his honourable friend, that whatever might have returned with a strong sympathy for the anti-Mahome. been the causes of the revolt in Syria, it was in no way dan population of the mountains, and, in common with caused by the instigation of British authorities, or by the present French consul at Bey root and many others, British officers." We wish we could add that the redesires to see the mountaineers of Lebanon independent. mainder of Lord Palmerston's speech was equally satisHe confesses that they were all but independent under factory, but we cannot. He denied that there was any the Turkish rule, whilst the Egyptian has ground them disposition on the part of the government of this country to the earth by carrying away all their youth to war, to abandon the alliance or intimate connection which almost forbidding culture of the earth by over-taxation, existed with France. And he alleged in corroboration and, by monopolising commerce, leaving all those who of this statement, "that with respect to the maintenance previously lived by it to starvation. M. de Lamartine of the integrity of Turkey under the existing dynasty, might have added to this the rigorous exaction of all there never existed any difference between France and those corvées which grind an eastern population under the other powers. The French government declared in any save a pacific ruler. French writers urge that Syria the most positive manner, that it was as anxious for the and Egypt are politically united, and that the possession maintenance of the Turkish empire in its integrity as of one implies that of the other; yet they are separated the other powers." No doubt France has made this deby a desert of ten days' journey. The fact is, the pacha claration; but on the 14th of April last, M. Thiers deof Egypt, having raised a fleet and army beyond the re-clared in the chamber of peers, that if the other powers sources of Egypt itself to man and to pay, has been forced to seek for wealth and population in an adjoining province; and Syria offered itself to his ambition. As to his having civilised it, that nonsense is abandoned even by his friends; and M. de Lamartine has completely put an end to it. The same reason that has impelled the pacha to the Taurus would soon spur him beyond it; and, as he must be stopped somewhere, unless we were to sit idle spectators of a struggle between him and Russia for Ottoman supremacy, the present moment and opportunity are not to be thrown away. The opinion of M. Lamartine, viz., that France has no sufficient object in having Syria an Egyptian more than a Turkish province to warrant her going to war, is shared by Count interfered to wrest from Mehemet Ali those territories which he de facto held, France would not participate in such policy, and felt herself strong enough to hold an independent course (de s'isoler.) It is clear from this, that when France speaks of maintaining the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, something very different is meant from what Lord Palmerston means when he uses the same vague phrase. The step has been taken by the four powers, which M. Thiers declared at the tribune (adding, that the allied cabinets were fully aware of his determination) would drive France "de s'isoler." Lord Palmerston therefore conceals a part of the truth, in order to produce in others a conviction not entertained by himself, that there is no disposition on the |