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? The senate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members of its own body, not to be re-elected for that
The senate cannot throw out twice in a year the senator of the same county.
. The power of the old fenate continues for three weeks after the annual election of the county representatives. Then all the new senators are shut up in a conclave, like the cardinals; and by an intricate ballot, such as that of Venice. pr Malta, they chuse the following magistrates ; a protector, who represents the dignity of the commonwealth, and presides in the senate ; two secretaries of state ; these fix councils; a council of state ; a council of religion and learning; a council of trade; a council of laws; a council of war; a council of the admiralty; each council consisting of five persons, along with fix commissioners of the treasury, and a chief commissioner. All these must be senators. The senate also names all the ambassadors to foreign çourts, who may either be senators or not.
• The fệnațe may continue any or all of these, but must re-elect them every year.
? The protector and two secretaries have sefsion and suffrage in the council of state. The business of that council is all foreign politics. The council of state has session and fuffrage in all the other councils.
•The council of religion and learning inspects the universities and clergy. That of trade inspects every thing that may affect commercę. That of laws inspects all the abuses of laws by the inferior magistrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the municipal laws. That of war inspects the militia, and its discipline, magazines, stores, &c. and when the republic is in war, examines into the proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the same power with regard to the navy, along with the nomination of the captains and all inferior officers.
• None of these councils can give orders themselves, except where they receive fuch powers from the senate. In other cases, they must communicate every thing to the senate.
• When the senate is under adjournment, any of the councils may affemble it before the day appointed for its meeting.
Besides these councils or courts, there is another called the court of competitors, which is thus constituted. If any candidate for the office of senator have more votes than a
hird of the representatives, that candidate, which has moft votes, next to the senator elected, becomes incapable for one year of all public offices, even of being a magistrate or representative: but he takes his seat in the court of competitors. Here then is a court, which may sometimes confift of a hundred members; sometimes have no members at all; and by that means,
be for a year abolished. The court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has only the inspection of public accounts, and the accusing any man before the senate. 'If the senate ac; quit him, the court of competitors may, if they please, appeal to the people, either magistrates or representatives. Upon that appeal, the magistrates or representatives meet on the day appointed by the court of competitors, and chule in each county three persons; from which number every senator is excluded. These to the number of three hundred meet in the capital, and bring the person accused to a new trial.
• The court of competitors may propose any law to the fenate; and if refused may appeal to the people, that is to -the magistrates or representatives, who examine it in their counties. Every, fenator, who is thrown out of the senate by a vote of the court, takes his feat in the court of competitors.
The senate poffesses all the judicative authority of the house of lords ; that is, all the appeals from the inferior icourts. It likewise nominates the lord chancellor, and all the officers of the law,
Every county is a kind of republic within itself, and the representatives may make county laws; which have no authority till three months after they are voted. A copy of the law is sent to the senate, and to every other county: The senate or any single county may, at any time, annul any law of another county.
The representatives have all the authority of the British justices of the peace in trials, commitments, &c.
• The magistrates have the nomination of all the officers of the revenue in each county. All causes with regard.co the revenue are appealed ultimately to the magiftrates. They pass the accompts of all the officers; but must have all their own accompts examined and past at the end of the year by the representatives.
• The magistrates name rectors or ministers to all the parishes.
• The presbyterian government is established ; and the highest ecclesiastical court is an assembly or fynod of all the prefbyters of the county. The magistrates may take any cause from this court, and determine it themselves.
• The magistrates may try, and depose or fuspend any presbyter.
« The militia is established in imitation of that in Switzerland, which being well known, we shall not insist upon it. 'Twill only be proper to make this addition, that an army of twenty thousand be annually drawn out by rotation, paid and encamp'd during fix weeks in summer; that the duty of a camp may not be altogether unknown.
The magistrates nominate all the colonels and down wards. The senate all upwards. During war, the general nominates the colonel and downwards, and his commission is good for a twelvemonth. But after that it must be confirmed by the magistrates of the county to which the regiment belongs. The magistrates may break any officer in the county regiment. And the senate may do the same to any officer in the service. If the magistrates do not think proper to confirm the general's choice, they may nominate another officer in the place of him they reject.
• All crimes are tried within the county by the magistrates and a jury. But the senate can stop any trial, and bring it before themselves,
* Any county may indict any man before the senate, for
The protector, the two secretaries, the council of state, with any five more that the senate appoints, on extraordinary emergencies, are poffest of dictatorial power for fix months.
« The protector may pardon any person condemned by the inferior courts.
In the time of war, no officer of the army, that is in the field, can have any civil office in the commonwealth.
• The capital, which we shall call London, may be allowed four members in the senate. It may therefore be divided into four counties. The representatives of each of these chuse one senator, and ten magistrates. There are therefore in the city four senators, forty-four magistrates, and four hundred representatives. The magistrates have the fame authority as in the counties. The representatives also have the same authority ; but they never meet in one general court: they give their votes in their particular county or division of hundreds.
When they enact any city law, the greatest number of counties or divisions determines the matter. And where these are equal, the magistrates have the casting vote.
• The magistrates chuse the mayor, sheriffs, recorder, and other officers of the city.
• In the commonwealth, no representative, magistrate, or fenator, as such, has any salary. The protector, fecretaries, councils, and ambasladors have falaries.
The first year in every century is set apart to correct all inequalities, which time may have produced in the reprefentation. This must be done by the legislature.'
The reason of these orders our author explains in some political aphorisms, after which he mentions the chief alteTations, that could be made on the British government, in order to bring it to the most perfect model of limited monarchy: and they are these following: • Firft,' says he, * the plan of the republican parliament ought to be restored, by making the representation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county elections who possess not a hundred a year. Secondly, as such a house of commons would be too weighty for a frail house of lords, like the present, the bishops and Scotch peers ought to be removed, whose behaviour in former parliaments, destroyed intirely the authority of that house : the number of the upper house ought to be raised to three or four hundred ; their feats not hereditary, but during life : they ought to have the election of their own members; and no commoner should be allowed to refuse a seat, that was offered him. By this means, the house of lords would confift intirely of the men of chief credit, ability, and interest of the nation ; and every turbulent leader in the house of commons might be taken off, and connected in interest with the house of peers. Such an Aristocracy would be an excellent barrier both to the monarchy and against it. At present, the ba* lance of our government depends, in some measure, on the ability and behaviour of the sovereign; which are variable and uncertain circumstances,
I allow, that this plan of limited monarchy, however. corrected, is still liable to three great inconveniences. Fir/, it removes not intirely, though it may foften, the parties of court and country. Secordly, the king's personal character must still have a great influence on the government. Thirdly, the sword is in the hands of a fingle person, who will always neglect to discipline the militia, in order to have a pretext for keeping up a fanding army, 'Tis evident,
that this is a mortal distemper in the British government, of which it must at laft inevitably perish. I muft, however, confess that Sweden seems, in fome measure to have remedied this inconvenience, and to have a militia, along with its limited monarchy, as well as a standing army, which is lefs dangerous than the British."
He concludes with shewing the fallhood of the common opinion, that no large ftate, such as France or Britain, could ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form of government can only take place in a city or small territory
ART. XII. A Treatise concerning the MILITIA, in fourz,
Sections. 1. Of the Militia in general. 2. Of the Roman Militia. 3. The proper Plan of a Militia for this Country. 4. Obfervations upon this plan. By C. S. 8vo.
IS. Millan. W
trifling away their time and their fortunes in idle diffipations, in fenfual enjoyments, or irrational diversions, and making meer amusement the grand businefs of life; we have the satisfaction to find, that there are still left among us, men of rank and distinction, whose manlier pursuits, and fuperior conduct, may convince the rest of mankind, that greatness and diffoluteness, are not always the fame things; and that to poslefs titles and affluence, and the favours of a court, is not incompatible with fobriety of manners, and a due regard to our country: that the accomplishments of the fine gentleman, and the politeness of the courtier, do not necessarily exclude the more ferious and ufeful studies. Of this, several late instances might be pointed out; but let it füffice that we here only mention the noble author of this fmall treatife, which is equally a proof of his publick fpirited difpofition, and political abilities. In it we have a fcheme for a national Militia; which every lover of his country cannot but thank him for,
as being intended to fecure our liberties at home and make us respected abroad: tho' perhaps, if carried into execution, it might be found liable to the same objection with Mr. Hume's plan for a limitted monarchy, as too much depending on the ability and behaviour of the Sovereign.
In the first section there are several judicious reflections on standing armies, and the necessity of having a well