would be, the attraction of an equal fum from all the neighbouring kingdoms, Nor does there feem to be any neceffary bounds fet, by the nature of things, to this practice of hoarding. A fmall city, like Geneva, continuing this policy for ages, might engrofs nine tenths of the money of Europe. There feems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invincible obftacle to that immenfe growth of riches. A weak ftate, with an enormous treafure, would foon become a prey to fome of its poorer but more powerful neighbours. A great ftate would diffipate its wealth on dangerous and ill-concerted projects; and probably destroy, along with it, what is much more valuable, the industry, morals, and numbers of its people. The fluid, in this cafe, raised to too great a height, burfts and deftroys the vessel that contains it; and mixing itself with the furrounding element, foon falls to its proper level.'

After producing a variety of inftances of vast sums amaffed by particular perfons and ftates, towards the clofe of this difcourfe he proceeds in the following manner. From thefe principles we may learn what judgment we ought to form of thofe numberless bars, obftructions and impofts, which all nations of Europe, and none more than England, have put upon trade; from an exorbitant defire of amaffing money, which never will heap up beyond its level, while it circulates; or from an ill grounded apprehenfion of lofing their fpecie, which never will fink below it. Could any thing fcatter our riches, 'twould be fuch impolitic contrivances. But this general ill effect, however, refults from them, that they deprive neighbouring nations of that free. communication and exchange, which the author of the world has intended, by giving them foils, climates and geniufes, fo different from each other."

The greatest part of our author's fixth discourse, in which he treats of the balance of power, is taken up with fhewing, that the idea of it is not entirely owing to modern policy. He produces a variety of inftances from antiquity to prove that the antients were not ignorant of it, and tells us that whoever will read Demofthenes's oration for the Megalopolitans, may fee the utmoft refinements on the balance of power, that ever entered into the head of a Venetian or English speculift.

Towards the clofe of this difcourfe he makes feveral observations on our national character and conduct, which we fhall prefent our Readers with in his own words. • Europe

has

has now, fays he, for above a century, remained on the defenfive against the greatest force, that eerr, perhaps, was formed by the civil or political combination of mankind. And fuch is the influence of the maxim here treated of, that tho' that ambitious nation, in the five laft general wars, have been victorious in four (thofe concluded by the peace of the Pyrenees, Nimeguen, Ryfwick, and Aix-laChapelle) and unfuccefsful only in one, (that concluded by the peace of Utrecht) they have not much enlarged their dominions, nor acquired a total afcendant over Europe. On the contrary, there remain ftill fome hopes of maintaining the refiftance fo long, that the natural revolutions of human affairs, together with unforeseen events and accidents, may guard us against universal monarchy, and preferve the world from fo great an evil.

In the three last of these general wars, Britain has ftood foremost in the glorious ftruggle; and fhe ftill maintains her ftation, as guardian of the general liberties of Europe, and patron of mankind. Befide her advantages of riches and fituation, her people are animated with such a national fpirit, and are fo fully fenfible of the ineftimable bleffings of their government, that we may hope their vigour never will languish in fo neceffary and fo juft a caufe. On the contrary, if we may judge by the past, their paffionate ardour feems rather to require fome moderation; and they have oftner erred from a laudable excess than from a blameable deficiency.

In the first place, we seem to have been more poffeft with the antient Greek fpirit of jealous emulation, than actuated with the prudent views of modern politics. Our wars with France have been begun with justice, and even, perhaps, from neceffity; but have always been too far pushed, from obftinacy and paffion. The fame peace, which was afterwards made at Ryfwick in 1697, was offered so early as the ninety-two; that concluded at Utrecht in 1712 might have been finished on as good conditions at Gertruytenberg in the eight; and we might have given at Frankfort, in 1743, the fame terms, which we were glad to accept of at Aix-la-Chapelle in the forty-eight. Here then we fee, that above half our wars with France, and all our public debts are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbours.

In the fecond place, we are so declared in our oppofition to French power, and fo alert in defence of our allies, that

they

they always reckon upon our force as upon their own; and expecting to carry on war at our expence, refufe all Habent fubje&tos,

reasonable terms of accommodation.

tanquam fuos ; viles, ut alienos. All the world knows, that the factious vote of the house of commons, in the beginning of the laft parliament, along with the profest humour of the nation, made the queen of Hungary inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with Prussia, which would immediately have restored the general tranquillity of Europe.

In the third place, we are fuch true combatants, that when once engaged, we lofe all concern for ourselves and our pofterity, and confider only how we may best annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues at fo deep a rate, in wars, where we were only acceffaries, was furely the most fatal delufion, that a nation, who had any pretenfions to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That remedy of funding, if it be a remedy, and not rather a poifon, ought, in all reason, to be referved to the laft extremity; and no evil, but the greatest and most urgent, fhould ever induce us to embrace fo dangerous an expedient.

Thefe exceffes, to which we have been carried, are prejudicial and may, perhaps, in time, become ftill more prejudicial another way, by begetting, as is ufual, the oppofite extreme, and rendring us totally carelefs and fupine with regard to the fate of Europe. The Athenians, from the most bustling, intriguing, warlike people of Greece, finding their error in thrusting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs; and in no contest ever took party on either fide, except by their flat teries and complaifance to the victor.

• ENORMOUS monarchies, such as Europe, at present, is in danger of falling into, are, probably, deftructive to hu man nature; in their progrefs, in their continuance, and even in their downfall, which never can be very distant from their establishment. The military genius, which aggrandized the monarchy, foon leaves the court, the capital, and the center of fuch a government; while the wars are carried on at a great diftance, and intereft fo fmall a part of the ftate. The ancient nobility, whofe affections attach them to their fovereigns, live all at court, and never will accept of military employments, which would carry them to remote and barbarous frontiers, where they are diftant both from their pleasure and their fortune. The arms of the state muft, therefore, be trufted to mercenary VOL. VI. ftrangers,

D

ftrangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour; ready on every occafion to turn them, against the prince, and join each desperate malcontent, who offers to pay and plunder. This is the neceffary progrefs of human affairs; thus human nature checks itself in its airy elevations thus ambition blindly labours for the deftruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear to him. The Bourbons trufting to the support of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would push their advantage, without referve or limitation. Thefe, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues and dangers of war; but never would submit to languifh in the garrifons of Hungary or Lithuania, forgot at court, and facrificed to the intrigues of every minion or mistress, that approaches the prince. The troops are filled with Croats and Tartars, Huffars and Coffacks; intermingled, perhaps, with a few foldiers of fortune from the better provinces: And the melancholy fate of the Roman emperors, from the fame caufes, is renewed, over and over again, 'till the final diffolution of the monarchy.'

After a very short discourse on taxes, our author proceeds to treat of public credit; in entring upon which fubject, he obferves, that it was the common practice of antiquity, to make provision in time of peace, for the neceffities of war, and to hoard up treafures beforehand, as the inftruments either of conqueft or defence, without trufting to extraordinary impofts, much lefs to borrowing in times of diforder and confufion: but that on the contrary, the modern expedient is, to mortgage the public revenues, and to truft that pofterity, during peace, will pay off the incumbrances, contracted during the preceeding war. After fhewing that the ancient maxims were, in this refpect, much more prudent than the modern, he proceeds to examine the confequences of public debts, both in our domeftic management, by their influence on commerce and induftry, and in our foreign tranfactions, by their effects on wars and negotiations.

He mentions two circumstances, arifing from our national debts, that have a favourable influence on commerce and industry; the firft is, that they furnish merchants with a fpecies of money, that is continually multiplying in their hands, and produces fure gains, befides the profits of their commerce; that this must enable them to trade upon lefs profit; that the fmall profit of the merchant renders.

the

the commodity cheaper, caufes a greater confumption, quickens the labour of the common people, and helps to fpread arts and industry through the whole fociety. The fecond is, that more men with large ftocks and incomes may naturally be supposed to continue in trade, where there are public debts; which is of fome advantage to commerce, by diminishing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging industry.

But in oppofition, fays he, to these two favourable circumftances, perhaps of no very great importance; weigh the many difadvantages, that attend our public debts, in the whole interior œconomy of the ftate: will find you no comparison betwixt the ill and the good that refult from

them.

First, 'tis certain, that national debts caufe a mighty confluence of people and riches to the capital, by the great fums, which are levied on the provinces, to pay the intereft of those debts, and perhaps too, by the advantages in trade above-mentioned, which they give the merchants in the capital above the reft of the kingdom. The queftion is, whether, in our cafe, it be for the public intereft, that fo many privileges fhould be conferred on Londor, which has already arrived at fuch an enormous fize, and seems still encreafing. Some men are apprehenfive of the confequences. For my part, I cannot forbear thinking, that though the head is undoubtedly too big for the body, yet that great city is fo happily fituated, that its exceffive bulk caufes lefs inconvenience, than even a smaller capital to a greater kingdom. There is more difference betwixt the prices of all provifions in Paris and Languedoc than be twixt thofe in London and Yorkshire.

Secondly, Public ftocks being a kind of public credit, have all the difadvantages attending that fpecies of money. They banish gold and filver from the most confiderable commere of the ftate, reduce them to common circulation, and by that means render all provifions and labour dearer than otherwise they would be.

Thirdly, The taxes which are levied to pay the interefts of thefe debts, are a check upon industry, heighten the price of labour, and are an oppreffion on the poorer fort.

Fourthly, As foreigners poffefs a fhare of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occafion the transport of our people and our industry.

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Fifthly,