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Inceptive Present.

Míλaw ypaqew. Scripturus fum. I am going to write.

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Middle or extended Present.

Τυγχάνω γράφων.

Scribo or Scribens fum. I am writing, Completive Present.

Teypapa. Scripfi. I have written.

Inceptive Paft.

Ἔμελλον γράφειν. Scripturus eram,

I was beginning to

write.

Middle or extended Paft.

Ἔγραφον οι ἐτύγχανον γράφων. Scribebam. I was writing. Completive Paft.

'Eysypape. Scripferam. I had done writing.

Inceptive Future.

Meλańow yapsın. Scripturus ero. I shall be beginning

to write.

Middle or extended Future.

"Ecoμas ypaQwv. Scribens ero. I fhall be writing. Completive Future.

"Ecoμal yeypapu's. Scripfero. I fhall have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above hypothefis fhould be juftified through all inftances in every language. It fares with Tenfes, as with other affections of fpeech; be the language upon the whole ever fo perfect, much must be left, in defiance of all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere Authority and Chance.'

Our author, having finished, in his first book, those principal parts of fpeech the fubftantive and the attributive, proceeds in his fecond to treat of definitives and connectives. Definitives, he tells us, are either articular or pronominal; and connectives, either prepofitions or conjunctions: all these he

confiders

confiders at full length. With regard to interjections, he fays, they coincide with no part of speech, but are either utter'd alone, or elfe thrown into a fentence, without altering its form, either in fyntax or fignification. To those who afk, What are they? he anfwers, Not fo properly parts of speech, as adventitious founds; certain voices of nature, rather than voices of art, expreffing those paffions and natural emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human foul, upon the view or narrative of interesting events. This book is closed with answers to those who afk, What is the utility of such enquiries? Our author fhews, that there is a pleasure in fcience itself, diftinct from any end, to which it may be farther conducive; and that every exercise of the mind upon theorems of science, like generous and manly exercise of the body, tends to call forth and ftrengthen nature's original vigour. Be the fubject itself, fays he, immediately lucrative or not, the nerves of reafon are braced by the mere employ, and we become abler actors in the drama of life, whether our part be of the bufier, or of the fedater kind'.

In the third Book he confiders language with a view to its matter and form. Its matter, fays he, is recogniz'd, when 'tis confidered as a voice; its form, as 'tis fignificant of our feveral ideas: fo that upon the whole it may be defined A Syftem of articulate voices, the Symbols of our Ideas, but of those principally, which are general or univer fal!

1-1

After this he proceeds to enquire by what process we come to perceive general Ideas. Man's first perceptions, fays he, are those of the Senfes, in as much as they commence from his earlieft infancy. These perceptions, if not infinite, are at least indefinite, and more fleeting and tranfient than the very objects which they exhibit, because they not only depend upon the existence of thofe objects, but because they cannot fubfift, without their immediate presence. Hence therefore it is, that there can be no fenfation of either Paft or Future; and confequently, had the foul no other faculties than the Senfes, it never could acquire the least idea of Time.

'But happy for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a faculty, called Imagination or fancy, which however as to its energies it may be fubfequent to Senfe, yet is truly prior to it both in dignity and use. This 'tis which retains the fleeting forms of things, when Things themselves are gone, and all Senfation at an end.

• That

That this faculty, however connected with Senfe, is ftill perfectly different, may be feen from hence. We have an Imagination of things, that are gone and extin&t; but no fuch things can be made objects of Senfation. We have an easy command over the objects of our Imagination, and call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our Sensations are neceffary, when their objects are present, nor can we controul them, but by removing either the objects, or ourselves.

'As the wax would not be adequate to its business of fignature, had it not a power to retain, as well as to receive; the fame holds of the Soul, with refpect to Senfe and Imagination. Senfe is its receptive power; Imagination its retentive. Had it Senfe without Imagination, 'twould not be as wax, but as water, where, tho' all impreffions may be inftantly made, yet as soon as made they are instantly loft.

Thus then, from a view of the two powers taken together, we may callSenfe (if we please) a kind of tranfient Imagination; and Imagination, on the contrary, a kind of permanent Sense.

'Now, as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the ri ́ver, till the froft bind the current, and harden the yielding furface; fo does the Soul in vain seek to exert its higher powers, the powers I mean of Reafon and Intellect, till Imagination first fix the fluency of Senfe, and thus provide a proper bafis for the fupport of its higher energies.

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"After this manner, in the admirable economy of the whole, are Natures fubordinate made fubfervient to the higher. Were there no Things external, the Senfes could not operate; were there no Senfations, the Imagination could not operate; and were there no Imagination, there could be neither Reasoning, nor Intellection, such at least as they are found in Man, where they have their Intenfions and Remiffions in alternate fucceffion, and are at first nothing better than a mere Capacity or Power. Whether every Intellect begins thus, may be perhaps a question; efpecially if there be any one of a nature more divine, to which In• tenfion and Remiffion and mere Capacity are unknown.' But not to digress.

'Tis then on these permanent phantasms that the human Mind first works, and by an energy as fpontaneous and familiar to its nature, as the feeing of colours is familiar to the eye, it difcerns at once what in many is one; what in things diffimilar and different is fimilar and the fame. By this it comes to behold a kind of fuperior objects; a new race of perceptions, more comprehenfive than those of

Senfe ;

Senfe; a race of perceptions, each one of which may be found intire and whole in the feparate individuals of an infinite and fleeting multitude, without departing from the unity and per"manence of its own nature.

And thus we see the Process by which we arrive at general Ideas; for the perceptions here mentioned are in fact no other. In these two we perceive the objects of Science and real Knowledge, which can by no means be, but of that which is general, and definite, and fixt. Here too even Individuals, however of themselves unknowable, become objects of Knowledge, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may any particular be faid to be known, when, by afferting it to be a man, or an animal, or the like, we refer it to fome fuch comprehenfive or general Idea.

Now, 'tis of thefe comprehenfive and permanent Ideas, the genuine Perceptions of pure Mind, that Words of all Languages, however different, are the Symbols. And hence it is, that as the Perceptions include, so da thefe their Symbols exprefs, not this or that fet of Particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur. Were therefore the inhabitants of Salisbury to be transferred to York, tho' new particular objects would appear on every fide, they would still no more want a new language to explain themselves, than they would want new Minds to comprehend what they beheld. All indeed that they would want would be the local proper names; which names, as we have faid already, are hardly a part of language, but muft equally be learnt both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode.

"Tis upon the fame principles we may perceive the reafon, why the dead languages (as we call them) are now intelligible; and why the language of modern England is able to describe antient Rome; and that of antient Rome to defcribe modern England.'

Having taken a view of the procefs, by which we acquire general Ideas, our author endeavours next to discover whence 'tis they originally come, and what kind of beings they are. Here he has feveral oblique reflexions on our modern Metaphyficians, who derive our Ideas from Senfation, &c. tho', if we rightly apprehend his meaning, the difference between him and them is not very great, and rather verbal than real.

In the laft chapter of this book he treats of the fubordination of Intelligence, the different genius of different Languages, &c. hear what he says.

1

• Original

Original Truth, having the most intimate connection with the fupreme Intelligence, may be faid (as it were) to fhine with unchangeable fplendour, enlightening throughout the universe every poffible fubject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence. Paffions and other obftacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obfcure the fun; but itself neither admits diminution nor change, because the darkness respects only particular percipients. Among thefe therefore we must look for ignorance and error, and for that fubordination of Intelligence, which is their natural confequence.

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We have daily experience in the works of Art, that a partial knowledge will fuffice for contemplation, tho' we know not enough, to profefs ourfelves artifts. Much more is this true, with respect to Nature; and well for mankind is it found to be true, elfe never could we attain any natural knowledge at all. For if the conftitutive proportions of a clock are so fubtle, that few conceive them truly, but the artift himself; what fhall we fay to thofe feminal proportions which make the effence and character of every natural fubject? Partial views, the imperfections of Senfe; inattention, idleness, the turbulence of paffions; education, local fentiments, opinions, and belief, confpire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, fome too general, fome too partial, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are erroneous, and contrary to truth. Thefe it behoves us to correct as far as poffible, by cool fufpenfe, and candid examination.

--

Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνησ' ἀπιτεῖν, ἄρθρὰ ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν.

And thus, by a connection perhaps little expected, the cause of Letters and that of Virtue appear to coincide, it being the business of both to examine our Ideas, and to amend them by the ftandard of Nature and of Truth.

In this important work, we shall be led to obferve, how Nations, like fingle Men, have their peculiar Ideas; how thefe peculiar Ideas become the Genius of their Language, fince the Symbol muft of courfe correfpond to its Archetype; how the wifeft nations, having the most and best Ideas, will confequently have the best and most copious Lauguages; how others, whofe languages are motly and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different arts and practices, difcover by Words, to whom they are indebted for Things.

To illuftrate what has been faid, by a few examples. We Britons in our times have been remarkable borrowers,

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