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131 These affertions therefore being admitted, and both Points and Nows being taken as bounds, but not as parts, it will follow, that in the fame manner as the fame Point may be the end of one line, and the beginning of another, fo the Jame Now or Inftant may be the end of one time, and the beginning of another. Let us fuppofe, for example, the lines A B, BC.

B

A

I fay that the point B, is the end of the line A B, and the beginning of the line BC. In the fame manner let us fuppofe A B, BC to represent certain times, and let B be a now or inftant. In fuch cafe I fay that the inftant B is the end of the time A B, and the beginning of the time BC. I fay likewife of these two times, that with respect to the now or inftant, which they include, the first of them is neceffarily Paft Time, as being previous to it; the other is neceffarily Future, as being fubfequent. As therefore every Now or Inftant always exifts in time, and without being time, is Time's bound; the bound of completion to the Paft, and the bound of commencement to the Future; from `hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is to be the Medium of continuity between the Paft and the Future, fo as to render Time, through all its parts, one intire and perfect whole.

From the above speculations, there follow fome conclufions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively confider'd. In the first place, there cannot (ftrictly speaking) be any fuch thing as Time prefent. For, if all time be tranfient as well as continuous, it cannot like a line be prefent altogether, but part will neceffarily be gone, and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be prefent at once, it would fo far quit its tranfient nature, and be time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus prefent, how can time poffibly be prefent, to which fuch continuity is essential?

Farther than this - If there can be no fuch thing as time prefent, there can be no Senfation of time by any one of the fenfes. For all Senfation is of the Prefent only, the Paft being preferved not by fenfe but by memory, and the Future being anticipated by prudence only and wife forefight.

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• But

But if no portion of time be the object of any fenfation; farther, if the Prefent never exift; if the Paft be no more'; if the Future be not as yet; and if thefe are all the parts, out of which Time is compounded: how ftrange and fhadowy a being do we find it? how nearly approaching to a perfect non-entity? Let us try however, fince the fenfes fail us, if we have no faculties of higher power, to feize this fleeting being.

The world has been likened to a variety of things; but appears to resemble no one more, than fome moving spectacle (fuch as a proceffion or a triumph) that abounds in every part with fplendid objects, fome of which are still departing, as faft as others make their appearance. The fenfes look on, while the fight paffes, perceiving as much as is immediately prefent, which they report with tolerable accuracy to the foul's fuperiour powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, fave what is present and instantaneous. But to the memory, to the imagination, and above all to the intellect, the feveral nows or inftants are not loft, as to the fenfes, but are preserved and made objects of Steady comprehension, however in their own nature they may be tranfitory and paffing. "Now 'tis from contemplating two or more of "these Inftants under one view, together with that inter"val of continuity, which fubfifts between them, that we

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acquire infenfibly the idea of Time." For example: The fun rifes; this I remember: it rifes again; this too I remember. These events are not together; there is an extenfion between them not however of space, for we may fuppofe the place of rifing the fame, or at leaft to exhibit no fenfible difference : yet ftill we recognize fome extension between them. Now what is this extenfion, but a natural day? and what is that but pure time? 'Tis after the fame manner, by recognizing two new moons, and the extenfion between thefe; two vernal equinoxes, and the extenfion between these; that we gain ideas of other times, fuch as months and years, which are all fo many intervals, defcribed as above that is to fay, passing intervals of continuity between two Inftants viewed together.

And thus 'tis the Mind acquires the idea of Time. But this Time it must be remember'd is Paft Time only, which is always the firft fpecies that occurs to the human intellect.

How then do we acquire the idea of Time Future? The anfwer is, We acquire it by Anticipation. Should it be de-, manded ftill farther, And what is Anticipation? We an

fwer,

fwer, That, in this cafe, 'tis a kind of reafoning by analogy from fimilar to fimilar; from fucceffions of events, that are paft already, to fimilar fucceffions, that are prefumed hereafter. For example: I obferve, as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been fucceeded by a night; that night by another day; that day, by another night; and fo downwards, in order, to the day that is now. Hence then I anticipate a fimilar fucceffion from the present day, and thus gain the ideas of days and nights in futurity. After the fame manner, by attending to the periodical returns of new and full moons; of fprings, fummers, autumns, and winters, all of which in time past I find never to have failed, I anticipate a like orderly and diverfify'd fucceffion, which makes months, and feasons, and years, in time future.

We go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in thefe natural periods, but even in matters of human and civil concern. For example: having obferved in many past inftances how health hath fucceeded to exercise, and fickness to floth; we anticipate future health to thofe, who, being now fickly, use exercise; and future fickness to thofe, who, being now healthy, are flothful. 'Tis a variety of fuch ob fervations, all refpecting one subject, which, when systematized by just reasoning, and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a master-artift, or man of practical wisdom. If they respect the human body (as above) they form the Physician; if matters military, the General; if matters national, the Statesman; if matters of private life, the Moralift; and the fame in other fuhjects. All these feveral characters, in their respective ways, may be faid to poffefs a kind of prophetic difcernment, which not only prefents them the barren profpect of futurity (a profpect not hid from the meaneft of men) but fhews withal thofe events which are likely to attend it, and thus enables them to act with superior certainty and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we except thofe, who have had divine affiftances) we may juftly fay, as was faid of old,

He's the best prophet, who conjectures well.

From what has been reasoned it appears, that knowledge of the future comes from knowldge of the past; as does knowledge of the past from knowledge of the prefent: so that their order to us is that of Prefent, Paft, and Future.

"Of thefe fpecies of knowledge, that of the Prefent is the loweft, not only as firft in perception, but as far the more extenfive,

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extenfive, being neceffarily common to all animal beings, and reaching even to zoophites, as far as they poffefs fenfation. Knowledge of the Paft comes next, which is fuperior to the former, as being confined to thofe animals. that have memory as well as fenfes. Knowledge of the Future comes laft, as being derived from the other two; and which is, for that reafon, the most excellent, as well as the most rare, fince Nature in her fuperadditions rifes from worfe always to better, and is never found to fink from better down to worse.

And now, having feen how we acquire the knowledge of Time paft, and Time future; which is firft in perception, which firft in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to the prefent Now or Inftant, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

In the first place there may be Times both past and future, in which the prefent Now has no existence; as, for example, in Yesterday and To-morrow.

'Agen, the prefent Now may fo far belong to Time of either fort, as to be the end of the past, and the beginning of the future; but it cannot be included within the limits of either. For if it were poffible, let us fuppofe C the prefent

A

B

C

E

Now included within the limits of the past time AD. In fuch cafe CD, part of the past time AD, will be fubfequent to C the prefent Now, and fo of course be future. But by the hypothefis it is past, and fo will be both paft and future at once, which is abfurd. In the fame manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a future time, fuch as BE.

• What then shall we fay of fuch times, as this day, this month, this year, this century, all which include with them the prefent Now? They cannot be past times or future, from what has been proved; and prefent time has no existence, as has been proved likewife. Or fhall we allow them to be prefent, from the prefent now which exists within them; fo that from the prefence of that we call these alfo prefent, tho' the shortest among them has infinite parts always abfent? If fo, and in conformity to cuftom, we allow fuch times prefent, as prefent days, months, years, and centuries, each muft of neceffity be a compound of the Paft and the Future, divided from each other by fome prefent Now or Inftant, and jointly called Prefent, while that

Now

Now remains within them. Let us fuppofe, for example, the time X Y, which let us call a day, or a century; and XA B B C Ꭰ E Y

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f let the prefent Now or Inftant exift at A. I fay, in as much as A exifts within X Y, that therefore X A is Time paft, and AY Time future, and the whole X A, A'Y, Time prefent. The fame holds, if we fuppofe the prefent Now to exift at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where before Y. When the prefent Now exifts at Y, then is the whole XY Time past, and still more fo when the Now gets to g, or onwards. In like manner before the present Now enter'd X, as for example, when it was at f, then was the whole X Y Time future; 'twas the fame, when the present Now was at X. When it had past that, then XY became Time prefent. And thus 'tis that Time is prefent, while paffing, in its prefent Now or Inftant. 'Tis the fame indeed here, as it is in fpace. A fphere paffing over a plane, and being for that reafon present to it, is only present to that plane in a single point at once, while during the whole progreffion its parts abfent are infinite.

From what has been faid we may perceive that all Time, of every denomination, is divifible and extended. But if fo, then whenever we fuppofe a definite time, even though it be a time prefent, it must needs have a beginning, a middle, and an end. And so much for Time.

6 Now from the above doctrine of Time, we propose by way of hypotheses the following theorie of Tenfes,

The Tenfes are ufed to mark Prefent, Paft, and Future Time, either indefinitely, without reference to any Beginning, Middle, or End; or elfe definitely, in reference to fuch diftinctions.

If indefinitely, then have we three Tenfes, an Aorift of the Prefent, an Aorift of the Paft, and an Aorift of the Fu-. If definitely, then we have three Tenfes to mark the Beginnings of these three Times; three, to denote their Middles; and three to denote their Ends; in all Nine.

ture.

"The three firft of thefe Tenfes we call the Inceptive Prefent, the Inceptive Paft, and the Inceptive Future. The three next, the Middle Prefent, the Middle Paft, and the Middle Future. And the three laft, the Completive Prefent, the Completive Paft, and the Completive Future.

And thus 'tis, that the Tenfes in their natural number appear to be twelve; three to denote Time abfolute, and nine to denote it under its respective distinctions.

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