ing, called revenge, constitute the crime termed murder? Our Lord says, if a man look on a woman, and lust after her, he hath committed adultery with her in his heart already. What is this lust, but a desire for the commission of the sinful act? This our Lord calls adultery. Indeed, the more any person attends to this subject, the more he will be convinced, that no operations of the mind are sinful or holy, but those which are termed the affections and passions. And these, it has been shown, are the operations of the heart. They have a full and complete existence, antecedent to those operations which I call volitions.

Of course our volitions cannot be considered as vicious or virtuous, any more than the operations of the understanding can be viewed in this light.

There are two reasons, why vice and virtue are seated in the heart or affections, and not in volitions. 1. The heart or taste with its affections are the primary principle of action. All the actions may be traced back to the heart, as the primary fountain from which they proceed; and they cannot be traced back any further, or to any antecedent principle of action in a moral agent. From the heart all good and evil proceed. The moral character of man, then, is just what his heart is. 2. The will is only an executive faculty. It is no more than a servant to the heart, to execute its pleasure. The will is no primary principle of action; its office is to obey the commands of the heart. Accordingly, for all the good or evil produced by the will, the heart only is praise or blame worthy; or every moral agent is to be blamed or praised, on account of the good or evil heart in him.

Hence no one need be surprised at the sentiment advanced. For the more he reflects upon it, the more he will be convinced it is correct, and accords with the word of God.

This will appear more evident to any candid person, if he duly considers the end to be answered by our voluntary exertions. These exertions are made to gratify the feelings, or affections of the heart. The man, who has revenge or murder in his heart, makes exertions, and employs his bodily powers, to put an end to the life of his victim. What is the design of all those motions and effects, produced by the will, but to gratify his revenge? This is the great design of all our volitions, to produce those external effects necessary to gratify our affections and passions.

Now is there not a generic difference, between those opera tions which are sinful or holy, and those which are neither vicious or virtuous? There can be no operations of the mind, between which there is a more essential difference in their very nature or kind. And it is perfectly unphilosophical, and serves only to confuse us in our investigations, to class those operations together, which have a generic difference. Our volitions then are operations, which cannot be classed with the affections, nor be considered as operations of the heart. They, therefore, form a third general class of operations. They are not operations of the understanding; for there is no likeness between them and perceptions. And for the same reason, they cannot be considered as the operations of the They must, therefore, be referred to the will. the operations of this faculty, and of no other. class does not admit of any subdivisions into specific classes. For every volition is designed to answer the same purpose; which is, the production of those effects, which are necessary to obtain the objects of the affections. The will is a servant to the heart. It is given to execute its wishes, and put it in possession of those objects, which gratify and satiate its feelings. As every voluntary exertion answers the same purpose, one volition does not specifically differ from another. course this general class of operations is not divisible into any specific classes.

taste or heart. Volitions are This general

Of

Some have attempted to account for the manifest difference, which exists between our affections and volitions, by making a distinction between immanent and imperate acts of the will. By immanent acts they mean, if I understand them, what I call the affections and passions. And by imperate acts, those operations which I call volitions. They therefore consider those immanent and imperate acts to be operations of the same faculty, called the will, But from what has been said, it is evident, this is classing those operations together, which generically differ from each other.

Why do not philosophers consider all the operations of the understanding, and the affections, as constituting but one general class of operations, and as belonging to one faculty? The reason is, they see no similarity between intellectual perceptions and affections. A perception is not a feeling either of pleasure or pain, nor a desire, And pleasure and pain, and desires, they clearly see, are not perceptions. Hence classing

them together would be improper, and create confusion. It would be confounding things which differ, and destroying all those distinctions which are necessary to the acquirement of scientific knowledge. For a person has no more than a confused notion of things, who does not make distinctions, where there are differences; or point out the difference between one thing and another. As perceptions and affections generically differ, philosophers have distinguished them, and formed them into distinct classes; and so they have admitted the existence of two faculties. And for the same reason they admit two, they ought to grant there are three faculties. For when we attend to the affections and to volitions, it is evident there is a generic difference between them. It is evident that pain, pleasure, and desires, are not volitions; and have no similarity to those voluntary exertions, which produce effects on the body, and in other things around us. For these affections do not immediately produce any external effects; they are effects themselves produced by the heart, and are either virtuous or vicious. For it has been shown, that vice and virtue belong to the heart only, and its operations, or affections. There is, therefore, no more propriety in classing the affections and volitions together, than in making but one class of the affections & perceptions. The affections & volitions so widely differ, that they naturally divide themselves into two distinct, general classes. Of course, they cannot belong to the same faculty; and the distinction concerning immanent and imperate acts, is inconsistent and useless. Those who make this distinction, divide the affections and volitions into two general classes; for the difference between them is so great, they cannot avoid admitting it. But to grant it, and then refer both classes to the same faculty, is unphilosophical, and creates confusion of ideas.

But the importance of admitting that the mind has three faculties, will appear more clearly and fully in some of the subsequent essays. I have now finished what I intended to say on the faculties of the mind, and their respective operations. The numerous operations of the understanding I have called by one general name, perceptions. I think I have made it evident, that every operation of this faculty is a perception. Those perceptions are divided into distinct, specific classes, termed reason, memory, conscience, judgment, imagination. And the numerous operations of the taste or heart, are known by the name of affections. This general class is divided into

several specific classes, termed primary, secondary, and malignant affections. And the numerous operations of the will are known by the term volitions. This class does not admit of any divisions. These three general classes, perceptions, affections, and volitions, include all the operations of the mind. It is presumed no person can name an operation,which is not included in one or the other of these classes. As these several classes generically differ, for the same reasons that two faculties have been admitted to belong to the human mind, it is necessary to admit a third.

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ESSAY XIII.

General Observations on Moral Agency.

Very different opinions concerning moral agency and liberty, have prevailed among the learned. This has occasioned very warm disputes, and numerous treatises. Of the different theories which have been advanced, very few, if any, agree wholly with facts and experience. The different opinions which have been embraced are included, I believe, either in the Arminian scheme, or the Calvinistic. Each of these schemes has been warmly defended by the ablest pens. Though the parties have widely differed, yet on some points they have been agreed. In this essay it is my design to show how far they are agreed, and in what particulars they differ; which will prepare the way for a more distinct discussion of the subject in the next essay.-The great dispute has been, and is still, what is necessary to constitute a being a real agent, and proper object of praise and blame, and a proper subject of rewards. To constitute such a being it is agreed,

1. That he must be an agent. It is agreed on both sides, that a being, who is not an agent, is not a proper object of praise or blame. But what is agency? Respecting this, different opinions have prevailed. And here is the proper place to discuss this subject. The words cause, agency, effi

ciency, action, are used in so many different senses, and their meaning is so ambiguous, that it is very difficult to explain their meaning. This, however, I shall attempt, so far as is necessary to understand the subject under consideration.

Whatever begins to exist is an effect, and must have a cause. And in things, which do exist, many changes and alterations take place. All such changes are effects, which must have a cause. And the causes must be adequate to the production of such effects, or they could not have an existence. These are first principles, which no candid person will deny. To the production of an effect a cause must operate, must act. For it does not appear to be possible for an inoperative, inactive cause, if it may be called a cause, to produce any effect. A proper cause then is something, which is in its nature operative and active. The operation of a cause is what we mean by action, and by activity, energy and efficiency. This implies a distinction between the thing, which is a cause, and its action, or operation. If the nature of a thing is such, that it will operate and act, and produce effects, whenever there is an opportunity for it, it is a proper cause; it is an active, efficient cause.

If any being has a principle in him of this nature, a principle which is active and operative, he is an agent. This active principle constitutes agency. In this active principle his agency consists. All things which exist either act, or are acted upon; they are either active agents, or passive subjects. And perhaps there is nothing in existence, of which both action and passion may not be predicated. A ball, when put in motion by some impulse, is acted upon. It is passive, or suffers the force of the impulse. But when we view it in motion, and in relation to some effect it produces, it acts and is the cause of effects. Motion is the action of the ball. And the effect it produces is greater or less, in proportion to its weight, magnitude, and velocity. In receiving an impulse, it is passive; in moving and producing effects, it is active. These observations are true with respect to all inanimate existences. But though such kinds of existence, viewed in one relation, may be considered as acting, and as causes of effects; yet they are not agents, according to the sense in which this word ought to be used, when we treat on the subject of moral agency. Because their motion does not proceed from any operative principle inherent in them.

Some say a cause is only an antecedent, and an effect the con