which are in all respects against them and opposed to every desire of their hearts. With this light their hearts rise, often, to a fearful height of opposition. They look on God as a hard master, a cruel tyrant; and they would in their rage dethrone Him, if they had power. And abundant experience teaches, that there is nothing which will excite so great enmity and opposition to God, as his absolute sovereignty. When this is held up to view in the doctrines of decrees and election; and when seen and realized by a sinner, his heart swells with enmity and rage. The reason is, there is nothing so perfectly opposed to a sinner's heart, as his entire dependance on the pleasure of God, to be lost as a transgressor, or be saved by grace.

Hence there are but two conditions, in which real hatred and opposition of heart to God will arise. One is, when providential events cross and oppose their primary or secondary desires. The other is, when sinners are under a real conviction of truth. But so long as all providential events harmonize with a sinner's desires; and so long as they do not see, or realize the opposition of the divine character and government to their selfish and perverse inclinations; so long they are free from the operations of positive hatred to God; although the seeds of enmity are latent in their hearts, and only wait for occasions of being elicited, and manifested to themselves and their fellow men, as they are now manifest to the eye of God.

Our primary affections form one class of the operations of our taste; secondary affections, a second; and our malignant passions, a third. These three classes include all the operations of this faculty. It is presumed no one can name any affection or passion, which is not clearly contained in one or another of the classes I have named.

These are the active principles, the laws of our nature, which put every wheel in motion; and from which have proceeded all the evils, and crimes, which have been committed in this world. In scripture they are called lusts. So when the question is asked, from whence come wars and fightings; the answer is, from the lusts which war in our members.

These principles are sufficient to explain the conduct of men. By them it is easy to account for all the actions of moral agents, and assign the reasons of their conduct in every condition of life. If a person makes the accumulation of property, or high stations of honor, or scenes of pleasure, his

K

great and principal object; if he defrauds, commits theft, or murder; or if he is moral, kind, liberal, and performs acts of charity and benevolence; it is easy to show, that such and all his other actions proceed from these principles or affections. The principles here advanced agree with facts, and with the observation and experience of all men. Is not every one sure and certain, that he perceives objects, not only their existence, but their properties, modes, and relations? Is he not sure, that he perceives truth and falsehood, good and evil, right and wrong? Can he doubt whether he is a feeling being, a subject of pleasure and pain; or whether he has desires to obtain some objects, and to shun others; or that he has affections and passions? Can he doubt whether his feelings excite him to action? And if he were to make it an object of inquiry, what principles and motives governed him in any of his particular pursuits in life, could he not ascertain them? And he would always find that his actions proceeded from these inward, active principles, which he knows operate within him. Upon these principles, we may reason as correctly and safely concerning phenomena in morals, as we can on the first principles in natural philosophy concerning the phenomena in the material world. We should find some facts more difficult to account for, than others; and some, perhaps, inexplicable. This is to be expected in every science. With respect to men, I see no great difficulty in accounting, on the principles advanced, for their actions and conduct in the several grades and stations of life. And the profession of a minister is such, it is one part of his study to account for the conduct of mankind. In this way he explains their characters, shows them what they are, and opens to their view the inward springs of action, and the external effects they will produce, so clearly, that persons often think that some one has informed him of their feelings and conduct. To me it appears impossible for a minister to explain the character and condof man in the most convincing manner, unless he is acquainted with those internal, active principles, which govern all m Before I had any clear, distinct view of them, many things appeared dark, and mysterious, which now are as obvious as day light. On the application of those principles, in explaining and accounting for the actions and conduct of mankind, I will detain you no longer at this time. For their truth and application will appear more clear and evident, as we pass on to other subjects, and especially to

explain the operations of the will, and the nature of liberty, and the motives by which all are influenced. For the sake of assisting the memory, I shall conclude this essay by a brief repetition of the leading ideas, and those most important to be remembered, which have been explained concerning taste.

The taste or heart is a distinct property or faculty of the mind, which prepares it for those operations called the affections and passions. To this faculty belong several distinct appetites, such as hunger, pity, natural propensities or affections, and love of novelty, implanted in us by God for our preservation, comfort, improvement, and well being, while in the present state of existence. This is a feeling faculty, the subject of all our pleasant and painful sensations; the primary spring, or principle of action. It constitutes agency; is the seat of all vice and virtue; and is of course a moral faculty.Without it, mankind would be inactive beings, like all existences incapable of feeling.

Each affection and passion contains two operations; a sensation either pleasant or painful; and a desire to obtain the object, if agreeable, or to avoid it, if disagreeable. These two operations, sensation & desire, combine to form every affection and passion. Hence all the affections, in their nature simply, are similar; though they differ much in vivacity and strength. Sensations and desires are the only operations of this faculty; & being perfectly similar, they form another moral class of operations of the mind, termed the affections and passions. And as this class is totally different in its nature from the class called perceptions, there is no way to account for them but on this ground, that the mind is endued with the property denominated taste.

The general class of operations called the affections is divided into three distinct classes. The first operations experienced by a human being in infancy and childhood, are for objects in their nature agreeable or disagreeable. These being the first experienced, are classed together, and called our primary affections. When affections are excited by objects which are indifferent in themselves, but which are regarded as necessary means of gratifying other desires, they form another class, denominated secondary affections. They are the second operations which we feel, and arise from the preceding or primary class. And when men have their primary or secondary affections crossed and disappointed, either by God or man, the

sensations of hatred, anger, malice, envy, or revenge, are excited. These form a third class, called the malignant passions.

The appetites, from which these classes of operations arise, are distinct laws of our nature by which all men are invariably governed. And by a proper application of them, all the actions and branches of conduct in men, in their various pursuits, may be accounted for and explained. When these are understood aright, then we have a knowledge of human nature, and not till then; I mean a knowledge of the principles, which govern men.

Of the Will, and its Operations.

Scarcely any writer, that I now recollect, has considered the heart and will to be distinct faculties. They have generally been treated as one and the same. Yet I hope to make it appear that they are distinct faculties, and ought not to be blended with the understanding.-The want of this distinction has occasioned much confusion in the discussions of this subject.

The will and its acts are as different as the subject and predicate of a proposition. Accordingly the will is considered as a subject, and volitions are the operations predicated of it. We therefore say, the will chooses and refuses. And voluntary exertions are the only operations, which properly belong to the will. There is certainly a preparedness or adaptedness in the mind, for operations of this particular kind. If there were not, it never could choose or refuse. For the mind cannot have those operations, to which it has no adaptedness. A square body is not adapted to that kind of motion called rolling. There is no adaptedness in matter for the operations of thinking, and feeling. And if the mind were not prepared to be the subject of those operations termed perceptions, feelings, and volitions, it could no more perceive, feel, and choose, than matter itself can. But the mind does think, feel, and choose.

These are facts, which prove undeniably, that it is prepared for these several operations. And a particular preparedness, fitness, or adaptedness for that kind of operations called volitions, is what I mean and understand by the term will, considered as a faculty of the mind. Some will say, this is no definition. I grant it is not. It is impossible to define simple ideas. Can any one define pain, or pleasure? If I were to say, the will is a power to choose and refuse, or a capacity for voluntary exertions, as many do; yet I might be requested to define power, and capacity. For these as really need defining, as the term will itself. The truth is, no one can give a logical definition of any simple thought, or existence. They can be illustrated by other words, which are better understood, if such words can be found. The will, then, is a preparedness of the mind for voluntary exertions.

We may now take into consideration the operations of this faculty. Those I call volitions. Every volition has an object. When we choose, there is something chosen. And the thing chosen, is what I mean by the object of volition. The immediate object of volition, is generally the motion of the whole body, or some one of its members. When I make a voluntary exertion to move my hand, the motion of the hand is the immediate object of this exertion. I move my hand to take my pen. I keep it in motion, that my pen may continue to move in making letters, and words. This is done to answer further purposes and ends. I may move my hand to take a sword, to put it in motion for my defence, or to produce some other effect. If an end is to be obtained, and a number of effects are necessary to obtain it, these are produced by volitions, or voluntary exertions. The first effect produced is some bodily motion. This is necessary, in order to produce the next effect in the arrangement; and this in order to the next in succession, until the desired end is attained. The motion of the body, or some of its members, is the first effect produced by the exertions of the will. Then the other effects, necessary to the end, follow each other in a regular succession. This motion of the body, or first effect produced, is what I mean by the immediate object of volition. Other effects produced, intervene between the first and the last, which puts us in possession of the object or end sought. The last effect is the ultimate object of volition. And those effects, which intervene between the first and the last, are its intermediate objects.