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objects combined in such a manner as to answer the design of the agent. Apprehension, conception, judgment, reason, memory, conscience, imagination, fancy, which are words abundantly used by philosophers who treat upon the intellectual powers of the mind, are names by which the acts or operations of the understanding are designated. For the understanding is the only intellectual faculty belonging to the mind. And when we attend to the meaning of these words, as applied to acts of the mind, it is obvious they cannot designate any other operations,th n those which I call perceptions. If persons will take the trouble of attending to the meaning of the above words, he will find they differ very much from the words feelings, sensations, affections, or volitions. They are, then,nothing more or less, than those acts called perceptions, thoughts, or ideas. An act of the mind is a simple operation. It cannot be defined. Seeing, thinking, apprehending, conceiving, remembering, reasoning, judging and the like, express acts of the understanding. These acts are not affections, desires, or volitions. These acts are perceptions. Seeing an object, conceiving of an object, remembering an object, and so on, is perceiving it. When perceptions are considered as acts of the mind, though called by different names, yet they are alike. It is not possible to point out any difference between one perception and another, considered as acts or operations of the mind. Being similar, of the same kind, they constitute one general class of operations. As all creatures, who have life, are classed together and called animals, so all those individual operations of the same kind are classed together, and called perceptions. But

7. This general class is subdivided into several distinct classes, to each of which a name is given. Though all the operations of the understanding are of the same kind, for which reason they constitute but one class; yet their objects differ. Where there is a perception, there is something perceived. This something, whether it be a substance, a property, a quality, a mode, or relation, is the object of perception. And the individual objects are as numerous as the perceptions. The objects are not of the same kind; they differ from each other in a variety of respects and circumstances. These differences among the objects, is the ground and reason of dividing our perceptions into several classes. Some objects have been seen, and are past; when seen again, they are recollected. These

perceptions constitute a class by themselves; and this class of perceptions is called memory.

Truth and falsehood constitute another class of objects, These are objects of perception. For we know what truth is, when we perceive it. Those perceptions, therefore, which have truth and falsehood for their object, constitute another class, which is known by the name of reason, and judgment. Right and wrong, good and evil, form another class of objects. And those perceptions, which have the right and wrong of our own conduct for their object, constitute another class, which is called conscience.

All the operations of the understanding form one general class called perceptions. This general class of operations is divided into several specific classes. And each specific class has some name given it, by which it is known; as simple perception, memory, judgment, reason and conscience. And the difference among the objects of perception, is the reason why our perceptions are formed into distinct classes. As those divisions are necessary in order to have a clear, distinct, and systematic view of the mind, so to facilitate the communication of our knowledge of the mind to others, it is necessary to give those several classes distinct names.

This mode of attending to the operations of the mind, appears to me far preferable to that generally adopted by metaphysicians. They generally begin by dividing the mind into two faculties, understanding and will; and say, those are the only faculties belonging to it. Then they proceed to talk about the memory, judgment, reason, and conscience; and frequently call each of these a faculty. Then the reader is confused; he asks himself, does the writer mean, as he first said, that the mind has but two faculties; or that it has six or seven? For he calls judgment, reason, memory, conscience, imagination, and the like, faculties also. What does he mean? Then when they write concerning the operations of these faculties, are these only one kind, or very different kinds of operations? This he cannot determine from their manner of writing. Of course, he is left in the dark respecting the nature of the operations of these several faculties, as they are pleased to

call them.

And after he has gone through a long treatise of philosophy on the human mind, though he has acquired many useful ideas, yet he has obtained no systematic knowledge of the mind. The

ideas he has acquired have no proper arrangement; neither does he see their connexion with first principles. Hence the reader has acquired only an indistinct and confused notion of the mind, and its operations. One great object here is, to give the reader a clear, and systematic view of the mind. Whether I have done it, as far as I have proceeded, he must judge.

I would observe one thing more, and close this essay. If any one should prefer considering memory, reason and conscience different powers of the understanding, I will not contend with him. If he says the understanding has a power of perceiving, or recollecting past objects; and a power of perceiving truth, and inferring one truth from another; and a power of perceiving the right and wrong of actions; still all the operations of these powers are perceptions. And of course, these several powers only designate the several classes into which the operations of the understanding are divided. One power denotes one class, and another power another class of operations. Hence, whether we consider memory, for instance, as a power of the understanding, or as the name given to one class of perceptions; still it is either the perception of past objects, or the power of perceiving them. So we consider all the operations of the understanding as similar in their nature; and divisible into as many classes, if no more, as are above enumerated and specified.

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ESSAY VIII.

of Taste.

Taste is another faculty of the mind, distinct from the understanding, and also from the will. There are several considerations, to which our attention must be directed for the elucidation of this subject. The reader who wishes to examine it impartially, is requested to suspend his judgment, till he has weighed the considerations here presented, and seen the relation and connexion of the several parts with each other.

1. Taste, like the understanding, is undefinable, being a simple property. It can be explained only by using other terms of nearly the same import. It is that preparedness, adaptedness, or disposition of the mind, by which the mind is affected agreeably or disagreeably when objects are presented to it. We know it is a fact, that some objects please,and others disgust us. It is a fact, that we are conscious of sensations or emotions, which are sometimes agreeable, sometimes painful. These emotions belong to the mind. They must have a cause. Those things which produce pleasure or pain, whether they are material or immaterial, are the objects that affect us. These objects operate, and thus occasion sensations or emotions. Their operation necessarily implies a subject. Taste is the subject operated upon, when objects afford us either pleasure or pain. The understanding is not the subject on which they operate for that has perceptions, but not emotions; it is a perceiving, but not a feeling faculty.-To say the mind is the subject, is not satisfactory. What is the mind? Is it a simple existence without properties? An existence simple in its nature cannot be the subject of operations so different in their kind, as perceptions, pleasant and painful sensations, and volitions.

How the same simple nature can see, feel and produce effects, is to us unaccountable. Philosophers have, therefore, been led to view the mind, like all other substances, as possessed of different, distinct properties, or faculties. Operations of different kinds, which we experience, have led them generally to make two faculties, called understanding and will. The same reason which induces them to admit two faculties, will require them to acknowledge three; which we design to make evident in its proper place. It will appear further on, that we have as much reason to view the taste as a faculty, as we have either the understanding or the will. And taste is that faculty by which the mind is pleased or disgusted by the objects which affect it. This faculty is the subject on which they operate, when we experience agreeable or painful sensations or emotions. These sensations do not belong to the understanding, nor to the will; as I shall show hereafter. Taste is the faculty to which all operations of this kind belong. If we had not the bodily sense, which is called taste, food would neither please or disgust us.

By a mental taste, the mind is pleased or displeased with

all objects with which it is conversant. There is a great similarity between that bodily sense, called taste, and this mental faculty, by means of which all objects affect us in an agreeable or disagreeable manner. On account of this similarity,

this mental faculty is called the taste. I know of no other word, which will, according to its common acception, more fully express the nature of this faculty. And for this reason I use it. The word of God calls this faculty, the heart. And whenever I may use the word heart to signify a faculty of the mind, I mean the same thing by it, I do by the word taste. Can the mind perceive? Then its nature and construction are such, that it is prepared for this kind of operations. Can it feel, or be the subject of painful and pleasant sensations? Then its nature is such, that it is prepared to be the subject of this kind of operations. Do we infer, from our perceptions, the faculty which is called the understanding? Then, from our feelings, we as safely infer the faculty we call taste, or the heart. And to suppose there may be perceptions and sensations, without any subject to which they belong, is absurd. And to suppose a subject, which has not different properties, but is simple in its nature, can perceive objects, and also be pleased or disgusted with them, is equally absurd. The different faculties, which belong to the mind, prepare it for operations of different kinds. This is as evident, as it is that the different construction of material bodies prepares them for different operations.

2. The taste, or the heart, is a feeling faculty. Although this has been noticed already, yet it deserves a further and distinct consideration. Both pleasant and painful sensations are feelings. Every one knows what pain is, and what pleasure is, by experience. Pain is a sensation, and pleasure is a sensation; pain is also a feeling, and pleasure is a feeling. Pain and pleasure are simple operations, which cannot be defined. Yet all persons are acquainted by experience with the meaning of these terms. The terms pleasure and pain, sensation and feeling, when applied to acts of the mind, are applied to the same class of operations. When I am pleased or disgusted, I feel; I have a sensation or emotion excited. And the taste is the only feeling faculty, which belongs to the mind. And material objects, when perceived through the medium of our senses; and all the operations of the mind, when they are objects of perception or reflection, either please or disgust us. The heart is never in a perfect state of indifference. Objects,

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