cient to satisfy every one, that there is no propriety in viewing conscience as a distinct faculty. As it is not a distinct faculty; then the terms approve,disapprove,pure,defiled,& those of a sim ilar import, mean no more than a clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our actions with the rule of duty. When we perceive that our actions agree with the rule, we say conscience is pure, undefiled, without offence; it approves, instead of accusing and condemning us as polluted, guilty creatures. This approving is also peace of conscience. When conscience accuses and condemns, there is no peace. Having shown what conscience is, we shall now attend, 4. To the feelings it excites in the heart. This is necessary, in order to show, that the operations of conscience and the feelings they excite are operations of a different kind, and ought never to be blended. We may now give attention to a class of feelings, which always attend on the operations of conscience. -These are feelings, which are either pleasant, or painful. When a person has committed theft, and reflects on his conduct, he clearly perceives he has transgressed the laws of God, and of men. He then sees he is exposed to disgrace, shame, and punishment; that he may in this world be detected, and punished; and will certainly have his guilt exposed to the view of an assembled universe at the judgment day, and receive the punishment his crime deserves. His conscience condemns him as a transgressor; the crime, the disgrace, the danger of punishment, all combine to wound him deeply, and excite strong wishes that he had never done the deed. Such pains and desires are the operations of the heart or taste. And these feelings are expressed by different terms; such as remorse, regret, compunction, and stings of conscience. If he is so hardened, that his conduct does not give him much pain, his conscience is said to be deceived, blinded, stupified, seared, or dead. Such expressions are figurative; they ascribe to conscience the feelings of the heart; or the feelings conscience produces in the heart are predicated of conscience itself. As when we say, reason loves the truth, and hates deception and error; we do not mean, that love and hatred are operations of reason; but they are connected with it, and produced by it in the heart. When reason discovers truth, the heart loves it; and hates error, when detected by reason. The feelings connected with reason, though they belong to the taste, are figuratively ascribed to reason. So the painful feelings excited in the heart on account of sin, are ever connected with a perception of wrong conduct in ourselves. And because they are connected with the operations of conscience, they are figuratively attributed to conscience. Hence, when a person's conduct agrees with the law of God and he perceives it, pleasant feelings are excited in the heart. Thus he has peace of conscience; it not only approves of his conduct, but his conscience is said to rejoice, to have joy in the holy Ghost. Hence, to understand the operations of the mind distinctly, we must attend to them carefully, and refer each operation to its proper faculty. And though operations follow each other, and are connected in a train ; yet we ought not to view all those thus connected as operations of the same faculty. But we ought to distinguish them according to their natures, and refer them to the classes and faculties to which they belong; and not suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by figures of speech. When we say reason delights in demonstrating truth, and loves the truth, and hates deception; here we ought to distinguish between the operations of reason, and the feelings connected with it. Reason itself is nothing but a train of perceptions, which have for their object the truth or falsehood of propositions. But those perceptions are attended with pleasant feelings, which do not belong to reason, but the heart. So the proper operations of conscience are only perceptions, which have for their object a rule of duty, actions, and their agreement or disagreement with the rule. These perceptions are always followed by pleasant or painful feelings in the heart, with their attendant desires. And these feelings, sometimes the strongest we ever experience, belong properly to the heart, though we often ascribe them figuratively to the conscience. In strict propriety of speech, therefore, we should say conscience includes operations both of the understanding and the heart. It cannot, however, be considered a distinct faculty. Benevolence is a most amiable quality. When we perceive, or have a knowledge of this quality in another, if our hearts are right, they are pleased. They delight in such a character, approve it, and commend it. Such feelings are excited, whenever we perceive amiable and virtuous qualities in any moral agent. But those feelings constitute no part of conscience; for a perception of those qualities is antecedent to those feelings, and is the cause which produces them. And those feelings are as different in their nature from the percep tions of moral qualities, as any other operations whatever ; yet they attend all the operations of conscience. But this is no evidence that they constitute any part of conscience. For operations, totally different in their nature, may accompany each other, and be closely connected in point of time. Vices are hateful qualities. When a person has committed murder, and we obtain a perception or knowledge of his criminality, displeasure and indignation are immediately excited. These feelings, which accompany our knowledge of crimes committed by others, have their seat in the heart. There is no similarity between them and perceptions of moral qualities; consequently they are not operations of conscience, but strong feelings, produced by a perception of criminal conduct in others. Thus distinguishing, as we ought, between the operations of conscience, and the strong and lively feelings or affections they produce, whether pleasant or painful, sinful or holy, is of great importance to a correct notion of conscience. That we may have accurate views of conscience, we proceed to consider three things, the objects of conscience; its operations, considered as acts of the mind; and the effects they produce. Right and wrong, good and evil, are predicated of our hearts and conduct. The heart is an object; its affections are objects; and our actions are objects. When these objects are viewed as subjects, right and wrong, good and evil, are predicated of them. These words, good and evil, denote the nature or qualities of these objects. And these qualities too are objects. For the predicate, as well as the subject of a proposition, is an object of perception. Then our hearts with their operations, and all our actions, with their qualities, are the objects which conscience regards. These objects constitute what we term duty. The word ought implies the idea of duty. We say, we ought to have a right heart, right affections, and right actions. And so far as our hearts, affections and actions are right, duty is performed. And our hearts and conduct ought not to be wrong, evil or sinful. But if they are wrong, duty is not performed, we are transgressors. As it is the office of conscience to inform us of our duty, it must inform us what is right and what is wrong. And it is evident, we cannot ascertain what is duty, when it is not self evident, but by comparing our hearts and conduct with self evident truths, or some infallible rule of right and wrong. By comparing our affections and actions with a self evident duty, or with the moral law, we ascertain what is duty. Then duty, or our hearts and conduct with their qualities, are the objects which conscience takes into view. This will clearly show, that the operations of conscience are perceptions. For there are no other operations of the mind, by which objects can be seen, or known. We do not learn the nature of hearts and conduct by feelings, or affections, or volitions. It is solely by our perceptions. A perception of an object & its moral quality, is a knowledge of what ought,or ought not, to be. Then perceptions are the operations of conscience. These perceptions produce pleasure or pain. These sensations are the effects of conscience on the heart; and they are as different from perceptions, as effects are from their causes. For we have already shown, that sensations are not the operations, but the effects, of conscience. And they ought to be viewed wholly different in their nature, and to be carefully distinguished from them. Then our conclusion is this: that those perceptions of the understanding, which have the right or wrong of our hearts and conduct, or in a word our duty, for their object, are classed together, and called conscience. Or conscience may be thus defined it is the understanding itself, when it takes cognizance of our own motives and actions, compares them with the standard of duty, and then acquits or condemns. : ********** ESSAY VII. Recapitulation. The object of this essay is to recapitulate the principal ideas contained in the preceding essays, in a brief manner, that the reader may see them in a narrow compass. And 1. The understanding is a faculty of the mind. This faculty is a property of the mind. Understanding, heart, will, are words, which express different properties of the mind. G 2. A faculty is a preparedness, a fitness, an adaptedness of the mind, to be the subject of definite operations. The same property does not prepare the mind to see, feel, and choose. There is no way to account for operations so different in their nature, but by supposing the mind to be possessed of different properties, or faculties.-Hence the different operations of the mind have led philosophers to consider it as having distinct faculties, or properties. 3. A faculty is as distinct from its operations, as a body is distinct from its motions. Hence a faculty is antecedent to its operations, and the foundation of them. 4. The construction of all languages is a direct proof of the existence of faculties. All languages have verbs; and every verb has a nominative case. The nominative case is the agent; and the verb expresses the action of the agent. I perceive. It is certain the mind does not perceive objects by the same faculty, by which it feels; nor by that, by which it prefers one thing to another. It is by the understanding only that the mind perceives. Accordingly we say, the understanding is a perceiving faculty. That mankind have,from time immemorial, considered the mind possessed of this faculty, is evident from the construction of all languages. Indeed it is a truth so evident, the words we use in talking and writing prove we have ideas of faculties, and believe in the real existence of such properties. It is a self-evident truth. If any deny it, they must be left to themselves. For it is vain to reason with persons, to convince them of the truth of self-evident propositions. 5. The word perception is used to signify all the operations of the understanding. I use this word in this sense, because I know of no other, which will more aptly express the operations of this faculty. Perception is an act of the understanding. The acts of the understanding may be, and often are, called ideas, thoughts, notions, and the like; but perception appears to me to be as proper a name of every act or operation of this faculty, as any that can be used. And perception is the name I give to every operation of the understanding. 6. Perceptions, which are operations of the understanding, are very numerous. Simple apprehension as an act of the mind, or the perception of an object. Conception is an act of the understanding. Memory, reason, judgment, and conscience, as we have shown, are operations of this faculty. This is true with respect to imagination; which is a perception of |