all our knowledge. Whatever, then, is known, is perceived; and whatever is an object of knowledge, is an object of percep tion. We have a knowledge of existence, of the properties of beings, of their relations, of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong, of good and evil. And are there any other objects of knowledge, which are not included under one or the other of these divisions? If not, then these contain all the objects of perception. But if there be other things, which are not included under either of these general heads, yet if they are known, they are only objects of perception.

This essay may now be concluded with a brief recapitulation of a few ideas. Perceptions, we have seen, form one general class of the operations of the mind. These belong to the understanding, & to no other faculty. The understanding acts, or operates. Perceptions are its operations. And the objects on which they terminate, or which are perceived, have been briefly arranged under several heads. When I say the understanding acts, I do not mean, it produces its own exercises. But I speak in this manner, to conform to the common use of words.

It is hoped the reader will carefully observe, that it is not designed in this work to show how external objects affect the bodily senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling; or in what way by these senses the mind is impressed or affected ; or in what manner sensations are produced in the mind, by the operation of objects on the bodily organs. That sensations are produced, we know is a fact by experience. But the manner in which objects affect the mind, is an inquiry foreign from my present design.

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ESSAY IV.

Of the Memory.

Some consider memory as a distinct faculty. Whether it is or not, depends on the nature of its operations. No one will suppose, that sensations, or affections, or volitions, are acts or operations of the memory. But the latter are perceptions; on that account may be called operations of the understanding. They either have only a specific difference from other opera

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tions of the understanding, and so belong to that faculty; or they have a generic difference, and ought to form a distinct class of operations. Whether they differ generically, or only specifically, from the operations of the understanding, is the inquiry to which I shall give immediate attention.

A few days since, as I passed along, I saw a house of a certain form, dimensions, colour and situation. No one will suppose the eye can see. It is only an organ, or medium, through which the mind sees external objects. It was, therefore, my mind, which perceived the house at that time. What other name, beside seeing, or perceiving, shall we give to this act of the mind? Whether we call it seeing, perceiving, conceiving, or by any other name, yet the act or operation is the same. Names do not alter things. This operation of the mind, I have hitherto called a perception. I give it this name, because I know of no other word, by which it can be more properly designated. At this moment I remember that I saw the above house. I recollect its form, dimensions, colour, and situation.

It will be granted, that remembering is an operation of the mind. What is the difference between this operation of the mind, and the one I had, when I first saw, and had a direct view of the house? The object is the same. The house was the object, when I saw it; it is the object now, when I remember it. Then I saw it; and now, when I remember it, I see it. Remembering, then, when considered as an act of the mind, is seeing or perceiving. Here are two operations of the mind; one respects a present, the other, a past object. Wherein do they differ? It is believed it is not in the power of any man, to show any difference between these two operations, unless it be this; one is more clear, the other more indistinct. Each is a perception of a house. And this is true respecting all the operations of the memory. There is a difference with respect to the objects. The object I now perceive before me, is present. When remembered, it is past. An interval of time has passed, between the first and the second perception of the same object. And when an object is recollected, it may be attended with a full persuasion, that it is the same object I once saw; that I am the same person now I was then; and that a period of time has intervened. Yet that operation,called remembering,is the same in kind with the one I had, when the object was present to the mind. Both are perceptions of the same object. But with relation to the object, and the two perceptions

of it, there is the difference of past and present. Though an interval of time, a day, a month, a year, has passed, between my first seeing an object and remembering it, yet the object is the same, and each perception of it is the same in kind. Also there may be this difference, that when the object is present, the perception of it is more clear and distinct, than when it is remembered. But a perception is the same operation in kind, whether it be clear and distinct, or obscure and indistinct. This, however, may be true of perceptions of present objects, as well as those which are past. Again, I now see a house. A year hence I travell the same way and see it again. Would any suppose there is any difference between the first and second perception I have of that house, because an interval of a year has intervened? Surely not. Yet there is no more difference between my seeing a house yesterday, and recollecting it to day, than between seeing it a year since when I passed it, and again to day, when I pass it again. For in both cases a portion of duration has succeeded, between the first and second perception of the same house. Indeed, the more this subject may be examined, the more obvious it will appear, that remembering, considered as an operation of the mind, is a perception of an object. And this perception differs no more from any other perception, than any two perceptions differ from each other. They are individual operations of the same kind, and may be numbered first, second, and third, as they succeed each other. Two or more individual things may be similar, and for this reason be called by the same name, as is the case with the same sort of rays of light.

Though all the operations of the mind are perceptions of objects, and being alike ought to be classed together; yet on account of a difference attending the objects, they are subdivided into several distinct species of operations. And to each division a name is given, by which it may be ever after designated and known.-Present and past constitutes a difference between objects now seen, and those remembered. This is one difference. An object, which is now seen, is present to the mind. I look, not back, nor forward, but directly at it. When I recollect, I look back; the object is not present before me. An object remembered is attended with a belief of personal identity; a present object is not. On account of these differences between the objects remembered and those which are not, all these perceptions of past objects are formed into a

distinct class, and to this class or division the name memory is given.

Hence it is as unphilosophical to say remembering is not perceiving objects, as to assert that a horse is not an animal. And we may as consistently say, that horse is not the name of one class of animals, as say that memory is not the name of one class of the operations of the understanding. And hence it is not philosophical to consider memory a distinct faculty. For there is no ground to believe there are any more faculties belonging to the mind, than there are classes of operations of different kinds. It is agreed, that loving, hating, choosing, refusing, are operations of different kinds-so different, that the faculty, which perceives, cannot love and hate. This is the reason, which has induced philosophers to admit the existence of two, if no more, distinct faculties, which they call understanding & will. But is it not as easy for the same faculty to perceive past, as present objects? If it is, what necessity is there of supposing two faculties, understanding and memory, to account for a perception of present and past objects? Even such a supposition will not account for it. It is a fact, that we perceive the objects which are before us, and those which are past. But how we perceive either, no person can tell. We may, then, conclude, there is no sufficient reason, nor any necessity,for considering memory to be a distinct faculty. We ought to view memory only as a name given to one class of the operations of the understanding. If any, however, choose to consider the memory as a power of the understanding, I have no objection to it. For by it nothing more can be meant, as far as I can conceive, than the ability of the understanding to perceive, or recal past objects. That it has a power, or ability, or can recal or remember them, is granted. For it is a fact, it does recollect them; and what it in fact does, it can or has power to do.

It may be inquired, if remembering is perceiving, what is the object? I answer, the object recollected is the same object perceived, when first presented to the mind. If it be asked, where is the object, when remembered? Answer, where it was, when we first obtained a knowledge of it. If any ask, how we remember or recal past objects? Answer, I know not. I know it is a fact, but cannot describe the manner of it. I cannot tell how we perceive present objects. These are inquiries beyond my reach.

Having made it evident, that the operations of memory are only perceptions, and the difference between them and other perceptions are such circumstances as present & past, and not the perceptions themselves except the relation of time; having shown the dissimilarity of the circumstances attending the objects, as the reason why they form a distinct class to which the name memory is given ; & that this class of operations are operations of the understanding, and of course there is no reason or necessity for considering and calling the memory a distinct faculty, the principal objects of this essay are answered. Many other things which might be observed respecting the memory, as they do not come within the design of these essays, receive here no particular attention.

It is granted, that several relations between objects afford great aid to the memory. One object suggests another; and a present object, by a relation of resemblance, or place, or some other relation, suggests a past object, or revives in the mind a perception of an object, which had been previously received. Hence it is granted, that the various relations of objects are of great use in recollecting, or reviving past objects, or objects which had been previously seen. But when we consider the perception of a present, and the perception of the same object at another time, those perceptions or operations of the mind are similar; and for this reason are operations of the same faculty.

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ESSAY V.

Of Judgment and Reason.

Judgment and reason are distinguished by some writers, and considered as different operations of the mind. It is apprehended that the difference, if any, is very small. Judgment is agreed to be an act of the mind. It is that act by which one thing is affirmed or denied of another; or it is an assent to the truth of a proposition. And this assent to the truth or falsehood of a proposition is an act of the mind.