No operations of the human mind differ in their nature moré widely. Can any candid person then say, that they are operations of the same faculty; and differ from each other in no other sense, than the first and all successive acts of the same series differ from each other? We might with as much reason say, that our perceptions or rational operations, and affections, are of the same nature, and differ in no other sense than the first and successive acts of the same series differ. They so widely differ in their nature, that they must be the operations of different faculties. And as the advocates of this scheme say, that imperate acts are operations of the will; the immanent acts, or affections, must be the operations of some third faculty. They cannot be the operations of the understanding, and for the same reason they are not the operations of the will; of course they belong to some other faculty, and we say the heart is this faculty. And if there must be a third faculty, to which the affections belong, our opponents would not object against attributing them to the heart.

Though they sometimes admit the existence of faculties, yet at other times they deny it. If we meet them on this ground, they must acknowledge the existence of three distinct classes of operations, belonging to the mind. One class includes all our perceptions or rational operations. A second class includes all the affections and passions. And a third class comprises all our volitions, or exertions to produce external actions. And we may reduce these classes to one, with as much reason, as to reduce them to two. Therefore, when this distinction of our opponents is fairly examined, it makes nothing in their favor, nor in the least evades the force of the texts adduced to support our system.

For now, to be consistent, they must grant, that by heart in these texts is meant that faculty called in these essays the heart; or if they deny the existence of faculties, they must grant, that the second class of operations, called the affections, constitutes the heart. Then this heart, which we call a faculty, and which on their scheme must be considered a distinct class of operations, is the heart intended in scripture; which includes all moral operations, all vice and virtue, and from which as a fountain all good and evil fruit proceeds. And this is the point for which we contend; and the sentiment they mean to undermine by their distinction between immanent and imperate acts. But their distinction fails them on examination, and is devested of

all its force.

Hence the scriptures adduced retain all the evi dence contended for, to prove the sentiment for which they were adduced.

ESSAY XXV.

Objections against this system, stated, and answered..

Objection 1. It is said this scheme represents vice and virtue, as consisting in principles which are inactive and dormant ; which is contrary to all our ideas of vice and virtue; and according to which we may as well suppose, that sin and holiness may be as rationally predicated of inactive matter. No principle, say they objectors, can be holy or sinful, unless it is active. Activity is essential to their existence. And as there is no action, or activity but in volitions, or such exercises; vice and virtue cannot have existence in any thing else. This is one objection in its full force, so far as my knowledge extends.

Answer. It is evident the person, who makes this objection, for some reason or other, has not understood the sentiments to which he objects. I have labored to prove there are, and must be, different and distinct principles of action in the human heart. There is no other way to account for the effects it produces, and to accord with facts, and the experience of all mankind. But I have no where said, that these principles are inactive, and dormant. If I have, it is a great oversight. Again, the scheme advanced in these essays, is fully proved by the scripture account of the christian warfare. According to the word of God, saints have in their hearts what are termed the flesh and spirit; the law of the members, and the law of the mind the old and new man; so that when they would do good evil is present with them.

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These opposite principles abide and remain in them. They do not succeed each other, as volitions do, but are permanent. They are in the same man, at the same time. According to the word, they are very active, operative principles; and the affec

tions proceeding from them are as different from each other, as sin and holiness. Also they oppose each other at the same time. The flesh lusteth against the spirit; and the spirit lusteth against the flesh. The law in the members wars against the law of the mind; and the law of the mind wars against the law in the members. From one of these fountains proceed sweet, and from the other bitter waters; and the old and the new man are constantly at variance. In the opposition of these two active principles to each other, consists the christian warfare; that inward war, which all real saints experience. This is the scripture account of this warfare; and it is perfectly similar to the description of the heart given in these essays. It has been shown that the heart of man is composed of several distinct appetites, from which proceed different and opposing affections, both in saints and sinners; so that sinners experience a warfare at times, as well as saints, though of a different moral complexion. For the warfare of the sinner is between one sinful and another sinful affection, which arise from distinct appetites, or inclinations. But the war of the christian is in the opposition of holy, and sinful affections. And this, it is believed, is the only scriptural and rational description, which can be given of the christian warfare. And as this is agreeable to these essays, the word of God, by giving the same view of the subject, fully establishes the leading sentiments advanced in them.

If we take the ground of some, that all vice and virtue consist in voluntary exercises; and that two of these do not exist in the mind at the same time, but are constantly succeeding each other; a warfare seems to be impossible. For a war necessarily supposes two parties, opposed, and contending, at the same time. Though holy and sinful volitions are different and opposite in their nature; yet they cannot in that case contend or fight with each other, because they are never on the ground, or in the mind, at the same time. How can two armies fight, if not opposed to each other in the field at the same time? If they come into the field in succession, so that one has left the ground before the other occupies it, there cannot be any actual fighting between them. Also, on the scheme that men have but one volition at a time, and that all vice and virtue consist in volitions, saints must be perfectly holy, or perfectly sinful, through every moment of their existence in this world. For the same simple volition cannot be partly holy, and partly sinful; and this is granted by them. Hence, when they have holy volitions

they are perfectly holy, and when they have sinful volitions, they are perfectly sinful. Hence they fall from grace, and are renewed again, perhaps a thousand times every day. Such ideas are too absurd to be admitted. Yet they necessarily follow from the sentiment now opposed. If it be admitted, to avoid such absurdities, that the heart is a faculty, which exists antecedent to any of its operations, and is the seat of all vice and virtue; yet if it is a simple faculty, how is it possible to account for the christian warfare? It is very inconsistent to suppose that a simple faculty, or the same simple principle of action, should contain in itself two different and opposite moral natures. Yet it must, in order to account for its sending forth both sweet water and bitter, at the same time, or to account for the existence of sinful and holy affections at the same time. Of course, on this ground a warfare cannot exist. This simple faculty must be perfectly holy, or sinful. And if saints have both sinful and holy exercises, this faculty must be changed in its nature from holiness to sinfulness, and then back again, as often as they have sinful and holy affections. This is as absurd, as to suppose sinful and holy volitions succeed each other, and of course that persons may be perfectly holy and perfectly sinful many times in a day. And there does not appear to be any way to avoid these absurdities, and to account for the christian warfare of which the scriptures inform us, except on the ground taken in these essays.

Hence the sentiments advanced concerning the heart or taste, as a compound faculty, containing different, active principles, which may and often do oppose each other, are rational and scriptural. It agrees with the experience of Paul, and all christians in every age, who have ever found one law in them warring against another, the flesh and spirit contending, so that when they would do good evil was present to oppose them.

For it has been my design to show, that they are in their nature the most active principles in existence; and the primary cause in moral agents of all the effects ever produced in the universe. Hence I see no way but one, by which any persons could have received such ideas, as are contained in the objection. These principles have been considered as existing in the order of nature, or of time, antecedent to their operations. So from this, the objector might say, if they exist prior to any operations one second, they might a year, and during that time remain inactive and dormant. But does this prove they are in

active in their nature? It is thought not. The objector, it is supposed, will grant there are such things as causes in existence, and causes which are active in their nature, and which exist in some sense antecedent to the effects which they produce. Will it follow from this, that all causes are in their nature inactive, and dormant, and of course that there are no active causes existing in the universe? He may as well draw this inference, as the former. Suppose the objector should say, that active causes are always operating. Grant it. Does this prove they did not exist in some sense, previous to the effect they produce? If it be said, they exist previous to their effects in the order of nature, but not of time and may not active principles, which are in reality causes, exist in the order of nature previous to their operations? This he must grant, or boldly say, the operations of the human mind have no cause, but are accidental. For if these causes do not exist in the human mind, they must exist some where. If it be said that God is the immediate cause of all mental exercises; still this cause existed previous to the operations of the mind, or the operations it produces.

Hence the existence of effects, and all operations of the human mind, prove the existence of active causes and principles; and that these exist previous to the effects and operations, which they produce. If this be not true, then effects and operations have no cause. But this is the principal thing, which I labored to prove; that active principles do exist in the mind, antecedent to the operations which proceed from them; antecedent in the order of nature, or of time, or both. And now is the objector prepared to say, that active causes or principles are always operating from the instant they exist, and never cease to operate for one second? He may assert this ; but can he prove it? Perhaps he would find he has a task to perform, greater than he supposed, or will be able to accomplish. It is the nature of water to run to the centre. But is it always running? It is the nature of lightning to deprive man of life. But is it always lightning? Is this fluid always in operation? It has been proved, and the objector must grant, or deny the existence of any causes, that active principles do exist previous to their operations. They do produce love, hatred, anger, and a great variety of affections and passious. Is the same person always hating, always loving, always angry? If not, where is the principle, which produced anger, but is not now producing it? Is it always operating, or producing its proper effect? If so,