desires arise to enjoy them; and those desires give rise to all the volitions and actions necessary to have possession of them; and in obtaining them we act according to our pleasure; and when we enjoy them, our pleasure is done. If acting in this sense according to our pleasure is what they mean by a self determining power, (viz.) that our pleasure produces our volitions; it is granted that we have this power. But this power destroys indifference, and is consistent with necessity. To say we have a power to produce, and govern our pleasure, is false; but to say we are governed by our pleasure is true, and corresponds with our wishes. If then they admit our pleasure, in the sense explained, is a self determining power, to be consistent they must also admit our ideas of liberty. If they would do this, the dispute between them and us would be ended. ********** ESSAY XVI. Whether liberty is necessary to vice and virtue; and, if not, for what purposes is it requisite, in moral agents? It is, I believe, a general opinion, that liberty is necessary to the existence of vice and virtue. But the truth of this sentiment may be questioned. And if, when examined, it should not appear to be well founded, the inquiry will be, why is liberty requisite in a moral agent? For all will grant, that without it mankind would be very imperfect moral agents. I shall, therefore, inquire, 1. Whether liberty is necessary to the existence of vice and virtue. According to the description given of liberty in the preceding essay, any person will clearly perceive, it is not essential either to vice, or virtue. For vice and virtue must exist antecedent to the need, or use of liberty. For an illustration of the truth in relation to this subject, let the following suppositions be carefully examined. Suppose a person to have an inveterate hatred against his neighbor, which will lead him to take his life on the first favor able opportunity; I ask, is he not a murderer? Does not this hatred, or as the law defines it, this malice prepense, constitute the sin, or crime, denominated murder? From the time this hatred exists in his heart, is he not a murderer in the sight of God? He says, in his word, he that hateth his brother is a murderer. And if we had a knowledge of his heart, should not we view him in the same light? If vice and virtue belong to the heart, it is certain that this person is guilty of the crime called murder. For taking the life of a neighbor, is only the fruit or effect of a murderous disposition. Let us suppose further, that this person is born with this hatred, not only to his neighbor but to all mankind, which will prompt him to take the lives of his fellow men, as often as he judges he can do it with impunity. Is he not born with a murderous heart? If mankind knew he had this disposition, would they not have the same view of his heart, they have of the heart of one who has committed a murderous deed? Would they not stand in fear of him? Would they not watch him, and guard themselves against his assaults? I may now ask, is liberty necessary to the existence of this murderous dis position? The person, according to the supposition, is born with it. Is his birth an effect of his choice? Is this disposition a voluntary action, or the fruit and effect of his will? Is it an effect, which was produced by the operation of this person's agency? Surely not. And if not, the liberty of this person was not necessary to the existence of this murderous disposition. Again. Suppose a person is born with a benevolent disposition of heart. And such a supposition is not impossible; for many believe, that some persons are sanctified from the womb. Is not this benevolent innate disposition a moral virtue? Does it not lay a foundation in him to be pleased with the divine character and government? Will it not, as an internal active principle, influence him to serve God with fidelity and delight? But was the liberty of this person, in any sense, necessary to the existence of this benevolent disposition? We may as well suppose the exercise of liberty in an agent is necessary to his very existence. Furthermore. Calvinistic divines believe, that all mankind are born with depraved, corrupt hearts. And it is presumed, they will not assert, that the depravity of heart with which they are born is produced by their own voluntary exertions. And if they say, this depravity consists in voluntary exertions, yet they will not believe, that the agent produced them. For this would represent him as acting voluntarily, before he had any volition. It implies the same absurdity, which is implied in saying that a person creates himself. It is obvious, that, with respect to those appetites or dispositions with which we are born, they are not produced by our agency. We are no more the cause of them, than we are of our own existence. It is as inconsistent to suppose, that we produce our own faculties, as our own existence. And if it be said, we have no faculties, and the mind is nothing but our various mental operations united, still our first operations are not produced by us. For if operations constitute the mind, till they exist, there is no mind in being to operate. Accordingly the first operations, which constitute the mind, the mind could not produce; unless it can act before it exists. To suppose the mind is nothing but operations united, does not relieve any difficulty. For then the first operations, which according to this scheme must be called the heart, constitute that depravity with which we are born. It therefore clearly follows, that all, who believe we are born with depraved hearts, must admit, that this depravity is no more our production, than our own existence is. Of course liberty is no more necessary to the existence of original depravity than it is to our having a being in this world. Neither is it necessary to original holiness of heart. Adam was created in the image of God. And Calvinists believe he was created in the moral, as well as in the natural, image of his Maker. Accordingly he was created with a benevolent heart. And this benevolence of heart was no more the effect of his agency, than his own existence. Was his liberty necessary to his own existence? Could no tsuch an agent, as Adam was, be created, unles she exercised liberty in his creation? If not, it was impossible for such an agent to be produced. For he could not exercise liberty, before he existed. And the exercise of liberty was not necessary to the existence of a benevolent heart. For this was a quality given him in his creation. he could not act freely in its production. For agents cannot act at all, much less freely, before they have existence. His liberty, therefore, considered as an agent, was not necessary to the existence of a benevolent heart. And These observations will apply with equal force to prove, that men do not act freely in that change wrought in them, termed regeneration. If in this change something is created, as Calvinists believe there is, it is not produced by the agency of man. For it is granted, he has not power to create any thing. As the virtuous disposition, or exercise, or whatever it may be called, is not produced by man as the agent, but by the power of God, the sinner exercises no liberty in the production of it. Liberty is the privilege of a moral agent; a privilege of acting according to his pleasure, or as his feelings dictate. Such an agent must exist, antecedently to the need, or use of liberty. And if he is a complete moral agent, he has moral as well at natural faculties. And his moral faculty must be vicious or virtuous, the moment it has existence, as has been made evident in a previous essay. If this cannot be denied, it is certain that liberty is not necessary to the existence of either vice or virtue in the heart of moral agents. This is not only evident from the description given of liberty in the fourteenth Essay; but it is true, if we adopt the opinion generally received respecting it. Orthodox divines have commonly said, that liberty is a power of willing. If the will, or a power of willing, be a just definition of liberty, then the terms will and liberty mean the same thing. According to the definition, it is asked, whether the will is vicious, or virtuous, or neither? If it be answered, that the will is either virtuous, or vicious, then nothing is predicated of the will, but what may be affirmed of liberty, if liberty and will are the same thing. It therefore follows, that the liberty of moral agents is either virtuous or vicious. But the will did not produce itself. It was not created by man, but by his Creator. And as man, considered as an agent, did not exercise any liberty in the production of his will, because he did not, create it, yet the moment it exists, it is either vicious or virtuous; it is therefore evident, that liberty is not necessary to the existence of vice and virtue in a moral agent. For no agent can exercise liberty, before it exists. It is said by many, that the faculty, or power of willing, is liberty. And it is created with. the quality of vice, or virtue. But the will, with either of these qualities, is not produced by man, but by his Creator. And the will, the moment it exists, with the quality of vice or virtue, constitutes the depravity with which we are born. And as men do not exercise any liberty in the production of this depraved will, their liberty is not necessary to its existence; and of course it is not essential to the existence of vice and virtue. Some however say, that liberty consists in spontaneous, vol untary exertion. They also assert, that all vice and virtue consist in voluntary exertions, or exercises. This makes liberty, volition, vice and virtue, the same thing, According to this representation, the first volition of a moral agent constitutes his orignal depravity. But who is the agent that produces this first, depraved, vicious volition? Is man the agent? If not, then there is no liberty exercised by him in the existence of that, which constitutes his original depravity. But if it be said, that man is the agent, in this case, because voluntary exercises constitutes agency, this involves on absurdity. For it makes agency, and the effect it produces, the same thing. Because it is said, that volition is agency; and volition, at the same time, is the effect it produces. This cannot be true with respect to the first original volition in man, whatever it may be in relation to those which are subsequent to it. Therefore, according to this definition of liberty, it is not necessary to the existence of that original depravity with which men are born. For with respect to this first volition, which constitutes their original depravity, and from which all subsequent vicious exercises proceed, they were not at liberty to have it, or not to have it. Furthermore; what is meant by the phrase, liberty is necessary to the existence of vice and virtue ? Does it mean, that the original fountain of either vice or virtue in man, is produced by himself, and he is at liberty to produce it, or not? Whether the original depravity of man consists in taste, or will, or the first voluntary operation of the will, will any say, we create or produce them? We might with as much propriety say, we create ourselves. For no man can create a taste, or a will, or the first exercise of his will, any more than he can create himself. If not, he certainly is not at liberty to be either vicious, or virtuous, any more than he is at liberty to exist, or not exist. Indeed, in whatever light we may view the subject, it is apparent, that liberty is not necessary to the existence of either vice or virtue. For whether we shall be created with either a vicious or virtuous character, does not depend on our pleasure, any more than our being. Some are often objecting to this representation, saying, if a sinful inclination does not depend on our exertions, we are not blameable. This will be attended to, under the subject of praise and blameworthiness. Here it may be observed, that all who believe the doctrine of total depravity, grant we are born with |