the classes of society were more steadily distinguished, or who paid more uniform respect to the distinctions of rank. We affect to trace to them our love of freedom. We glory in attributing to them several of our wisest laws and the noblest principles of our constitution; we ascribe, and justly ascribe, to their wittenagemotes some of those institutions to which England at this hour owes her glory. Whom did these, our free, wise, and high-spirited ancestors, consider the best qualified to make laws for the welfare of the nation? Did they select the boxer, whose gambling adventures had gained him an equal portion of wealth and infamy? the manufacturing adventurer, whose sole eminence consisted in his successful attempts to make blacking for shoes? or the needy and reckless demagogue, who went about proclaiming to the rabble that all the existing order of things was one monstrous abuse? Were these the characters or rank of the men to whom our ancestors confided the great duty of legislation? They placed that power in the hands of their "wise men;" and those whom they designated by this honourable title were the then existing peers, spiritual and temporal, of the realm. True it is that many of that class whom we now denominate commoners were included in that assembly; but was it as an elected Far from it: or representative class? each man held his place there in his own right: he was not indebted to a faction for his rank, and compelled to consult the whim of that faction to retain that rank. Such men as this our ancestors deemed the objects of laws, not the makers of them. But it will be said that new principles were introduced at the Conquest. Perhaps so if they were, they were certainly not more favourable to liberty; but we are not here called on to show what is the nature of our constitution with regard to this great body, for that is sufficiently obvious; but to demonstrate that, in conferring on one portion of the community the powers and duties of the House of Lords, that constitution has acted wisely. But, in fact, the Conquest, as it is called, although it did ultimately, by the influx of Normans, bringing with them their national habits and institutions, materially alter our constitution, yet, with respect to the subject of our inquiry, their views But," it may be answered, “the wild and sanguinary ambition-bent The aristocracy of England was upon gaining the means of carrying on that portion of her inhabitants who that ruinous war with the neighbouring alone stood forward to brave and check continent, the success of which would the growing despotism of the papal have been fatal, and the failure of which see; who formed the constitutions of was most disastrous to the empire; Clarendon; who wrung from the unand hopeless of ever attaining, with willing cowardice of the caitiff John their consent, that arbitrary sway which the great charter of our liberties; who the other sovereigns of Europe had again and again vindicated and realready, in a great degree, become stored that charter when violated by possessed of did not the monarch, him and his successors, and finally under the influence of all these motives, established it beyond the reach of danger fix upon this very representative body, as the great beacon of the rights of and call them into being, for the pur- Englishmen. That illustrious body it pose of gaining a party in the legisla- was who repelled the attempt to subture, from their rank, more easily in- stitute for the free and rational princifluenced and corrupted; from their ples of the ancient common law of education, more incapable to judge England the elegant despotism of the with wisdom and impartiality; from code of Justinian; and when that system their habits and information less com- was pressed upon them with all the petent to foresee the result of measures; attractions attending its recent discoand, from all these united, better fitted very, with all the artifices and ingenuity to be the servile instruments by which of the clergy, aided by the influence of the despotism of the houses of Tudor the papal see and the favour of the and of Stuart was to be raised upon the sovereigns of Europe, whom it would ruins of Saxon and Norman liberty. have rendered masters of despotic power, they repressed the first attempt to introduce it by the brief and memorable reply, "We will not that the laws of England should be changed." a The introduction of a representative body into the legislature was so far, then, from being the result of feeling, on the part of the nation, that the confidence of their ancestors had been misplaced, and that the wise men, as they were emphatically called, were not the fittest persons to be entrusted with legislative power, that it was, in fact, the strongest proof that that body had not only executed their office with ability and success, but that they were such powerful and vigilant guardians of the constitution, that the monarch was compelled to create a house of commons to enable him to subvert the liberties of the nation. The truth of this position was exemplified in the manner in which this new body was looked on by the people. So conscious were they of the object of its formation, and so well aware that their liberties were in safer hands before its establishment, that it was a matter of great difficulty to persuade or force them to return representatives. For a length of time after its creation, the lower house was merely a committee of supply, and its admission to legislative power was merely a consequence of the influence it derived from the direction of the resources and of its greater subserviency to the designs of the crown. The limits to which we are at present confined will not admit a detailed history of all the important occasions on which the House of Lords, subsequently to the establishment of the House of Commons as a separate branch of the legislature, exercised its power to check the encroachments of the royal prerogative at one time, and to restrain the democratic spirit of the Commons at another, to defeat the attempts of that body to destroy the rights of the sovereign, or to turn on the very class for whose special protection they professed to have been founded, and to reduce the hereditary rights and liberties of the people to a submissive dependence on their haughty will. Numerous instances of the active, decided, and salutary interference of the upper house on all these occasions of public emergency, might be adduced, to which, as far as we can venture to point out the consequences likely to have resulted from a state of things where experience affords no direct light, the national rights and liberties owed their preservation from ruin. The importance of the House of Lords, as the guardian of the people against the tyrannical ambition of the Commons, was remarkably exemplified in the case of the Aylesbury burgesses, in the reign of William III. The Lord Chief Justice Holt had decided that the subject, when refused his right of voting by a returning officer at an election, had right of action against that officer in a court of common law. The Commons, incensed at this, asserted that no one had power to decide in any such cases but themselves. This was an affair of obvious importance, involving the question whether the subject had a right, by the law, to the exercise of his franchise, or whether a majority in the lower house should be able to perpetuate their power by authorising the returning officer to admit only such votes as they approved. The importance of the question was duly estimated by the nation, as well as by the courts of law and both houses. The Commons, enraged that any one should attempt to limit their authority, or propose any other mode of decision than their will, seized all the electors who had brought the actions, resolved them guilty of contempt and breach of privilege, and committed them to Newgate. The latter sued out writs of Habeas Corpus, and Holt fearlessly said that they were entitled to their discharge. The house, incensed at such audacity, issued warrants to seize even the counsel who had been concerned. Throughout the whole affair Holt had stood alone. The terrors of the house had intimidated the other judges. He bravely said, "If the House of Commons declare themselves to have privileges which they have no legal claim to, the people of England will not be stopped by that declaration." Here, however, he was mistaken. The people of England would, because they could not help it, have submitted; for their only remedy would have been by a rebellion. Holt would have fallen a victim to his courage, and the usurpation so gained would have been but the stepping-stone to more. But the country was saved even from a struggle. The House of Lords interposed their power; decreed, in a most solemn decision, that Holt was right; published an able and full statement of their judgment; sent it to all the returning officers, with their mandate to obey it, and enforced a sulky submission on the lower house. But the peers have not confined their interposition to the defence of the subject, although that is either passively or actively the constant effect of their authority. They have as frequently exerted it in restraining the unconstitutional attempts of the lower house against the rights of the crown: for examplein the reign of Charles the Second, the Commons had contrived a mode of assuming to themselves the whole legislative power, by tacking whatever bills they wished to pass to the end of the money bills; so that the one could not be passed without the other. Here the Lords interposed, and remonstrated against the practice, and finally made it a standing order of the house not to entertain any bills annexed to money bills. Soon after, in the same reign, the Commons attempted to render the crown elective, and to exclude the right heir from it. This would have been effected with the approbation of the people, who merely looked to the particular instance. The Lords, however, though feeling the urgency of that instance as strongly as either, yet saw the consequences of such a usurpation of power, and positively rejected the measure. The result was, that instead of a complete destruction of the whole system and principles of our social constitution, by a proceeding which would have subverted the monarchy, the nation was relieved from all the evils apprehended, by the subsequent abdication of the individual in question, and the consequent settlement of the crown on the very principles advocated by the Commons to justify their proposal, but in a manner which left the whole structure of the constitution precisely as before that event, or rather, if anything, confirmed and secured thereby. The Lords could not, it is true, have foreseen this result, and were therefore actuated merely by a steady and patient conviction of duty in disregard to the shallow wavering and Will-o'-thewisp-like doctrine of expediency; the adoption of which was certainly never more plausibly urged, or its fearless rejection more gloriously rewarded. It has also been a favourite attempt of the lower house to pass what are called place bills, restraining the distribution of preferments by the crown. During the whole of the last century the Lords resisted this encroachment, and uniformly rejected all such bills. We are here far from wishing to imply that the lower house has not been repeatedly of the greatest service in restraining the upper. We think, that in this respect, the obligation, for such it really is, has been perfectly mutual. But if our readers will take the trouble of tracing the circumstances in which these occasions of contest originated, they will probably arrive at the same conclusion which has impressed itself on our mind, that in most instances the improper conduct of the House of Lords was rather the result of individual or accidental motives, while, on the other hand, the salutary interference of that body, and the usurpations of the Commons were part of a system originating in, and produced by the essential constitution of the two bodies. To ascertain this, history must, in this respect, be viewed as a connected whole; but we think that this is the fairest way to view it, and we are assured that the result of the examination will justify the position we have laid down. We have endeavoured to show that the perfection of a legislative body consists in its being qualified to enact salutary laws for the benefit of the people, and that it is not of the least consequence whether such laws are agreeable to the people; that the House of Peers are in a high degree qualified for this purpose, not merely on account of their extensive acquirements and high honor, but from the fact of their not being, if we may so say, removeable from office at the pleasure of those whom the laws are made especially to govern and control, while they are also comparatively free from the temptations of individual interest, and that anxiety to make a name by introducing a measure, which is the natural result of temporary dignity. We have also noticed some of the practical illustrations afforded by history. We would briefly state our opinion thus. As far as results from their essential constitution, the House of Peers must be disposed to consider the introduction of a new law to be in itself, to a certain extent, an injury; the House of Commons to look upon it as a merit. It is better for a state to have its laws too few than too many. A legislative body should be as much on its guard against activity as an executive against supineness. It will not be necessary to enter at much length into the question of the utility of the House of Peers as a supreme court of judicature. It is obvious that some such court must exist-that it must be endowed as well with a legal as equitable jurisdiction--and that, since superiors may materially suffer from a trial by their inferiors, though the latter can seldom suffer from being judged by the former, that court should consist of the highest persons in the realm, who are competent for the office. But let us consider what are the component parts of that supreme court. Its acting members are chiefly of two classes, peers by descent, and peers elevated for legal learning and abilities. It derives, therefore, from the latter the greatest body perhaps of judicial information in the world, while the former act as a species of jury, selected from the very finest panel, if we may so express it, that was ever formed. As the court of ultimate resort, they must be, to a certain extent, judges both of law and of fact, and for this office there exists no other body equally qualified; while, as the authority which is to lay down what is the law in cases wholly new and without precedent, they must be more or less cognizant of, and able to declare the intention of the legislature which framed the law. The right of deciding without appeal, in all manner of cases, must be lodged in some one body. To none can it be so safely entrusted as to that class which is supplied by the constant influx of all that is most eminent for wisdom, learning and virtue. We cannot refrain from calling the attention of our readers to a powerful testimony which has lately appeared in favor of the utility of the House of Lords, and of the aristocracy in general. This evidence is drawn from the infuriated hatred and malice displayed towards them in three little pamphlets, attributed, though perhaps without foundation, to the pen of a distinguished patron of, and voucher for, the present ministry. Were that house useless they would not have been honored with such deep and bitter hatred; were they not really the safeguard of the nation they would not be denounced by the author and his faction with such ferocious hostility, as the grand obstacles to all improvement, or, in other words, as what he and they feel to be, the sole power in the state, able and willing to prevent the absolute ruin of every public and private right-every religious and political institution. This is sufficient to excite the most active malignity of such a person, and the unhappy beings to whom he addresses these seditious pamphlets. But this is not the only crime of that house in the eyes of those men. When the ringleader of that party, the secret patron and public eulogist of these pamphlets, was first raised to that house, its members were resolved, in spite of all his previous life, to treat him as if they supposed him to possess gentlemanly feelings, and they continued to do so until he had so effectually shown that the Ethiopian could not change his skin, that they were compelled not merely to form a just estimate of his character, but to manifest, in no doubt ful manner, what that estimate was. The works to which we allude are called, "Thoughts upon the Aristocracy of England, by Isaac Tomkins, Gent. ;" "A Letter to Mr. Isaac Tomkins, by Peter Jenkins ;" and "A Letter to Isaac Tomkins and Peter Jenkins, on Primogeniture, by Timothy Winterbottom." We strongly recommend the perusal of these little works to all those who think that they should seek for truth by joining no party, the Nicodemi and Agrippa of politics-but especially to that numerous body who advocate in principle or practice the doctrine of expediency, who eulogize the constitution, and with amiable indignation deny that they would suffer to be removed any portion whatever of its glorious fabric, except merely the useless blocks which constitute the foundation. To this most unhappy class of politicians, who add to the crime of following in the train of revolutionary ruffians the contemptible weakness of doing so reluctantly, we consider these little epitomes of all that is false, gross and disgusting in the radical press of Great Britain may be of use, because we think it will show them more fully than we can do, the folly and criminality of attempting to attain ends which they suppose to be good, by the encouragement and aid, in however slight a degree, of men whose principles they disapprove; and will demonstrate the practical fallacy of the theory, that in a revolution, the moderate majority of soi-disant reformers can restrain the more violent and consistent democrats, and effect by their united efforts a partial alteration. The rumour, which certainly proceeded from high authority, with respect to the authorship of these pamphlets, was probably grounded upon, and certainly received a strong confirmation from, the remarkable similarity to the style and consistency with the character and disposition of the individual whose first appearance was as contributor to an infidel periodical-his next as the advocate of that unhappy and abandoned woman, whom, for the purpose of obtaining an opportunity of insulting his sovereign and acquiring a polluted notoriety, he actually, while affecting zeal in her behalf, was foully and fatally betraying. It is not surprising that these productions should have been attributed to, and favourably reviewed, nay, highly eulogized by him, who, after a long and fruitless struggle to creep into the favor of the king he had insulted, and obtain the gratification of his vanity and the great object of his desires, an elevation to that rank which he affects to despise-an introduction to that society on which he now pours forth the vile abuse of his calumnious pen—at length attained the rank to which he had so long fondly aspired, by seizing the moment when a new ministry were coming in and embarrassed by a variety of difficulties, to give notice of a bill, the introduction of which would drive his friends out of office, in order to compel them to secure his silence by removing him to the upper house before the appointed day. The same perfectly consistent individual, while he retains the title of his rank in England, lays it aside in France, and preconcerts with one of the associates of his depravity, that the latter should, in the midst of a furious and pointless tirade against the aristocracy, make a mock apology to his lordship, in order that |