much more force, and knit with much greater vigour than any preceding one, would be formed against this country? was it not probable, from the experience of the past, that Denmark would be induced by inclination, or compelled by force, to join that league? He illustrated the probability of such an event at great length, by his torical details, accompanied with reflections and inferences. Among other details and comments, he read extracts from several dispatches from Mr. Garlicke, stating that after the French decree of the 21st November had been communicated to the Danish government, a deanand was made, that the Danish army should be withdrawn from Holstein, that no English or Swedish troops should be allowed to enter the Danish territory, nor any mea sures taken demonstrative of distrust of France; that on receipt of this intelligence at Kiel, relays of horses had been provided, not for the advance, but to secure the retreat of the crown prince; that no preparations had been made for defence, nor any inclination shewn to resort to the aid of the natural allies of Denmark; that several of -the persons employed in the offices of state, were attached to the French interests, and acted in collusion with France. In short, Mr. Garlicke thought it his duty to state, that there was reason to conclude, that France, when in an attitude to make the demand, would insist on the exclusion of British vessels from the ports of Denmark, and probably afterwards, on the surrender of Copenhagen. Mr. C. asked, whether Denmark had not the most unequivocal intimation of the dangers that hung over her? Had not the bulletin published by Buonaparte, after the battle of Friedland, given her notice of her approaching fate; when it stated, "That the blockade of the continent would then cease to be a vain word?" To what other ports than those of Denmark, could this prospective threat be applied? What others were neutral? To Denmark alone, this intimation of the bulletin referred, and accordingly she was found shrinking into her shell, as France approached, and neglecting to make any addition to her means of defence. He asked, if this was a state of things in which his majesty's ministers were to go on, confiding in the sincerity and the means of the Danish government, till they should be called on for assistance?-As to the disposition of Russia, all accounts agreed in representing, that the mind of the court of Russia was alienated from this country, and one might easily conceive a reason for that alienation. The expectation of assistance from this country, no matter whether well or ill founded, was the cause, not of the peace of Tilsit, but of the temper in which it was concluded. Out of twenty dispatches received from our ambassador with the emperor, there was not one in which he did not say, "Send assistance, or Russia will fail you. Make a diversion that shall take part of the weight of the war off Russia, or she will withdraw from it.” It had been said, why not attack Cronstadt, and menace the emperor in bis own capital? There was a great party, or rather a majority of the bettermost people in Russia, who were anxious for British connection; but whatever the partialities of such persons might have been, they must all have felt for the honour and glory of their country and mented. Those who thought the policy of that measure weak, and its execution unjust, would vote against him; but he could not consider it as manly to take the division upon the motion for papers, and not on the merits of the question, merely because some few would vote for papers who would not support a motion for censure. and therefore it could not be desireable to destroy, by an unprofitable attack on the national feelings, the nascent popularity of this country. Besides, there were, at that time, five hundred British ships in the ports of Russia, and six thousand British seamen. The conduct that had been adopted in the expedition to Copenhagen, was not without precedent or example. In the year 1801, the island of Madeira had been taken possession of by our government, for fear it should fall into the hands of the French; yet Portugal was a neutral nation, and bad always, by way of eminence, been styled the old and ancient ally of England. In the year 1866, there had been reports of its being the intention of the French government to invade Portugal. He had, himself, no doubt of the perpetual intention of the French government to prosecute that design, though it did not appear, that a French army was assembled at Bayoune. He admired the conduct which had been adopted by the late minister on the occasion; and he felt gratitude, for the manner in which their proceeding had enabled him to meet the general question on this charge. Here he read an extract from the instructions, given by the late board of admiralty to the earl of St. Vincent, when dispatched to-Lisbon. Of all persons he did not think, that the present ministers should be accused of injustice by the captors of Alexandria; of mismanagement, by the attackers of the Dardanelles; as inglorious, by the conquerors of Constantinople.tugueze themselves, that there was By the expedition to Copenhagen, no alternative between our tempothe means of the enemy for injuring rary possession of the ships, and Great Britain had been reduced, their seizure by France: that though and the security of the country aug- compelled to the execution, the Mr. Windham, after a good deal of laughter at the action and gesticulation with which Mr. Canming was accustomed to grace his oratory, observed, that he had ventured to justify himself upon cases not only not analagous, but in direct and pointed contradiction to the question at issue: "You," says he, "the late ministers, condemn our measure against Copeulragen, although you did the same thing against Portugal:"-" To this," said Mr. Windham, we answer, "that though in the same situation, we did not perform the same act. The navy of Portugal was threatened with an attack by Buonaparte; an army had actually been assembled at Bayonne, for the purpose of violating the neutrality of Portugal, and ultimately seizing her fleet.— We sent a squadron, under the command of an intelligent and active officer, to be actually on the spot; not to be guided by general and unsupported surmises; not to proceed to extremity until the intention of France was not only manifest, but likely to be carried into execution, until it should be evident to the world, and to the Por means means of justification should be as manifest as the measure." The attack on Copenhagen, Mr. Windham considered as a violation of that public law of nations, which, though adverse on occasions to the particular views of communities, was still conducive to the general interests of mankind. Did the partizans of that measure vainly hope, that its advantages would outlive the danger and the calamities that would spring from it? When Denmark or France should have recruited that marine with the hearts and energies which our conduct had afforded them? Here Mr. Windham drew a very lively picture of the recollections and sentinents of the Danes, and other nations, on beholding the monuments of our havoc in Copenhagen. There was a class of men, he said, so prone to all the narrow views aud, sordid inducements of life, that no measure appeared to be of value, but in the sordid profit it produced. These men would greet with acclamation every act of plunder and rapine, careless of the means and manner in which it was effected. "But I wish to hear the opinion of your learned doctors of the law, of your profound sages, and learned civilians, on the opposite side of the house. Are they converts to the new doctrine? Will they disclaim the efficacy of that public law of nations, which they have taken such care to understand and to communicate? Are they prepared to throw off their wigs, bury, their books, and break their wands, in order to substitute the new system of unprovoked outrage, in place of the exploded doctrine of moral justice? A due and proper confidence in ministers, I would be the last man to refuse; but under the present circumstances, I must tell them, that from me they have no letter of attorney to involve the credit and honour of the country, and to tarnish it with a stain, which no future circumstances can remove." Mr. Milnes said, that while gentlemen opposite to him gave credit to the assurances of Buonaparte, they omitted no opportunity of calling in question the declarations of their own sovereign and his ministers. It had been contended that the measure now before the house was wrong upon the face of it; but was there not something wrong ou the face of a motion, which requir ed a disclosure of information confidentially communicated? Would it not be injudicious to throw open the records of the foreign office, by which the enemy would be put in possession of the means that government had of obtaining a knowledge of his plans, and eventually of frustrating their execution? He considered the motion as an attempt, on the part of the opposition, to convert the money voted by parliament for secret service into means of procuring information for themselves, which no one else was at all solicitous to obtain. He advised them, instead of bringing forward motions of this description, at once to propose a resolution, that ministers had lost the confidence of parliament. Mr. Bathurst observed, that the danger of disclosing proofs should not be pleaded generally. Let ministers tell, why this or that specific paper could not be granted. Nor was it necessary, in granting any paper, that they should ac quaint the house how they came by He did not think, that there could be any objection to the prodoction of any documents that had been moved for: and, in his opiBion, the letters, extracts from which had been read, ought to be among the number. The letter of Mr. Garlicke, for instance, stating the hostile mind of Deumark, was very important. It was important also, for the house to know, upon what the opinion of that gentleman was founded; that, if the French were once in possession of Holstein, the island of Zealand must fall into their power. Mr. Canning, in allasion to the conduct of the late administration towards Portugal, had argued, that if we could atack our ally, surely we might attack a power which we had every reason to suspect of hostile intentions against us; but the honourable secretary seemed not to know, er to have forgot, that the expedition alinded to was sent, not to attack, but to protect an ally, at a time when there were British troops in Portugal, to repel an actual i Vason of French and Spanish troops. He could not, however, best remark that ministers, while they withheld all information, respecting the late expedition, had not the smallest scruple in disclosing all the secrets of government for the last seven years. Mr. Leslie Foster conceived, that the expedition to Copenhagen was imperatively dictated by the ascendancy which Buonaparte had acquered over the arms and counsels of the powers of the north, in consequence of the negligence and supineness of the late administration, which had done nothing for the common cause, except sending a miserable subsidy to the king of Prussia, which was like a present to the dey of Algiers. Mr. Morris called upon gentlemen to reflect on the imminent danger with which this country was threatened, and particularly Ireland; the invasion of which was the object to which the use of the Danish fleet was destined. Mr. Lyttleton confessed, that differing as he did from the present administration, on many important points, from the satisfaction they had given the house on the measure of the late expedition, he had on that point become their proselyte. The Danish fleet was nodoubtedly intended for the invasion of Ireland. a Mr. Whitbread concluded speech in support of the motion before the house, as follows: "Ministers wanted to imitate the enemy of France. How did they do that? France had slain a giant, and then England must go and kill an heipless, innocent child; but the question now was, not whether the expedition was ju-tifiable, but whether that house was bound to give credit to the assertions of ministers, and whether it ought not to require more information. Lord Leveson Gower denied positively, that the hostility of Russia was occasioned, either by the neglect of England to send her succours, or by the attack on Copenhagen. The real cause of that hostility, was, the battle of Friedland. When the emperor Alexander arrived at Petersburgh from Tilsit, after siguing the peace with France, the first person he visited was his minister of marine; and the first orders he afterwards gave, was to repair the batteries of Cronstadt. Lord Lord Castlereagh, among a great variety of particulars touched on in a long speech, in vindication of the expedition to Copenhagen, gave an account of the various endea vours used by his majesty's government to bring the court of Denmark to an explanation of its views, without effect; and concluded, that the crown prince, in the whole of his conduct, had secretly favoured the views of France. He denied, that Denmark was competent to defend itself against the power of France. As to the assertion, that we ought to have remained in Copenhagen, government had given that question every discussion; and the naval and military officers being consulted on the occasion, were of opinion, that it would require a larger force to keep possession of Zealand than this country could spare; and much greater than was then in Zealand. The question, also, had been put to the first naval authorities, whether the island could be surrounded by our vessels, so as to prevent an invasion on the part of the French. The report of Admiral Keith was, that on the JutJand side there were seven or eight forts, in which might be collected to the amount of sixty thousand men; that, if the ninety pendants which were then flying round Zealand were to occupy the Belt, they must be five miles distant from each other; and that, as some of these might be driven from their stations the French could on that occasion send over their forces in the small craft, of which there was a sufficient number along the shores of Jutland. Mr. Lushington defended the expedition on the usual grounds. On the topic of the law of nations, he said, the sentimental system of gentlemen on the other side of the house, embraced all nations but their own. Their disquisitions might be well enough calculated for the amusement of schools; but they were not fitted for the events of real life, or a state of ferocious war.-On a división of the house, there appeared for Mr. Ponsonby's motion 108. Against it 253. House of Lords, Feb. 8.-The duke of Norfolk called the attention of their lordships to the important subject, on which he had moved them to be summoned. The expedition to Copenhagen, was a measure which deeply affected the character of the country; and, in order that they might come to a true judgment of it, it was material that they should be furnished with all that body of information, to which ministers had, on a former night, alluded, but which was not regularly on their table. Violence of an extraordinary kind had been used, and great scandal had been incurred both to the government and the nation, from which nothing but clear evidence of au imperious necessity could acquit them: an evidence not to be afforded but by the examination of papers. He would so word his motion, as to steer clear of all difficulty and danger of disclosure; and he should even have no objection to alter the words, if it should be thought any inconveniency could arise from it as it now stood to any of the agents of ministers, or to the state. The duke moved, for "the substance of all the communications that had been made to ministers in the course of the last year, with respect to the state of the Danish navy, of any apparent increase thereof, or of any steps |