"series of acts, if I had secretly intended to "threaten, or to use a degree of violence, for "no other purpose than to draw from the object "of it a mercenary atonement for my own "private emolument, and suffer all this tumult "to terminate in an ostensible and unsubstan"tial submission to the authority which I re"presented."

He had just before said, "If I ever talked "of selling the Company's sovereignty to the "Nabob of Oude, it was only in terrorem." In the face of this assertion, he here gives you to understand, he never held out any thing in terrorem, but what he intended to execute. But we will shew you, that in fact he had reserved to himself a power of acting pro re natâ : and that he intended to compound or not, just as answered his purposes upon this occasion. “I admit,” he says, " that I did not enter it," (the intention of fining Cheit Sing) on the "consultations, because it was not necessary; " even this plan itself of the fine was not a fixed

plan, but to be regulated by circumstances, "both as to the substantial execution of it and "the mode." Now here is a man who has given it in a sworn narrative, that he did not intend to have a farthing less. Why? Because I should "have menaced and done as in former times "has been done; made great and violent de

"mands

"mands which I reduce afterwards for my own corrupt purposes." Yet he tells you in the course of the same defence, but in another paper, that he had no fixed plan, that he did not know whether he should exact a fine at all, or what should be his mode of executing it.

My Lords, what shall we say to this man, who declares, that it would be a proof of corruption, not to exact the full sum, which he had threatened to exact, but who finding that this doctrine would press hard upon him, and be considered as a proof of cruelty and injustice, turns round and declares he had no intention of exacting any thing? What shall we say to a man, who thus reserves his determination, who threatens to sell a tributary prince to a tyrant, and cannot decide whether he should take from him his forts, and pillage him of all he had; whether he should raise 500,000l. upon him, whether he should accept the 220,000 1. offered (which by the way we never knew of till long after the whole transaction), whether he should do any or all of those things, and then by his own account going up to Benares, without having resolved any thing upon this important subject?

My Lords, I will now assume the hypothesis that he at last discovered sufficient proof of rebellious practices; still even this gave him no right to adduce such rebellion in justification of VOL. XV. resolutions

L

resolutions which he had taken, of acts which he had done, before he knew any thing of its existence. To such a plea we answer, and your Lordships will every one of you answer, you shall not by a subsequent discovery of rebellious practices, which you did not know at the time and which you did not even believe, as you have expressly told us here, justify your conduct prior to that discovery.

If the conspiracy which he falsely imputes to Cheit Sing; if that wild scheme of driving the English out of India had existed, think in what miserable circumstances we stand as prosecutors and your Lordships as judges, if we admit a discovery to be pleaded in justification of antecedent acts founded upon the assumed existence of that which he had no sort of proof, knowledge or belief of!

My Lords, we shall now proceed to another circumstance, not less culpable in itself though less shocking to your feelings than those to which I have already called your attention; ; a circumstance which throws a strong presumption of guilt upon every part of the Prisoner's conduct, Having formed all these infernal plots in his mind, but uncertain which of them he should execute, uncertain what sums of money he should extort, whether he should deliver up the Rajah to his enemy, or pillage his forts; he goes

up

up to Benares; but he first delegates to himself all the powers of government, both civil and military, in the countries, which he was going to visit.

My Lords, we have asserted in our charge, that this delegation and division of power was illegal. He invested himself with this authority; for he was the majority in the council. Mr. Wheler's consent or dissent signifying nothing. He gave himself powers which the Act of Parliament did not give him. He went up to Benares with an illegal commission civil and military; and to prove this I shall beg leave to read the provisions of the Act of Parliament. I shall shew what the creature ought to be, by shewing the law of the Creator: what the Legislature of Great Britain meant that Governour Hastings should be, not what he made himself. [Mr. Burke then read the seventh section of the Act.]

Now we do deny that there is by this Act given, or that under this Act there can be given to the Government of India, a power of dividing its unity into two parts, each of which shall separately be a unity, and possess the power given to the whole. Yet, my Lords, an agreement was made between him and Mr. Wheler, that he (Mr. Hastings) should have every power civil and military, in the upper provinces, and

that Mr. Wheler should enjoy equal authority in the lower ones.

Now, to shew you that it is impossible for such an agreement to be legal, we must refer you to the constitution of the Company's government. The whole power is vested in the Council, where all questions are to be decided by a majority of voices, and the members are directed to record in the minutes of their proceedings, not only the questions decided, but the grounds upon which each individual member founds his vote. Now although the Council is competent to delegate its authority for any specifick purpose to any servant of the Company, yet to admit that it can delegate its authority generally, without reserving the means of deliberation and controul, would be to change the whole constitution. By such a proceeding the government may be divided into a number of independent governments, without a common deliberative council and controul. This deliberative capacity, which is so strictly guarded by the obligation of recording its consultations, would be totally annihilated, if the Council divided itself into independent parts, each acting according to its own discretion. There is no similar instance in law, there is no similar instance in policy. The conduct of these men implies a direct contradiction, and you will see,

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