dom of the nation was from turning a case of neceffity into a rule of law.

Unquestionably there was at the revolution, in the perfon of King William, a small and a temporary deviation from the ftrict order of a regular hereditary fucceffion; but it is againft all genuine principles of jurifprudence to draw a principle from a law made in a fpecial cafe, and regarding an individual perfon. Privilegium non tranfit in exemplum. If ever there was a time favourable for establishing the principle, that a king of popular choice was the only legal king, without all doubt it was at the revolution. Its not being done at that time is a proof that the nation was of opinion it ought not to be done at any time. There is no perfon fo completely ignorant of our history, as not to know that the majority in Parliament of both parties were fo little difpofed to any thing resembling that principle, that at firft they were determined to place the vacant crown, not on the head of the Prince of Orange, but on that of his wife Mary, daughter of King James, the eldeft born of the iffue of that king, which they acknowledged as undoubtedly his. It would be to repeat a very trite ftory, to recall to your memory all thofe circumftances which demonstrated that their accepting King William was not properly a choice; but to all those who did not wifh, in effect, to recall King James, or to deluge their country in blood, and again to bring their religion, laws, and liberties into the peril they had just efcaped, it was an act of neceffity, in the ftricteft moral fense in which neceffity can be taken.

In the very act, in which, for a time, and in a fingle cafe, Parliament departed from the ftrict order of inheritance, in favour of a prince, who, though not next, was however very near in the line of fucceffion, it is curious to obferve how Lord Somers, who drew the bill, called the Declaration of Right, has comported himfelf on that delicate occafion. It is curious to obferve with what addrefs this temporary

1

folution of continuity is kept from the eye; whilft all that could be found in this act of neceffity to countenance the idea of an hereditary fucceffion is brought forward, and fostered, and made the most of, by this great man, and by the Legiflature who followed him. Quitting the dry, imperative ftyle of an act of Parliament, he makes the Lords and Commons fall to a pious, legiflative ejaculation, and declare, that they confider it "as a marvellous pro"vidence, and merciful goodness of God to this "nation, to preserve their faid Majefties royal per"fons, moft happily to reign over us on the throne of their ancestors, for which, from the bottom of "their hearts, they return their humbleft thanks and "praifes." The Legiflature plainly had in view the act of recognition of the firft of Queen Elizabeth, chap, 3d, and of that of James the Firft, chap. 1st, both acts ftrongly declaratory of the inheritable nature of the crown, and in many parts they follow, with a nearly literal precifion, the words, and even the form of thankfgiving, which is found in these old declaratory ftatutes.

The two houfes, in the act of King William, did not thank God that they had found a fair opportunity to affert a right to choose their own governors, much lefs to make an election the only lawful title to the crown. Their having been in a condition to avoid the very appearance of it, as much as poffible, was by them confidered as a providential efcape. They threw a politic, well-wrought veil over every cir cumftance tending to weaken the rights, which in the meliorated order of fucceffion they meant to perpetuate; or which might furnish a precedent for any future departure froin what they had then fettled for ever. Accordingly, that they might not relax the nerves of their monarchy, and that they might preferve a close conformity to the practice of their ancestors, as it appeared in the declaratory ftatutes of

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Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, in the next clause they veft, by recognition, in their majefties, all the legal prerogatives of the crown, declaring, that in them they are moft fully, rightfully, and intirely invefted, incorporated, united, and an"nexed." In the claufe which follows, for preventing queftions, by reafon of any pretended titles to the crown, they declare (obferving alfo in this the traditionary language, along with the traditionary policy of the nation, and repeating as from a rubric the language of the preceding acts of Elizabeth and James) that on the preferving a certainty in the "SUCCESSION thereof, the unity, peace, and tran"quillity of this nation doth, under God, wholly "depend."

They knew that a doubtful title of fucceffion would but too much refemble an election; and that an election would be utterly deftructive of the "unity, peace, and tranquillity of this nation," which they thought to be confiderations of fome moment. To provide for thefe objects, and therefore to exclude for ever the Old Jewry doctrine of "a right to choose our own governors," they follow with a claufe, containing a moft folemn pledge, taken from the preceding act of Queen Elizabeth, as folemn a pledge as ever was or can be given in favour of an hereditary fucceffion, and as folemn a renunciation as could be made of the principles by this fociety imputed to them. "The lords fpiritual

and temporal, and commons, do, in the name of "all the people aforefaid, moft humbly and faithfully fubmit themselves, their heirs and poflerities for ever; and do faithfully promife, that they will "ftand to, maintain, and defend their faid majefties, and alfo the limitation of the crown, herein specified and contained, to the utmost of their powers," &c. &c.

ift Mary, feff. 3. ch. 1.

So far is it from being true, that we acquired a right by the revolution to elect our kings, that if we had poffeffed it before, the English nation did at that time moft folemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themfelves, and for all their pofterity for ever. Thefe gentlemen may value themselves as much as they please on their whig principles; but I never defire to be thought a better whig than Lord Somers; or to understand the principles of the revolution better than thofe by whom it was brought about; or to read in the declaration of right any mysteries unknown to thofe whofe penetrating ftyle has engraved in our ordinances, and in our hearts, the words and fpirit of that immortal law.

It is true that, aided with the powers derived from force and opportunity, the nation was at that time, in some sense, free to take what course it pleased for filling the throne; but only free to do fo upon the fame grounds on which they might have wholly abolished their monarchy, and every other part of their conftitution. However they did not think fuch bold changes within their commiffion. It is indeed difficult, perhaps impoffible, to give limits to the mere abftract competence of the fupreme power, fuch as was exercifed by parliament at that time; but the limits of a moral competence, fubjecting, even in powers more indifputably fovereign, occafional will to permanent reason, and to the fteady maxims of faith, juftice, and fixed fundamental policy, are perfectly intelligible, and perfectly binding upon thofe who exercife any authority, under any name, or under any title, in the ftate. The houfe of lords, for inflance, is not morally competent to diffolve the house of commons; no, nor even to diffolve itself, nor to abdicate, if it would, its portion in the legislature of the kingdom. Though a king may abdicate for his own perfon, he cannot abdicate for the monarchy. By as ftrong, or by a ftronger reason, the houfe of commons cannot renounce its

hare of authority. The engagement and pact of fociety, which generally goes by the name of the conftitution, forbids fuch invafion and fuch surrender. The conftituent parts of a ftate are obliged to hold their public faith with each other, and with all those who derive any ferious interest under their engagements, as much as the whole ftate is bound to keep its faith with feparate communities. Otherwife competence and power would foon be confounded, and no law be left but the will of a prevailing force. On this principle the fucceffion of the crowir has always been what it now is, an hereditary fucceffion by law in the old line it was a fucceffion by the common law; in the new by the ftatute law, operating on the principles of the common law, not changing the fubftance, but regulating the mode, and defcribing the perfons. Both thefe defcriptions of law are of the fame force, and are derived from an equal authority, emanating from the common agreement and original compact of the ftate, communi fponfione reipublice, and as fuch are equally binding on king and people too, as long as the terms are obferved, and they continue the fame body politic.

It is far from impoffible to reconcile, if we do not fuffer ourselves to be entangled in the mazes of metaphyfic fophiftry, the ufe both of a fixed rule and an occafional deviation; the facrednefs of an hereditary principle of fucceffion in our government, with a power of change in its application in cafes of extreme emergency. Even in that extremity (if we take the measure of our rights by our exercife of them at the revolution} the change is to be confined to the peccant part only; to the part which produced the neceffary deviation; and even then it is to be effected without a decompofition of the whole civil and political mafs, for the purpose of originating a new civil order out of the firft elements of fociety.

A ftate without the means of fome change is without the means of its confervation. Without fuch