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1792.

Nabob toward the peace establishment was fixed at nine lacs of pagodas, per CHAP. IV, annum; the payment to his creditors was reduced from twelve to six lacs, 21,105 pagodas; and for the expenses of war, he was to contribute, as by the last agreement, four-fifths of his revenues.

As security for these payments, it was agreed, That during war, the Company should assume entirely the receipt and disbursement of the Nabob's revenues, which he should recover upon the restoration of peace: And that, if any failure of payment occurred during peace, the Company should enter upon the receipt of the revenues of certain specified districts, from which the Nabob's officers should, in that event, be withdrawn. The Polygars of Madura and Tinivelly, whose power enabled them to resist the feeble government of the Nabob, and, in a great measure, to prevent the collection of his revenue, were transferred to the management of the English.

It appears from the dispatches of Lord Cornwallis, that he set a great value upon this arrangement; and fondly believed it was calculated to answer all the ends which it was the object of himself and his countrymen to secure. The complaints of which he had heard, were chiefly complaints respecting the securities for the payments of the Nabob. The securities which he had taken had the appearance of being complete; and he saw not far beyond first appearances. The observation is just, "that though this engagement simplified in some points, and greatly ameliorated in others, the engagement which Sir Archibald Campbell had contracted; it corrected none of its radical defects."* Management during a limited and precarious period excluded that minute knowledge on which could be founded an assessment, just either to the Company or the inhabitants; ensured the bad offices of all descriptions of the people, who had an interest in courting the government which they were again to obey; and totally prevented the introduction of a new management, in place of that cruel and oppressive system which, under the government of the Nabob, desolated the country.

French settle

Of the transactions of Lord Cornwallis with foreign powers, one yet remains Capture of the of sufficient importance to require an appropriate statement. In 1793, the ments. change of government in France precipitated the people of England into a war with that country. It followed, as a matter of course, that in India the possessions of the French should be attacked. The interests of the French in India, had now, for a great while, languished under poverty and neglect. The progressive embarrassments of the government at home, and the progressive inten

6.

*Sir John Malcolm, ut supra, p. 114..

1792.

BOOK VI. sity with which the eyes of the nation were turned upon that government, left the Indian establishments in a state of weakness, ill fitted to resist the weight of the English power, when the bonds of peace were broken asunder. The forces of Madras were sent against Pondicherry, with Major-General Sir John Brathwaite at their head. And Lord Cornwallis hastened from Bengal, to obtain the honour of expunging the republicans. The difficulty, however, was so very small, that the enterprise was accomplished before he arrived; and the whole of the French settlements in India were added to the English possessions.

CHAP. V.

Lord Cornwallis's Financial and Judicial Reforms.

THE measures taken during the administration of this Viceroy, for altering the CHAP. V. internal government of the British dominions in India, are not less memorable than his transactions with foreign states.

1787.

commanded by the autho

In the eye of the new government of India, consisting more ostensibly of the Regulations Directors, more really of the King's ministers, revenue naturally constituted the first object. In the code of instructions, with which, upon his departure for his rities at home. government, Lord Cornwallis was provided, occasion was taken to censure the financial administration of his predecessors, and to prescribe a new arrangement. The frequent changes, the substitution of farmers and temporary agents for the permanent Zemindars, the failure of all attempts to enhance the revenue, and the exclusion of the collectors from a share in forming the assessments of their respective districts, were mentioned with disapprobation. Complaint was made of the heavy arrears outstanding on the settlement of the last four years; and the country was represented as exhausted and impoverished. Such is the opinion which it was, by the King's ministers and the Court of Directors, held fit to express, of the merits of the British government, in India, at the date of this document, in April, 1786. For the purpose of improvement, they directed, that a settlement should be made with the Zemindars. Knowledge sufficient for an equitable assessment, they presumed, was already acquired. They prescribed the period of ten years, as the limit to which the settlement should be confined, in the first instance. But they declared their intention to render it permanent, provided, on experience, it should merit their approbation. They further commanded, that the collectors of the revenue should be vested with the powers of judicature and police; by having conveyed to them the principal authority in the Duannee Adauluts, with the power of magistrates in apprehending offenders against the public peace. And, in making this provision for the administration of justice, they declared, that they were not actuated by "abstract theories-drawn," they said, "from other countries, or applicable to a different state of things, but a consideration of the subsisting manners and usages of the people."

Upon his arrival in India, Lord Cornwallis found, that his masters in England Lord Corn

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Book VI. were egregiously mistaken, when they imagined that there was sufficient knowledge, already treasured up, for the business of settling the revenue. The very

1787. wallis suspends obedience in

regard to the

revenue.

Obeys in regard to justice and police.

The Company's servants

ill situated for

business of veform.

nature of the land-tenure was not understood. The rights of the different orders of people, who cultivated the soil, and divided its produce, formed a complicated mystery. All that was known, with any certainty, was, the amount of revenue which had been annually collected. But whether the country could pay more, or the exactions were already heavier than it could bear, no man had any satisfactory grounds to affirm. In this situation Lord Cornwallis determined to suspend his obedience to the orders of Whitehall and Leadenhall-street; to content himself, in the mean time, with annual settlements, by the local agency of the district collectors, and the superintendance of the Committee, now decorated with the title of Board, of Revenue; to circulate interrogatories, and collect information from every accessible source.*

The directions of the government at home, with regard to the administration of justice, were treated with greater respect; the Governor-General saw nothing here to dissuade prompt obedience. In 1787, regulations were promulgated ; and the collectors were vested with the triple power of revenue agents, of judges, and of police magistrates. It is good to hear the reasons which the compound of statesmen and Directors now formed into an instrument of government for India, produced for this device of theirs. They prescribed it, they said, on account of its" tendency to simplicity, energy, justice, and economy."

By Mr. Shore,† on whom the Governor-General chiefly relied for information, it was remarked, in that document, in which he exhibited the result of his obserthe important vation and inquiries; That the constitution of the English government in India was ill adapted for promoting improvement, and the situation of the Company's servants ill calculated for the acquisition of knowledge and legislative talent. The individuals of whom the government was composed, were in such a state of fluctuation, that no separate portion of them had time to conceive and mature any important ideas of reform. In the next place he remarked, that the servants of the Company were so much engrossed with official forms and the details of business, as to be in a great measure debarred from the acquisition even of local knowledge. Still further; he asserted, that the knowledge which they acquired was not appropriate knowledge, such as lays the foundation for political wisdom:

* The fate of Mr. Francis, and of Mr. Francis's ideas, formed a contrast. He himself had been treated by the powers which then were, with any thing rather than respect. But his plan of finance was adopted with blind enthusiasm, a sort of a mechanical and irresistible impulse. ↑ Afterwards Sir John Shore, and finally Lord Teignmouth.

1787.

it was a mere knowledge of practice; that is to say, a knowledge of a certain CHAP. V. number of facts which are obvious; with ignorance of the numerous facts which lie more remote; and ignorance of the numerous connexions which subsist both among those same facts which may happen to be familiar, and those of the far wider circle which is wholly unknown.* From knowledge of this sort, no plan of improvement; no combination of expedients to make the future better than the past, can ever be rationally expected.

It is necessary to remark, that Mr. Shore, aware of that succession of blunders, which constituted the succession of attempts to improve the mode of governing India, claims indulgence for so many errors, on account of the time required to obtain a knowledge of Asiatic manners and finance. This apology may delude; unless the distinction is made between the errors which arose from the want of local knowledge, and those which arose from general ignorance. Those which arose from the want of local knowledge, as far as more time was absolutely necessary for its acquisition, are not to be blamed. Those which arose from general ignorance are, in every instance, the proper objects of reprobation: because provision should always have been made for giving to the

* The words are worth transcribing. They meet some obstinate prejudices, and some pernicious ideas. "If we consider the form of the British government in India, we shall find it ill calculated for the speedy introduction of improvement. The members, composing it, are in a constant state of fluctuation; and the period of their residence often expires, before experience can be acquired, or reduced to practice.-Official forms necessarily occupy a large portion of time, and the constant pressure of business leaves little leisure for study and reflection, without which no knowledge of the principles and detail of the revenues of this country can be obtained.-True information is also procured with difficulty; because it is too often derived from mere practice, instead of being deduced from fixed principles.-Every man who has long been employed in the management of the revenues of Bengal, will, if candid, allow, that his opinion on many important points has been often varied, and that the information of one year has been rendered dubious by the experience of another. Still, in all cases, decision is necessary. And hence, precedents, formed on partial circumstances, and, perhaps, on erroneous principles, become established rules of conduct. For a prudent man, when doubtful, will be happy to avail himself of the authority of example. The multiplication of records, which ought to be a great advantage, is, in fact, an inconvenience of extensive magnitude; for in them only the experience of others can be traced, and reference requires much time and labour." Mr. Shore's Minute on the Bengal revenues, paragraph 2d, in the Appendix, Fifth Report of Committee on India Affairs, 1810, p. 169. If the multiplication of documents is troublesome to the Company's servants, what must it be to the historian, whose field is so much wider? It is worth remarking, that the Committee in 1810 not only inserted the whole of the Minute, in the Appendix to the Report above quoted, but laid so much stress upon this particular passage, as to incorporate it with the Report, p. 11.

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