commanded by their ablest marshal. The increasing activity of the war, with the vicissitudes of service, engendered many irregularities, and courtsmartial became frequent. The Duke of Wellington, anxious that these should be conducted with as close a consistency as possible to established rules, although in many respects the military code dispenses with the formalities of civil practice, had applied for a regular legal practitioner to fill the important post of judge advocate- general to the army under his command. Mr. Larpent was appointed to the office in 1812, and continued from the time of his arrival to manage all the courts-martial that occurred, and to move with the head-quarters, until the last detachment returned to England from Bordeaux, in 1814. It had become highly necessary that a professional lawyer, with competent experience, should be appointed to this duty, which had often been discharged by regimental officers, recommended by a certain readiness with the pen, by private interest, or by a confused smattering of the technicalities gathered from a slight perusal of such scanty volumes on military jurisprudence as were at that time accessible. These unqualified functionaries soon began to talk of Grotius, Puffendorff, Vattel, and Coke upon Littleton, as solemnly as if they had kept their terms in Lincoln's Inn or the Temple, in the regular form, and had worn wig and gown on many circuits. But they made strange mistakes, and scanty justice was sometimes administered by the tribunals they undertook to instruct in the way in which they should go. Once within our own experience we heard a general officer, as president of a court-martial, in a case nearly approaching life and death, lay down, under the suggestion of his military counsel, that it was not necessary for the prosecutor to substantiate the charge, but that the prisoner must first establish his innocence. The court would have proceeded on this learned showing, had not a very young member ventured modestly to suggest, that they were directly and ingeniously inverting the fundamental principle of all English law, which holds every supposed criminal innocent until his alleged guilt is proved. Military tribunals are good courts of honour, and discharge their duties conscientiously,

but they are sometimes pressed for time, are not very susceptible of legal quibbles, and a little careless as to minute particulars. Our readers will remember the conclusive logic of the Black Douglas in the "Fair Maid of Perth," when, sitting on the trial of Sir John Ramorny and Dwining for the murder of the Duke of Rothsay. The Lord Balveny descended to tell him that the criminals were already executed. "Then there is no further use in the trial," said the Earl, "how say you, good men of inquest, were these men guilty of high treason-ay or no?" "Guilty" exclaimed the obsequious inquest, with edifying unanimity, 66 we need no further evidence.'

Mr. Larpent arrived at head-quarters, at Rueda, on the 5th November, 1812, and was immediately introduced to the Great Captain, who received him very courteously, and forthwith transmitted to him fifty cases against officers, to be examined as to the sufficiency of evidence. He soon appears to have obtained the good opinion of Lord Wellington, and to have been admitted to as much of his confidence as he usually communicated to those subordinates who satisfied without tormenting him. He had a great dislike to all officials who gave unnecessary trouble, and made a great fuss about nothing. Mr. Larpent speedily discovered the clear decisive character of his commander, the control he exer cised by the supremacy of mind and quick decision, and the total absence of" humbug" in all the arrangements at head-quarters. On more than one occasion, at dinner, the conversation turned on the celebrated letters of "Vetus," in the Times, which were then causing much remark, and were considered by many the most pungent and ably written political essays since the days of Junius. The general purport of these letters was a wholesome and well-deserved condemnation of the ministry for allowing the Spanish war to languish for want of adequate supplies, while the grand resources of the nation were exhausted in the fatal and fruitless expedition to Walcheren. We have often wondered they were not re-published in a separate volume, not only from the interest of the subject, but from their undoubted pretensions as literary efforts of no ordinary mind. We are not aware that the author has ever been ascertained,

but many thought, and it was commonly reported then and after, that they were written by Lord Wellesley, from the warm eulogiums they contained on his brother, and the corroborating circumstance that about this time he retired from the ministry, in disgust at the wavering dispositions of the cabinet, and the incompetence of some of his colleagues. If Lord Wellesley wrote the letters of "Vetus," Lord Wellington was certainly ignorant of the fact. Mr. Larpent says:

"A few days since, at dinner at Lord Wellington's, he got upon the subject of 'Vetus' (the subject had been introduced before). He said he thought he knew the author, and that he had been in India-not Mackintosh as reported here. He then went on to say he did not think much of 'Vetus's' letters; that many of his facts as to this country were quite without foundation; that neither ⚫ Vetus,' nor the O. P.'s, nor Lord Wellesley knew anything about the war here, and what could or could not be done; that he fully believed Government had done all they could; that the men who did come could not have been here sooner, and perhaps had better have come still later. More cavalry he could not have employed had he had them at Lisbon, for want of transport for food; that when he advanced formerly to Talavera, he left several thousand men at Lisbon, because he could not supply them if with the army. In short, he said, Lord Wellesley knew nothing about the matter, and that he had no reason to be dissatisfied with the Government at home. All this made several of us stare. I am told Lord Wellington was very angry with Lord Wellesley for his resignation, and hardly spoke to any one for some days after he had heard the fact."

It was commonly said that Sir John Moore was sacrificed because he had no parliamentary or cabinet interest, and that Lord Wellington, on the contrary, owed much to both, and particularly to the commanding influence of his brother. It is quite clear that Lord Wellesley retired from office at the exact crisis, when his abilities and influence would have been more valuable than ever to Lord Wellington. But the latter was now strong enough to rest exclusively on his own name and pretensions, which obtained for him full power, such as no delegated

English general had ever exercised since Cromwell received commission from the Long Parliament.

Mr. Larpent gives great credit to Sir George Murray, and seems to consider him as, next to the Duke, the foremost man of the army. There can be no doubt he was an excellent quartermaster-general, and that the office requires a clear head, and an executive genius; but Sir G. Murray never had the good fortune to be tried in a separate command; his qualities, therefore, as an efficient leader not having been tested, are scarcely open to discussion. Many said he was to the Duke what Berthier was to Napoleon, and that neither of the great modern captains could have got on without his right hand. Those who were better informed smiled at both conclusions, and knew how far they were removed from the fact. In some respects it was no very desirable compliment to be compared to Berthier. He damaged long years of faithful service by rather a hurried adieu of his old master and friend at Fontainebleau, and was regarded by his brother generals and marshals as a plodding official drudge, who never originated an idea, or suggested a remedy for a disaster.

Mr. Larpent tells some amusing anecdotes of the gallant General Robert Craufurd, who commanded the light division, and fell at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo. Like Sir David Baird, he was never happy except when under fire, and had no business to lead a storming party, which might have been more fitly consigned to a brigadier or a regimental colonel. English generals often throw away their lives as subaltern officers, in a manner which has occasioned much animadversion, and some jeers amongst our enemies. It is seldom necessary for the leader of a division to act the part of a grenadier, although there are times and places when example ensures victory. Cæsar in the battle against the Nervii, and again at Munda, Alexander at Granicus and Oxydracè, Bonaparte at Lodi and Arcola, Wolfe at Quebec, and Wellington at Waterloo, were cases

where the personal exposure of the commander-in-chief contributed materially to the result. But the immolation of Craufurd at Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812, was as gratuitious and unnecessary as that of the veteran Sale at Moodkee in 1845, where he had nothing to do, and where his proper place as quarter-master general was anywhere but where his courage carried him. Craufurd with all his brilliant qualities was dangerous, and not so implicitly to be trusted as Lord Hill, of whom the Duke said, "he is immovable and steady as a rock; whatever I tell him to do, I am sure it will be done to the letter." Mr. Larpent says of this dashing officer

"I have heard a number of anecdotes of General Craufurd. He was very clever and knowing in his profession all admit, and led on his division to the day of his death in most gallant style; but Lord Wellington never knew what he would do. He constantly acted in his own way, contrary to orders; and as he commanded the advanced division, at times perplexed Lord Wellington considerably, who never could be sure where he was. On one occasion, near Guinaldo, he remained across a river by himself—that Lis, only with his own division-nearly a whole day after he was called in by Lord Wellington. He said he knew he could defend his position. Lord Wellington, when he came back, only said, 'I am glad to see you safe, Craufurd.' The latter replied,

Craufurd in 1810, when Massena invaded Portugal, kept his single corps for two months within a march or two of the French army, laid the country Lunder contribution for his support, intercepted the French foraging parties, and, finally, fought 40,000 men for a whole day on the Coa, with the river at his back, and carried off his division, inflicting on the enemy a heavier loss than he sustained. tactics were faulty, but his gallantry was excessive; and the action, though an error, was a brilliant episode which astonished the enemy not a little.

His

Sir W. Napier, whose praise is the more valuable, as not being easily obtained or indiscriminately bestowed, says of Craufurd, in conjunction with

Picton, that both were officers of mark and pretension, but adds, that they were insubordinate to their superiors and harsh in command. Had Craufurd lived, he would undoubtedly have risen to higher distinction and much more exalted rank, but he lacked the coolness to manage a great battle, and the head to plan a complicated campaign.

Spain is a difficult country to make war in, and many reputations have been withered in the attempt. Henry IV. of France, who was not only a daring soldier, but a skilful general, declared that it was hopeless to carry on military operations in that country, for that small armies would be beaten, and large ones starved. Now, the Duke of Wellington carried on war in Spain for six years, with small armies and large ones, and without being either beaten or starved. It is true he suffered much from the imbecility of native cabinets, the incompetence of the Spanish generals, and the constant poltroonery of the regular troops; until he declared, with bitterness of spirit, after the fruits of Talavera were wrested from him, "I have fished in many troubled waters, but Spanish waters I will never fish in again."

In May, 1813, the British army broke up from the frontiers of Portugal, which Lord Wellington looked on for the last time; and then commenced that brilliant march which found him in the following year, after a series of victories and perpetual fighting, in possession of Toulouse and Bordeaux, and in a fair way of realising Lord Liverpool's prognosticated march to Paris, so long looked upon and laughed at as an idle chimera. The invasion of the sacred territory of France was to be the signal of utter and irretrievable ruin to the invaders, who, on the contrary, often found themselves more kindly received, and treated with a more cordial welcome, than on the supposed friendly soil of Spain. Lord Wellington was at one time more apprehensive of his allies in his rear than of the enemy in his front, and was by no means confident that he should not be compelled to fight his way back through the people he had liberated. The French relinquished Burgos without a struggle, and retired behind the Ebro. Dubreton abandoned his impregnable castle, and by offering no opportunity

the decisive day of Vittoria, the French fought against hope, and with the certain and discouraging prestige of defeat, but they struggled gallantly and pertinaciously; and Soult continued to uphold the falling cause of his master with a fidelity that gained for him universal applause. Mr. Larpent, although a non-combatant, contrived to expose himself to many dangers, and at last was taken prisoner, but he was soon released through the application of Lord Wellington, and the intercession of General Count Gazan, to whose lady he had shown courtesy and kindness, when she was left with many other fair captives amongst the spoils of Vittoria. The lady, it appears, was renowned for her gallantries, but her husband, incredulous as Belisarius, turned a deaf ear to all these idle stories, and never suffered them to disturb his domestic quiet.

Mr. Larpent speaks in rather disparaging terms of the Guards and Household Cavalry, whom he considers as less hardy warriors, and less effective in the field, than the ordinary battalions and squadrons of the working line.

"The Life-Guards and Blues," he says, "looked well on their entrance into Palentia, and on their march yesterday; the former, however, seem dull and out of spirits, and have some sore backs among their horses. The Blues seem much more up to the thing, but they are neither of them very fit for general service here. Lord Wellington saves them up for some grand coup, houses them when he can, and takes care of them."

When we remember that these Patagonian householders, and their mount, had cost the country, man by man, at least £300 before they got to Vittoria, we need scarcely wonder that a prudent general should hesitate to bring such costly warriors into action, unless an opportunity offered of sending them in to finish, as they say in the ring, and as they afterwards did so manfully at Waterloo.

Mr. Larpent contrived to get a good

*

view, without being exposed to much danger, of the grand field-day of Vittoria, of which, and of the state of the ground and city after the battle, when strewed with the whole materiel of the French army, he gives an animated account, as also of his accidental rencontre with the Countess de Gazan. It appears that about £250,000 in hard cash, in gold, was taken with the French military chest at Vittoria, but a very small portion found its way into the public coffers. Our author says on this subject

"Much was certainly plundered by the natives and soldiers, the latter offering nine dollars for a guinea for the sake of carriage. Lord Wellington, however, has his suspicions of pillage by the civil departments; he has also heard various stories of money taken on the road back from Vittoria. I do not know what may come of this; I have made out but little satisfactory as yet; I think, however, one gentleman I examined yesterday intended to keep two thousand dollars. At the same time, the understanding that this was all fair seems pretty general."

This much is quite certain, that large sums of money were privately appropriated from the spoils of Vittoria, and that the high authorities passed the matter over without any very rigid investigation. During Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna, in 1809, much treasure was abandoned on the road, from the constant deaths of the carriage-mules, and the impossibility of transporting it further. The casks containing dollars were broken in, and the money thrown down the ravines, whence it was afterwards gathered up by the peasants and the pursuing enemy. An English soldier's wife collected as many dollars as she was able to carry, and placed them round her waist. Despite the fatigue of long marches and scanty food, she arrived safely at the place of embarkation with the prize. But on stepping into a boat, her foot slipped over the gunwale, when she sank immediately and never rose again. The weight of the dollars, from which she was unable to extricate herself, produced the unlooked for catastrophe. We are rather startled to find at page 257, vol. i., the following passage,

which has occasioned much animadversion and strong dissentient opinions amongst military readers :

"In marching, our men have no chance at all with the French. The latter beat them hollow, and, I believe, principally owing to their being a more intelligent set of beings, seeing consequences more, and feeling

them. This makes them sober and orderly whenever it becomes material, and on a pinch their exertions and individual activity are astonishing. Our men get sulky and desperate, drink excessively, and become daily more weak and unable to proceed, principally from their own conduct. They eat voraciously when opportunity offers, after having had short fare. This brings on fluxes, &c. In every respect, except courage, they are very inferior soldiers to the French and Germans. When the two divisions, the 4th and Light, crossed through Tafalla the day before yesterday, the more soldier-like appearance and conduct of the foreigners, though in person naturally inferior, was very mortifying. Lord Wellington feels it much, and is much hurt."

Without impugning in the slightest degree the value of Mr. Larpent's ge neral observations or the merit of his book-on a purely military point we can scarcely consider a non-combatant and civilian as a competent authority. His professional duties and judicial capacity brought him much more in personal contact with the delinquents -the drones, scamps, and malingererst of the army than with the hardy

veterans and able men who constitute the staple; while the former include only the exceptions in a well-organised regiment. It cannot be disputed that drunkenness has ever been the bane and besetting sin of the three gallant nations who compose the British army, and all are prone to become disorderly and insubordinate, to straggle and plunder, on a retreat. But let a halt take place with the prospect of engaging, and the ranks are speedily filled, and discipline restored. This was remarkably evidenced at Lugo, where Sir John Moore offered the battle, which Marshal Soult prudently declined; and still more signally at Corunna, where the transports had not arrived, and the exhausted infan

Two choice divisions of the British army.

try, entirely unsupported by cavalry, were forced to join combat with a superior enemy, and in an unfavourable position. When a French army is surprised, or driven headlong from a field of battle, as at the Douro, at Arroyo de Molinos, and at Vittoria, they fling away every incumbrance, knapsacks, and, as Sir W. Napier says, including arms, accoutrements, and it is impossible for others to keep pace with them who retain their usual gear. But in fair marching, in the fatigue and endurance of a campaign, it has never yet been found, either in ancient or modern times, that the French were superior or equal to the English. In Shakspeare's Henry V., the King, in reply to Mountjoy, the French herald who summons him to surrender, says :

"My people are with sickness much enfeebled;
My numbers lessen'd; and those few I have,
Almost no better than so many French;
Who, when they were in health, I tell thee, herald,
I thought, upon one pair of English legs,
Did march three Frenchmen."-Act iii. sc. 6.

Such was the national opinion on this subject when Shakspeare wrote, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Now for a sample in our own days. Sir W. Napier says

"This day also (July 29th, 1809) General Robert Craufurd reached the English camp with the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th Rifles, and immediately took charge of the outposts. These troops, leaving only seventeen stragglers behind in twenty-six hours, crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body, having in that time passed over sixtytwo English miles, in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about the delicacy of modern soldiers."- Vol. ii. p. 400.

The same unquestionable authority, when concluding a comparative summary of the soldiers of modern Europe, says" The result of an hundred bat. tles, and the admitted testimony of foes as well as friends, assigns the first place to the English infantry." He is not in the least blind to their defects, but long service has deeply impressed