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must fail in the performance of their duties in life, as men, citizens, and Christians, And who is it that suffers from such a state of things ? Not merely the young men themselves, but society also: the whole community must suffer. Men so situated cannot maintain the character of philosophers, nor of virtuous men, nor of religious men. They have no opportunity of exercising their reflective faculties or their moral and devotional feelings. It is madness in society to expect that its members should grow up virtuous and high-minded men while it exposes them to the influences of such a demoralizing system. There are none who hear me to-night who are not deeply interested in this question. There is not a mother who may not have a son in some shop exposed to all the evils which I have been endeavouring to point out; and I trust every one will do their best to do away with a system so fraught with injury and wrong. It appears that if the public would only come forward to assist the victims of this system in their efforts to emancipate themselves, the thing could be done. It is not to the interest of the employer that his shop should be kept open to such injuriously late hours ; I have shown you it is not the interest of the assistant. If it is not to the interest of the employers, why then is it done? Because there is a system of doing business at unseasonable hours. Ladies go into drapers' shops after six o'clock, and thus they perpetuate this evil; and as long as that thoughtless custom is continued, will the evils complained of continue. When they cease to attend these shops at such hours as they now do, the masters of them will put out their gas lights; for it will not be worth their while to burn them, and they will find it their interest to let their assistants cultivate their minds, and not only to let them do so, but to encourage them to do so. But it will not be till then ; it will not be till the public have resolved to forego the late shopping they have hitherto practised that this good result ean be brought about.
But in this appeal to you, I do not confine myself to the advocacy of a particular class; I plead for all—all who are thus engaged in labour. I appeal to you, not only on behalf of the shop-keeper, but on behalf of the domestic servant also; and I feel that the subject ought to come home to every bosom. Domestic servants are too frequently treated worse than slaven; I believe no slave-holder would exact such an amount of toil from his slave as is frequently imposed upon domestic servants. I know many at this moment who work sixteen hours a day, without a moment to develope their better feelings or cultivate the higher faculties. I ask you also to extend your sympathy to the factory operatives to the poor votaries of the needle-to the whole world. Let us act as Christians in this matter, not as mere men of the world, as if we felt and acknowledged the common tie of brotherhood which binds us one to another; and even if it be necessary, let us rather retrench our superfluities than make our fellow-creatures suffer so much.
REVIEW OF THE PHRENOLOGICAL ESSAYS.
PHRENOLOGY of course, like every other question that presents itself for decision, must be judged of purely from the evidence it can present for its support. It is unphilosophical to denounce any system as untrue, because it may apparently be hostile to certain facts we may previously have ascertained either in science or religion. The truth of a newly-projected branch in scientific inquiry must not be tested either by its coincidence or contrariety to other points that have long been settled : because what may be to us paradoxical and contradictory, time and more complete research may entirely clear and harmonize ; or if not, we may rest assured that, as truth must in its very nature agree with truth, the conflicting circumstances are not really discordant, but only in appearance, on account of the imperfect faculties that have to consider them, and the disjointed manner in which they are frequently viewed. All that we have to do is to examine, in a true and candid spirit, what is the nature of the evidence on which a proposition rests, and to receive or reject it accordingly. At the same time it must be remarked, that, if the truth of such proposition does appear palpably hostile to the truth of other well-proved propositions, it should render us doubly cautious in our investigations, inasmuch as from experience we have seen, on the grandest scale, newly ascertained phenomena not only unhostile to former discoveries, but beautifully confirming and elucidating them; and this it is indeed that constitutes the philosopher's greatest glory, and sheds the brightest lustre on modern science.
We are not, however, aware that Phrenology will stand in need of this sifting scrutiny, on account of the discrepancy that obtains between it and any other description of religious or scientific truth. There does not appear to be reason for assertions made respecting it,—that it has a tendency to favour the doctrines of materialism or necessity. The arguments by which these forms of infidelity could be supported, on phrenological grounds, would with equal force apply to the supposition that the brain is one undivided organ. They who contend for either of the opinions above mentioned must be aware that they are incapable of the least support from any description of physical development, and are, if at all, to be upheld solely by the assistance of abstract reasoning, and also that their most powerful and successful supporters have been men unacquainted with, or at least not believers in, the phrenological system. Dismissing therefore from our view all these unfounded prejudices, which we cannot but think have been too often caught with eagerness by phrenologists, and held up to public notice as the grand declamations by which their sober examination of facts and their calm unprejudiced reasonings have been met—dismissing, we say, every thing calculated to blind our better judgment to the claims of Phrenology, upon what grounds are we called to assent to its truth? And it is of course our first duty to consider carefully the evidence that has already been presented in its favour by our worthy essayist, Mr. R. Smith.
On examining attentively this gentleman's first argument, we are not quite certain of the precise meaning he attaches to the word “organ," page 106, and we give him the benefit of the doubt. Our first impression was that he desired to prove from the conclusion—that to organic structure we must trace individual differences that diversities in character and acquirements were to be sought for in “specific diversities of the brain itself,” which diversities were assumed to be, in fact, the phrenological organs. Of course such reasoning as this would equally involve Phrenology in a dilemma ; for it is to be supposed that all men would have like mental manifestations, if all the organs of the brain were similar, so that diversity must here also be traced to “specific differences in the organ;" hence, if our interpretation of Mr. Smith were a correct one, there would be required a series of organs within a series ad infinitum. But we conclude that his meaning is, that to difference in size and development of specific organs must be placed peculiarity of mind. This is the point, and how is it proved ? By the simple assertion, “that a difference in one particular part of the brain alone is the cause of the diversity of the particular phenomena; and that no difference in any other part can occasion the same diversity in the same phenomena,” which is merely a definition of Phrenology, the very question at issue, and which still remains to be substantiated !
“We next argue the truth of Phrenology,” says Mr. Smith, “in relation to memory. Upon this subject the most unphilosophical opinions were prevalent. There was nothing like classification of memory. A man was esteemed to have a good memory who could easily retain historical facts, or store up words; but phrenologists have proved that this faculty is greatly diversified.” Such a statement as this is altogether absurd. Granting that the most unphilosophical opinions were prevalent in relation to memory, upon what new principle has the phrenologist proceeded to explode their fallacy? Without entering into the metaphysical parts of the statement, as to whether memory is really a distinct faculty of the mind, or the mere result of vivid impressions, we will simply quote the fundamental proposition of Mr. Stallybrass, which no system in the world can overturn, “ That the science of mind can be based only on phenomena of mind, and phenomena of mind can be ascertained only by consciousness." So that all who desire to make inquiries into mental science must do so on the same footing ; in fact, the organs of the brain, if there are any, are so many unmeaning excrescences, till we have first settled, by the adoption of the principles of what phrenologists call “ the old school," what peculiarity each of these developments is to signify. How then can Mr. Smith assert that on Phrenological principles the faculty of memory has been proved to be greatly diversified ?
We find Mr. Smith, page 106, again recurring to the results of organic structure, in the assertion that man is adapted to the circumstances under which he exists, and that were he to be transplanted to another state he would require to be adapted by an alteration in his mind to the peculiarities of that state. It is really no small tax upon our patience to recapitulate frivolities like this, which are resorted to for the purpose of proving the truth of a science; but as we are anxious not to lay ourselves open to the charge of unfairness in our criticism, we will endeavour seriously to answer them. We say, then, that although the bodily structure of man would doubtless require re-modification, yet there can be no manner of reason for supposing his mind would need alteration. We cannot think Mr. Smith is an advocate for the doctrine of innate ideas; and yet only on this ground would mental alteration be required; for while the mind has powers, and faculties essentially belonging to it, in whatever new sphere it may be called upon to operate, it will be equal to the task, and impressions, of whatever character they may be, will be received and judged of with a facility equal to that which it displays in its present situation. There is consequently no necessity for the far-fetched hypothesis that man's mind will require alteration, or that his present views and feelings will be unadapted for a future state,-an hypothesis that does not deserve mention for the support of any mental system taken at its greatest worth. The physical capacities must indeed be suited to the place of existence, but the mind requires not change,-let it be transplanted to worlds infinitely remote.
Mr. Smith has undertaken to reply to some objections which he states have been urged against Phrenology. These objections are exceedingly meagre and paltry, and easily admit of a satisfactory answer. There is,
however, one difficulty which we do not think Mr. Smith has by any means overcome, viz., " that there is no correspondence betwixt the shape of the brain and the figure of the skull ;” which is an assertion, he says, quite beyond the power of proof, inasmuch as the true configuration of the brain cannot be ascertained during life, and after death it becomes collapsed. How obvious is it that this argument equally tells against the phrenological system. Is it necessary to say that, if this be true, phrenologists are equally unable to ascertain,—we use Mr. Smith's own words," that certain peculiarities of mental constitution are always found linked to certain peculiarities of cerebral conformation ?” By the self-same process that organs are discovered can their existence be disproved; and if there is no method of disproving their existence and conformity to the skull, neither is there any method of proving them.
But the objection is obviously founded on that which constitutes the very basis of Phrenology,—the assertion that the organs of the brain always cause corresponding protuberances on the skull ; and therefore the difficulty ought to have been met, not by referring to the brain after death in its collapsed state, but to the interior appearance of the skull, whether there are really any concavities caused by the cerebral conformation during life, and whether these concavities do precisely correspond with the external convexities or bumps. A reply to the question, if in the negative, will at the outset completely destroy the pretensions of Phrenology, or, if in the affirmative, will correspondingly heighten its claims. We cannot do better towards the solution of this question than quote the words of that eminent physician, Dr. P. M. Roget :-“ The possibility,” he says, “ of discovering the size and the shape of the different parts of the brain from the external examination of the head is discountenanced by anatomy. There are often considerable impressions in the interior of the skull where the corresponding exterior surface does not exhibit the slightest appearance of projection, and is sometimes even depressed ; and there are frequently large prominences without, where there are no corresponding concavities within : so that when the outer surface of the bony case is compared with a mould in plaster or wax of the cavity itself they exhibit considerable differences, and, from the great variation which may take place in the thickness of the bones, this difference is not the same in any two skulls."* It would be a work of supererogation to make any lengthy comment on Mr. Smith's concluding assertion, that “Phrenology has given the most symmetrical and perfect nomenclature of the mental faculties which we possess." Our readers will find this assertion combated with considerable felicity by Mr. Stallybrass ; and if what we have endeavoured to prove be correct, that Phrenology introduces no new principles for the study of mental science, the case assumes this aspect : Have the labours in mental philosophy-quite independent of physiology or anatomy-of Gull, Spurzheim, or Combe, been of greater value than those of Brown, Reid, or Stewart? We hesitate not to say that the classification of mental faculties by the former are not worthy to be compared with the labours of the latter; and for the plain reason that the sole light by which they could possibly proceed they have not only neglected but sneered at, whilst their peculiar turn of mind has induced them to treat with contempt the light of abstract truth, and to think nothing real or valuable that is not accompanied by physical appearances.
* Article Phrenology, last edition, Encyclopædia Britannica.
We are quite certain that Mr. Smith will not be displeased for the open avowal we have made of our opinion on this long agitated question, or for the manner in which we have reviewed his essay. We are not aware that we have uttered anything harsh, or capable of being construed into a disrespectful manner. Our opinion as to the merits of his paper he is possessed of, for his essay was chosen from a vast number as the most clear, concise, and elegant. We feel sure that his object as well as our own is the attainment of truth; and, if he holds any opinions that we can detect to be unsound, we are convinced he will gladly receive our criticisms in the same spirit as we shall rejoice to receive his.
We can say little of the essay of Mr. Stallybrass, for the views he takes, with few exceptions, coincide with our own. We offer him our best thanks for the care he has evidently taken in preparing his essay, and the manner in which he has succeeded does him great credit.
It is our intention on some future occasion to take a still more comprehensive view of Phrenology than our limits have now permitted.
ON THE STUDY OF MATHEMATICS.
BY T. E. STALLYBRASS, B. A.
THERE is so great a difference between learning Mathematics in the sense of merely committing demonstrations to memory, and studying Mathematics in the real sense of the phrase, that what may be said respecting the one cannot be at all affirmed of the other. We have known some learn off the solutions as well as the problems of Euclid by rote ; as long as they were allowed to proceed without interruption, they poured them forth with a volubility almost surprising, and which, if you took the utterance for the expression of an intellectual process, might present a proof of a great mathematical genius. Bat alas! it comes out to be a mere act of memory; one question from the teacher breaks the chain of associated words, and the fluent utterer is involved as in a bog, and sticks fast as in a quagmire. Now this is not studying Mathematics at all—it is a mere committing of words to memory; and if this were the only end to be answered by this study, there is no benefit attending it in particular, because any other composition might serve quite as well, if not better, for training up the memory to words. In the study of Mathematics, however, it is not the memory (which of course is exercised), but the ratiocinating faculty that is specifically exercised. The study consists in following with a clear understanding the demonstration of mathematical truths—in perceiving how clearly and how inevitably one step succeeds another, and how all the steps lead to the conclusion-in observing how certainly and how unerringly the reasoning goes on from things perfectly self-evident, and by the smallest addition at each step, every step being as easily taken after the one before it as the first step was. This is an operation of the understanding. No one can be said to know Mathematics who has not studied them, so as to perceive how they are proved, and understand the grounds on which they rest. He may by an act of memory know their doctrines, but he has not studied them if he is unable to show why he believes them, or to prove before others that they are true.
The object of intellectual education may be said to consist in aiding the development of the mind in the three general departments of memory, reason, and imagination. Before, however, any of these states can be properly unfolded, there is a certain habit of mind