systems, while a rigid adherence to it may be expected to conduct us to the true science of mind. Suppose a man denied the existence of any power of mind, how would you meet his denial and try to convince him that such a power did form a part of the mental constitution, but by arguments derived from consciousness? If you could not appeal to his consciousness, you must fail to convince him; for we are as little entitled to assert any quality to belong to the mind of which we are not conscious, or for which we have not the indubitable authority of the consciousness of others, as we are entitled to assert any quality as a property of iron, which we have not observed or received on the faith of the observation of credible witnesses. In examination of various systems, it is only by consulting the reports of our own consciousness that we can detect in them what is true, and separate it from the errors with which it may be mixed. Psychological observation, then, is the only method in mental science. As knowledge of the phenomena of mind is the only foundation of the science, so consciousness is the only method by which such an acquaintance with them can be obtained. From the nature of the thing, nothing can rival or supersede this method.

If so, what has Phrenology to do with the science of mind? Does it pretend to discover any new faculty, the existence of which is not proved by consciousness, or any thing at all about mind independent of consciousness? What can it achieve in mental science for which the old philosophy is incompetent? It asserts the correspondence of certain organs with certain mental facts. But what is the science of mind to gain by this? Will the organs aid it in the discovery or analysis of mental phenomena? Verily no! An analysis of the mind by consciousness must precede the appropriation of particular organs to particular faculties. Before the organ can be assigned to the faculty, the existence of the faculty must be ascertained; and how can this be done but by consciousness? If its existence is ascertained by consciousness, what more have we to learn from Phrenology? If not, how can an organ be assigned to a faculty, the existence of which is not ascertained? So that, after all, Phrenology, as distinguished from "the old philosophy," cannot discover any thing about mind; and, on the data it supplies, no mental philosophy of any sort can be established. But the discovery of the mere fact of a correspondence between one set of physical and another set of mental facts, does not entitle Phrenology to the rank of mental science; otherwise physiognomy is equally entitled to that rank. Neither have any thing to do with science of mind; and instead of designating their science Phrenology, its advocates should have adhered to its former name of Craniology, or adopted a more appropriate one.

II. But supposing the possibility of a new mode of investigation into mental phenomena independently of consciousness, or rather supposing that Phrenology does not pretend to any thing beyond the discovery that there is a correspondence between certain organs and certain mental phenomena-it is of course expected for that boasted correspondence to hold good. There must be an exact coincidence between the list of organs supplied on phrenological principles, and the list of simple faculties to which a rigid analysis may reduce the innumerable variety of mental phenomena. We must of course be first in possession of the list of mental faculties, as recognised by our consciousness, and make it the standard of the comparison. Since, however, there is considerable diversity in the results of analyses into mental phenomena by different philosophers, (a

diversity which arises from the degree to which the analysis has been carried,) we need not refer to any particular schools or systems of philosophy, but appeal to those original powers which every intelligent observer may ascertain by consulting his consciousness. Do the phrenological organs then exactly correspond with what every observer may ascertain by a careful analysis to be primitive faculties of the mind? Are they competent to account for all mental phenomena? Are there no redundancies-no deficiencies? Yes, there are; and we shall briefly indicate a few which may guide the reader in pressing the examination a little further.

1. There are great redundancies. E. G. There is an organ of form, and another of size. There is no need for original powers to account for our ideas of form and size, otherwise on the same principle we must demand original powers to judge of distances, heights, lengths, &c. Every one may see that both form and size are reducible into extension, ideas of which are the result of the sense of touch. Form is but the comparative extension of the several parts of the same object, and size is but the comparative extension of two separate objects. Again, ideas of extension, though seemingly original, are obviously derivative-being among those which arise from a coalescence, by frequent association, of other ideas and feelings; like an act of vision, it is a complex process, resulting from certain inextricable associations, the products of the sight, the touch, and the muscular movement. By frequent and long association they have so coalesced as to become apparently one simple idea; but it is not so. There are no simple and original powers corresponding with the organs of form and size. Let the reader in the same manner examine the list, and compare it with the results of his own mental analysis, and he will discover in the list a very sloven redundancy. Thus we have an organ for veneration, which is obviously the result of love, fear, and marvellousness, and not an original faculty. Again, we have separate organs for love, of sex, children, home, friends, property, &c.; all which are the same in the nature of their operations, and differ only in their objects. So form, size, weight, colouring, time, &c. are resolvable into judgment and the principle of suggestionare identical in their nature, and differ only in the objects on which the faculty is engaged.

2. But a still more palpable and fatal objection is, that there are no organs for faculties which we may ascertain to be simple and original ones. Perhaps the clearest analysis may not be so perfect as not to admit of doubt, and the resolution of complex states into simpler ones may not in all cases be perfectly evident. But there are some operations so manifestly original, that almost every one "who runs may read." And if any such primitive powers are not provided with an organ by which to perform that which is unquestionably accomplished in the mind-such a defect must be fatal to the science of Phrenology.

Now, memory must be an original faculty, because it implies an element which cannot be accounted for otherwise. That element is not the recurrence of ideas which is explained by the laws of association, but the recognition of ideas thus recurring as having been entertained before. Without this recognition and reference to past time, the same ideas might perpetually recur, but always as new ideas which are conceived for the first time; and it has never been satisfactorily shown into what simpler elements this recognition of ideas, as known in past time, could be reduced. But memory is not favored with an organ in special on the phrenological list; must we therefore, and in spite of consciousness, deny that memory is a

separate power? We are told there is a great diversity in memory. Well, this was known and accounted for as early as the time of Aristotle. It is explained clearly by the laws of association and the accidental circumstances by which these laws are modified. Constitutional differences, both mental and physical, habits, &c. are found to give a prevailing tendency to some one primary law of association, which, far from making the varieties of memory and the equally striking diversities of imagination in different individuals wonderful, renders them necessary, even had there been no other cause of difference than the variety of the laws of suggestion. Again; of our five senses, Phrenology recognises only three. The sense of touch has two organs, those of form and size; that of sound also two, those of time and tune; but that of sight, though the noblest, seems to have but the one organ of colouring. But what becomes of the senses of smell and taste? Why should they not be favoured each with an organ? Yet who shall deny that they are as capable of remembering and judging of their objects as any of the rest? And if neither memory nor judgment has a separate organ, surely these two senses ought to have each an organ to itself. But they have none; therefore, either these senses cannot remember and judge of their respective objects, or the phrenological list is woefully defective. This leads to our last remark.

III. The principle of classification in Phrenology is most unintelligible and illogical.-It is a rule in logic for division, that the several parts of it ought to be opposed, i. e. one part ought not to include another. Some principle must be adopted on which to base the classification. Now, mental phenomena may be classified on two different principles, according to the object of the classification, viz: 1st. on the subjective principle, i. e. by classifying them according to their own nature; and 2dly. on the objective principle, i. e. according to the classes of objects on which they are engaged. In mental science, the design of which is not the discovery of the objects of mental operation, but of the attributes of the mind itself,—the first is the only admissible principle of classification. But the phrenological classification of powers seems to defy the rule of logical division, and it presents the most vague and confused jumble of the partial results of both these principles of division. If it proceed on any principle, surely it must be on the latter, arranging phenomena according to the variety of objects on which they are exercised; for instead of one memory we have several separate memories, differing not in the nature of their operations, but in the objects on which the mind is engaged; and sometimes all the thirty-five original faculties would seem to have memories of their own. Again; instead of one property of love susceptible of impression from different classes of objects, we have different ones for the sex, children, home, &c. A classification on this principle does not fall within the province of mental science; but, supposing it did, let the reader see if the list include all the operations of mind considered objectively, and he will see a great deficiency. Why should not love of power, or of fame, have an organ as well as love of property? But we must close; hoping that we have not only asserted, but shown, that every thing about Phrenology is vague and indefinite. Explicit terms we cannot find; and seldom have we seen language used so loosely and slovenly. If there is any truth in it, we fear it suffers from its advocates, who are but poor metaphysicians, and very ignorant of the old philosophy.

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