The Student: a magazine of theology, literature, and science

forth by Mr. Owen are mainly taken from "Hume's Dialogues on Natural Religion," in which latter they are presented in far too abstruse and philosophical a manner to be understood or appreciated by the general reader. Mr. Owen has endeavoured to popularise Hume's arguments, and to present them in their purely theological aspect; and the lecturer, whose essay we are commenting upon, dimly understanding some few points, has absurdly applied them to Paley's well-known, but ill-understood, illustration of the watch. We recognised the positions he has advanced against this illustration as old acquaintances, so badly and imperfectly stated, however, that, while we cannot give him credit for his originality, we are unable even to award to him any very great amount of verbal accuracy; so entirely has he failed to perceive that they not merely apply to theological doctrines, but equally to the every-day affairs of life, in which we apprehend he is a decided believer. And now let us see how he states the proposition he proposes to discuss. The true question we would premise is, Does the universe present to us evidences of a designing Intelligence? The following, however, is our lecturer's lucid explanation of this simple proposition:

"Are the works of creation produced by some material substance, or a combination of certain material substances which may be called the vital principles, which, seizing upon vitalisable matter, converts it into organisations, such as the contingent circumstances enable it? OR, is the phenomena of life the result of the influx of spirit communicated only by an intelligent power, who designs its body and its circumstances?''

We would seriously recommend our lecturer to study a few more philosophical treatises before he again discourses upon topics like the present one. Such a perfect jumble of nonsense we never perused. What on earth does he mean by "material substances producing organisation"? Does he not know that what we call matter, and material substance, is nothing but the result of organisation? that matter is known to us only as an effect produced by some extrinsic cause, and is nothing more than the sensation produced through the medium of the five senses? He does not know it; and he is, consequently, guilty, in his very definition, of the absurdity of stating that matter, whose very existence depended upon our senses, existed before those senses were in being; nay more, that seizing upon some hocus pocus, which he terms vitalisable matter, it of itself produced those senses! Such is the positive side of the argument which he states he is about to maintain, and we only wished he had kept to his promise. A reward to a very large amount has been recently offered to any mathematical scholar who shall succeed in squaring the circle. We would have guaranteed a still larger amount to our lecturer if he would have shown us how a material substance could produce an organisation. No, no! He falls on to the negative side immediately, and, without waiting to prove his position, he commences an attack on Paley, which we will now examine, and with this must close our remarks in the present number. In all honesty and fairness, he is bound to quote an author correctly. If he has read " Paley's Natural Theology" with proper attention, he must be fully aware that he is doing gross injustice to the argument; and if he has not read it, which

Enquiries and Correspondence.

Ipswich, May 14th, 1846. "DEAR SIR,-The following essay was read on Monday evening last, at a Young Men's Mutual-Improvement Society, recently formed in this town, and possessing but about twenty members. The two oldest are infidels, including the composer of this essay, who is a young man about twenty-six or from that to thirty years of age, of considerable ability and extensive information. One of the youngest of its members delivered an essay on 'The Comparative Merits of Christianity and Atheism.' This was intended to be a reply, though, as you will see, it partakes not much of the nature of a reply; however, such as it is, it has been delivered, and has created considerable excitement. I have managed to obtain the essay for one evening, and have taken this copy, which I believe is correct, though badly written. I now send it to you, and let me beg of you to give it your earliest and most serious attention, for, to be candid, it has made me rather uneasy, some of the many objections I am not able to meet. Dear Sir, to gain your attention, I would fling in all my merits. I have been a subscriber from the commencement, but in that I am the party benefited, so I throw myself upon your goodness and the interest you have ever manifested to 'youth.'

"I have enclosed five stamps to defray the expense of postage. Should you require remuneration, please state it.*

"In haste, I am, yours obediently,

"M. B. I."

The foregoing letter will speak for itself. We are sure our readers will require from us no apology for noticing the lecture it alludes to. It is enough for us that some young men have been perplexed and bewildered by the metaphysical conjuration of this youthful lecturer. It will be our sincere endeavour to solve their difficulties, and our great happiness if we succeed in affording them mental satisfaction. We will not now stop to administer the deserved castigation to the young infidel, who, with the presumption that invariably accompanies gross ignorance, holds up to ridicule a truth held sacred by the most stupendous intellects, that shall be presently dealt to him by a pen far abler than our own. At present we will proceed to expose the suicidal nature of the reasonings he so valorously holds forth, trusting to furnish him with an argumentum ad hominem that will silence him for some time to come.

The arguments which he urges with such confidence against "the theologians," as he terms them, he has probably derived from a work published by Watson, of Paternoster-row, entitled, "A Discussion on the Existence of Deity, between the Rev. Origen Batchelor and Robert Dale Owen," the son of the founder of Socialism. The reasonings put

We do not, of course, require any remuneration from our correspondent.

We would seriously recommend our lecturer to study a few more philosophical treatises before he again discourses upon topics like the present one. Such a perfect jumble of nonsense we never perused. What on earth does he mean by "material substances producing organisation"? Does he not know that what we call matter, and material substance, is nothing but the result of organisation? that matter is known to us only as an effect produced by some extrinsic cause, and is nothing more than the sensation produced through the medium of the five senses? He does not know it; and he is, consequently, guilty, in his very definition, of the absurdity of stating that matter, whose very existence depended upon our senses, existed before those senses were in being; nay more, that seizing upon some hocus pocus, which he terms vitalisable matter, it of itself produced those senses! Such is the positive side of the argument which he states he is about to maintain, and we only wished he had kept to his promise. A reward to a very large amount has been recently offered to any mathematical scholar who shall succeed in squaring the circle. We would have guaranteed a still larger amount to our lecturer if he would have shown us how a material substance could produce an organisation. No, no! He falls on to the negative side immediately, and, without waiting to prove his position, he commences an attack on Paley, which we will now examine, and with this must close our remarks in the present number. In all honesty and fairness, he is bound to quote an author correctly. If he has read "Paley's Natural Theology" with proper attention, he must be fully aware that he is doing gross injustice to the argument; and if he has not read it, which

we are really inclined to think is the case, how dare he come forward and state himself to be an inquirer after truth? Probably he has derived a sufficient idea of Paley's argument from the work he alludes to, viz., "Paley Refuted." How very easy it is for a man to misrepresent, and then to answer. Let him take a lesson in this respect from Paley, who is one of the most candid opponents, and who, rather than otherwise, gives strength and lucidness to the reasonings of his adversary.

We will place, side by side, our lecturer's abridgment of Paley's words, and the words themselves. We dwell more upon this, because we shall have to show that no metaphysical subtleties will shake the position on which Dr. Paley builds,—a position which is, in point of fact, the one on which we rest, not, as we before stated, theological doctrines merely, but every truth in which we believe. It is a principle of true induction, upon which every follower of the new rule introduced by Lord Bacon bases his philosophical investigations. Explode it in theology, and you explode it in philosophy. Natural Theology and Natural Philosophy rest on the self-same ground; they both stand or fall together. However, let us now see Paley represented and misrepresented.

THE LECTURER'S ABRIDGMENT.

'Experience convinces us that works of art have had a maker. When, therefore, we behold a work of art, we immediately infer the existence of a maker; and the reason why we do so is, the thing exhibits works of a particular design, and we know that works of a particular design imply the existence of a particular designer. Now the world exhibits design, and the world, therefore, must have had a designer. The designer of the world must have been intelligent, or capable of designing, but intelligence is always connected with consciousness," &c.

DR. PALEY'S OWN STATEMENT,

"When we come to inspect the watch, we perceive that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose.' Nor does it weaken the conclusion that we had never seen a watch made, that we had never known an artist capable of making one, that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and to the generality of mankind of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned," &c.

Remark where Paley is misrepresented. He was too wise to discuss the abstruse question, as to whence our ideas of design are derived. He does not, therefore, as the lecturer states, affirm that it is only on account of our experience of the manufacture of works of art that we conclude that intelligence is in operation in design. He states broadly that, where we see means beautifully adapted to certain ends, that there we necessarily infer the existence of intelligence. As to what intelligence is in itself, or how it operates, we know no more about it in ourselves than we do in the Omnipotent Ruler of the universe. Whichever way, therefore, we put the question, Dr. Paley's argument will be found valid.

1. Either our ideas of design, being the result of intelligence, are derived, as the lecturer states, from our experience;

2. Or, they precede our experience.

Take the former of these positions. Dr. Paley, it will be perceived, has anticipated the objection that may be raised against it. "You conclude," says his opponent," rashly. You have no right to say that because you have invariably found in works of art that design is consequent on forethought and intelligence, that therefore it is so in the universe at large.” Have I not?" says the worthy Doctor; "neither, then, have you any right to conclude, because your experience has convinced you that a certain number of watches have been constructed by intelligent agents, that all watches are constructed by intelligent agents. Why do you conclude that works of art, that you never saw constructed, and the means of fabricating which are entirely lost to you, why do you conclude that they required great intelligence and power to accomplish? Verily, with your own hands you seal your fate. Is not experience sufficient to prove the truth of anything beyond that which we have experienced?" Then why does our lecturer believe that to-morrow will arrive? Not because the sun has arisen a great many times already on our world. This does not prove that it will rise to-morrow. He states in one part of his lecture that " any given acid, combined chemically with a given alkali, will invariably produce a certain shaped prism." Indeed! how does he know that? cause it has done so hitherto," is his reply. That is to say, that the self-same experience that assures him of this, he accepts in the one case, and rejects in the other. He believes that, all the universe over, an acid and alkali will produce this prism; and he does not believe that, all the universe over, intelligence is the source of design. Hume saw better how to carry out this mode of reasoning consistently; or perhaps we should rather say, that these petty anti-religionists just retain as much of it as serves their purpose, and reject the rest.

"Be

We have occupied so much space with these remarks, that we must reserve the consideration of the second position, viz., "Do the ideas of design, &c., precede our experience?" till July, when we hope to make a few comments on the remainder of this very superficial essay, and to administer the promised censure to the author of it.

A SUBSCRIBER," Ipswich," wishes to know the nature of the distinction between Reason and Instinct. If he would desire to see this question very ingeniously, but not very profoundly discussed, we would commend to his notice Lord Brougham's "Dialogues on Instinct." For ourselves, we are inclined to think that the difference can never be ascertained but by an observation of effects, and these would lead us to conclude that ideas of sensation are alone experienced by the brute creation, while complex ideas are peculiar to man. But even to this view many objections can be raised. The question before us may possibly form the subject of a future paper in our Journal; at least, if it is at all interesting to the generality of our readers. In the meantime, it may be satisfactory to our correspondent to see how it is treated by one of the first physiologists of the day: now, we believe, a president of the College of Surgeons. We allude to Mr. Green.

« Предыдущая Продолжить »

Книги