after remaining three months before it, with open trenches, retreated towards the end of October in that year, with a loss of upwards of 7,000 men.

It was again invested on the 18th of May, 1829, by a Russian force of 21,000 men, and eighty-eight pieces of cannon, the operations being covered by an army of 65,000 men, and 240 gunsthe garrison then consisting of 8,000 Albanians and about 2,000 Turks. After a desperate resistance, when there were two practicable breaches, and the ammunition of the garrison was exhausted, they capitulated, on the 1st of July, and 9,000 men laid down their arms; the loss to the Russians in killed and wounded being 115 of ficers and 2,566 men. These are noble traditions, and well do they appear to be sustained by the conduct of the present gallant defenders of Silistria. As well as can be collected from the vague and confused accounts before us, the siege must have been commenced early in May; and the latest authentic report of the strength of the besiegers is contained in a letter from Admiral Dundas, bearing date the 25th of May, which positively states it to be 80,000 men, under the command of the Grand Duke Constantine. The garrison is said to number about 15,000.

On

Upon this point, as we have said, the whole interest of the campaign of the Danube is now concentrating. The Russians have retired from their positions in Lesser Wallachia, pursued and pressed by Turkish troops detached from the garrisons on the west of Omar's front. Kalafat has been left with but 3,000 men; and an army of 30,000 Turks, including a considerable force of cavalry, is said to be now upon the left bank of the Danube, pursuing the Russians, and with orders to press on to Bucharest with all speed. the other hand, the Russian army in the Dobrudscha would seem to have moved towards Silistria, from the north-east; while the latest news favour the reports that a junction is about to be effected, between Silistria and Schumla, between Omar Pasha and an Anglo-French force. On the 10th of June it was expected that 30,000 French, and 15,000, or 17,000 British troops, with forty-five pieces of cannon, would have been in line fifteen miles south-west of Varna, with the design, we presume, of joining Omar, and jointly attempting to raise the

1

siege movements which can scarcely fail to be followed shortly by a general and probably a decisive battle.

It would be in vain to speculate upon the future, which is involved in such a cloud of complications; but the mere facts we have stated teach a lesson which ought not to be lost sight of. If the Eastern question has been put to the arbitrement of war, it is very plain that that end has been brought about by the force of events, and has not been aimed at by the directors of the tactics of the Anglo-French commanders. The slight sketch we have given of the topography of the seat of war must satisfy every reader that the President of the Peace Congress could not have devised a plan of a campaign more likely to be bloodless than that which was begun in the intrenched lines of Gallipoli. Nature, history, and the engineer's art, all combined to point out that spot as the most unlikely in all Europe whereon to meet a Russian enemy. The deep current and steep right bank of the Danube, a double line of strong fortresses, the rugged passes of the Balkan, the history of Count Diebitsch's strange luck in finding Turkish traitors willing to treat with him at Adrianople, when his army was reduced to some 13,000 men, all bore witness to Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan, that fighting was not the work cut out for them by those who selected that base for their operations When the "Crosser of the Balkan,' in 1829, approached that position, which after all he never reached, and never would have reached had the Sultan been unrestrained by kind British and other friends from resisting with the means at his disposal, Silistria had been taken, Varna had fallen by treachery, and Schumla had been turned. The whole of Bulgaria, from the Danube to the Balkan, was at the mercy of the troops of Russia, and her ships had the command of the Black Sea. Yet for all that, as we have said, there is every reason to believe that Count Diebitsch never would have reached the Sea of Marmora, and never would have extorted the treaty of Adrianople, but for the evil council of the foreign ministers (among them the British ambassador) at Constantinople, and the feebleness and treachery of Sultan Mahmoud's own advisers. Many a feint has, however, been converted by an accident into a true at

tack; and it is now only to be hoped that the original feebleness and insincerity of the Anglo-French tactics may not damage the execution of the more manly and honourable action which the courage of the garrison of Silistria, and, no doubt, the spirit and soldier-like feeling of the French and English generals, have forced on. Earnestly do we hope those officers may be able to give a good account of themselves and of the Russians on the banks of the Danube, notwithstanding the imperfections of their equipment, and although that was the last place to which their political superiors intended them to march.

Although the campaign of the Danube unquestionably requires the greater share of public attention given to the war in the East, still certain striking events, and many uncouth names, attract the notice of newspaper readers to another series of warlike operations, rendered difficult of comprehension by their desultory character and the extent of country over which they are spread. To these operations, engaging the entire of the northern and eastern, and half of the southern coasts of the Euxine, from Odessa to Sinope, and extending to the south-east into the Pashalic of Kars, we shall, for lack of a better, give the name of the campaign of the Black Sea. The main local features of this seat of the war are the great Russian commercial entrepot and fortress of Odessa, the naval arsenal of Sebastopol, and the Russian forts on the coasts of Circassia and Mingrelia, from Anapa in the north-west, to St. Nicholas or Shefkatil in the southeast. The events of the campaign of the Black Sea have been hitherto, with perhaps a single exception, either disastrous or trifling. The capture of St. Nicholas by the Turks, occurring at the commencement of hostilities and simultaneously with the brilliant successes at Kalafat and Oltenitza, served materially to change the public opinion of Europe, in reference to the military power both of Russia and Turkey, and had thus, no doubt, a most important influence upon subsequent events. Meu began to think that the "sick man" had a good deal of life still left in him; his weak and moribund state came to be spoken of by professing friends with less of destructive pity; and the doctor's absolute omnipotence for evil was

no longer implicitly believed in. In all human probability it was those gallant and most unexpected, though in themselves small, achievements that stimulated the hopeful sympathies of France and England to the point at which they overwhelmed the " connivance or credulity" of the governments, and swept them onward, unwillingly enough, into the course of active friendship towards the Turks in which they are now engaged. Unfortunately, the work so well begun at St. Nicholas was not carried on so as to secure or merit success. Less under the eyes of Europe than the Danubian army, the force employed in this campaign appears to have been more neglected by the authorities at Constantinople, and to have fallen into that state of disorganisation which the corruption and want of patriotism of the Turkish officers have so generally induced. Notwithstanding the exertions, described as very meritorious, of Kerschid Pacha (the English officer Guyon), the promise given at St. Nicholas has not been sustained, and we have heard little of late of the progress of the Turkish arms in Asia; but, upon the other hand, no Russian successes of moment have been there achieved. On the coast, the operations of the Black Sea campaign were inauspiciously begun by the disaster at Sinope, and the events which have since occurred were not calculated to produce any considerable influence upon the course of the war. The bombardment of Odessa was an inconsequential exploit, undertaken in a fit of passion, carried on with childish forbearance, and terminated without result. Whatever of material injury may have been done on that occasion by the guns of the allied fleet was more than counterbalanced by the moral effect of their retreat, re infectâ, upon the Russian people, enforced as that lesson has been by the calamitous accident to the Tiger. The batteries and gun-carriages of Odessa will be soon repaired, and but few subjects of the Czar will ever know the extent of injury they sustained: the news will be carefully spread into every nook of all the Russias, that a numerous French and British fleet bombarded the defences of a commercial fortress, and that the result was the burial of a captain of Her Majesty's navy, with such military honours as two Russian battalions and two Russian

guns could confer, and the committal of a captured British standard to the custody of a Russian corps of marine cadets. To lookers-on from without the Czar's frontier it is, nevertheless, manifest, that in the presence of the allied fleets bis naval power in the Euxine is absolutely nought. From the moment when it was discovered that the purpose of England and France was really hostile, not a sail has ventured out of a Russian port; and while we write, a despatch of Sir Edward Lyons is before us, announcing the hasty destruction and abandonment of the forts on the Circassian coast. This, too, is after all nothing but stripping for the fight, and small indeed is the triumph it affords the allies.

It is

but the old Muscovite policy-destruction where defence is impracticableand the result is the liberation of the garrisons, and their availability for other and more important employment. No serious blow will have been struck in the Black Sea campaign, until the flags of the allies shall have been planted upon the citadels of Sebastopol and Odessa. How or when those operations should be attempted, or whether they are, under any probable combination of circumstances, practicable, it is not our intention at present to discuss.

The third branch of this complex war-the campaign of the Baltic will require but a few words. The local features are generally familiar to our readers, and the events have as yet been few and wholly unimportant. The local interest of this campaign is circumscribed within the Gulf of Finland, and is fixed at present upon the operations of the allied fleets in refe rence to the naval stations of Helsingfors, Revel, and Cronstadt, in which the three divisions of the Czar's Baltic fleet are now shut up. Helsingfors, the ancient capital of Finland, is situated on the northern coast of the gulf, at a distance of 180 miles from St. Petersburg. It is, like the other two ports, closed by the ice usually until the month of May, and is defended by the fortifications of Sveaborg, built upon a number of small islands, and mounting 800 guns. On the opposite, southern, side is Revel, about 200 miles from St. Petersburg, also strongly fortified and very difficult of entrance; and at the top of the Gulf, and twenty miles due west of the capital, is

Cronstadt, the chief of all the Russian arsenals, and, in fact, the outwork of the Imperial city. It is built upon the island of Kotline, and contains three ports, that for men-of-war being capable of accommodating thirty-five ships of the line. For the defence of this centre of the Czar's naval power the resources of art have been exhausted. Every rock and islet around it bristles with cannon, and the place itself is strengthened by the most elaborate works, while the narrowness of the channel, which is but thirty-six feet deep, would seem to render these costly preparations against hostile approach from the sea almost unnecessary. By the latest intelligence in our hands, we learn that Sir Charles Napier was with his fleet off Sveaborg, and it has even been reported that he has tried the range of his guns upon its works. The incidents of the Baltic campaign have, however, been very similar to those that occurred in the Black Sea. The Russians have abandoned positions which they could not expect to be able to defend, and have withdrawn themselves within the shelter of their granite bastions and great guns. The operations of the allied fleets have been of the most trifling and inconsequential kind; a few merchant vessels have been taken, and a few stones knocked out of a battery at Ecknaess, at a risk which proved, indeed, the indisputable gallantry of the officers engaged, but which neither brought nor promised any equivalent advantage. Yet there are already rumours abroad which foreshadow great and worthy results from the Baltic campaign. Our Scandinavian kinsmen in blood and brethren in the spirit of constitutional freedom, have not seen the British ensign on their waters without emotion. It is said that Sweden, King and people, will strike in for liberty, and against her ancient and ever merciless foe. That the people are so inclined, the manner of their reception of our ships leaves no room to doubt; that the natural disposition of King Oscar would lead him to the same conclusion, the course of his life gives reason to believe. He is, however, but a young member of the corporation of monarchs, and signs are not wanting that he is not to be left to the free course of his inclinations. Recent news from Stockholm intimates that "an envoy of Austria has had

private audiences of the King, for the purpose of laying before him the views of his sovereign as to the conditions of Sweden's joining the Western Powers, and taking an active part in the war." The greatest reverence is due to a boy: may the Swedes reverentially guard their youthful dynasty from the pollution of communion with that hoary despotism! The natural ally of Sweden and Denmark, closely bound to both by ties of affinity and policy, is England. These three powers united, might at any time, in an honest cause, set at nought the power of Russia— supported by France, they may impose what terms they please upon the disturber of the peace of the world. It is to be hoped that they will so unite, and that the Danes will follow out what is certainly their best interest, and what there is good reason to hope is their inclination; and, notwithstanding the autocratic leanings of their sovereign, that they will heartily join in the great movement against military oppression and absolute government, which is now threatening Northern as well as Eastern Europe. Should this end be brought about by Sir Charles Napier's campaign in the Baltic, the game will be well worth the candle; and in playing it out it will by no means be necessary for him to knock his head against the granite walls of Sveaborg, or the bottoms of his ships upon the sands of the Great Road of Cronstadt. A league of the northern powers, offensive and defensive, and anti-Russian, supported by a blockade of the Baltic and the consequent stoppage of the supplies which now reach the Czar's treasury and the pockets of his noble serfs, in the shape of returns for hemp, tallow, hides, corn, and flaxseed, would shortly induce a lucid interval, and bring the Imperial madman to terms upon the most approved modern principles of mad-doctoring, and without the employment of shot, shell, or cutlass, or any direct means of bodily coercion. Let no man, therefore, be impatient because Sveaborg is not bombarded, or Revel stormed, or Cronstadt taken by a coup de main. Success against any of those strongholds by direct operations would be miraculous, and attempts to achieve it are not necessary to the accomplishment of the desired result. The campaign of the Baltic differs from those of the Danube and of the Black Sea, in the circum

stance of the Czar's position in regard to it being one strictly of defence. He has not advanced, and he dares not advance from his northern ports; to hold him thus in durance is a victory, while he is struck at in a most vital part by the obstruction of his commerce, and the interception of the means of his existence. In the East he has been and is an aggressor; and as long as he can maintain that position, the moral prestige remains with him. If he be not repulsed from the Danube, the triumph is his; if he be suffered to retain the Crimea, there will be no security for the peace of the world from day to day; if the mouth of the Danube be not wrested from his keeping, the trade of Europe will not be free. But the way to all these results will be shortened by a blockade of the Baltic, such as can be kept up under any circumstances by Sir Charles Napier's fleet, but still more completely by such a cordon sanitaire as could be established by an anti-Russian league of the northern powers. Had we a real statesman among our men in power, honest endeavours to consolidate such an alliance would have long since superseded the wretched intrigues with Austrian and Prussian diplomatists, which, during the last two years, have marred the national interests, and jeopardised the national honour.

We have now hastily and imperfectly traced out the geographical features of this multiform war; and there remains for the accomplishment of our present purpose but to add a few words-they shall be few-in reference to the means at our command to meet the exigencies of this trying occasion. The rapidity and completeness with which the Baltic fleet was manned and sent to sea, and the ease and safety with which some five-and-twenty thousand soldiers have been withdrawn from our garrisons and transported to the shores of the Dardanelles, leave little room to doubt that the materiel of war is ready to our hands, good in quality and abundant in quantity. Nor can any man have observed the cheerfulness, good order, and quietness with which the naval preparations were made, without being impressed with a conviction of the excellence of the organisation of that department of our public service.

Under circumstances of considerable difficulty, with wages far above the average of many years, and with an

unusual demand for seamen, the largest number of ships ever sent out of harbour under one command, was fitted out and commissioned in a space of time incredibly short, and with as few complaints from any quarters as, perhaps, have ever been uttered in the course of so gigantic an operation.* Upon two points only have we heard a word of censure or disappointment expressed in reference to the organisation and arrangements of the fleets. A certain amount of shabbiness, the remnant of old Post-office notions, combined, perhaps, with a lurking disinclination to encourage private correspondence, has characterised the settlement of postal charges for transmission of letters to the ships, and a good deal of dissatisfaction has been felt at the uncertainty and delays of the mails. The latter has been, probably, to some extent unavoidable at the commencement of the campaign, under crude experimental regulations, with letter-writers inexperienced in the proper mode of addressing their communications, and letter-carriers untrained in the method of their delivery. The candid spirit in which the public criticisms upon this defect have been accepted by the responsible authorities, warrant us in believing that every practicable remedy will be applied to it; and we even indulge a hope that it will be seen to be but poor economy to balance the public liberality in carrying seamen's letters for a penny by mulcting officers of sixpence for every half-ounce of news from home, transmitted to them, at no cost to the public, by a Queen's ship. The only other stricture we have heard upon the naval arrangements, relates to the supply of medical officers. There has been difficulty in the way of providing a sufficient number of assistantsurgeons; some of the ships have not as yet got their complement; and Sir James Graham has admitted that it is not contemplated to appoint surgeons to the gun-boats a service in which,

no doubt, they would be specially required. A return to the House of Commons, called for by Colonel Boldero, does, indeed, show that the list of candidates for naval medical appointments has run very low. There were but five names upon it on the 5th of May, 1854, the date of the return; a fact which we must look upon as indicative of a marked disinclination among young medical men to enter into that department of the public service. There is some reasonable ground for this feeling, and also, we are bound to say, much mistaken prejudice, founded upon misrepresentation, to remove which would, we conceive, be to confer a benefit upon the medical profession no less than, at this conjuncture, upon the naval service. It is not necessary to refer to Roderick Random's history of cockpit life, to learn that there was a time when the surgeon's mates of men-of-war were but scurvily treated no worse, however, in all probability, than they generally deserved. No one acquainted with the circumstances will deny that their position during the last war was not calculated to raise the assistantsurgeons in the estimation of their brother-officers, or to improve their own tone; neither, we trust, will any candid person refuse to admit that very great improvements have been effected in their condition during the last twenty years. An assistant-surgeon is now a commissioned officer, distinguished as such by his uniform, and placed, in regard to pay and reckoning of his time of service, in a position much superior to that of the class of executive officers equal to him in rank. He has the advantage over his fellows in the army, of being able not merely to live on his pay, but, if he be prudent, to save money from the very moment he enters the service.† The grievances complained of by or for him are, first, that he is not provided with a cabin; and secondly, that he is not at once a wardroom officer. The