*

metaphorical or analogous name as bringing along with it something of the nature of the thing it originally signified, that Mr. Stewart is led to make the remark, not less original than just, that it is well for the understanding, though it may be a loss to the fancy, when a metaphorical word has lost its pedigree that is, when it no longer excites the primary idea denoted by it, and is reduced by custom to a plain and direct appellation in its secondary sense. He suggests also t with equal ingenuity, in cases where words have not yet been worn down to this use, the expedient of varying our metaphor when speaking of the same subject, as a preservative against this dangerous and encroaching error. Of the utility of this practice I have no doubt: and I think it may be regarded as an advantage of the same kind, that the parables of the New Testament are drawn from such a great diversity of objects, as to check the propensity in man, especially in matters of religion, to attach some mystical character to the images so employed, and to look upon them as emblems possessing an intrinsic virtue, or at least a secret affinity with· those spiritual truths, to the illustration of which they are made subservient.

"When the points in which are of secondary importance

the similarity of relation holds when instead of being essen

* Philosophical Essays, Ess. v. chap. 3.

† Ibid. In the analysis here given of analogy, it will be perceived by those who are conversant with Mr. Stewart's writings, that I have ventured to depart widely from his use of the word. Indeed M. Prevot's etymology, as given in a passage quoted with approbation by Mr. Stewart, vol. ii. chap. iv. § 4, appears to me quite erroneous. "Le mot Analogie, dans l'origine, n'exprime que la ressemblance." The reverse of which I take to be the fact. But this is not the place for entering further into the discussion.

tial and characteristic, they are slight and superficial — the analogy is often called a metaphor, and often a similitude, as being addressed rather to the fancy than to the judgment, and intended rather to adorn and illustrate, than to explain. But it would perhaps be better to avoid the name similitude in these cases, and to regard them as being, what they really are, analogies, although subsisting in points of inferior mo

ment.

"Thus when the swallow is called the herald of summer, or a ship is said to plough the waves, it is easy to resolve the phrase into the form of analogy or proportion: the swallow is to the summer what the herald is to his prince; he announces his approach. So the action of a ship is to the sea, what the action of a plough is to the land. But because in these cases the relation is fanciful rather than real, that is, it consists not in essential points but in mere circumstances of inferior importance, we leave such things to the province of taste or amusement, and no considerate man ever attempts to reason from them.

"I am not of the mind of those speculators,' said Mr. Burke, who seem assured that all States have the same period of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude, that are found in individuals. Parallels of this sort rather furnish similitudes to illustrate or to adorn, than supply analogies from whence to reason. The objects which are attempted to be forced into an analogy are not found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are physical beings commonwealths are not

"A remarkable example of this kind is that argument of Toplady against free-will, who, after quoting the text, Ye also

* Letters on a Regicide Peace, p. 4.

as lively stones are built up a spiritual house, triumphantly exclaims, this is giving free-will a stab under the fifth rib: for can stones hew themselves, and build themselves in a regular house?'t

“Even when we attribute to inanimate things the qualities of animals, the same analysis may be adopted as before. Thus the rage of the sea denotes a similarity of effect to the effect of rage in animals. This is even more the work of fancy than the example before given: for in reducing it to the form of a proportion one term is wholly supplied by the imagination. We do not really believe there is a principle in the sea producing these effects, answering to rage in animals, but the imagination suggests such a principle, and transfers the name of rage to it.

“In those cases where the analogy is traced between things perfectly heterogeneous there is little danger of confounding the idea with that of similitude. But when the subjects we are comparing are of a kindred nature, so that the things spoken of not only stand in the same relation, but also bear a close resemblance to each other, then it is we are most apt to confound them together, and to substitute resemblance for analogy. Thus because the heart or the tooth of an animal not only serves the same office to the animal that the heart or the tooth of a man does to him, but is also an object very nearly resembling it in structure and outward appearance, we are apt to imagine that the same name is given to it solely on this last account. But if we pursue the inquiry throughout the animal creation, we shall find that the form of the corre

* 1 Pet. ii. 5.

+ Christian and Philosophical Necessity Asserted, p. 56. See 1 Cor. xiv. 4.

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sponding parts is infinitely varied, although the analogy re mains the same: till at length we arrive at such diversities, that it is only persons conversant with comparative anatomy who can readily detect the analogy. And long before the difference has reached this length in popular discourse the analogical name is dropped, and the scientific use of it in such cases sounds pedantic to unlearned ears. Thus the beak of a bird answers to the tooth of man, and the shell of a lobster to the bones of other animals. If the use and office remain the same, no diversity of form impairs the analogy: but we ought from such examples to learn, even when similitude of form does exist, not to regard it as the true ground of the comparison we make, and of our affixing the same name.

“Thus too when we speak of qualities of things which are not cognizable by our senses except in their effects, we bestow the same name on account of a real or supposed analogy, not on account of any similarity in the qualities themselves, which may or may not exist according as the things we speak of are more or less of a kindred nature. Sagacity, courage, fidelity, love, jealousy, revenge, are all predicated of brute animals not less than of man, although they are not things or existences themselves, but certain attributes or affections in them, exhibiting symptoms and producing effects corresponding with the symptoms and effects attendant upon those qualities in ourselves. In these instances, still more than in the former, we are prone to confound analogy with resemblance

- because as these things have no form or existence of their own as the whole essence of them consists in their relation to something else if the relations be alike, the things are necessarily alike, and we naturally slide into that form of speaking which makes no distinction between analogy and resemblance but even then we regard the qualities as 42*

identical, only in proportion as the nature of the respective subjects to which they belong may be regarded as the same.

"The SECOND error above noticed as carefully to be avoided in the use of analogy is, when we do not indeed treat the corresponding terms as resembling one another in their own nature, but when we presume that a similarity of relation subsists in other points besides those which are the foundation of the analogy.

"When the analogy consists in slight or superficial circumstances, still more when it is fanciful only, no attempt whatever should be made to reason from it; as was exemplified in the passage produced from Burke's writings: but even when the analogy is solid and well-founded we are liable to fall into error, if we suppose it to extend farther than it really does. Errors of this nature are often committed by men of lively fancies, or of ardent minds, and they are the more seducing, because they set out not only with a show of reason, but with reason and truth actually on their side.

"Thus because a just analogy has been discerned between the metropolis of a country and the heart in the animal body, it has been sometimes contended that its increased size is a disease that it may impede some of its most important functions -or even be the means of its dissolution.

"Another frequent example of this second error is found in the use of the same titles of office or dignity in different nations or in distant times. Although the relation denoted by them be the same in one or in several important particulars, yet it scarcely ever holds throughout; and the most false notions are in consequence entertained by people of the nature of these corresponding offices in every country but their own. We have known what mischief has been produced by the adoption of the phrase, servant of the people,' although it