&c., or against the mischiefs of anarchy; with high-flown panegyrics on liberty, rights of man, &c., or on social order, justice, the constitution, law, religion, &c., will gradually lead the hearers to take for granted, without proof, that the measure proposed will lead to these evils or these advantages; and it will in consequence become the object of groundless abhorrence or admiration. For the very utterance of such words as have a multitude of what may be called stimulating ideas associated with them, will operate like a charm on the minds, especially of the ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a tumult of feeling, as will effectually blind their judgment; so that a string of vague abuse or panegyric will often have the effect of a train of sound Argument. This artifice falls under the head of "Irrelevant Conclusion," or ignoratio elenchi, mentioned in the Treatise on Fallacies. CHAP. III. Of the favorable or unfavorable disposition of the hearers towards the Speaker or his opponent. § 1. Indirect self commendation. IN raising a favorable impression of the speaker, or an unfavorable one of his opponent, a peculiar tact will of course be necessary; especially in the former, since direct self-commendation will usually be disgusting to a greater degree even, than a direct personal attack on another: though, if the Orator is pleading his own cause, or one in which he is personally concerned, (as was the case in the speech of Demosthenes con cerning the "Crown,") a greater allowance will be made for him on this point; especially if he be a very eminent person, and one who may safely appeal to public actions performed by him. Thus Pericles is represented by Thucydides as claiming, directly, when speaking in his own vindication, exactly the qualities (good Sense, good Principle, and Goodwill) which Aristotle lays down as constituting the character which we must seek to appear in. But then it is to be observed, that the historian represents him as accustomed to address the People with more authority than others for the most part ventured to assume. It is by the expression of wise, amiable, and generous Sentiments, that Aristotle recommends the speaker to manifest his own character;* but even this must generally be done in an oblique † and seemingly incidental manner, lest the hearers be disgusted with a pompous and studied display of fine sentiments; and care must also be taken not to affront them by seeming to inculcate, as something likely to be new to them, maxims which they regard as almost truisms. Of course the application of this last caution must vary according to the character of the persons addressed; that might excite admiration and gratitude in one audience, which another would receive with indigna · * When (as of course will often happen) the hearers are thus induced, on insufficient grounds, to give the speaker full credit for moral excellence, from his merely uttering the language of it, the fallacy which in this case misleads them may be regarded as that of "undistributed Middle:" "a good man would speak so and so; the speaker does this therefore he must be a good man." + E. G. "It would be needless to impress upon you the maxim," &c. "You cannot be ignorant," &c. &c. "I am not advancing any high pretensions in expressing the sentiments which such an occasion must call forth in every honest heart," &c. Eloquence rela tive. tion and ridicule. Most men, however, are disposed rather to overrate than to extenuate their own moral judgment; or at least to be jealous of any one's appearing to underrate it. Universally indeed, in the Arguments used, as well as in the appeals made to the Feelings, a consideration must be had of the hearers, whether they are learned or ignorant,— of this or that profession,-nation, - character, &c., and the address must be adapted to each; so that there can be no excellence of writing or speaking, in the abstract; nor can we any more pronounce on the Eloquence of any Composition, than upon the wholesomeness of a medicine, without knowing for whom it is intended.* The less enlightened the hearers, the harder of course, it is, to make them comprehend a long and complex train of Reasoning; so that sometimes the arguments, in themselves the most cogent, cannot be employed at all with effect; and the rest will need an expansion and copious illustration which would be needless, and therefore tiresome, (as has been above remarked,) before a different kind of audience. On the other hand, their feelings may be excited by much * Aristotle has given, in his Rhetoric, besides a very curious and valuable analysis of the Passions, — a description of the prevailing Characters of men of different ages and situations in life; in reference to the different modes in which they are to be addressed. With a similar view, I have appended to the present Part a Lecture delivered a few years ago, on the moral and intellectual influences of the several Professions. It was composed without any reference to the present subject; and it omits several points which might, not unsuitably, have been introduced. But it will be easy for the reader to make the requisite application of the remarks it contains, and to fill up for himself the outline sketched out in it. bolder and coarser expedients, such as those are the most ready to employ, and the most likely to succeed in, who are themselves only a little removed above the vulgar; as may be seen in the effects produced by fanatical preachers. No class in capable of be- their But there are none whose feelings do not occasionally need and admit of excitement by the powers of eloquence; only there is a more exquisite skill required in thus affecting the educated classes than the populace. "The less improved in knowledge and discernment the hearers are, the easier it is for the speaker to work upon their passions, and by working on their passions, to obtain his end. This, it must be owned, appears on the other hand to give a considerable advantage to the preacher; as in no Congregation can the bulk of the people be regarded as on a footing, in point of improvement, with either House of Parliament, or with the Judges in a Court of Judicature. It is certain, that the more gross the hearers are, the more avowedly may you address yourself to their passions, and the less occasion there is for argument; whereas, the more intelligent they are, the more covertly must you operate on their passions, and the more attentive must you be in regard to the justness, or at least the speciousness, of your reasoning. Hence some have strangely concluded, that the only scope for eloquence is in haranguing the multitude; that in gaining over to your purpose men of knowledge and breeding, the exertion of Oratorical talents hath no influence. This is precisely as if one should argue, because a mob is much more easily subdued than regular troops, there is no occasion for the art of war, nor is there a proper field for the exertion of military skill, unless when you are quelling an undisciplined rabble. Every body sees in this case, not only how absurd such a way of arguing would be, but that the very reverse ought to be the conclusion. The reason why people do not so quickly perceive the absurdity in the other case, is, that they affix no distinct meaning to the word eloquence, often denoting no more by that term than simply the power of moving the passions. But even in this improper acceptation, their notion is far from being just; for wherever there are men, learned or ignorant, civilized or barbarous, there are passions; and the greater the difficulty is in affecting these, the more art is requisite."* It may be added to what Dr. Campbell has here remarked, that the title of eloquent may have come to be often limited to such compositions as he is speaking of, from the circumstance that their eloquence is (to readers of cultivated mind) more conspicuous. That which affects our own feelings is not, by us, at the time at least, perceived to be eloquence. (See note to the next section.) On the other hand, it is, as has been said, in the same degree more difficult to bring the uneducated to a comprehension of the arguments employed; and this, not only from their reasoning powers having less general cultivation, but also, in many instances, from their ignorance of the subject; their needing to be informed of the facts, and to have the principles explained to them, on which the argument proceeds. And I cannot but think that the generality of sermons seem to presuppose a degree of religious knowledge in the hearers greater than many of them would be found on examination When this is the case, the most angelic eloquence must be unavailing to any practical purpose. to possess. In no point more than in that now under consideration, viz. *Campbell's "Rhetoric," B. I. Ch. X. Sec. 2, pp. 224, 225. |