operation of the Writer, has of course contributed to the extension of those terms which, in their primary signification, had reference to Speaking alone. Many objects are now accomplished through the medium of the Press, which formerly came under the exclusive province of the Orator; and the qualifications requisite for success are so much the same in both cases, that we apply the term "Eloquent" as readily to a Writer as to a Speaker; though, etymologically considered, it could only belong to the latter. Indeed "Eloquence" is often attributed even to such compositions, e. g. Historical

works, as have in view an object entirely different from any that could be proposed by an Orator; because some part of the rules to be observed in Oratory, or rules analogous to these, are applicable to such compositions. Conformably to this view, therefore, some writers have spoken of Rhetoric as the Art of Composition, universally; or, with the exclusion of Poetry alone, as embracing all Prose composition.

A still wider extension of the province of Rhetoric has been contended for by some of the ancient writers; who, thinking it necessary to include, as belonging to the Art, every thing that could conduce to the attainment of the object proposed, introduced into their systems, Treatises on Law, Morals, Politics, &c., on the ground that a knowledge of these subjects was requisite to enable a man to speak well on them; and even insisted on Virtue as an essential qualification of a perfect Orator; because a good character, which can in no way be so surely established as by deserving it, has great weight with the audience.

*

small a number that the printing of them would have been more costly than transcribing.

See Quinctilian.

ecessors.

These notions are combated by Aristotle; Aristotle's cen- who attributes them either to the ill-cultivated sure of his pred- understanding (naidevola) of those who maintained them, or to their arrogant and pretending disposition (lagovela); i. e. a desire to extol and magnify the Art they professed. In the present day, the extravagance of such doctrines is so apparent to most readers, that it would not be worth while to take much pains in refuting them. It is worthy of remark, however, that the very same erroneous view is, even now, often taken of Logic; * which has been considered by some as a kind of system of universal knowledge, on the ground that Argument may be employed on all subjects, and that no one can argue well on a subject which he does not understand; and which has been complained of by others for not supplying any such universal instruction as its unskilful advocates have placed within its province; such as in fact no one Art or System can possibly afford.

The error is precisely the same in respect of Rhetoric and of Logic; both being instrumental arts; and, as such, applicable to various kind of subject matter, which do not properly come under them.

So judicious an author as Quinctilian would not have failed to perceive, had he not been carried away by an inordinate veneration for his own Art, that as the possession of building materials is no part of the art of Architecture, though it is impossible to build without materials, so, the knowledge of the subjects on which the Orator is to speak, constitutes no part of the art of Rhetoric, though it be essential to its successful employment; and that though virtue, and the good

* Elements of Logic, Introd.

reputation it procures, add materially to the Speaker's influence, they are no more to be, for that reason, considered as belonging to the Orator, as such, than wealth, rank, or a good person, which manifestly have a tendency to produce the same effect.

In the present day, however, the province of Rhetoric, in the widest acceptation that would be reckoned admissible, comprehends all "Composition in Prose;" in the narrowest sense, it would be limited to "Persuasive Speaking."

Extremes in

the limitation

and extension of the province of Rhetoric.

Objects of the present Treatise.

I propose in the present work to adopt a middle course between these two extreme points; and to treat of "Argumentative Composition," generally, and exclusively; considering Rhetoric (in conformity with the very just and philosophical view of Aristotle) as an offshoot from Logic.

66

I remarked in treating of that Science, that Reasoning may be considered as applicable to two purposes, which I ventured to designate respectively by the terms "Inferring," and Proving;" i. e. the ascertainment of the truth by investigation, and the establishment of it to the satisfaction of another: and I there remarked that Bacon, in his Organon, has laid down rules for the conduct of the former of these processes, and that the latter belongs to the province of Rhetoric and it was added, that to infer is to be regarded as the proper office of the Philosopher, or the Judge; Advocate. It is not, however, to be understood, that Philosophical works are to be excluded. from the class to which Rhetorical rules are applicable; for the Philosopher who undertakes, by writing or speaking, to convey his notions to others.

to prove, of the

Philosophy and Rhetoric compared.

ideas to

assumes, for the time being, the character of Advocate of the doctrines he maintains. The process of investigation must be supposed completed, and certain conclusions arrived at by that process, before he begins to impart his others in a treatise or lecture; the object of which must of course be to prove the justness of those conclusions. And in doing this, he will not always find it expedient to adhere to the same course of reasoning by which his own discoveries were originally made; other arguments may occur to him afterwards, more clear or more concise, or better adapted to the understanding of those he addresses. In explaining, therefore, and establishing the truth, he may often have occasion for rules of a different kind from those employed in its discovery. Accordingly, when I remarked, in the work above alluded to, that it is a common fault, for those engaged in Philosophical and Theological inquiries, to forget their own peculiar office, and assume that of the Advocate, improperly, this caution is to be understood as applicable to the process of forming their own opinions; not as excluding them from advocat ing, by all fair arguments, the conclusions at which they have arrived by candid investigation. But if this candid investigation do not take place in the first instance, no pains that they may bestow in searching for arguments, will have any tendency to insure their attainment of truth. If a man begins (as is too plainly a frequent mode of proceeding) by hastily adopting, or strongly leaning to, some opinion which suits his inclination, or which is sanctioned by some authority that he blindly venerates, and then studies with the utmost diligence, not as an Investigator of Truth, but as an Advocate laboring to prove his point, his talents and his researches, whatever effect they may produce in making converts to his notions

will avail nothing in enlightening his own judgment, and securing him from error.*

Composition, however, of the Argumentative kind, may be considered (as has been above stated) as coming under the province of Rhetoric. And this view of the subject is the less open to objection, inasmuch as it is not likely to lead to discussions that can be deemed superfluous, even by those who may choose to consider Rhetoric in the most restricted sense, as relating only to "Persuasive Speaking;" since it is evident that Argument must be, in most cases at least, the basis of Persuasion.

Plan of the

present Treatise.

I propose then to treat, first and principally, of the Discovery of ARGUMENTS, and of their Arrangement; secondly, to lay down some Rules respecting the excitement and management of what are commonly called the Passions, (including every kind of Feeling, Sentiment, or Emotion,) with a view to the attainment of any object proposed, principally, Persuasion, in the strict sense, i. e. the influencing of the WILL; thirdly, to offer some remarks on STYLE; and, fourthly, to treat of ELOCUTION.

History of

Rhetoric.

2. It may be expected that, before I proceed to treat of the Art in question, I should present the reader with a sketch of its history. Little, however, is required to be said on this head, because the present is not one of those branches of study in which we can trace with interest a progressive improvement from age to age. It is one, on the contrary, to which more attention appears to have been paid, and in which greater proficiency is supposed to have been made, in the earliest

* See Essay on the Love of Truth, 2d Series.