Analysis of Persuasion. PERSUASION, properly so called, i. e. the art of influencing the Will, is the next point to be considered. And Rhetoric is often regarded (as was formerly remarked) in a more limited sense, as conversant about this head alone. But even, according to that view, the rules above laid down will be found not the less relevant; since the Conviction of the understanding (of which I have hitherto been treating) is an essential part of Persuasion; and will generally need to be effected by the Arguments of the Writer or Speaker. For in order that the Will may be influenced, two things are requisite; viz. 1. that the proposed Object should appear desirable; and 2. that the Means suggested should be proved to be conducive to the attainment of that object; and this last, evidently must depend on a process of Reasoning. In order, e. g. to induce the Greeks to unite their efforts against the Persian invader, it was necessary both to prove that coöperation could alone render their resistance effectual, and also to awaken such feelings of patriotism and abhorrence of a foreign yoke, as might prompt them 18* 209 to make these combined efforts. For it is evident, that however ardent their love of liberty, they would make no exertions if they apprehended no danger; or if they thought themselves able, separately, to defend themselves, they would be backward to join the confederacy: and on the other hand, that if they were willing to submit to the Persian yoke, or valued their independence less than their present ease, the fullest conviction that the Means recommended would secure their independence, would have had no practical effect. Exhortation. Persuasion, therefore, depends on, first, Argument, (to prove the expediency of the Means proposed,) and secondly, what is usually called Exhortation, i. e. the excitement of men to adopt those Means, by representing the end as sufficiently desirable. It will happen, indeed, not unfrequently, that the one or the other of these objects will have been already, either wholly or in part, accomplished; so that the other shall be the only one that it is requisite to insist on; viz. sometimes the hearers will be suf ficiently intent on the pursuit of the End, and will be in doubt only as to the means of attaining it; and sometimes, again, they will have no doubt on that point, but will be indifferent, or not sufficiently ardent, with respect to the proposed End, and will need to be stimulated by Exhortations. Not sufficiently ardent, I have said, because it will not so often happen that the object in question will be one to which they are totally indifferent, as that they will, practically at least, not reckon it, or not feel it, to be worth the requisite pains. No one is absolutely indifferent about the attainment of a happy immortality; and yet a great part of the Preacher's business consists in Exhortation, i. e. endeavoring to induce men to use those exertions which they themselves believe to be necessary for the attainment of it. Aristotle, and many other writers, have spoken of appeals to the passions as an un Passions. fair mode of influencing the hearers; in answer to which Dr. Campbell has remarked, that there can be no Persuasion without an address to the Passions:* and it is evident, from "To say, that it is possible to persuade without speaking to the passions is but at best a kind of specious nonsense. The coolest reasoner always in persuading, addresseth himself to the passions some way or other. This he cannot avoid doing, if he speak to the purpose. To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show that the action will answer some End. That can never be an End to me which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. You assure me 'It is for my honor.' Now you solicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You say, 'It is for my interest.' Now you bespeak my self-love. It is for the public good.' Now you rouse my patriotism. It will relieve the miserable.' Now you touch my pity. So far, therefore, is it from being an unfair method of persuasion to move the passions, that there is no persuasion without moving them. "But if so much depend on passion, where is the scope for argument? Before I answer this question, let it be observed, that, in order to persuade, there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers; the second is, to satisfy their judgment that there is a connection between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites. This is the analysis of persuasion. The former is effected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object; the latter, unless so evident of itself as to supersede the necessity, by presenting the best and most forcible arguments which the nature of the subject admits. In the These incorone lies the pathetic, in the other the argumentative. porated together constitute that vehemence of contention to which the greatest exploits of Eloquence ought doubtless to be ascribed.". Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book I. Chap. VII. § 4. what has been just said, that he is right, if under the term Passion be included every active Principle of our nature. This, however, is a greater latitude of meaning than belongs even to the Greek word lán; though the signification of that is wider than, according to ordinary use, that of our term "Passions." Will. But Aristotle by no means overlooked the Influence of the necessity with a view to Persuasion, properly so termed, of calling into action some motive that may influence the Will; it is plain that whenever he speaks with reprobation of an appeal to the Passions, his meaning is, the excitement of such feelings as ought not to influence the decision of the question in hand. A desire to do justice, may be called, in Dr. Campbell's wide acceptation of the term, a "Passion" or " Affection;" this is what ought to influence a Judge; and no one would ever censure a Pleader for striving to excite and heighten this desire; but if the decision be influenced by an appeal to Anger, Pity, &c., the feelings thus excited being such as ought not to have operated, the Judge must be allowed to have been unduly biased. And that this is Aristotle's meaning is evident from his characterizing the introduction of such topics, as "foreign to the matter in hand.”* It is evident, also, that as the motives which ought to operate will be different in different cases, the same may be objectionable and not fairly admissible, in one case, which in another would be perfectly allowable.† * Εξω τοῦ πράγματος. + See the Treatise on FALLACIES, § 14. The following very sensible remarks on this subject are extracted from an article in the Edinburgh Review. "As to all truths capable of being established by evidence either on certain or probable grounds, God has given us the faculty of judging of that evidence, as the instrument of obtaining a belief in An instance occurs in Thucydides, in which this is very judiciously and neatly pointed out in the debate respecting the Mityleneans, who had been subdued after a revolt, Cleon is introduced contending for the justice of inflicting on them capital punishment; to which Diodotus is made to reply, that the Athenians are not sitting in judgment on the offenders, but in deliberation as to their own interest; and ought therefore them. Any belief acquired not through the use of this instrument, but by pressing into the service faculties intended for other purposes, be the subject of belief never so true, rests on defective grounds as regards the party believing. If truth have really any objective existence at all if it be any thing more than that which every man troweth - it is the merest truism to say, that to believe as truth that which is established on slight evidence or no evidence, or arguments addressed to the conscience and not to the reason, may be an act piously done, but must proceed from a neglect of that portion of the faculties which is specially assigned to us by our Creator for that special purpose. This is an error which may often lead to good results in particular cases, as it has led, and still leads, to fearful evils in many others; but all the sophistry in the world cannot make it other than an error. He [Loyola] fixes on a particular defect in human nature as a means of government, and consequently as something to be encouraged and cultivated. He would have obedience, as far as possible, comprehend the acts of the judgment, as well as the acts of the will. He would have men strive to give a false bias to their minds; to stifle the light within them. He is not content with knowing that they will do so, and availing himself of the weakness; he would implant it in them as a principle. "It would take but a short process to show that it is this fatal notion of governing men by their failings which has led, in the main, to all the perverse and irreligious portions of the developments of Jesuitism; to condescensions to every weakness, apologies for every crime, and serious defences of every unnatural absurdity." -- Edinburgh Review, April, 1845. |