of committing the act charged against them, they were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness; 5. Persons who committed the act, or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent. But ignorance of the law does not excuse from punishment for its violation; 6. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof; 7. Persons who committed the act, or made the omission charged while under involuntary subjection to the power of superiors. Subd. 4. As drafted, this subdivision expresses the rule of the common law as very uniformly understood and practised, until within a recent period. (McNaughton's case, 1 Townsend's St. Tr., 312, 401.) Within a few years past, some respectable authorities in medical jurisprudence, and some adjudications in cases involving civil rights, have advanced the view that any mental aberration, any monomania however limited in subject, is to be deemed a disease of the mind, as a unit, necessarily involving and embarrassing all the mental action of the individual. That what have been heretofore deemed partial insanities, are in truth special developments of a disease of the mind, which is necessarily so fundamental as to render its soundness, even upon subjects furthest removea rom the particular hallucination exhibited, wholly uncertain. (Waring v. Waring, 12 Jurist, O. S. C. S., 948; Moore's Privy Co. R.; Ray's Med. Jur. of Insanity, 2 ed., 27, 29.) If this view shall be deemed sound, and to be a proper element in the criminal jurisprudence of insanity, a question will arise which is now suggested only for the consideration of the Legislature; whether the last clause of the subdivision- the words "upon proof that, &c., they were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness," may be omitted. $ 17. No act committed by a person while in a state Intoxicated of voluntary intoxication, shall be deemed less crimi- persons. nal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the Morbid criminal accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act. People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. (4 Smith), 9; Peo ple v. Hammill, 2 Park. Cr., 223; People v. Robinson. Id., 235. 18. A morbid propensity to commit prohibited propensity. acts, existing in the mind of a person who is not shown to have been incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, forms no defense to a prosecution therefor. Insane persons, ac quitted, how disposed of. Involuntary subjection. Subjection by duress. Subjection inferred from coverture. The validity of this defense was thoroughly discussed in the late case of Huntington, in this State; where the earlier authorities will be found collected. (See Trial of Huntington.) S 19. When a jury have returned a verdict acquitting a defendant upon the ground of insanity, the court may thereupon, if the defendant be in custody, and they deem his discharge dangerous to the public safety, order him to be committed to the State lunatic asylum till he becomes sane. Rep. Code Cr. Pro., § 511. S20. The involuntary subjection to the power of a superior, which exonerates a person charged with a criminal act or omission from punishment therefor, arises either from 1. Duress; or, S 21. The duress which excuses a person who has committed a prohibited act or neglect from punishment, must be an actual compulsion by use of force. S22. A subjection sufficient to excuse from punishment may be inferred in favor of a wife, from the fact of coverture, whenever she committed the act charged, in the presence and with the assent of her husband; except where such act is a participation in: 1. Treason; 2. Murder; 3. Manslaughter; 4. Maiming; 5. An attempt to kill; 6. Rape; 7. Abduction; 8. Abuse of children; 9. Seduction; 10. Abortion, either upon herself or another female; 11. Concealing the death of an infant, whether her own or that of another; 12. Fraudulently producing a false child, whether as her own, or as that of another; 13. Bigamy; 14. Incest; 15. The crime against nature; 16. Indecent exposure; 17. Obscene exhibitions of books and prints; 18. Keeping a bawdy or other disorderly house; 19. Misplacing a railway switch; or, 20. Obstructing a railway track. Treason and murder have long been recognized as exceptions to the rule which exempts a wife from punishment for an act committed in her husband's presence. Other offenses have been considered exceptions by many authorities. The commissioners have deemed it desirable to specify the excepted crimes with precision, and to extend the list to all which are of so grave and clearly marked a character, or relate so closely to the sex, and peculiar duties, privileges, or rights of woman, that a female cannot be supposed to be misled in regard to the character of her act, by the influence of her husband. That a wife should aid her husband in the commission of a rape, a seduction, or of either of the similar crimes mentioned in the foregoing list, is doubtless improbable. But the supposition of such a case as possible seems justified by the conviction of Lord Audley, for forcibly assisting one of his servants to commit a rape upon his wife. (3 How. St. Tr., 402.) When not inferred. Inference may be rebutted. Exemption of public S23. In case of the crimes enumerated in the last section, the wife is not excused from punishment by reason of her subjection to the power of her husband, unless the facts proved show a case of duress as defined in section 21. S 24. The inference of subjection arising from the fact of coverture may be rebutted by any facts showing that in committing the act charged the wife acted freely. The proof of marriage requisite to entitle a woman to the benefit of this exemption, is intended to be left to the operation of the ordinary rules applicable to the proof of that relation in other cases. $25. Ambassadors and other public ministers from ministers. foreign governments, accredited to the President or Government of the United States, and recognized by it according to the laws of the United States, with their secretaries, messengers, families and servants, are not liable to punishment in this State, but are to be returned to their own country for trial and punishment. Wheat. Int. L., 264, § 6; 271, § 14; Vattel, 470, § 91 and onward; 1 Bish. Cr. L., § 585; Act of Cong. of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25. Olassification of parties to crimes. TITLE II. OF PARTIES TO CRIMES. SECTION 26. Classification of parties to crimes. 27. Who are principals. 28. Who are accessories. 29. No accessories in misdemeanor. 30. Punishment of accessories. $26. The parties to crimes are classified as⚫ 1. Principals; and, 2. Accessories. principals. S27. All persons concerned in the commission of Who are a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, though not present, are principals. See Rep. Code Cr. Pro., 156, § 310. accessories. $28. All persons who, after the commission of any who are felony, conceal or aid the offender, with knowledge that he has committed a felony, and with intent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, are accessories. See Rep. Code Cr. Pro., 156, § 311, note, for reasons why the commissioners recommend the abrogation of the distinction between an accessory before the fact, and a principal. That distinction being abrogated, there is no longer a need of retaining the phrase "accessory after the fact." The above definition of an accessory corresponds with the definition of an accessory after the fact, as given in 2 Rev. Stat., 699, § 7. $29. In misdemeanor there are no accessories. $30. Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by law, an accessory to a felony is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding five years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 2 Rev. Stat., 699, § 7. No accessories in misdemeanor. Punishme't sories. of acces TITLE III. OF CRIMES AGAINST RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE. SECTION 31. Blasphemy defined. 32. Words used in serious discussion. 33. Blasphemy a misdemeanor. 34. Profane swearing defined. 35. Punishment of profane swearing. 36. Summary conviction for profane swearing. |