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respect to Sunderland also, I see no foundation for any charge of treachery. I admit that, unlike Stanhope, he, far from striving to avert, probably promoted and co-operated in the fall of Townshend. But then his political position was very different from Stanhope's. He was not bound to Townshend by any ties of confidence and friendship. He had some grounds to complain of Townshend's jealousy, and of his own exclusion from power. He was considered by Townshend not as an ally, but as a rival; and his enmity was all along expected and foreseen. Now it surely must be owned that previous confidence is implied in a charge of treachery; and that where there was no friendship there can be no breach of friendship.

In concluding my narrative of the various and intricate transactions which led to Lord Townshend's dismissal, I may observe that, even had they not existed, there seems great reason to doubt whether the ministry could have continued unchanged. We have some remarkable expressions to that effect in a letter written at a previous period under Townshend's own direction :-"His Lordship and Mr. Methuen are sorry to observe that from the disposition of offices, and the behaviour of Lords Sunderland and Cadogan before the King's going over, as well as from the encouragement since given to the Tories by the Prince's countenancing Mr. Hill, Mr. Hutchinson, and the Dukes of Shrewsbury and Argyle, the Whigs in general are become so uneasy and divided, that should things continue upon the present foot, the prospect for the next session of Parliament would be but melancholy."

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Mr. Poyntz to Secretary Stanhope, Aug. 17, 1716, O. S. Coxe's Walpole.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE news of Lord Townshend's removal was received in London with almost universal disapprobation. No clear and definite cause being then assigned for that measure, and its advisers being absent from England, a large field was left open to conjecture, exaggeration, and mistrust.* It was commonly considered as a Hanoverian cabal, as a fatal proof of the ascendency of Continental politics; and the conduct of Stanhope, in being a party to it, was loudly and generally inveighed against. The Jacobites hailed this symptom of weakness in the Government as an omen of hope to their cause. The Whigs, who well knew the high worth and tried merit of Lord Townshend, felt no less sorrow than surprise at his dismissal; and the moneyed men foreboded the loss of public confidence, and the decline of public credit. "I will venture to say," writes Mr. Brereton, the same who brought these despatches from Hanover, "the town is in greater confusion now than it was in any part or at any alterations whatsoever made in the late Queen's reign. When I go into the City all the considerable men there crowd about me, and press me in the most earnest manner to give some reasons for these sudden and unexpected resolutions, and to tell them who I thought were the advisers and contrivers of them." It may be doubted, however, whether there is not some exaggeration in these statements, since, when we come to positive facts, we find that the fall in the funds did not amount to one per cent.‡

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Townshend himself, and the Walpoles, were not among the least indignant. Their resentment was still further exasperated by a very intemperate letter from Sunderland to Lord Orford, directly accusing Townshend, Robert Walpole, and the Lord Chancellor, of having entered into engagements with the Prince and Duke of Argyle against the King's authority.§ No wonder that Townshend, perfectly innocent as he felt himself on that charge, should have more than ever given the reins to his passionate temper, should com

"It is difficult to trace the causes of a dispute between statesmen." This was the remark of Sir Robert Walpole after his own quarrel with Lord Townshend in 1730. Coxe's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 339.

† Mr. Brereton to Mr. Charles Stanhope, December, 1716. Erasmus Lewis writes to Swift, Jan. 12, 1717:-"The division of the Whigs is so great that, morally speaking, nothing but another rebellion can ever unite them." In this sense Lewis would probably not have been displeased at their union.

Letter from Mr. Charles Stanhope to Mr. Brereton. December, 1716.

This letter itself is missing; but it is mentioned by Lord Townshend when writing to M. Slingeland, Jan. 1, 1717, O. S., and by Baron de Wassenaar when writing to Lord Townshend, Jan. 26, 1717. Coxe's Walpole.

plain of this "infamous accusation" from the "villany and infatuation" of Lord Sunderland, and should impute to that nobleman "frenzy fits" in writing his letters.*

Townshend lost no time in sending his answers to Hanover. To Stanhope he wrote only a few lines in a style of bitter irony; to the King his letter was couched in very loyal and becoming terms, respectfully but firmly declining the offer of Ireland. "My private affairs," says he in his correspondence with the Hague, “would not permit me to remove to Ireland, any more than common honesty would allow me to put the profits of that employment in my pocket, without going over to do the duties of it." This was intended as a severe reflection on Sunderland, for having acted in the manner here described; but it might have been more prudently omitted, since we shall find Townshend himself very shortly afterwards taking precisely that course which he had branded as repugnant to " common honesty."

Both the Walpoles, on their part, wrote to Stanhope in very reproachful terms, declaring that he had acted "in a passion," and with "sudden changes to old sworn friends;" and that, in their opinion, "the authors of this scheme did not expect that Townshend would, nor desire that he should, accept the Lord Lieutenancy.' Stanhope, in his reply, expresses deep concern that what he judged and meant as a service to Lord Townshend should be thus resented; that, so far from representing his Lordship's refusal of the Lord Lieutenancy to his prejudice, he had obtained the King's commands to renew the offer; that the Lord Lieutenancy would at all events be kept open for him till the King's return; and that he entreated Robert Walpole to prevail upon Townshend to accept it. He adds his satisfaction that Walpole at least has expressed no thoughts of resigning his office, and most earnestly hopes that they may "continue to live and act for the King's service with the same friendship and union which has been."I

These friendly expressions tended in no small degree to allay the resentment of the brother ministers; and a still more favourable effect was produced when the King left Hanover, and passed a few days at the Hague, on his way to England. The leading men of the Dutch republic were, for the most part, personal friends of Townshend. To one of them, Slingeland, he had just written a full account of his dismissal and vindication of his conduct. They openly expressed their fears of the fatal consequences which this division in the British Cabinet might produce to the combined interests of the two countries, and they left no exertion untried to

See Townshend's letter to Slingeland, Jan. 1, 1717, O. S.
Ibid.

Stanhope to Robert Walpole, Jan 1, and 3, 1717. Archdeacon Coxe imputes the conciliatory language of Stanhope in writing to Walpole and Methuen to his "terror" at perceiving the great weight which the opinion of the Dutch statesmen had with George the First when his Majesty was at the Hague on his return to England. (Memoirs of Walpole, vol. i. p. 104, 105.) A single fact overturns this surmise. The letters quoted by Coxe are dated from Hanover before the King's departure.

promote a reconciliation. They held repeated conversations with Sunderland and Stanhope; they wrote pressing letters to Townshend. They assured him that Sunderland repented of his violent letter to Lord Orford, and of his charge of caballing with the Duke of Argyle, which had proceeded from his misconceiving a hasty expression of Lord Cadogan. They declared, as they truly might, that the blame rested mainly upon the Hanoverians, and their false intelligence from England; that if Lord Townshend declined the King's commands at present, he would close the avenue to his returning favour; and that if even Lord Townshend should be indifferent to that consideration, he ought still to sacrifice his own. resentment to the necessity of union and to the public good.

*

The King himself, on his arrival (he landed at Margate towards the end of the month), received Townshend very graciously, and expressed his regret for the precipitation with which he had acted. By his direction the fallen minister received a visit from Count Bernsdorf, who stated to him that his Majesty having, though perhaps on false reports and on hasty impulse, taken away the seals from Lord Townshend, could not, with due regard to his own consistency and character, immediately restore them. But, if Lord Townshend would accept of Ireland, the King, satisfied with that mark of submission, would give him every satisfaction in his power; would make no other change whatever in the administration; and, so far from requiring Townshend to proceed to his post, would allow him to continue a member of the Cabinet in England, and give him leave to consider the Lord Lieutenancy as only a temporary office, to be exchanged hereafter for another at his pleasure. Townshend was softened by these promises; he saw, moreover, all the evils of division at that dangerous crisis; and, being still more patriotic than passionate in his character, he gave way, and accepted the terms proposed to him. His political adherents, comprising Methuen, Pulteney, Walpoles, the Duke of Devonshire, and Lord Orford, were thus satisfied, and remained in their places. Methuen, who had hitherto merely acted as Secretary of State during Stanhope's absence, was now appointed his colleague for the southern department; and thus it was hoped that the party schism might be completely closed, and the great body of Whigs completely reunited.

My wish of presenting these intricate ministerial transactions in one unbroken narrative has prevented me from noticing till now the conclusion of the treaties at the Hague.-Even after sufficient full powers for Lord Cadogan had arrived, some trifling obstacles delayed for several days longer the separate signature with Abbé Dubois. Cadogan insisted that the title of King of France should still be borne by George the First, and that the treaty should be written, not in French, but in Latin. In the former point he prevailed, in the latter he yielded; and, in fact, how could he deny that the two Kings of France" should negotiate in the language of that coun

66

• Baron de Wassenaar to Lord Townshend, Jan. 19 and 20, 1717. Coxe's Walpole.

try? "It is not difficult to discover," says Dubois, "that these pretensions in the English Ministers proceed from their inexpressible terror of being brought before Parliament, and most severely arraigned on the slightest pretext. "* But these little difficulties being soon surmounted, the Convention between France and England was finally signed on the 28th of November.

Meanwhile, the slow formalities of the Dutch Republic were by no means exhausted, and the agents of the Court of Vienna made every exertion to delay or to prevent its accession. But happily the principal statesmen were sensible of their true interest; and some threats of the Regent's displeasure having spurred their lazy good will, they at length waved some forms, quickened some others, and finally signed the treaty on the 4th of January, 1717. It repeated all the articles of the previous convention between England and France; which convention, when Stanhope, shortly afterwards, passed through the Hague, was, at his suggestion, destroyed; that no idea might prevail of separate interests, and that the whole might seem in appearance, as well as be in reality, "THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE."†

It had been intended that the King should open Parliament immediately on his return; but its meeting was delayed, and the public attention diverted by a new and unexpected discovery. That the Jacobites should enter into another conspiracy was no strange event; but to find the King of Sweden negotiating with them, and intending to assist their revolt by foreign invasion, might justly excite dismay. So far back as the late rebellion, the Duke of Berwick had formed a project of this nature, and held several conferences upon it with Baron Spaar, the Swedish Minister at Paris. It was designed that a body of seven or eight thousand Swedes, then encamped near Gothenburg, should be embarked at that port; that a sum of 150,000 livres should be advanced by the Pretender for their expenses; and that they should proceed to Scotland, which, as Berwick observes, would be the easier, since no one had the least idea of such a scheme, and since, with favourable winds, the passage might be made in forty-eight hours. A trusty messenger was immediately despatched with this project to the King of Sweden. But Charles being then closely besieged in Stralsund, it was long before this communication could reach him; and when it did, the critical state of his own affairs compelled him to decline it. A renewal of this enterprise was now a favourite object with Charles, and recommended to him by the influence of Baron Gortz, his chief confidant and minister. Gortz was a Franconian by birth, and an adventurer in fortunes; but a man of singular activity, penetration, and address. For courage he was much less distinguished: he appears to have

Mém de Sevelinges, vol. i. p. 232; see also p. 454.

Ibid., vol. i. p. 240. Corps Diplomatique, vol. viii. part i. p. 484, ed. 1731.

Mém. de Berwick, vol. ii. p. 147, ed. 1778. See also the extracts from the Stuart Papers. Appendix.

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