due regard to its finances to diminish some of those burdens, and relax some of those regulations of revenue, which had been felt the most inconvenient in that part of the united kingdom. His majesty further commands us to return you his thanks for the provision which you have enabled him to make for the establishment of his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick. My Lords and Gentlemen, His majesty has directed us to acquaint you, that Portugal, rescued from the oppression of the enemy, by the powerful assistance of his majesty's arms, has exerted herself with vigour and energy in making every preparation for repelling, with the continued aid of his majesty's forces, any renewed attack on the part of the enemy; and that in Spain, notwithstanding the reverses which have been experienced, the spirit of resistance against France still continues unsubdued and unabated: and his majesty commands us to assure you of his firm and unaltered conviction, that not only the honour of his throne, but the best interests of his dominions, require his most strenuous and persevering assistance to the glorious efforts of those loyal nations. His majesty has commanded us to recommend to you, upon your return to your respective counties, to use your best exertions to promote that spirit of order and obedience to the laws, and that general concord amongst all classes of his majesty's subjects, which can alone give full effect to his majesty's paternal care for the welfare and happiness of his people. His majesty has the fullest reliance upon VOL. LI. the affections of his subjects, whose loyalty and attachment have hitherto supported him through that long and eventful period during which it has pleased Divine Providence to commit the interests of these dominions to his charge. His majesty feels that the preservation of domestic peace and tranquillity, under the protection of the law, and obedience to its authority, is amongst the most important duties he owes to his people. His majesty commands us to assure you, that he will not be wanting in the discharge of that duty; and his majesty will always rely with confidence on the continued support of his loyal subjects, to enable him to resist with success the designs of foreign enemies, and to transmit unimpaired to posterity the blessings of the British constitution. II. Earl of Chatham's Memorial and Sir Richard Strachan's Reply on the Expedition to the Scheldt. (Extracts.) 1. Earl of Chatham's Memorial: dated October 15, 1809. Presented to his Majesty, February 14, 1810. In submitting to your majesty a statement of my proceedings in the execution of the service your majesty was graciously pleased to confide to me, and of the events which occurred in the course of it, it is not my intention to trouble your majesty with any further details of the earlier parts of our operations, but to bring under your majesty's view the consideration of the two following points, as most inmedi Ff ately ately applying to the conduct and it was besides distinctly agreed Lieutenant-General Lord Huntley and Commodore Owen, and the other under Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope and Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Keats; but both directed to assist and ensure a rapid progress up the Scheldt, had the admiral found it practicable in other respects. With respect to the former, which was destined to destroy the Cadsand batteries, and particularly that of Breskens, had it been carried at once into effect, and that the admiral could have availed himself of it, to take the ships up the West Scheldt by the Weeling passage, it would have beer of the utmost advantage: but it was certainly rather fortunate it did not take place at a later period, as after all the transports, storeships, &c. were ordered into the Veere Gat, and the plan of running at once up the West Scheldt by the Weeling channel seemed abandoned, the object of destroying the Cadsand batteries ceased, and a landing there would only have been an unnecessary risk, and the very inconvenient separation of our force, and, of course, occasion great delay in collecting it for ulterior operations. It must not, however, be forgotten, that the difficulties here turned out to be much greater than had been at all foreseen before we sailed.---When it was found that Lord Huntley's division could neither laud nor proceed by the Weeling passage up the Scheldt, as I had intended they should, it was determined to withdraw them; but from the boisterous state of the weather, it was some days before this could be effected. As soon as it was accomplished, they were passed over to South Beveland.--With respect to Sir John Hope's operation, it was more prosperous., It was conceived that, by landing on the north side of South Bevelaud, the island might be possessed, and all the batteries taken in reverse, and thereby the position of the French fleet, if they ventured to remain near Flushing, would be, as if it were, turned, and their ́ retreat rendered more difficult, while the attack on them by our ships would have been much facilitated; and for this object the division of Sir John Hope rather preceded, in sailing from the Downs, the rest of the fleet. This division was landed. near Ter-Goes, from whence they swept all the batteries in the island that could impede the progress of our ships up the West Scheldt, and possessed themselves, on the 2d of Angust, of the important post of Batz, to which it had been promised the army should at once have been brought up.-Sir John Hope remained in possession of this post, though not without being twice at tacked by the enemy's flotilla, for nine days before any of the gunboats under Captain Sir Home Popham were moved up the Scheldt to his support.---Your majesty will be pleased to recollect, that the troops which sailed from Portsmouth, under Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, were destined for the service of Walcheren, and had been considered as sufficient for that object, according to the intelligence received, and the supposed strength of the enemy; though at the same time certainly relying for the first efforts against Flushing on the promised co-operation of the navy, and on their establishing, as was held out in the first instance, a naval blockade, except on the side of Veer and Rammekins. UnforFf 2 tunately, tunately, however, this did not take place; and for several nights after the army was before Flushing, the enemy succeeded in throwing from the opposite coast, probably from the canal of Ghent, considerable reinforcements into the place, which enabled him constantly to annoy our out-posts and working parties, and finally to attempt a sally in force, though happily, from the valour of your majesty's troops, without success. I have already stated that Rammekins surrendered on the evening of the 3d of August. Immediately upon this event, feeling, as I did, great uneasiness at the delay which had already taken place, and the departure from the original plan, I wrote a letter to the admiral, then at Ter Veer, expressing my hope that the ships would now be able to enter the West Scheldt by the Sloe passage, and that no time should be lost in pressing forward as speedily as possible our further operations; and I requested at the same time that he would communicate to me the extent of naval co-operation he could afford, as well for the future blockade of Flushing, as with a view to protecting the coast of South Beveland, aud watching the passages from the Meuse to the East Scheldt, as this consideration would govern very much the extent of force I must leave in South Beveland, when the army advanced. To this letter he did not reply fully till the 8th of August; but I had a note from him on the 5th, assuring me the transports should be brought forward without delay; and I had also a very long conversation with him on the morning of the 6th, on the arrangements to be taken for our further opera tions; when I urged, in the strongest manner, the necessity of not losing a moment in bringing up the cavalry and orduance ships, transports, store ships, victuallers, &c. in order that the armament might proceed without delay to its destination; and I added my hopes, that they would receive the protection of the ships of war, none of which had yet entered the West Scheldt. The frigates, however, did not pass Flushing till the evening of the eleventh, and the line of battle ships only passed to the anchorage above Flushing on the fourteenth, the second day of the bombardment. These ships began to proceed up the river on the eighteenth, and arrived on the nineteenth; one division as high as the bay below Waerden, the other off the Hanswent, where they remained; the Courageux passed above Batz; the cavalry ships only got through the Sloe passage into the West Scheldt from the twentieth to the twenty-third, and arrived off Batz on the twenty-second and twentyfourth; the ordnance ships and store ships passed through from the twenty-second to the twenty-third, and arrived at their destination off Batz on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth; the transports for Lieutenant General Grosvenor's division only came up to receive them on the nineteenth, on which day they embarked; and those for Major General Graham's division, on the twentieth and twenty-first; and they arrived off Batz on the twentyfourth. The corps of Brigadier General Rottenburgh, and the light battalions of the German legion, proceeded to join the Earl of Rosslyn's division in South Beveland. From this statement your majesty will see, that notwithstanding every effort on my part with the admiral, the armament was not assembled at the point of its destination till the twenty-fifth, and of course that the means of commencing operations sooner against Antwerp were never in my power. It now became at this advanced period my duty to consider very seriously the expediency of landing the army on the continent. On comparing all the intelligence obtained as to the strength of the enemy, it appeared to be such as to leave (as stated in my dispatch of the twenty-ninth of August) no reasonable prospect of -success to the force under my command, after accomplishing the preliminary operations of reducing Fort Lille as well as Liefkenshoek, on the opposite side of Antwerp, without the possession of which the destruction of the ships and arsenals of the enemy could not be effected; and in addition to this, the sickness which had begun to attack the army about the twentieth, and which was hourly increasing to an alarming extent, created the most serious apprehensions in the minds of the enemy would have given us the opportunity. Secure in his fortress, he had a surer game to play; for if ever the army, divided as it must necessarily have been in order to occupy both banks of the river, exposed to the effect of inundation on every side, and with all its communications liable to be cut off, while the force of the enemy was daily and hourly increasing, had once sat down before Antwerp, it is unnecessary for me to point out to your majesty how critical must in a short time have been their situation. But when, added to this, sickness to an alarming extent had begun to spread itself among the troops, and the certain and fatal progress of which, at that season, was but too well ascertained, it appeared to me that all further advance could only tend to commit irretrievably the safety of the army which your majesty had contided to me, and which every principle of military duty, as well as the direct tenour of my instructions, alike forbade. Earl Chatham's statement, the medical men, as to its further 2. Sir Richard Strachan's reply to progress, at that unhealthy season, and which fatal experience has since shown to have been too well founded. Your majesty will not be surprised if, under these circumstances, I paused in requiring the admiral to put the army on shore. That a landing might have been made, and that any force which had been opposed to us in the field would have yielded to the superior valour of British troops, I have no doubt: but then, any such success could have been of no avail towards the attainment of the ultimate object; and there was still less chance that Contains many pointed observations, general charges of inaccuracy, and a refutation of the insi nuations both against the gallant admiral and the navy, contained in his lordship's statement. After the first point to which his Majesty's attention was called, namely, "that after the army was assembled near Batz, a landing in prosecution of the ulterior objects of the expedition was not deemed adviseable," Sir Richard declines making any remark, because the reasons which |