tion was, a specific vote of thanks for a particular service. The motions were put and negatived.

House of Lords, January 26. The order of the day being read, the Earl of Liverpool rose, for the purpose of moving the thanks of the house to Lord Viscount Wellington, and the officers and the army under his command, for the skill and ability, the valour and bravery, by which they obtained a victory over the enemy at Talavera. In framing his motion, he had, with a view to conciliation, separated the conduct of the army, and the officer commanding, from every other subject connected with the general management of the campaign. Whatever opinion might be entertained with respect to the measures which led to the battle itself, or to the consequences which ensued, there could be but one sentiment as to the skill of the general, and the valour of the army that fought at Talavera. The thanks of both houses had been given to Sir John Stuart, and the army, for the eminent skill and valour displayed, and the splendid victory obtained by the battle of Maida; though the objects for which that battle was fought, were not obtained. It had been determined to make a concentrated attack on the combined armies. Although the Spanish army was present, and partially took a part in the battle, the brunt of the attack was principally, if not wholly, borne by the English, not amounting to more than 20,000 men. The French army fell but little short of 50,000. The enemy, after repeatedly renewing their attacks, were repulsed with the loss of nearly 10,000 men,

twenty pieces of artillery, and four standards. It was of the last importance, that such victories as that of Talavera, should be rewarded by every tribute of honour and praise, that house could bestow. It had been the good fortune of Great Britain to unite a military spirit with commercial pursuits, and every encouragement was due still further to promote that spirit. No achievement was ever more entitled to praise than the victory of Talavera.

He admitted, that if their lordships were called upon to decide on all the circumstances of the campaign, it might materially alter the question. But he wished to direct their lordship's attention solely to the conduct of the officer, and the army under his command, on the 27th and 28th of July.

Lord Liverpool concluded with moving, "That this house do return their thanks to General Lord Viscount Wellington, for the skill and ability displayed by him on the 27th and 28th of July, 1809, at Talavera.

The Earl of Suffolk said, that, as a professional man, it was with pain to his feelings he rose to state his objections to the motion of thanks to Lord Wellington. The noble earl had alluded to the battle of Maida. But that battle was decisive in its issue, and did not come in a questionable shape like the victory of Talavera. He could not denominate that a victory where a retreat immediately fol lowed, and the wounded and the prisoners fell immediately into the hands of the enemy. As to the capture of artillery, this was not, in all circumstances, to be considered as a signal of victory. It

might have been convenient for the enemy to leave them on the field. With regard to the reinforcement of 36,000 men, which was advancing to support the French, why did not Lord Wellington know of their situation, and the probability of their approach? It was the duty of every general to have such information. The Earl of Suffolk, considering the amount of the British force in the peninsula, and that only so small a portion of it was brought into action at Talavera, there was here also much ground for reprehension. And this conduct appeared to be in perfect conformity to that of the same general, in bringing up only half his forces to act against the enemy, at the battle of Vimeira.*

The Earl of Grosvenor was apprehensive, that if the house were to be called upon to vote thanks for every instance of the display of valour, the proceeding would draw after it injúrious results. If a single detachment, nay, if an individual had exhibited proofs of determined bravery, their lordships might be called upon to vote away thanks. The battle of Talavera was one, which, in all its cir cumstances, did not appear to him to be entitled to such a reward.Lord Mountjoy maintained, that no general was better skilled in war, none more enlightened, none more valiant than Lord Viscount Wellington. The choice of a position at Talavera reflected lustre on his talents; the victory was as brilliant and glorious as any on record. It was entitled to the unanimous approbation of their lordships, and

the eternal gratitude of Spain and of this country.

The Earl of Grey agreed with the Earl of Liverpool, as to the propriety of bestowing rewards where rewards were due, and of conferring the high honour of the thanks of that house on transcendent merit; but not that the battle of Talavera was an event that ought to be characterized in such a way, or remunerated by that distinction. Before, however, he should enter into a discussion of the subject immediately before the house, he begged leave to say a few words relative to the victory of Maida. The objects of the expedition to Italy, under Sir John Stuart, had not completely failed, as stated by the noble lord. If they did fail, the failure was remote. A French force was, at that period, assembled on the Neapolitan coast, for the purpose of making a descent on Sicily. To destroy this force, was the object of the expedition of Sir John Stuart; and in that object, in the battle of Maida, and the consequences that resulted from it, he completely succeeded. The enemy did not, after that action, retire in regular order, nor take up a position within sight of the field of battle. They were completely dispersed, and, as an army, annihilated. The battle of Talavera had neither succeeded in attaining the general object of the campaign, nor the immediate object, namely, that of dispersing the enemy's army.

The general object of the advance of Lord Wellington into Spain, Lord Grey took to be that

of driving the enemy's troops before him, and obtaining possession of the capital, Madrid. The French troops, in Spain, at that time, occupied a defensive line of positions, from Toledo to Salamanca. On the advance of Lord Wellington into Spain, they left their positions, and concentrated their forces to oppose him.* Lord Wellington marched, in the direction of Madrid, as far as Talavera; where he was obliged to stop for want of provisions, and the means of transport. The battle was fought, and the enemy for the moment repulsed. But the general object of the advance into Spain was lost. The enemy retained possession of the capital, and the British troops were obliged to retreat. It had been said that Lord Wellington had displayed great skill in the dispositions he made for battle. Lord Grey would not agree in that opinion. The position on the left had not been sufficiently secured or taken advantage of there was much also to blame in the conduct of Lord Wellington, with respect to the Spanish troops; though certainly the dispatch of the Spanish general, gave a very different account of the conduct of those troops, from that given in the dispatch of Lord Wellington. But if Lord Wellington believed the Spanish troops to be of such a description that they could not be trusted to meet the enemy in a situation of such imminent peril at Talavera; if Lord Wellington held such an opinion of the Spanish troops, why did he give the Spanish general the option, either of defending the

passes against the advance of the French army, under the Duke of Dalmatia, which threatened the flank and rear of the British, or taking care of our sick and wounded at Talavera? Why, also, had not Lord Wellington better information respecting the defence of the passes? Why trust to the intelligence he received from the Spaniards, neglecting even the ordinary precaution of sending an officer of his own to ascertain whether the passes were properly defended? His Majesty's ministers, at the time that they trumpeted forth the battle as a splendid and decisive victory,were in the possession of Lord Wellington's dispatches, in which he stated the unfortunate situation of his army, the necessity of retreating, and the difficulties he had to encounter in effecting a retreat.

The Marquis of Wellesley, after expressing his private feelings on the present occasion, when he was called on to perform a public duty, by vindicating the character and conduct of so near and dear a relation as a brother, begged leave, in the outset, to observe, that the noble earl (Grey) did not seem very clearly to understand the objects of Lord Wellington's operations. On the arrival of his brother in Portugal, he found that the enemy was not only in possession of its northern provinces, but that a plan had been concerted, by which Victor and Soult were to advance from different points, into the south. The first object, therefore, was the deliverance of Portugal. The operation by which he expelled Soult was as able, as rapid,

and