was, in the regular course of business, communicated to the senate, where it was also passed, and also given immediate effect. The bill was signed by the governor.

The record presents the single question of the validity of this act. The specifications of the attack made upon it

are:

1. House Bill No. 210 proposed to amend a particular section of a particular act, which section had been repealed when the bill was introduced.

2. The substitute for House Bill No. 210 is an independent legislative enactment, and was introduced more than 50 days after the beginning of the session.

3. Local Act No. 448 does not in terms repeal the provisions of the general law relating to drains, nor can it be held to repeal by implication any particular section of the general law.

4. That if Local Act No. 448 has been legally enacted and has any force, it will operate to suspend a general law of the State in a particular locality.

On the part of the relator it is contended that the case is ruled by Attorney General, ex rel. Reece, v. Shekell, 138 Mich. 287. In that case relator had been appointed to the office of city attorney under a city charter which fixed the term of his office at two years. The legislature, during his term, gave to the city a new charter in which the term was fixed at one year. Respondent was appointed city attorney under the provisions of the new charter, and was performing the duties of the office when the information was filed. It was conceded that the legislature has the power to abolish, cut down, abridge, limit, or extend the term of office of an officer created by the legislature, if not prohibited by the Constitution. The only question was whether the legislature had in the new charter clearly and sufficiently expressed the intention to make the term of the particular office a one-year term in place of a two-year term, as it had been under the former charter, and in so doing to deprive respondent of one year of the term for which he had been appointed. Relator's contention was based upon certain

language in section 5, tit. 4, of the act (Act No. 523, Local Acts 1903), which language this court held did not support the contention. An altogether different question is presented upon this record. The act which we are considering does not abolish, cut down, abridge, limit, or extend a term of office. Its effect, it is true, will be, if the law is valid, to shorten the term for which respondent was appointed. The further effect of the act, if valid, is to repeal by implication section 1 of chapter 2 of the general law in Berrien county; to create a term of office beginning January 1, 1905, instead of beginning, as it does in all other counties, on January 1, 1904; to take from the supervisors of that county the power to appoint the drain commissioner; and to fix the penal sum of the bond at one-half that required in other counties.

As to the first contention of respondent, which is that, because the particular section of the law of 1897 had been repealed by the law of 1899, an act to amend the repeal section could have no force, there is conflict of authority. It was held in City of Beatrice v. Masslich, 47 C. C. A. 657, that, where the provisions of the new statute were independent and complete in themselves, the objection was not good. See, also, the cases collected and reviewed in note to Columbia Wire Co. v. Boyce, 44 C. C. A. 588.

The inaccuracy in the title of the bill as first introduced, failing as it does to allude to the amendment of section 1, chap. 2, made in 1899, is not fatal. There could be no doubt of the intention to amend the section then in force; the identification not being difficult, if the text of the bill did not correct it, which it may have done. Attorney General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 385; Brooks v. Hydorn, 76 Mich. 273.

The substitute was not reported within the first 50 days of the session. Whether the legislation is void for that reason must depend upon the question whether the act, as passed, is germane to the general purpose of the bill as first introduced; i. e., 210. The purpose of the substitute

is plain. It was to make Berrien county exceptional in the method of the selection of a drain commissioner. That must be supposed to have been the purpose of bill 210, and, if so, that bill would have made a valid law, although the particular nature of the proposed amendment was not shown by the title, if such exceptional provisions could have been made a part of the drain laws originally enacted. We are of the opinion that such a provision would have been valid. See Common Council of Detroit v. Schmid, 128 Mich. 379, where the authorities are cited, and People, ex rel. Board of Sup'rs of Kent Co., v. Loomis, 135 Mich. 556.

It is urged that this substitute is not germane, because it cannot be said to be an amendment to section 1, chap. 2, or some other section, of the drain law, and because it is not a general provision, but a local measure. Had its provisions appeared in the original section, the particular provision would have been no more general, and no less local, than it is now. Hence, if right in saying that it would then have been valid, it would seem that it must be valid now. Again, while this does not in express terms amend section 1 as it stood, it is an unmistakable amendment by implication of that section.

The relator should have judgment of ouster, with costs.

MOORE, C. J., and CARPENTER, MCALVAY, and HOOKER, JJ., concurred.

MORTON v. EATON.

ASSUMPSIT BUILDING CONTRACT-LIENORS — AMOUNTS DUE FOR LABOR AND MATERIALS-NECESSITY OF SWORN STATEMENT. In assumpsit for labor and materials furnished for the erection of a building, where the time within which liens for such labor and materials could have been obtained by the laborers and materialmen has long since passed, no sworn statement as to the amount due such laborers and materialmen is necessary.

Error to Washtenaw; Kinne, J. Submitted April 28, 1905. (Docket No. 114.) Decided September 28, 1905.

Assumpsit by Robert Morton against Caleb Eaton for work and labor done and materials furnished. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

D. C. Griffin and Frank E. Jones, for appellant.
Lee N. Brown, for appellee.

MOORE, C. J. This cause was commenced in justice's court. The plaintiff declared orally on the common counts in assumpsit and for work, labor, and materials, and claimed damage $300, and filed a bill of particulars in writing claiming a total of $488.70. Defendant's plea was in writing, and was the general issue, with notice:

1. That whatever work was done and materials furnished upon and in the construction of the dwelling house, as claimed by the said plaintiff in this cause, was done under the terms and conditions of a certain contract in writing between said plaintiff and defendant, by the terms of which all moneys due and payments made thereunder were due and payable to James E. McGregor and John P. Kirk, and not to plaintiff.

2. That under the terms and conditions of said contract all claims for extras and additional work was to be left to E. P. Rorison, architect, as arbitrator thereof, and the decision of said Rorison was to be final as between said parties, and payments therefor were to be made to the said James E. McGregor and John P. Kirk.

3. That said dwelling house was not and has not been completed by the said plaintiff as provided for in said contract, and no moneys are now due thereunder; and, further, that about $900 due subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen was unpaid.

Plaintiff recovered a judgment in the justice's court. The case was appealed to the circuit court, where he recovered a judgment of $116. The defendant has brought the case here by writ of error.

It is the claim of plaintiff that he commenced to build a house for defendant under an oral contract; that after he had worked thereon about a week a written contract was drawn and signed; that the provisions of the written contract and specifications were disregarded because of oral agreements made later between the parties thereto; and that plaintiff put in an extra cross-wall, extra work on the rear porch, a partition in the hall, extra work because of the sash weights, furnished some bricks and siding, tore up a pine floor and substituted a hardwood floor, changed the spindles in the stairway, put rear steps to the front porch, lowered the floor joists after they were once in, made changes in the attic windows, and put in four extra windows, and a change in plate glass, for all of which he says Mr. Eaton agreed to pay, and that changes were made in the floors which cost him $125 to make, which the architect thought was twice too much. He also claims that in the fall, probably in November, he made an oral contract to make changes in the barn of defendant, for which he was to have $125, that he did much of this work, and did not do the rest because Mr. Eaton failed to do what he agreed, and that for his work on the barn he never received a dollar.

It was the claim of defendant that all the work done on