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LURTON, Circuit Judge. The contention of Compton that the paragraph reserving his rights should be construed so as to entitle him to an absolute decree against the purchaser for the amount due him under his Ohio decree, when it was determined that he had a lien, and regardless of its rank, is not founded in reason or justice. Such a construction would operate to prefer his claim over all others, without regard to the place and rank of the other lienors. What the court meant to do was to leave Compton's claim undetermined by the decree of foreclosure, and to reserve power and jurisdiction over the purchaser to enforce his lien by appropriate remedy, under all the facts, if it should be found that he had one. This view is made manifest by the concluding sentence of the paragraph, which says, “It being the intention to hereby preserve the rights of said Compton in the relation in which he now stands towards the mortgagees, parties hereto.”

To attribute to this decree a determination that Compton's lien, if he had one, should override all others, and entitle him to an absolute decree against the purchaser, would not be a preservation of the relation in which he stood to other lienors, some of whom were asserting priority over Compton, but to destroy that relation, and settle the rank of his lien, without a hearing upon that question. Such a clause should be interpreted in the light of the whole record preceding it, and of the other portions of the decree of which it was a part, and of the issues which might arise upon Compton's claim, for he had not then answered. Read in this light, the court adjudged nothing affecting Compton. The fact of a lien, and the rank thereof, was left undetermined. I was at first strongly inclined to the opinion that the effect of the whole decree was to sell the entire railroad, free from all liens, including Compton's, and that his lien, like all others, was transferred to the proceeds of sale. Inasmuch as the foreclosure decree provided for the payment of the purchase money chiefly in bonds and coupons secured under the several mortgages foreclosed, it was essential to the preservation of Compton's rights in the fund that there should be reserved a right to require the purchaser to pay off Compton's lien, if the rank of his lien was found to be such as to entitle him to payment out of the fund, and in advance of securities which had been paid in by the purchaser. I still think there is much room for this interpretation of the decree, in view of its language, and of the strenuous effort made by all the prior and subsequent mortgagees to offer the property free from all liens and incumbrances. This construction would operate to defeat any recovery by Compton, inasmuch as the two divisions covered by his lien did not sell for a sum sufficient to pay off the prior liens. I have come, however, to an appreciation of the injustice which this construction would do him. He was placed at some disadvantage by a sale in advance of the determination of his rank, the place of all others being fixed and known. This consideration, in the light of other parts of the decree lending support to the idea of a sale subject to any lien which Compton might successfully maintain, persuades me to adopt the view taken by the circuit court,—that his lien was not foreclosed, and that the property was sold free from all lien, charge, or incumbrance, save that of Compton. His attitude is therefore precisely what it would have been, with respect to remedy, if he had not been a party to the foreclosure proceeding. Instead of dismissing the bill, as to him, without prejudice, the circuit court sold subject to his lien, and reserved jurisdiction to thereafter adjudge to him such relief, by sale or otherwise, as should be appropriate. What would be the proper remedy could not be foreseen, and nothing in the saving clause deals with the question of remedy, beyond a reservation of jurisdiction over the purchaser to enforce such remedy as, under established principles of equity, should be appropriate. It was not improbable that the biddings on the divisions embraced within Compton's lien would be sufficient to pay off the prior incumbrances, and Compton as well. If this had been so, it is clear that the remedy would have been neither sale nor redemption, but a payment out of proceeds of sale. This, unfortunately, proved not to be the case. The sale accepted was under a bid for the entire line. The unit bid aggregated but an insignificant sum over the aggregate of the separate bids on divisions. The bid on the Ohio Division was for barely enough to pay off the two Ohio divisional mortgages, while the bid on the Indiana Division was insufficient to pay off the second Indiana divisional mortgage, by more than a million of dollars. I quite agree with Judge TAFT in holding that under these circumstances the character of the remedy to which Compton was entitled must be determined “wholly apart from anything in the decree for sale, because the saving clause leaves it entirely in the judgment of the court.” I also agree with him in the conclusion that, under existing circumstances, Compton is not entitled, either by force of the Ohio decree, or under the general principles of equitable practice, to a decree for a resale, and that the only relief which a court of equity should afford him is that of redemption. Compton must stand as an unforeclosed lienor, obliged, by change of circumstances, to apply to equity for relief upon the footing of a decree which is nonenforceable according to its terms. Though nominally a defendant, he is really and substantially a complainant. It would be clearly inequitable to grant a decree for a resale of the Ohio property, in view of the existing status. Such a decree now would be by no means the decree he obtained. If he had executed that decree before any obstacle arose, and obtained possession as a purchaser, he would have been obliged to have redeemed the senior mortgages. The remedy of a junior incumbrancer, both before and after foreclosure, is to redeem the senior mortgage. Without the consent of the prior mortgagee, a junior lienor could not enforce a sale of more than the mortgagor's equity of redemption. If he wished a sale free from the prior lien, and the prior lienor will not consent, the decree should be that he redeem, and then foreclose for the enforcement of his own lien, and that he had redeemed. 2 Jones, Mortg. S$ 1394-1396, 1431, 1439, 1580; Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734; Woodworth v. Blair, 112 U. S. 8, 5 Sup. Ct. 6; McKernan v. Neff, 43 Ind. 503; Spurgin v. Adamson, 62 Iowa, 661, 18 N. W. 293. A judicial foreclosure sale is not void because one interested in the equity of redemption, as a junior mortgagee, was not a party. “The sale vests the estate in the purchaser, subject to redemption by the owner of the equity, or other person interested in it, who was not a party to the proceedings. His only remedy, however, is to redeem.” Jones, Mortg. § 1395. Martin v. Noble, 29 Ind. 216; Frische v. Kramer, 16 Ohio, 125; Rose v. Page, 2 Sim. 471; Fulghum v. Cotton, 3 Tenn. Ch. 299; Trayser v. Trustees, 39 Ind. 556; Bank v. Goldman, 75 N. Y. 127. I agree with him in the conclusion that Compton's only remedy is through redemption, not only for the reasons so forcibly stated by him, but upon other considerations which will hereafter be stated in connection with the question of entire or partial redemption. I am not at all in agreement with him as to the duty of the court to allow a separate redemption of the Ohio divisional mortgages.

1. If we are right in the agreement that the decree reserving Compton's lien from foreclosure, and his rights for future determination, leaves all questions concerning the validity, extent, and character of his lien, and all questions touching the remedy for the enforcement of his lien, as completely open as if he had never been a party to the foreclosure proceedings, then it must follow that his attitude now is that of a complainant. Neither should the court be moved to enlarge the remedy to which he would otherwise be limited by reason of the fact that he was made a defendant in the foreclosure suits, and that he came in unwillingly. He was not enjoined from enforcing a sale under his state decree, and might have proceeded with his sale, although made a defendant to the general foreclosure proceedings. Why did he elect to abandon the remedy the Ohio court had awarded him? The answer is obvious. So many obstacles had arisen, both pending his suit and after his decree, that his remedy by sale had become practically unavailable. Pending his suit the United States courts had taken possession of the entire line of railroad, of which the Ohio Division was but a part, first under the general insolvency bill filed by the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Company v. Central Trust Company and others, and finally under an extension of that receivership to the foreclosure suits out of which this controversy arose.

The pendency of his suit was no obstacle to the institution of these subsequent foreclosure proceedings, and none to the seizure of the property by the courts in which they were begun. If he had not been made a party to these subsequent foreclosure suits, and had proceeded with his sale under his decree, the purchaser would have be n obliged to have intervened in order to have obtained possession, or to have waited until the receivers were discharged, and then, by an independent suit with the purchaser under the federal foreclosure decree, had his right and title determined.

In either case, as the owner of a mere equity of redemption obtained under a foreclosure decree, to which senior mortgagees were not parties, he could have obtained no relief except through redemption of the prior liens. No injury was done him by making him a party to the subsequent suits, in which it was sought to sell the property free from all liens, and to marshal the assets according to priorities. Indeed, he was a proper party to a simple foreclosure of the mortgages senior to his own lien, and a necessary party to any decree intended to convey to the purchaser a clear title. In such a suit his natural attitude would be that of an active, rather than a passive, party. Such, in fact, was the position which he at once assumed when he found that he could not escape the jurisdiction, for he availed himself of the decree which required that all answers theretofore or thereafter filed which stated matter that was proper foundation for affirmative relief should be deemed and taken as cross bills. By his answer he sought: First, the enforcement of his Ohio de

: cree by a sale of the Ohio Division separately from all other parts of the road; second, to reach, and subject to his lien, certain terminal properties at Toledo, Ohio, of great value, which he claimed had been acquired after the Ohio divisional mortgages, and had not passed to the Ohio mortgagees; third, he claimed priority over the divisional mortgagees in all of the rolling stock and equipments acquired after the prior mortgages; fourth, he demanded an accounting as to the earnings of the Ohio Division, claiming that they were greatly in excess of its share of operating expenses, and that the surplus had been improperly applied to the support and improvement of other divisions of the consolidated line. From the filing of that pleading down to the final decree from which he has appealed, he was in the attitude of one seeking relief by a sale, or by redemption, if that was inadmissible. After the foreclosure decree his status was more than ever that of one applying to a court of equity for relief upon the footing of a former decree, which, by circumstances subsequently ensuing, could not be advantageously enforced without further aid. That the court did not foreclose his lien, along with those of the other lienors, was a matter of pure grace and indulgence to him. That the rank of his lien was undetermined was no obstacle to a foreclosure sale by which all liens would have been transferred to the proceeds of sale. Bank v. Shedd, 121 U. S. 74, 7 Sup. Ct. 807. Yet that indulgence is now made ground for complaint, and demand is made for a resale, or for granting him a separate redemption of the Ohio mortgages, even though otherwise unentitled. I see no merit in this claim for indulgence whatever.

2. In the determination of the question as to whether Compton may redeem the Ohio Division without also redeeming the Indiana mortgages, the remedy awarded him by the Ohio court should have no conclusive effect whatever. In permitting him to sell so much of the road as was within the state of Ohio, subject to the senior liens thereon, the court did not adjudge him to have a separable lien on the Ohio Division, and another on the Indiana property. It merely awarded him a sale as at law, under execution. Because the court limited the sale awarded to the property within its jurisdiction, it is not to be inferred that it thereby adjudged that Compton had one lien embracing two separable equities of redemption. tion as to whether, under his lien, he could redeem separately, was submitted, involved, or decided. The remedy awarded appears to me to pertain to process, and not to be within the principle of res

No ques

adjudicata, even as to the parties to his suit. Clearly, no estoppel exists, in consequence of the grant of that remedy, applicable either to the two original mortgagor companies, or any of their mortgagees, inasmuch as they were not parties to his case. If any legal or equitable reason existed before that decree which would enable them, or either of them, to require redemption of all the mortgages senior to his lien, or none, that right remained unaffected by a decree to which they were not parties. The Ohio court, in its statement of the case, described the suit, and the issues presented and the relief sought, by saying:

“This was an action commenced in the court of common pleas of Lucas county by James Compton, asking that certain bonds, of which he claimed to be the owner, with the unpaid interest coupons thereon, should be declared a lien upon so much of the road of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company as formerly belonged to the Toledo & Wabash Railway Company, by whom the bonds had been issued, and for the finding of the amount due him thereon, and an order of sale of so much of its road as is within the jurisdiction of the court, subject to certain admitted prior liens, unless the amount found due him should be paid by the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Company in a short time, to be named, and for other relief." Compton v. Railroad Co., 45 Ohio St. 592, 16 N. E. 110, and 18 N. E. 380.

The only other reference to a remedy in the course of a very lengthy opinion is found near its conclusion, the court simply saying:

“The plaintiff is entitled to a finding of the amount due on the bonds heid by him, and an order for the sale of so much of the road as is within the jurisdiction of the court."

I am utterly unable to agree that the limitation upon the order of sale to so much of the road as was within the state is an adjudication conclusive upon all the parties to that suit “that he has a lien which may be enforced against the Ohio Division alone, without regard to his remedy against the Indiana Division," "and that he may redeem it by paying to the purchaser, the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, the amount due on the Ohio divisional mortgages." This conclusion that, because he was permitted to sell the Ohio Division separately, therefore he may redeem it separately, seems to me utterly unsupported by the premises; yet Judge TAFT seems to rest it upon the assumption “that, against all the parties to his Ohio suit, he may exercise this right, because it was incident to the relief granted in the Ohio decree.

3. But, if it be assumed that a right to separately sell the Ohio Division is within the estoppel of that decree, as to the parties, it is not incumbent on a court of equity, when a complainant applies to it for relief upon an ineffective decree, which cannot be enforced without further equitable aid, to extend him any assistance, unless he will do equity. In the determination of what relief he is entitled to, the court cannot escape a consideration of his rights with reference to the mortgages senior to his lien, as well as his rights in relation to the other titles, rights, and equities united in the purchaser from whom redemption is sought. If his decree is ineffective, for want of means to execute it; if the remedy awarded him by his decree is insufficient, and incapable of practical enforcement, —then the court will look into his decree, even as to its merits, and

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