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usually cognizable in state courts, there is a heavy obligation on the federal courts to secure to those thus deprived of the privilege of resorting to their ordinary state tribunals as near the same relief or remedy as they would have received in the state courts as circumstances permit. A striking recognition of this obligation by the supreme court of the United States may be found in the case of Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 132, 8 Sup. Ct. 379, the opinion in which, by Justice Matthews, has already been quoted from. It would be strange indeed if a jurisdiction asserted only because of the necessity of the case, and under extraordinary circumstances, could be used to bring in direct review before a circuit court of the United States a decree of the supreme court of a state. Had Compton never been made a party to the action below, he might have proceeded with execution of his decree, and bought in the interests of the parties to his action in the Ohio Division. He could not have taken possession of the property, because it was in the possession of the court below; but, having executed his decree in this wise, he might have then been made a party to the action below, or could have brought an independent action to redeem from the purchaser. In such a case certainly the other parties to his Ohio decree could not be heard to object to his enforcing a remedy against the Ohio Division alone. It is difficult to see why the execution of a decree fixing the rights of the parties should work any more of an estoppel than the decree itself.
It is next objected that the Ohio decree is not binding on the parties to it with reference to the appropriation of the Ohio Division to the payment of the equipment bonds, because in this respect the decree was not responsive to the issue raised between the parties. It is true that a decree or judgment is only res judicata in so far as it is responsive to the issues tendered by the pleadings, or to the matters which, by the record, appear to have been actually controverted. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 11 Sup. Ct. 773. The Ohio decree is not open to this objection. The question at issue between the parties to the decree in the supreme court of Ohio was—First, whether Compton had a lien upon the property of the Toledo & Wabash Railroad Company, reaching from Toledo to the Illinois state line; and, secondly, how it could be enforced. The supreme court held that he had such a lien, and directed the Ohio property to be sold for its enforcement. The prayer of Compton was for the enforcement of his lien by the sale of the whole railroad. If he asked for a sale of the whole property, the court had the right to enforce in his favor that remedy, or any remedy less than that which it thought just and proper. It was therefore within its jurisdiction, as invoked by Compton's prayer, to take so much of the property on which it declared the lien to exist as, in equity, it thought it had the right to take. It took that over which it had territorial jurisdiction. See opinion of court in 45 Ohio St. 592, 623, 16 N. E. 110, and 18 N. E. 380. Whether it erred in this, neither the court below nor this court is vested with the power to decide. It is true that the record does not show that any formal issue was made with reference to the amount of property to be sold to pay the lien, but this can make no difference. The court was bound, before it made an operative decree, to specify the property to be sold to pay the lien (Railroad Co. v. Swasey, 23 Wall. 405), and it was plainly within its power to subject less than that prayed for by the plaintiff to such a sale. The parties were present in court, and might have objected to this form of remedy. Whether they did so, or not, the granting of the remedy, being within the prayer of Compton, was a binding and conclusive adjudication upon the parties in court that such a remedy was proper. This is identically the same issue and cause of action which was in the supreme court of Ohio, and therefore no objection can be made or entertained by the court below, or by this court, to the form of relief there granted, which was or might have been made in the court entering the decree. In Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, Mr. Justice Field used this language:
“In considering the operation of this judgment, it should be borne in mind, as stated by counsel, that there is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former case the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. Thus, for example, a judgment rendered upon a promissory note is conclusive as to the validity of the instrument and the amount due upon it, although it be subsequently alleged that perfect defenses actually existed, of which no proof was offered, such as forgery, want of consideration, or payment. If such defenses were not presented in the action, and established by competent evidence, the subsequent allegation of their existence is of no legal consequence. The judgment is as conclusive, so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the defenses never existed."
The same principle is laid down in many cases. Stout v. Lye, 103 U. S. 66; Dimock v. Copper Co., 117 U. S. 559, 6 Sup. Ct. 855.
It is further suggested that the order of sale against the Ohio property was mere process to carry out the decree, and was not an adjudication which, when the decree is pleaded in another court, can be used to secure the same remedy afforded in the Ohio court. Such a contention is untenable. The decree for sale was the operative part. It was the court's act. All previous to that was mere declaration or finding, upon which the justice of the court's act was founded. It was within the power of the court to compel a sale of the entire line affected by the lien. So far as the Indiana property was concerned, it might have enforced a sale by compelling the defendant company to convey to the purchaser at its judicial sale. Instead of doing this, it ordered a sale of the Ohio property alone. This required judicial action. In Hill v. Bank, 97 U. S. 450, a trustee under a power of sale sold real estate separate from water power and paper-mill machinery. A bill was filed by the debtor to set the sale aside. This was done on the ground that the realty, the water power, and paper-mill machinery should be sold as an entirety, and the sale was set aside. Thereupon a bill was filed against the debtor to enforce the payment of the amount in default, and the court below directed that the property should be sold as an entirety. In the supreme court, error was assigned that the court sold as an entirety, and it was held that the error could not be sustained, because the point was res adjudicata. Said the court:
“The decree upon the points in issue, and decided, is as binding upon the parties as a judgment or decree would be in any other case."
It is manifest from this case that the question how large a part of the property involved shall be sold to pay a lien is as clearly the subject of res judicata as the decision of any other right. The amount of the property to be sold under a decree in equity is one of the essential adjudications of the court, and is conclusive on the parties. In Railroad Co. v. Swasey, 23 Wall. 405, the question was whether a decree was final, or not, so as to permit an appeal. The action was to subject stock pledged to secure bonds to the payment of unpaid interest; and the court entered the decree appealed from, declaring that the stock must be sold for the purpose, and referring to a master the question what proportion of the stock was equitably applicable. Chief Justice Waite said (page 409):
“An appeal may be taken from a decree of foreclosure and sale when the rights of the parties have all been settled, and nothing remains to be done by the court but to make the sale, and pay out the proceeds. This has long been settled. The sale is the execution of the decree. By means of it the rights of the parties, as settled, are enforced. But to justify such a sale, without consent, the amount due upon the debt must be determined, and the property to be sold ascertained and defined. Until this is done the rights of the parties are not all settled. Final process for the collection of money cannot issue until the amount to be paid or collected by the process, if not paid, has been adjudged. So, too, process for the sale of specific property cannot issue until the property to be sold has been judicially identified. Such adjudications require the action of the court. A reference to a master to ascertain and report the facts is not sufficient. A master's report settles no rights. Its office is to present the case to the court in such a manner that intelligent action may be there had, and it is this action by the court, not the report, that finally determines the rights of the parties.”
In Winter v. Eckert, 93 N. Y. 367, in a suit to settle up a partnership, a judgment had been entered directing the sale of partnership property, consisting of the stock and good will of a brewery business, horses and wagons, etc., by public auction, at public auction rooms. The sale was made in accordance with the judgment, and the sale was confirmed. The order confirming the sale was appealed from, but not the judgment ordering it. In affirming the action of the court below, the court of appeals rested its decision on the binding effect of the provisions of the judgment with reference to the mode of conducting the sale. Ruger, C. J., said:
. “This judgment remains in full force as a binding adjudication upon all parties to the action, and conclusively determines, as between them, not only the necessity and propriety of, but the place and manner of, a sale of the property, including the conjunctive sale of the real and personal property therein described at a place where the presence of the personal property on such sale was entirely impracticable.”
It therefore follows that as against the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, the defendant company below, the successor in title of the mortgagors in the various mortgages foreclosed below, as well as against Humphreys and Lindley, trustees, and Knox and Jesup, trustees, and all other mortgagees whose liens are junior to that of Compton, the decree of the Ohio supreme court establishes conclusively that Compton has a lien on the railroad of the Toledo & Wabash Railway Company, which may be enforced against the Ohio Division alone, without regard to his remedy against the Indiana Division. But it is said that under the present circumstances a sale subject to the divisional mortgages is impossible, and that any relief which is granted must include a disposition of Compton's rights with reference to those mortgages. This may be true, but it does not destroy the force and effect of the judicial determination that, so far as the parties to the Ohio decree were concerned, Compton has the right to enforce his remedy by sale or redemption against the Ohio Division. The decree for sale of the Ohio Division subject to the divisional mortgages necessarily carried with it, so far, at least, as the parties to the suit were concerned, the right on Compton's part, or on the part of the purchaser at such a , a sale, to redeem the divisional mortgages. They, in any event, cannot be heard to urge that Compton should be compelled, in the enforcement of his lien, either by sale or redemption, to resort to the entire line.
It remains to consider, therefore, whether a resale can be decreed as against the Ohio divisional mortgagees. They were not parties to the Ohio decree, and are therefore not bound by it. The ordinary equitable rule is that the junior mortgagee cannot compel the sale of the premises free from the lien of the senior mortgage, against the consent of the senior mortgagee, but that his only remedy is to redeem the senior mortgage. It has been urged upon us, however, that in Ohio, by statute and decision, it has become a rule of property that a junior mortgagee of real estate need not redeem a senior mortgage, but may bring an action for foreclosure, make the senior mortgagee party, sell the premises free of all liens, and compel the senior mortgagee to look to the proceeds of sale for the payment of his debt. Stewart v. Johnson, 30 Ohio St. 24; section 5316, Rev. St. Ohio. Even if we concede that this rule has application to the foreclosure of railroads, and to liens other than mortgages, though the statute in terms applies to mortgages on real estate only, nevertheless I think that the peculiar circumstances of this case require that we shall not order a resale. Compton's lien, as it was decreed by the supreme court of Ohio, arose from the merger, by consolidation, of the Toledo & Wabash Railway Company in the Toledo, Wabash & Western Railway Company. The same Ohio decree declared a lien in favor of the holders of all the remaining equipment bonds not held by Compton, and the same reasoning would establish a lien in favor of every unpaid creditor of the constituent railroad company. These liens are of equal priority with Compton's, and depend on the same act of the original creditor. They can be. equitably satisfied only by dividing the benefit of the security ratably between them. Justice both to others interested in the property, and to the co-lienholders themselves, would seem to require that all the co-lienholders should be parties to an action to enforce the lien of any one of them, and that the decree should provide proper relief for all of them. The relation between the lien of Compton and that of the other bondholders and creditors of the Toledo & Wabash Railroad Company is not very different from that between those of the bondholders in the case of Canal Co. v. Beers, 2 Black, 448, or that between the liens of the creditors of the insolvent corporations in Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610, 622; Patterson v. Lynde, 106 U. S. 519, 1 Sup. Ct. 432; and Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640, 644, 4 Sup. Ct. 619,—and in all those cases, a suit for the benefit of the whole class of creditors was held to be necessary. See Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366, 369, 11 Sup. Ct. 117. Now, it is true that Compton's decree in the Ohio supreme court estops the parties to it from objecting to the relief which that decree gives him on the ground that he should have brought his suit as a class suit, and joined all his co-lienholders, but the Ohio divisional mortgagees were not parties to that decree. They may, therefore, properly be heard to object to a resale of the Ohio Division at their risk, if, on equitable grounds, it should not be permitted. From the cases cited above, I feel convinced that, even if the Ohio statute would otherwise apply, the relation of Compton's lien to those of his co-lien holders is such that a foreclosure and sale should not be had, except in a suit for the benefit of all, and that the prior mortgagees have a direct interest and right to make this objection. If a sale is ordered on Compton's lien without the presence of, the other co-lienholders, then the title to be conveyed to the purchaser must be subject to their liens, of uncertain amount. This fact will, of course, impede the sale, and reduce the price bid. It was Compton's duty to have brought either a representative suit, or to have made his co-lienholders parties, if he wished a sale free from all liens. He did neither. It would be unjust to the assignee of the prior mortgages to send the case back for the purpose of bringing in other parties, or to permit Compton to change the form of his pleadings, when we can give him by redemption all the relief that he can equitably ask in the absence of his co-lienholders. Not being in a position where he can ask a foreclosure and sale against the mortgagees, we may, if Compton states a case for it, treat his prayer for general relief as a prayer for a decree for redemption. Hudnit v. Nash, 16 N. J. Eq. 550. It is well settled that the tenant in common of an equity of redemption has the right to redeem the mortgage to protect his own interest by paying the full amount due thereon. 1 Jones, Mortg. § 1063, and cases cited. Either before or after thus redeeming the entire mortgage, he may call on his cotenants to contribute to the expenses of redemption, and on their failure to do so he may foreclose and bar their liens. Young v. Williams, 17 Conn. 393; Seymour v. Davis, 35 Conn. 264; McLaughlin v. Curts, 27 Wis. 644; Crafts v. Crafts, 13 Gray, 260.
Though, for the reasons given, I do not think Compton may have a resale of the Ohio Division, it seems clear to me that he may redeem it by paying to the purchaser, the Wabash Railroad Company, the amount due on the Ohio divisional mortgages. As against all the parties to his Ohio suit, he may exercise this right, because it was incident