nature require such a love to God. If he did, he stood disposed for every act of obedience. And this is true holiness of heart.”

You answer (in many words) "The new-created man did not love God supremely. For before he could love God, the powers of his mind must have been quite finished, and actually exercised." And doubtless the very moment he was created, they were quite finished and actually exercised too. For man was not gradually formed by God, as a statue is by a human artificer: but he spake the word, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created.' And as light and heat were not subsequent to the creation of the sun, but began to exist with it, so that the moment it existed it shone, so spiritual light and heat, knowledge and love, were not subsequent to the creation of man: but they began to exist together with him. The moment he existed, he knew and loved.

2. "If the new-made creature had not a propensity to love and obey God, but was in a state of mere indifference to good or evil, then his being put into such an union with flesh and blood, among a thousand temptations, would have been an over-balance on the side of vice. But our reason can never suppose, that God the wise, just, and good, would have placed a new-made creature in such a situation."

This argument cannot be answered, unless it can be showed, either, 1. That in such a situation, there would not have been an over-balance on the side of vice; or, 2. That to place a new-made creature in a situation where there was such an over-balance, was consistent with the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God.

But instead of showing, or even attempting to show this, you feebly say, "I do not think the reason of man by any means sufficient to direct God, in what state to make moral agents." (p. 187, 188.) (O that you had always thought so! How much vain, yea, mischievous reasoning, had then been spared!) "But however Adam's propensities and temptations were balanced, he had freedom to choose evil as well as good." He had. But this is no answer to the argument, which like the former, remains in its full force. How could a wise, just, and good God, place his creature in such a state as that the scale of evil should preponderate! Although it be allowed he is in a measure free still: the other scale does not "fly up and kick the beam."

3. "Notwithstanding all the cavils which have been raised, yet if these two texts (Eph. iv. 24, Col. iii. 10) are considered, their obvious meaning will strike an honest and unbiassed reader. The new man, or the principle of true religion in the heart, is created by God after his moral-image, in that righteousness and true holiness wherein man was at first created." (p. 189.)

You answer, "I have endeavoured to prove the contrary, and he does not offer to point out any one mistake in my interpretations." I have pointed out more than one.

4. "If these are the qualifications with which such a new-made creature should be endued, and these the circumstances, wherein from

the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God, we should expect him to be situated: then by a careful survey of what man is now, compared with what he should be, we may easily determine, whether man is at present such a creature, as the great and blessed God made him at -first."

:

You answer, (in abundance of words, the sum of which is this,) “Our circumstances are, on the whole, far better than Adam's were. For he was under that severe law, Transgress and die." (p. 190.) He was so but this does not prove the point still, balancing this single disadvantage, (if such it was; for even that may be disputed,) with the numerous advantages he was possessed of, with the holiness and happiness which he enjoyed, and might have enjoyed for ever, it does by no means appear, that the present circumstances of mankind in general are better than Adam's were.

5. "God did not give Noah dominion over the brute creatures, in so ample a manner as he did to Adam. Fear indeed fell on the brutes but this does not sufficiently preserve man from their outrage. In the innocent state no man would have been poisoned or torn by serpents or lions as now."

You answer, "The second grant runs, The fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the field, and upon every fowl of the air, and upon all that moves on the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea: into your hands they are delivered. Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you: even as the green herb I have given you all things.' Now this grant is more extensive than the first." (p. 192.) It is as to food; but not as to dominion The liberty of eating an animal does not necessarily imply any dominion over it at all. "But the fear and dread of every beast are the effects of dominion in man, and the subjection in brutes." Nay, neither does fear necessarily imply dominion. I may fear what has not dominion over me, and what I am not subject to. And those animals may fear me, over which nevertheless I have not dominion, neither are they subject to me. I fear every viper, yea, every poisonous spider; and they fear me : yet neither has dominion over the other. Fear therefore and dread may be in a high degree and yet no dominion at all. But they are "all delivered into our hands." Yes, for meat; as the very next words explain that expression. Whatever therefore it may "import in other scriptures," the meaning of it here is plain and certain.

6. "Would God have exposed the pure and innocent works of his hands, to such unavoidable perils and miseries, as arise from bears, tigers, serpents, precipices, volcanoes, &c."

You answer, "He did expose innocent Adam to a peril and misery greater than all these put together, even to a tempting Devil." (p. 191, 192.) I reply, 1. This did not imply any unavoidable misery at all: 2. It implied no more peril than God saw was needful, as a test of his obedience. Therefore this has no parallel case. So this argument also stands unanswered.

7. "It has been said indeed, If Adam fell into Sin though he was

innocent, then among a million of creatures every one might sin, though he was as innocent as Adam. I answer, there is a possibility of the event: but the improbability of it is as a million to one. prove it thus. If a million of creatures were made, in an equal probability to stand or fall; and if all the numbers from one to one million inclusively were set in a rank, it is plainly a million to one, that just any single proposed number of this multitude should fall. Now the total sum is one of these numbers, that is, the last of them. Consequently it is a million to one against the supposition, that the whole number of men should fall. And this argument will grow still ten thousand times stronger, if we suppose ten thousand millions to have lived since the creation."

Your argument stood thus. "If we cannot infer from Adam's transgression, that his nature was originally corrupt, neither can we infer from the transgressions of all mankind, that their nature is originally corrupt." It is answered, "If a million creatures were made in an equal probability to stand or fall, it is a million to one they should not all fall." You reply, "This is no answer to my argument." Surely it is; and a direct answer. That one man sinned, does not prove he had a corrupt nature. Why? Because (supposing him free to choose good or evil) it was as probable he should sin as not, there being no odds on one side or the other. But that all men should sin does prove they have a corrupt nature: because it is not as probable, that all men should sin, as that one man should: the odds against it being as a million or rather ten thousand millions to one. Either therefore we must allow, that mankind are more inclined to evil than to good, or we must maintain a supposition so highly improbable, as comes very near a flat impossibility.

And thus much you yourself cannot but allow : "The reasoning may hold good, where all circumstances agree, to make the probability equal with regard to every individual in this supposed million." And how can the probability be other than equal, if every individual be as wise and as good as Adam? But be it equal or not, you say, "The case is not to be estimated by the laws of equal probability, but of infection. For when sin is once entered into a body of men, it goes on, not according to the laws of chance," (is this precisely the same with equal probability?) "but the laws, as I may say, of infection." But how came sin to enter into a body of men? That is the very question. Supposing first a body of sinners, sin “may assume the nature of a contagion." But the difficulty lies against supposing any body of sinners at all. You say indeed, "One sinner produces another, as the serpent drew in Eve! The first sin and sinner being like a little leaven which leavens the whole lump." " All this I can understand, supposing our nature is inclined to evil. But if not, why does not one good man produce another, as naturally as one sinner produces another? And why does not righteousness spread as fast and as wide among mankind as wickedness? Why does not this leaven leaven the whole lump,' as frequently, as reas dily, and as thoroughly, as the other? These laws of infection (so

called) will therefore stand you in no stead. For, (to bring the matter still more to a point,) suppose Adam and Eve newly infected by sin: they had then none to infect, having no child. Afterward they repented and found mercy. Then Cain was born: now surely neither Adam nor Eve would infect him! Having suffered so severely. for their own sin: which therefore they must needs guard him against. How then came he to be a sinner? "Oh, by his own choice, as Seth was righteous." Well: afterwards both wicked Cain and good Seth begat sons and daughters. Now was it not just as probable, one should infect his children with goodness, as the other with wickedness? How came then Cain to transmit vice any more than Seth to transmit virtue? If you say, "Seth did. transmit virtue : his posterity was virtuous till they mixed with the vicious offspring of Cain." I answer, 1. How does that appear? How do you prove, that all the posterity of Seth was virtuous? But, 2. If they were, why did not this mixture amend the vicious, rather than corrupt the virtuous? If our nature is equally inclined to virtue and vice, vice is no more contagious than virtue. How then came it totally to prevail over virtue, so that all flesh had corrupted themselves before the Lord? Contagion and infection are nothing to the purpose; seeing they might propagate good as well as evil.

Let us go one step farther. Eight persons only were saved from the general deluge. We have reason to believe, that four, at least, of these, were persons truly virtuous. How then came vice to have

a majority again, among the new inhabitants of the earth? Had the nature of man been inclined to neither, virtue must certainly have had as many votaries as vice. Nay, suppose man a reasonable creature, and supposing virtue to be agreeable to the highest reason, according to all the rules of probability, the majority of mankind must in every age have been on the side of virtue.

8. "Some have reckoned up a large catalogue of the instances of divine goodness, and would make this as evident a proof that mankind stands in the favour of God, as all the other instances are, of a universal degeneracy of man, and the anger of God against them. But it is easy to reply, The goodness of God may incline him to bestow a thousand bounties upon criminals. But his justice and goodness will not suffer him to inflict misery in such an universal manner, where there has been no sin to deserve it either in parents or children."

You answer, "There is more than enough sin among mankind, to deserve all the sufferings God inflicts upon them. And the Scriptures represent those sufferings as disciplinary, for correction and reformation." What, all the sufferings of all mankind? This can in nowise be allowed. Where do the Scriptures say, that all sufferings, those of infants in particular, are purely disciplinary, and intended only "for correction and reformation ?" Neither can this be reconciled to matter of fact. How did the sufferings of Grecian or Roman infants, tend to their correction or reformation? Neither

do they tend to the correction and reformation of their parents or of any other persons under heaven. And even as to adults: if universal suffering is a proof of universal sin; and universal sin could not take place, unless men were naturally prone to evil. Then the present sufferings of mankind are a clear and strong evidence that their nature is prone to evil.

9. "Notwithstanding all God's provision for the good of man, still the Scripture represents men, while they are in their fallen state, as destitute of God's favour, and without hope."

You answer, "How can men be destitute of God's favour, when he has vouchsafed them a Redeemer ?" (p. 207.) By destitute of God's favour, we mean, children of wrath, objects of God's displeasure. And because they were so, the Redeemer was given, to reconcile them to God by his own blood. But notwithstanding this, while we and they were in our fallen state, we were all objects of God's displeasure.

"But how can they be without hope, when he hath given them the hope of eternal life?" All men who are not born again, born of God, are without hope at this day. God indeed hath given, but they have not accepted the hope of eternal life.' Hence the bulk of mankind are still as void of this hope as are the beasts that perish. And so (the Scripture declares) are all men by nature, whatever difference grace may make. By nature all are children of wrath, without hope, without God in the world.'

10. "Doth that man write the sincere sense of his own mind and conscience, who charges the expression, Adam was on trial for us all, with this inference, "That we are none of us in a state of trial now, but Adam alone was upon trial for us all?" We have owned and granted, that men are now in a state of trial: but this is upon the foot of a new covenant.”

You answer, "What can be more evident than that according to this scheme Adam alone was to be upon trial for us all, and that none of Adam's posterity are upon personal trial?" (p. 209.) Do you not see the ambiguity in the word alone? Or do you see and dissemble it? Dr. Watts supposes, that Adam alone, that is, This single person was on trial for all men. Does it follow from hence, that Adam alone, that is, no other person, was ever in a state of trial? Again: if no person but Adam was upon trial for all men, will it follow, "no person but Adam was upon trial at all?" It is really hard to think, that you here "speak the sincere sense of your own mind and conscience."

You go on, "He supposes all mankind are still under the original covenant with Adam, according to which he alone was upon trial for us all, and none of his posterity are upon personal trial." He does not suppose any man to be so under that covenant, as to supersede his being upon personal trial. Yourself add, "I knew he owned, we are upon personal trial, and that all mankind are now under the covenant of grace. But how can either of these consist with the scheme?" Both of them consist with it perfectly well. 1. Adam