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birth among the peasants of Thrace, and withholds from him the benefits of early studies and liberal education. He entered the private guards of Justinian before he was emperor, and rose to rank and distinction by individual merit, without interest. Nature had endowed him with a tall, commanding form, a noble countenance, great activity and vigour, coolness, constitutional self-possession and daring courage. The external requisites were combined with the intellectual composition of a hero. He began his military course precisely as what, in our own days, is termed a soldier of fortune, trusting for advancement to chance and opportunity. A successful campaign against the Persians, which he commenced in a subordinate capacity, but terminated as commander-in-chief, followed by his faithful service in the great sedition of Constantinople, between the blue and green factions of the circus, established his ability and reputation with the emperor, and placed him, while yet in the prime of life, beyond the reach of envious rivalry. His fortunes were materially promoted by his marriage with Antonina, who, though a widow, without dowry, possessed much political influence, as having been long the chosen friend and companion of the empress Theodora, the participator and confidante in her early irregularities. In the imperial household she seems to have filled an important office, nearly the same as that of lady of the bedchamber in modern courts, with rank, honour, and emolument in due accordance. Ignoble in birth (her father was a charioteer, her mother an actress of loose character), and disdaining the commonplace merit of conjugal fidelity, Antonina expressed for Belisarius, the friendship of a military comrade, who accompanied him in all his wars, regardless of personal hardship or privation. In like manner the career of Marlborough was assisted by the ascendancy which his duchess for a long time maintained over the unstable mind and variable affections of Queen Anne. The effect in both cases was the same, but between the characters of the English and the Roman ladies a wide distinction is to be drawn. The former were respectable in private mo rality, and faithful in domestic relations; bearing no resemblance, and

forming no parallel to the unrestrained licentiousness by which the Eastern empress and her favourite were degraded. Sarah of Marlborough was mean and vindictive; ambitious, griping, selfish, and cold-hearted; but her chastity was unimpeached, and she discharged her duties as a wife and mother without stain or reproach.

When Belisarius made his first essay as commander-in-chief in the Persian war, he was a very young general, not more than six-and-twenty, being of the same age as Napoleon when he conquered Italy, and the elder Africanus when he wrested Spain from Carthage. His two Persian campaigns were illustrated by two great battles, fought at Dara and Callinicum. In the first, he obtained a complete victory over an army doubling his own in number. In the second, he was defeated by the same overwhelming force, and through the delinquency of his own troops, who clamorously insisted on engaging, contrary to his better judgment, and proved faithless to him and to themselves in the hour of difficulty. There are points of peculiar interest attached to this battle, which deserve a plan and a minute explanation. It affords a memorable example of the power with which high intuitive genius soars above established rules, and triumphs, when mediocrity or incapacity sins against them and fails. Persians had invaded the Roman territories on the side of Mesopotamia, and, crossing the Euphrates, advanced against Chalcis and Antioch. Belisarius hastily collected such forces as he had at his disposal, and hastened from Dara, where he was stationed on the frontiers, to intercept them. He arrived in time, and the Persian army, remembering the overthrow of Dara, paused and retreated.* Belisarius, not wishing to hazard a battle with very inferior numbers, and in which victory could scarcely give him more advantages than he already possessed, followed them cautiously, remaining usually at one day's march behind them, encamping each night on the station they had left the morning before. He felt the wisdom and adopted the maxim of Cæsar, who was of opinion that a good general, in most cases, should make a bridge of gold for a retreating enemy. The Persians marched along the right bank of the Euphrates,

"Procop. De Bello Persico," lib. i. c. 18.

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a broad and rapid river, until they came opposite to Callinicum, a little above which they intended to cross, and passing (as on their advance) through Mesopotamia, to regain their own country. The Roman soldiers, indignant at seeing their enemies escape, and over-estimating their own prowess, assailed Belisarius with loud reproaches. They attributed his systematic caution to cowardice or ignorance, and urged by the inferior officers, loudly demanded to be led to battle. Belisarius, compelled to sacrifice his own judgment to this senseless clamour, submitted cheerfully to the dangerous alternative he

could no longer avoid, regained the confidence of his troops by pretending that he had only delayed the combat to test their alacrity and spirit, and proceeded to make the ablest arrangement of his forces which circumstances allowed. It was by no choice of his own that he fought with an unfordable river in his rear; a vicious disposition, contrary to all sound principles, and seldom ventured on without fatal consequences. We shall soon see that what would have ruined an ordinary general, his ready genius converted to a source of safety.

BATTLE OF CALLINICUM, BETWEEN BELISARIUS AND THE PERSIANS, FOUGHT ON EASTER SUNDAY, APRIL THE 19TH, A.D. 531.-No. 1.

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A-Persian army under Azarethes and Almondar. B-Roman army commanded by Belisarius.

a-Roman infantry of the left wing resting on the river. b b-Roman cavalry in the centre. c-Isaurian (or Arabian) auxiliaries on the right. dd d-Islands on the Euphrates to which the Roman cavalry, and some of the right wing escaped, when routed by the Persians.

Belisarius drew up his best troops, his infantry, on the left. The Arab auxiliaries, on whom he placed less dependence, he posted on the right, and took his own station with the cavalry, in the centre. The arms of his men, both offensive and defensive, were superior to those of the enemy, but the Persians were more rapid and more skilful bowmen than the GreekRomans. For a considerable part of the day, no advantage was gained on either side; at length the Isaurians fled, actuated by either cowardice or treachery, or more probably by both. The Persians then surrounded the cavalry, who, pressed on all sides, and exhausted with fatigue, gave way, and fled headlong to some islands on the Euphrates in the rear. Those who failed to effect their escape, were

slaughtered or made prisoners on the spot. Belisarius dismounted from his horse, calling upon all his staff to follow his example, and took part at the head of the infantry of the left, who still stood firm in their original places. His eagle eye detected at a glance, the advantages of the ground, and that by rapidly wheeling back their right, the bend of the river immediately behind them would cover both flanks, and enable them to maintain their position. At all events, their lives depended on an obstinate defence. Procopius relates what followed, with the clear accuracy of an eye-witness. He says:

"The Persians seeing the resolution taken by Belisarius, of still resisting with the Roman infantry, ceased to pursue the fugi

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A-Roman infantry

Persians.

of the left wing under Belisarius, in a compact mass, resisting the attack of the

B-The entire Persian army, thrown on the left wing of the Romans.

d d d-Islands on the Euphrates to which Belisarius retreated during the night, after having repulsed th Persians,

c-Remains of the Roman army, when routed in the earlier part of the battle.

VOL. XLII.NO. CCXLVIII.

L

tives, and united their whole forces to fall upon the remnant of his army, who turned their backs to the river, to prevent being surrounded. The combat was most obstinate, but the forces were very unequal. A mere handful of foot-soldiers opposed to the innumerable cavalry of the enemy. But this small detachment was neither broken, nor reduced to flight. They closed their ranks, and linked their large bucklers together so effectually, that they inflicted a much heavier loss than they endured. The enemy tried to break their compact order by repeated charges of heavy horse, but without effect. The remainder of the day passed in this obstinate contest, which was only interrupted by the approach of darkness. During the night, the Persians withdrew to their camp, and Belisarius having found some boats, embarked the few survivors of this sanguinary battle, and gained some islands of the Euphrates, where the rest of his army had already taken refuge."

The next morning, the Persians having plundered the dead bodies, and lamented their own slain, continued their retreat, while Belisarius crossed over to Callinicum on the opposite bank of the river. The foregoing plan, No. 2, shows the concluding manœuvre of the battle.

Nothing can be more dangerous, or more opposed to skilful tactics, than taking up a position for battle with a river in the rear. A wood is quite a different matter. Wallenstein covered his retreat from Lutzen by means of the woods, which assisted and concealed his own movements, while they impeded the advance of the Swedes. The Duke of Wellington, if by any overwhelming attack he had been driven from the position of Waterloo, would have found certain shelter in the wood of Soignies, and effectual means of checking the enemy. But a river neither offers cover nor outlet. The Roman consul Caius Flaminius, in his campaign against the Insubrian Gauls, passed the Adda, broke up his temporary bridge, cut off his own communications, and engaged a formidable enemy with the river at his back, and

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no line of retreat open to him, in case of disaster. His operations proceeded from his own free choice, and demonstrated a lamentable want of generalship. But he won the battle he ought to have lost, by the superior arms, discipline, and courage of his troops. The senate justly censured his conduct, notwithstanding his victory, and eminent historians, commencing with Polybius, have ratified the decree. This same Flaminius repeated his error at Thrasymene, and paid dearly for the second experiment.

This time he had to deal with Hannibal, and not with a barbarian who knew no principle of war, beyond the simple one of close and desperate combat. Overtaken and surprised on his march, in loose order, and unprepared, the enemy poured down from the high ground on his left flank, while the lake shut in his right, which soon became his rear, as he faced round to encounter his opponents. Into this lake his army were pushed by thousands, when broken and scattered by the skilful stratagem of the Carthaginian commander. Maxentius, in his great battle with Constantine, at the Saxa Rubra, near Rome, fought with the Tiber in his rear, and sustained a defeat, in which he lost his empire and his life. Cæsar was too consummate a master of his trade to fall into these errors. In the war against the Belgæ, he passed the Axona, now the Aisne, and encamped with the river close behind him; but, dreading an attack from the enemy in this disadvantageous position, which his inferior forces prevented him from quitting immediately, he entrenched his front with a fosse and rampart, extending four hundred paces, communicating at each end with a tower provided with engines, at right angles with, and extending to, the river. He thus covered both his flanks, so that he could not be turned, or driven back into the stream; and the enemy, struck with terror by these formidable preparations, abandoned

At one of his military dinners many years since, when the conversation happened to turn on Waterloo, the Duke was asked by a general officer present, what he would have done, if his position had been forced? "I should have retreated into the wood," was the ready answer. "And what would your grace have done if you had been driven from the wood?" continued the pertinacious querist. Everybody stared, but the Duke quietly replied, "No, no; hang it, that was impossible. They never could have beaten us out of the wood." The anecdote was related to the writer by another general present, who was not a little astonished at the boldness of his brother in arms. But fortunately, the great captain was neither beaten into the wood, nor out of it.

their preconcerted plans, and dared not to attack him.*

Belisarius at Callinicum, as we have seen, in a critical moment formed his foot in a dense mass, within a bend of the Euphrates. Until then, we may suppose they were drawn up in the usual open order of the Romans, and in three lines, as handed down in their habitual practice, which, together with the legionary form, had not yet been abolished. The result showed the immeasurable superiority of infantry, when cool, determined, and well commanded, in resisting the clamorous and outwardly imposing attacks of cavalry. Tallard, at Blenheim, was less fortunate, although his troops were brave and well-disciplined -in his own opinion, the best in the world. But Tallard was neither Beli

sarius nor Marlborough. On that great day, the English general having, after a desperate conflict, attended by some vicissitudes, broken the centre of the French, and completely separated their wings, abandoned the right, under Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria, to the disposal of Eugene, and turned his whole force against the left. He saw in a moment the errors of Tallard's dispositions, and how completely his battalions posted in Blenheim, and the sustaining squadrons in their rear, were insulated. With a furious charge of seven thousand horse, in one compact body, he overpowered opposition, and drove many French squadrons before him into an abrupt bend of the Danube, immediately in their rear, exactly similar to that of the Euphrates at Callinicum.

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A B-English Cavalry. C-English Infantry. D-French Cavalry driven into the Danube. E-French Battalions in Blenheim forced to surrender.

Had Tallard withdrawn his twentyseven battalions from Blenheim by a rapid movement, while time was yet left him, and formed them across the

bend, supported on either flank by the cavalry, he might have held his ground as Belisarius did, and, if unable to obtain a victory, might at least,

• "Ab utroque latere ejus collis transversam fossam obduxit circitur passuum C.D.; et ad extremas fossas castella constituit ibique tormenta collocavit; ne quum aciem instruxisset, hostes (quod tantum multitudine poterant), à lateribus suos pugnantes circumvenire possent." Cas. de Bello Gall., lib. ii. c. 8.

† At least, so he said when presenting his sword to the victor-"Your grace has beaten the finest soldiers in Europe." "I hope, M. le Mareschal," replied Marlborough, "you will except those who beat them."

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