Regula

tions for

2186.

nently proper, and taken in connection with the preceding section seems to conform more to the English rule as laid down in the case cited at length in the note thereto. It is almost impossible to make the restrictions too stringent, in view of the reckless running of cars and steamers, and great sacrifice of life in this fast age. Sec. 483, ante, requires all to be provided with accommodations inside the cars. The beneficial results

from the adoption of the two preceding sections will not be long in manifesting themselves.

A common carrier of persons may make

conduct of rules for the conduct of his business, and may require

business.

Fare, when payable.

Ejection of passengers.

passengers to conform to them, if they are lawful, public, uniform in their application, and reasonable.

NOTE." May make and enforce compliance with rules."-Vedder vs. Fellows, 20 N. Y., p. 126; Barker vs. Coffin, 31 Barb., p. 556. "If lawful and public." Pollard vs. N. Y. and N. H. R. R., 7 Bosw., p. 437. "Uniform and reasonable."-Vedder vs. Fellows, 20 N. Y., p. 126.

2187. A common carrier may demand the fare of passengers, either at starting or at any subsequent time.

"The carrier

NOTE.-Red. on Car., etc., Sec. 133. is entitled to demand his pay in advance," but if not insisted on at the time the owner or passenger not bound to pay. See, as to rule applying to both carriers of goods and of passengers, Sec. 132, id.

2188. A passenger who refuses to pay his fare or to conform to any lawful regulation of the carrier, may be ejected from the vehicle by the carrier. But this must be done with as little violence as possible, and at any usual stopping place or near some dwelling house.

NOTE.-See Sec. 487 and note. Kline vs. C. P. R. R. Co., 37 Cal., p. 400; id., 39 Cal., p. 587, which case was twice before our Supreme Court, and as it was closely contested, ably argued both by counsel and the Court, frequent references to it may not be improper and are here given somewhat at length.

DAMAGES FOR INJURY BY RAILROAD CAR.-In a suit brought by a boy sixteen years old for damages sustained by being forcibly expelled from a railroad car, if the testimony tends to show that plaintiff' is told

he cannot ride, and that he is ordered by the conductor,
with a show of force, to get off the car, a nonsuit should
not be granted upon the ground that the carelessness
and negligence of the plaintiff contributed to his injury.
Kline vs. C. P. R. R. Co., 37 Cal., p. 400.

FORCIBLE EJECTION FROM A RAILROAD CAR.-If
a boy sixteen years of age only leaps from a railroad
car while in motion, in obedience to the command of
the conductor, accompanied by a show of force, the
Court cannot say judicially that the act of the boy was
voluntary, but should leave it to the jury to say whether,
under all the circumstances, the conduct of the con-
ductor did not amount to compulsion.-Id., 39 Cal., p.

587.

LIABILITY FOR REMOVING PERSON FROM RAILROAD CAR.-Although a person gets upon a railroad car wrongfully, and as a trespasser, for the purpose of riding without paying his fare, yet the conductor, if he resolves to exercise his right to remove him, must do so prudently, and in such a manner as not to endanger his personal safety. If he do not exercise this prudence, and injury result, the company cannot absolve itself from liability on the ground that the wrong was mutual.-Id.

IDEM.-If, in such case, the conductor sees the person attempting to get on the car, he may use force to prevent him, and no liability will result from injury; but if the person is once fairly on the car care must be exercised in his removal.-Id.

This case further treats of damages where both parties are in the wrong, and where act of agent binds principal, and liability of company for act of railroad conductors; and, also, company liable for act of railroad conductor.

2189. A passenger upon a railroad train who has not paid his fare before entering the train, if he has been afforded an opportunity to do so, must, upon demand, pay ten per cent in addition to the regular rate.

NOTE. This is a limitation to the exorbitant and disproportionate percentage sometimes exacted, and will afford some protection. The provision for this State is new. "Company may demand higher fares if paid in cars," but this limits the amount.-Red. on Car., etc., Sec. 483.

2190. After having ejected a passenger, a carrier

Passenger

who has

not paid

fare.

Fare not payable after ejection.

Carrier's lien.

has no right to require the payment of any part of his fare.

NOTE. This is certainly correct, for if the penalty is inflicted for non-compliance with a regulation there is no reason for a subsequent compulsion to comply; having been ejected, you could not compel a payment of fare, or an orderly ride, or subsequent good conduct on the car from which he is ejected.

2191. A common carrier has a lien upon the luggage of a passenger for the payment of such fare as he is entitled to from him. This lien is regulated by the Title on Liens.

NOTE." Passenger carrier has lien on baggage for fare" (Red. on Car., etc., Sec. 278), but not on the person of the passenger. See, also, Story on Bailm., Sec. 604; Wolf vs. Summers, 2 Camp., p. 631; McDaniel vs. Robinson, 26 Vt., p. 316. It was held that a carrier's lien for freightage is lost by the voluntary surrender of the possession in the case of Wingard vs. Banning, 39 Cal., p. 543; so, also, if a common carrier sues out and procures to be levied a writ of attachment against property on which he has a lien for freight, he thereby abandons and forfeits his lien.-Id.

Liability

of inland carriers for loss.

2200. Consignor of valuables to declare their nature.

2201. Delivery of freight beyond usual route.

2202. Proof to be given in case of loss.

2203. Carrier's services, other than carriage and delivery.

2194. Unless the consignor accompanies the freight and retains exclusive control thereof, an inland common carrier of property is liable, from the time that he accepts until he relieves himself from liability pur

suant to Sections 2118 to 2122, for the loss or injury Same. thereof from any cause whatever, except:

1. An inherent defect, vice, or weakness, or a spontaneous action, of the property itself;

2. The act of a public enemy of the United States, or of this State;

3. The act of the law; or,

4. Any irresistible superhuman cause.

NOTE. When consignor accompanies and controls freight.-Sto. Bailm., Secs. 533, 578; Cohen vs. Frost, 2 Duer, p. 355; Tower vs. Utica R. R., 7 Hill, p. 47. Inland carrier liable from the time he accepts the freight.-Blossom vs. Griffin, 13 N. Y., p. 569; Lakeman vs. Grinnell, 5 Bosw., p. 625. Continues liable till he relieves himself by actual delivery or a warehouse deposit.-Story on Bailm., Secs. 533, 509; Goold vs. Chapin, 20 N. Y., p. 259, or is relieved by:

Subd. 1.-Sto. Bailm., Sec. 492a; Ang. on Car., Sec. 214a; Clarke vs. Rochester R. R., 14 N. Y., p. 574.

Subd. 2.-Sto. Bailm., Secs. 510, 526.

Subd. 3.-Van Winkle vs. U. S. Mail Steamship Co., 37 Barb., p. 122; Bliven vs. Hudson River R. R., 35 id., p. 188; but,

Subd. 4.-"Inevitable accident" does not excuse the carrier, if such accident is of human origin.-Miller vs. Steam Navigation Co., 10 N. Y., p. 431; Goold vs. Chapin, 20 id., p. 259; 10 Barb., p. 612; Merritt vs. Earle, 31 id., p. 38; McArthur vs. Sears, 21 Wend., p. 190; Hall vs. Cheney, 36 N. H., p. 31; see, also, note to Sec. 2168, ante, "responsibility."

2195. A common carrier is liable, even in the When

cases excepted by the last section, if his ordinary negligence exposes the property to the cause of the loss.

NOTE.-Read vs. Spaulding, 5 Bosw., p. 395; Wing vs. N. Y. & Erie R. R., 1 Hilt., p. 235. See also Red. on Car., etc., Sec. 28: "Where negligence of carrier exposes him to what he might otherwise have escaped, he is responsible for losses thus occurring through the combined agency of his own negligence and inevitable accident or the public enemy." It will be here observed that "inevitable accident" is substituted for act of God, as explained in note to Sec. 2168, ante.

exemptions

do not

apply.

Liability for delay.

Liability

of marine carriers.

Same.

2196. A common carrier is liable for delay only when it is the effect of his ordinary negligence.

NOTE. Wibert vs. N. Y. & Erie R. R., 11 N. Y., p. 245; Conger vs. Hudson River R. R., 6 Duer, p. 375; Red. on Car., etc., Sec. 29; and note "reasonable time," question of fact for the jury, etc.

2197. A marine carrier is liable in like manner as an inland carrier, except for loss or injury caused by the perils of the sea or fire.

NOTE. "Perils of the sea" defined, Sec. 512a, Story on Bailm. See also, on the same, Angell on Carr., Secs. 166-170. "Neither the element on which goods are carried, nor the nature, magnitude, and form of the carriage make any difference."-Ang. on Carr., Sec. 99. See, also, "Perils of the Sea" and "Dangers of the River," id., Sec. 168, et seq.

2198. The liability of a common carrier by sea is further regulated by Acts of Congress.

NOTE.-9 U. S. Stat., p. 635.

Perils of sea, what.

1. Storms and waves;

2. Rocks, shoals, and rapids;

3. Other obstacles, though of human origin;

4. Changes of climate;

5. The confinement necessary at, sea;

6. Animals peculiar to the sea; and,
7. All other dangers peculiar to the sea.

NOTE.-Ang. on Carr., Secs. 166, 226, and the case of Amer vs. Astor, 6 Cow. N. Y. R., p. 266, particularly referred to in Sec. 170, id. The whole question discussed in sections named, supra. In its connection with marine insurance, this question is discussed in 2 Pars. Marit. Law, p. 219, et seq. "By this phrase 'perils of the sea' is meant all the perils incident to navigation, and especially those arising from the wind and weather, the state of the ocean, and its rocks and shores."-Pars. Merc. Law, p. 443.

2200. A common carrier of gold, silver, platina, or precious stones, or of imitations thereof, in a manu