no.

vide their own equipments, yet they came to him in crowds, youths of the most wealthy families of Genoa, Milan, and Bologna. The marvels he accomplished with this little army it is no part of our purpose to rehearse; but, from the outset, Garibaldi was strictly a Constitutionalist. He understood nothing about diplomacy, and suspected it; still he was vulgar visionary-no poetical patriot. He was a practical, as well as a brave man, and had as sound and decided a conviction of the necessity of unity to Italy, if her independence was to be won, and maintained, as Count Cavour himself. In De la Rive's "Reminiscences of the Life and Character of Cavour," the interview at Turin is mentioned, though less specifically, and the importance attached by the Sardinian Minister to Garibaldi's co-operation fully admitted. It appears from the state ments of Cavour's biographer, that the Sardinian War Minister opposed the introduction of the Garibaldian corps as an "element of military disorder," and that civilians and the diplomatic corps objected to it, as an element of political disorder." Cavour insisted, however, upon the importance of not only bringing Garibaldi into the foreground, but of allowing him to "strike the first blow before the arrival of the French." Doubtless the shrewd statesman calculated that Italy, flattered by this recognition of her chief,and inspired with enthusiasm by his exploits, would become more partial to the Sardinian dynasty, and less dependent on foreign aid. Cavour knew what those around him did not know, that the word of Garibaldi was implicitly to be trusted, and that when, accordingly, he pledged himself to employ his sword for Victor Emmanuel and the constitutional liberties of Italy, no temptation would cause him to swerve from that noble profession of political faith and personal allegiance. The subsequent career of the great subject abundantly justified that confidence. Though he lost his faith in Count Cavour, he never deserted the King, and was the principal means of carrying Italy over from Mazzinism, to the better choice of that liberty which a constitutional monarchy secures.

The high estimate set both by Cavour and the King upon the assistance

of Garibaldi was again shown during the meeting of the King and his illustrious servant at San Salvatore, the head-quarters of the Sardinian army. The King having handed to the General an autograph rescript, empowering him to enlist volunteers and impose contributions of war, opened a discussion as to a plan of campaign for the hero. It was no doubt Cavour's purpose--probably that of the Emperor of the French also-to confine him to certain specified operations. Garibaldi, however, would have been useless so hampered. He begged to be allowed to follow his own inspirations, to make his cam-. paign against the Austrians where he knew he could do them the greatest injury. This request would have been refused to any mere military chieftain, however distinguished, but Garibaldi had been taken into his service by the King from political reasons as much as military. Victor Emmanuel's commission consequently was-"Go where you like; do what you like! I feel only one regret-that I cannot follow you.'

Whether his estimate of the powers of Italy was excessive or not, it is certain that without Garibaldi, Solferino would have advantaged Piedmont little. It is hard to say what the Italians, unaided, might not have done if the national spirit had been boldly evoked, as the patriot desired. His own exploits in Sicily and Southern Italy, at a later moment, when he had Napoleon's enmity and hardly the countenance of the King, for whom he was still honestly fighting, showed that there was a power in Italy of the force of which statesmen and diplomatists were unaware. A conversation between Garibaldi, Fruscianti and Vecchj, at Caprera, long after Victor Emmanuel had abandoned the idea of freeing Venice, proves that the General still believes Italy to have been merely shackled by the French alliance; and were it possible that the expedition to Sicily, the flight of the Bourbon, and the acknowledgment of Victor Emmanuel's sovereignty over Naples and the South, could have preceded the struggle in Lombardy, the great Minister and his master would doubtless have attempted alone what Garibaldi had the daring to conceive-the expulsion

of the Austrians from every foot of Italian soil. "We are refused," said Vecchj, on the occasion referred to

"The pleasure of delivering Venice, and humbling the pride of the House of Hapsburgh, on the plains of Temesnar. With twenty-two millions of free Italians, they can attempt, whenever they please, to rescue three millions of oppressed Italians.'

"They will never attempt it,' said Frus

cianti.

"Or, only when they have obtained permission of the 'magnanimous ally,' added Specchi.

"For which they must give a province in exchange,' said Deiderj, an emigrant from Nice.

"Vecchj is right,' (said Garibaldi.) 'If twenty-two millions are not sufficient to free Venice, the Italians do not deserve a country.'"

66

Garibaldi, it is Count Arrivabene's opinion, overrated the irregular forces of the country, and trusted too much in the practicability of developing them on an immense scale." It is remarkable, however, that the hero was more correct than Count Cavour in his vaticinations as to the immediate result of the French alliance, for which such a bargain as that of Villafranca, together with the surrender of Savoy and Nice, would have been a heavy price to pay.

The "irregular forces of the country," as represented and led by him, were also formally appealed to on a second occasion, when Garibaldi came to the rescue under the banner of "Victor Emmanuel and Italy," with a still more unselfish patriotism than before, as he had then still less sympathy with the diplomatists by whom the Re Galantuomo was surrounded. After the expulsion of the Austrians, when Cavour had made up his mind, and had brought the King to the same conviction, that there was no escape from the existing complications but by arousing the feelings of the country, he again sought an interview with Garibaldi, who had just left Turin for Nice to encourage the resistance of the people of his native town against its annexation to France. At Genoa, the Count met him, and Garibaldi's purpose was changed by what occurred between them. In a fortnight from that date the "thousand

men" were sailing for Sicily. Upon the nature of the conference, M. de la Rive, Cavour's relative, says:—

"It is evident that Cavour was neither ignorant of nor prevented Garibaldi's expedition. Was he unable or unwilling to do so? If he was unwilling, I am inclined to think it was because he felt that he would be powerless to prevent it; and that he was averse to an open rupture with Garibaldi, who was backed by the national feeling, while at the same time he was quite disposed to admit into his political combinations the eventual fall of the Neapolitan monarchy. The impediments which government was supposed to have placed in the way of the enrolment of the volunteers, of their equipment, and of their embarkation, are all mere illusions. I said that Cavour was averse to oppose the stream of popular favour which bore Garibaldi along. Perhaps he was apprehensive of being overwhelmed by it, and of losing the popularity which he had slowly acquired, and had so long enjoyed."

as

The writer of these words, as the eulogist of Cavour, is hardly just to Garibaldi. If the world possessed minutes of the conversation between Garibaldi and Cavour, when the latter applied a second time for the hero's aid, a flood of light would be thrown upon the springs and motives of those actions which amazed and gladdened constitutional Europe. In the absence of such aid Count Arrivabene has supplied with respect to the first interview of the triumvirate of genius and honesty -Victor Emmanuel, Garibaldi, and Cavour in the palace of Turin, we are left to speculation as regards Garibaldi's exact share in the plans subsequently carried out so brilliantly, and the extent to which the King favoured them; but there is every probability that Cavour acted with the policy of a practised statesman; and whilst encouraging Garibaldi to undertake an enterprise which was manifestly the patriot's own project, reserved to himself the power of disavowing the chieftain, should his attempt to revolutionize Sicily and the South fail. This was, no doubt, only the course Cavour's position rendered necessary; but the fact adds lustre to the character of Garibaldi, who distrusted Cavour, and yet was ready to attempt what seemed the most impossible task, in order to save his country. "Garibaldi," said Cavour,

as he lay on his death-bed, "is an honest man.' The testimony from such lips was remarkable. Cavour had the best reason to know what manner of person this Italian was. "His desire," added the sinking statesman, "is to go to Rome and Venice, and so is mine; no one is in a greater hurry than we are." "Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi," declares Cavour's biographer, were two powerful coadjutors in the work which, nevertheless, is the work of Cavour." Without depreciating that great man, we may yet claim for Garibaldi more than the position of a subordinate in the accomplishment of the vast change. Not only was his sword the principal agency by which the work was done, but his instincts appear to have been truer, even in a political direction, than the acumen of the professed statesman. Cavour, it is clear, had no confidence in, no respect for, the Neapolitans. Among his last words were expressions amounting almost to despair on account of their moral corruption. The Minister who held these opinions would never have made the bold attempt to join Naples to Northern Italy. That is Garibaldi's special achievement. There is every probability that it was originally his idea. It does not diminish the greatness of Count Cavour to acknowledge that the hero and the patriot whom he consulted in two great crises of the nation's history was something more than a fiery soldier, eager for employment. Garibaldi, indeed, took occasion once more during his late visit to England to disavow a passion for warfare. "Countrymen," he said, addressing the representatives of the Italian residents of London, "I am not a soldier by profession. I do not like the profession of a soldier. I only took up the trade of a soldier when I found robbers in my house. I turned soldier to expel them. I became a soldier to fight against the oppressors of my country." These words are in harmony with the declaration frequently made by the General to his friends and guests at Caprera.

The feature of real interest in Colonel Chambers's book is his full and important reference to the sad affair of Aspromonte. The author is now

acting as English secretary to the General, and may be taken as the authorized exponent of Garibaldi's views on that event, of his motives in undertaking the expedition which had so bitter an ending, and of his feelings in looking back upon it. According to the official reports received from Italy, there was a hot though not protracted struggle between the volunteers and Pallavicini's battalion. Garibaldi was summoned to surrender in the name of the King, and refused. Thereupon the fight was said to have begun, and the General only yielded when his men had been scattered by a bayonet charge, and then begged leave to quit Italy for ever in an English steamer. If this version of the occurrence were in all respects true, there is no doubt that it would militate seriously against the character claimed for Garibaldi in the earlier portion of these observations. Heretofore, the British public have been obliged to assume its general truth, and no one has ever attempted to do more than suggest certain extenuations for Garibaldi's unfortunate act of rebellion against the sovereign of his earlier allegiance and his unchanged affections. But Colonel Chambers describes the episode of Aspromonte differently, and his story bears every mark of simple truth. We have the fullest confidence in Garibaldi's desire that nothing but the truth-nothing less or more than the truth-should be told. There was, in reality, no fight. At midday the Garibaldini halted on the edge of a dense forest of pine. Suddenly the "enemy" were seen in front, occupying partly the opposite heights. Garibaldi had made no preparations for a conflict. He had stationed no outposts. He did not care to occupy the favourable points of his position. His men entered the forest, and his only desire was to avoid an encounter. He sat near the centre of his column, and despatched repeated orders to his officers not to fire. made eager observations through his telescope, the sole object of which was to avert, if possible, the painful and unsought collision. Colonel Chambers's spirited narrative continues:- "The troops kept advancing; the riflemen in front with a running step, the troops of the line behind. The first ranks of riflemen were al

-

He

ready within gunshot; they had taken aim. The whole column observed in silence. Not a cry, not a shot was heard. The General alone, standing erect, continued to take his observations, his large cloak of pale gray, lined with red, thrown over his broad shoulders; ever and anon he turned to repeat the command 'Do not fire.'" The orders given to the Royal troops, however, were positive. They were to attack the Volunteers wherever they came up with them. Without intimation, therefore, the riflemen pour a volley upon the General's small and surprised force. The firing from the attacking squadrons grows hotter, and still Garibaldi's command is not to return it. Ultimately, however, a number of the less experienced of the Volunteers reply to Pallavacini's fire, and Piedmontese blood is spilt. But "the rest do not move; he who is standing continues to stand; he who is sitting continues to sit. All the bugles, without exception, sound the signal for the fire to cease. All the officers give the same order by word of mouth. Such is the answer we send to the troops which are sounding the advance, accompanying it with a well-sustained fire. The General from his post, erect amidst a thick shower of balls, repeats the cry, 'Do not fire !'" It was at this moment, when Garibaldi was actually exerting himself to prepare his men for the submission he had purposed as soon as he saw the sword of Victor Emmanuel really drawn against him, that two balls struck him, one on the thigh, the other giving him the serious wound on the instep of the right foot. The General, "at the time he was wounded," continues Colonel Chambers, not only remained standing, but drew himself up najestically. Friends, brothers, cousins, acquaintances, companions in recent battles fought for the country, meet and recognise each other. A lieutenant of the Royal staff presses forward before the rest." He announces that he has come to parley. "But why did he not come sooner? The General reproves him thus:-'I have known for thirty years, and better than you, in what war consists. Learn that those who come to parley do not present themselves in that guise.' Se veral officers are led under the tree where the General is placed. He

orders their swords to be taken from them, but afterwards that they should be restored. "Meanwhile, unmoved himself, and waving aloft his hat with his left hand, he cried out repeatedly, Long live Italy. Do not fire.' Then calmly, as was his wont, he continued to give orders. The most precise were ever these 'Let them advance; do not fire.' Along our whole front the firing had ceased. A little while after Menotti is brought up, who is also struck with a spent ball in the calf of the left leg, causing a most painful contusion; he cannot stand. Father and son are both laid down under the same tree. A circle of officers and soldiers is made around Garibaldi; he lights a cigar and begins smoking, and repeats to all, 'Do not fight.' The soldiers turn inquiring words and looks to the officers. The answer for all is the same, 'Do not fight.' Garibaldi has since then again and again insisted that he never meant civil war. He appears to have supposed-and not unnaturally-that he might calculate for the third time upon at least the silent consent of the King, if not of the Turin Government. It is not fair, under the circumstances, to treat him as having been a mere rebel at Aspromonte. History will acquit him of any dishonourable design. He merely desired to fight, as before, for "Victor Emmanuel and Italy." Diplomacy overmastered him. Intrigue and a timorous policy destroyed a great opportunity, perhaps, for completing the independence of Italy. Napoleon the Third, it may be, had something to do with humiliating the man who, from the commencement of the Italian revolution, had stigmatized him as untrustworthy, and warned his countrymen without reserve against a French alliance. The weakness of Ratazzi made him a fit instrument for such a design on the part of the French sovereign.

There seems no doubt whatever that the Turin Ministry deliberately misrepresented what occurred at Aspromonte, with the object of discrediting Garibaldi as a seditionary. The General was a dupe, not a criminal. He became the victim of Ratazzi's vacillation. Had Count Cavour been in the latter's place, he might have played the game followed in the case of Garibaldi's Sicilian expedition

with deeper astuteness, but he would not have shot down the hero of whom he might make so vast and advantageous a use. Ratazzi was wholly unequal to the occasion. It must be borne in mind, at the same time, that the liberation of Venice, and the conquest and secularization of Rome, involved issues far more serious and difficult than the expulsion of the Bourbons from the Two Sicilies. It did not at all follow that the victor of Calatafimi would have been able to take the Quadrilateral, or drive the Pontiff into exile. It is true that the attempt to seize Sicily with a handful of red-shirts, seemed the acme of madness, when the Garibaldini had just landed, and an astonishing success attended their efforts; but it would have been rash in the extreme to reason from this that Garibaldi would in a few weeks be able to place his standard on the Capitol, and declare Italy free to the Adriatic. It is unnecessary to examine now the motives and capacity of Ratazzi. It is enough to say, what is clear, that he wofully lacked courage; but justice requires that Garibaldi's share in the responsibility of the Aspromonte affair should be plainly stated. "I was wounded," he has written, "when I was not fighting, and when I had no intention of fighting." "I had given,' ," he added, "the strictest orders not to fire." 'Happily there were but few wounded among the brave Bersaglieri who captured me; as for my Volunteers, they were needlessly fired at, and many of these brave fellows fell wounded with me, without discharging their muskets." The General has also more than once declared emphatically that from the position he occupied at Aspromonte, he could have crushed the royal troops completely; but, to sum up his defence with his own words, he "never willed civil war."

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With this reference to the last of

Garibaldi's exploits, which simple regard for the truth of history seemed to demand, we may bring these observations to a conclusion. If his violent love for Italy on a single occasion" outran the pauser, reason," it was an error to which previous campaigns, and their motives and issues, lent a semblance of sagacity. We cannot condemn Garibaldi for a madness which had certainly a method in it. His character as a man and a patriot, at all events, is unaffected by that occurrence, and it is for his personal virtues largely that the heart of the English nation warms to him. His perfect unselfishness makes him a preacher to the time. The Italians can well say of him,

"Our spoils he kick'd at ; And look'd upon things precious, as they

were

The common muck o' the world: he covets less

Than misery itself would give; rewards His deeds with doing them; and is content To spend the time, to end it."

And in this aspect of his character Garibaldi is illustrious beyond the power of malice to depreciate. It is fortunate that on his visit to our shores he was protected by the hospitality of distinguished persons from being, in his simplicity, made the prey or the scoff of designing men.

As things have happily fallen out, the hearty celebration of the hero's exploits in this country will bind Italy and England together, and the "Italian alliance" may at a future time recompense us for the loss of other friendships on the Continent of Europe.

It will ever have this element of strength and permanence, that it is an alliance of sympathy between two peoples, not a compact between individuals, dependent on the caprices of a minister, or the slippery turns of an ambitious monarch's policy.