gation of the county to pay them, but in the method by which the county may raise the money to discharge its own obligations. In the former case it may levy the taxes upon the property in the precinct which voted for their issue; in the latter case, upon

all the property in the county. But the obligation of the county to pay them is as sacred and effective in the one case as in the other." Clapp v. Otoe County, Neb., 45 C. C. A. 579, 104 Fed. 473.

Dissolution of municipal corporation; new corporation succeeds to its rights and is liable for its debts. 639. (Fla. 1876.) "When, there fore, a new form is given to an old municipal corporation, or such a corporation is reorganized under a new charter, taking in its new organization the place of the old one, embracing substantially the same corporators and the same territory, it will be presumed that the legislature in tended a continued existence of the same corporation, although different powers are possessed under the new charter, and different officers administer its affairs; and, in the absence of express provision for their payment otherwise, it will also be presumed in such case that the legislature intended that the liabilities as well as the rights of property of the corporation in its old form should accompany the corporation in its reorganization. That such was the intention of the State of Florida in the present case, we have no doubt; to suppose otherwise would be to impute to her an insensibility to the claims of morality and justice, which nothing in her history warrants."

"So a change in the charter of a municipal corporation, in whole or part, by an amendment of its provisions, or the substitution of a new charter in place of the old one, should

not be deemed, in the absence of express legislative declaration otherwise, to affect the identity of the corporation, or to relieve it from its previous liabi'ities." Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, 23 L. Ed. 896.

640. (La. 1877.) Consolidated city liable for debts of constituent bodies without express declaration to that effect. New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644, 24 L. Ed. 521.

Changes in municipal corporations and their powers, subject to legislative regulation.

641. (Wis. 1879.) "Old towns may be divided and new ones incorporated out of parts of the territory of those previously organized; and in enacting such regulations the legislature may apportion the common property and the common burdens, and may, as between the parties in interest, settle

all the terms and conditions of the division of their territory, or the alteration of the boundaries, as fixed by any prior law. State legislation may regulate the subject; but if the legislature omits to do so, the presumption, as between the parties, is that they did not consider that any regulation was necessary. Where none is made, in case of division the old corporation owns all the public property within her new limits, and is responsible for all the debts of the corporation contracted before the act of separation was passed. Debts previously contracted must be paid entirely by the old corporation, nor has the new municipality any claim to any portion of the public property, except what falls within her boundaries, and to that the old corporation has no claim whatever. Laramie County v.. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307; Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 521.”

One town merged in two others.

"Where one town is by a legisla tive act merged in two others, it would doubtless be competent for the legislature to regulate the rights, duties, and obligations of the two towns whose limits are thus enlarged; but if that is not done, that it must follow that the two towns succeed to all the public property and immunities of the extinguished municipality. Morgan V. Beloit, City and Town, 7 Wall. 613, 617."

Not so where old town not extinguished.

"It is not the case where the legislature creates a new town out of a part of the territory of an old one, without making provision for the payment of the debts antecedently contracted, as in that case it is settled law that the old corporation retains all the public property not included within the limits of the new municipality, and is liable for all the debts contracted by her before the act of separation was passed. Town of Depere and Others v. Town of Bellevue and Others, 31 Wis. 120, 125."

One charter vacated, territory transferred to two others.

"Instead of that, it is the case where the charter of one corporation

is vacated and rendered null, the whole of its territory being annexed to two others. In such a case, if no legislative arrangements are made, the effect of the annulment and annexation will be that the two enlarged corporations will be entitled to all the public property and immunities of the one that ceases to exist, and that they will become liable for all the legal debts contracted, by her prior to the time when the annexation is carried into operation."

Territory and property of one corpo

ration transferred to another. "Grant that, and it follows that when the corporation first named ceases to exist there is then no power left to control in its behalf any of its funds, or to pay off any of its indebtedness. Its property passes into the hands of its successors, and when the benefits are taken the burdens are assumed, the rule being that the successor who takes the benefit must take the same cum onere, and that the successor town is thereby estopped to deny that she is liable to respond for the attendant burdens. Swain v. Seamens, 9 Wall. 254, 274; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & El. 474."

annexed territory as a separate municipality ceased to exist, whether to pay debts or for any other purpose the reason being that the power, so far as respected its future exercise, was transferred with the territory and the jurisdiction over its inhabitants to the appellant towns, as enlarged by the annexed territory; from which it follows, unless it be held that the extinguishment of the debtor municipality discharged its debts without payment, which the Constitution forbids, that the appellant towns assumed each a proportionate share of the outstanding obligations of the debtor town when they acquired the territory, public property, and municipal jurisdiction over everything belonging to the extinguished municipality."

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Pecuniary burdens may be increased or diminished by the change; but, in the absence of express provisions regulating the subject, it will be presumed in every case where both municipalities are continued, that the outstanding liabilities of the same remain unaffected by such legislation. Unlike that in this case, the charter of the old town was vacated and annulled, from which it follows that the same principles of justice require that the appellant towns, to which the territory, property, and inhabitants of the annulled municipality were annexed, should become liable for its outstanding indebtedness." Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 25 L. Ed. 699.

Rights of creditors on dissolution of

municipal corporation.

642. (Tenn. 1880.) In a cause in equity in which complainants, judg ment-creditors of the city of Memphis, whose charter had been repealed by the legislature, prayed that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the assets of the city, including her tax-books and bills for past due and imposed taxes, and that he be clothed with the power conferred by statutes of Tennessee relied upon, the court held, on consideration of said statutes: 1. Property held for public uses, such public buildings, streets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves, landing-places, fire engines, hose and hose carriages, engine-houses, engineering instruments, and generally everything held for governmental pur

as

poses, cannot be subjected to the payment of the debts of the city. Its public character forbids such an appropriation. Upon the repeal of the charter of the city, such property passed under the immediate control of the State, the power once delegated to the city in that behalf having been withdrawn.

2. The private property of individuals within the limits of the territory of the city cannot be subjected to the payment of the debts of the city, except through taxation. The doctrine of some of the States, that such property can be reached directly on execution against the municipality, has not been generally accepted.

3. The power of taxation is legislative, and cannot be exercised otherwise than under the authority of the legislature.

4. Taxes levied according to law before the repeal of the charter, other than such as were levied in obedience to the special requirement of contracts entered into under the authority of law, and such as were levied under judicial direction for the payment of judgments recovered against the city, cannot be collected through the instrumentality of a court of chancery at the instance of the creditors of the city. Such taxes can only be collected under authority from the legislature. If no such authority exists, the remedy is by appeal to the legislature, which alone can grant

relief.

5. The receiver and back-tax collector appointed under the authority of the act of March 13, 1879, is a public officer, clothed with authority from the legislature for the collection of the taxes levied before the repeal of the charter. The funds collected by him from taxes levied under judicial direction cannot be appropriated to any other uses than those for which they were raised. He, as well as any other agent of the State charged with the duty of their collection, can be compelled by appropriate judicial orders to proceed with the collection of such taxes by sale of property or by suit or in any other way authorized by law, and to apply the proceeds upon the judgments."

An extended discussion will be found in the opinion. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. Ed. 197.

Assumption by consolidated city, under legislative authority, of the debts of constituent municipalities; subsequent legislation impairing taxing power.

643. (La. 1881.) "The acts of 1852 consolidated the three previously existing municipalities within the limits of New Orleans into one, and added to it the adjacent city of Lafayette. The new corporation took all the property and interests of the municipalities, and of Lafayette, and consequently became subject to their obligations. The advantages which accrued from the possession of their property were accompanied with the burdens of their debts. This liability was not, however, left to rest upon any general principles of corporate liability in such cases. The legislature recognized its existence, and in consolidating the municipalities and the corporation of Lafayette, declared that the debts of the old corporation, of the municipalities and of that city, should be assumed and paid by the city of New Orleans, which was declared to be liable therefor. The first of the acts appointed commissioners of the debt thus consolidated, and authorized them to issue new bonds of the city having forty years to run, with interest coupons payable semiannually in exchange for the obligations and debts of the old corporation, and of the municipalities, to which the debts of Lafayette were subsequently added by the supplementary act. To meet the interest it provided that the common council of the city should annually, in the month of January, pass an ordinance to raise the sum of $600,000, increased to $650,000 by the supplementary act, by a special tax on real estate and slaves, to be called the consolidated loan tax. It also provided that any surplus remaining at the end of each year, after payment of the interest on these bonds, and the expenses of managing the debt, should be applied to the purchase of such of the bonds as might have the shortest period to run. These provisions, until the bonds were accepted. were in the nature of proposals to the creditors of the old city, of the municipalities, and of Lafayette. The State in effect said to them: The city will give these bonds, running for the period designated, and drawing interest, in ex