all the usual requisites, such as paying the dues, and performing exercises, and that the two societies of the Inner and Middle Temple, upon their being consulted by that of Gray's Inn, had been of opinion that the ground of rejection was not sufficient. The affidavit also mentioned two late instances, one of a bankrupt, another of a person who had been discharged as an insolvent debtor; who had been called to the bar. It appeared that the society of Lincoln's Inn had been of opinion, when consulted, that the cause was sufficient. In behalf of the application, it was urged, that it would be highly inconvenient to permit such a body as the Benchers of an Inn of Court to exercise a jurisdiction in such matters, uncontrolable by a court of law, and that, in the present instance, there had been manifest injustice in permitting the prosecutor to lose his time, and put himself to expense, in order to qualify himself for the bar, if he was thought to be a person incapable of being called. * Lord MANSFIELD. We have consulted the other Judges on the subject of this application, and I am prepared to state the result. The original institution of the Inns of Court no where precisely appears, but it is certain that they are not corporations, and have no constitution by charters from the Crown. They are voluntary societies, which, for ages, have submitted to government analogous to that of other seminaries of learning. But all the power they have concerning the admission to the bar, is delegated to them from the Judges, and, in every instance, their conduct is subject to their control as visitors. * * From the first traces of their existence to this day, no example can be found of an interposition by the courts of Westminster Hall proceeding according to the general law of the land; but the Judges have acted as in a domestic forum. The only case in which an attempt was made to proceed in this court is reported in March. One Booreman, a barrister of one of the Temples, having been expelled, he applied for his writ of restitution, but it was denied, "because there is none in the inn of court to whom the writ can be directed, for it is no body corporate, but only a voluntary society, and submitting to government; and the ancient and usual way of redress. for any grievance in the Inns of Courts, was by appealing to the Judges." I do not take the first reason stated in March to be the true one. It is not solid. The second is the true reason. As to the first the Inns of Court had regulations, they acted and were known as a body. * But the true ground is, that they are voluntary societies submitting to government, and the ancient and usual way of redress is by appeal to the Judges. * * * The consequence of all this is, that we are all of opinion, that no rule should be made for a mandamus; but, if there is a ground for it, the party must take the ancient course of applying to the twelve Judges.2 2 Hart, afterwards, applied by petition of appeal to the twelve Judges, and, on the 15th of Nov. M. 21 Geo. 3, he was heard by his counsel, (Morgan and THE ADMISSION OF SOLICITORS IN ENGLAND. Edmund B. V. Christian, A Short History of Solicitors (1896) Preface, pp. vii, viii: The person who wishes to enter the misunderstood profession [of solicitor] must first pass an examination in "general knowledge." He must then pay £80. to the government. Having done this, he is entitled to be, and must be, apprenticed to a solicitor (who must have only one other such articled pupil) for five years, unless he has passed certain other examinations, in which case the term may be reduced to four years or three. His apprenticeship indentures, or "articles of clerkship," must then be registered with the proper authority. During this period of pupilage the clerk must have no other occupation (except by a judge's permission) and must pass two examinations in his legal acquirements. Having satisfied the examiners, and been labelled proficient, he must pay some £30. more to the government, and is then entitled to be admitted a solicitor on taking the oath to behave as such. But before he can practice he must pay, and so long as he continues to practice he must continue to pay every year, his "certificate duty." This is, in effect, an additional fixed incometax calculated on profits which the solicitor may not make. In return for these payments he and his fifteen thousand fellow solicitors have an exclusive right to advise in legal matters for reward, and to conduct such legal business as does not fall within the province of the Bar. Lind.) His petition was accompanied' with the same affidavit which had been produced to the court of King's Bench. At the same time, a certificate was laid before the Judges from the treasurer and benchers of Gray's Inn, in which they set forth, that they had not refused to call him to the bar merely because he had been discharged by an insolvent act, (although they stated that the society of Lincoln's Inn had been of opinion that that was a sufficient cause,) but, because it appeared to them from a memorial of his own, (which he had also laid before the Judges,) that he had knowingly become security for money borrowed by others, to a much greater amount than he was able to answer, and for other circumstances of his life mentioned or alluded to in the certificate. The judges were unanimous in dismissing the petition.-Reporter's Note. In Manisty v. Kenealey, 24 W. R. 918, 920, (1876), Hall, V. C., said that “it appears to me perfectly clear that as regards the admission to the bar and the expulsion of members of an Inn of Court, the jurisdiction has been held by competent authority to be with the benchers, subject only to an appeal to the judges [as visitors]." 3 "OF THE QUALITIES WHEREWITH A SOLLICITOR OUGHT TO BE ENDUED TO MAKE HIM COMPLEAT.-* First, he ought to have a good natural wit. "Secondly, that wit must be refined by education. "Thirdly, that education must be perfected by learning and experience. "Fourthly, and lest learning should too much elate him, it must be balanced by discretion. And, "Fifthly, to manifest all those former parts, it is requisite that he have a voluble and free tongue to utter and declare his conceipts."-The Compleat Sollicitor (1668) p. 9. CLASSES OF LEGAL PRACTITIONERS IN ENGLAND. James Robert Vernam Marchant, Barrister-at-Law (1905) pp. 1, 2: A legal practitioner in England at the present day must belong to one or other of the following classes: Barristers, solicitors, notaries public, conveyancers, special pleaders, draftsmen in equity, and parliamentary agents. Barristers derive their authority to practise from one of the four Inns of Court; so also do conveyancers, special pleaders, and draftsmen in equity. Solicitors are admitted by the Master of the Rolls and their names are then entered on the roll of solicitors which is kept by the Incorporated Law Society. Notaries public derive their authority to practise from the Court of Faculties of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Solicitors, conveyancers, special pleaders, draftsmen in equity, and notaries public have to take out annual certificates authorizing them to practise. No certificate is required for a barrister to practise. ADMISSION TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE UNITED STATES. Orrin N. Carter, Ethics of the Legal Profession (1915) pp. 21, 22: It is now the settled rule in practically all jurisdictions that the right to practice law is not a natural inherent right, but one which may be exercised only upon proof of fitness as to satisfactory legal attainments and character. * * The practice of the law is in the nature of a franchise and is permitted only to those who have complied with the conditions required by statute and the rules of the It has been held that originally the courts alone determined the qualifications for admission to the bar, and that this power still exists as one of the inherent privileges of the court and necessarily incident to its control over the membership of the bar. In many, if not most, of the states, to avoid friction between the departments of government, the courts have usually acquiesced in all reasonable enactments of the legislature, the right being conceded to the Legislature by virtue of its police power. Some courts, however, have denied the existence of any power in the legislature to prescribe what qualifications shall be prerequisite to the admission of an attorney by the court.* 4 On the power of the legislature to prescribe the qualifications for the admission of lawyers, see notes in 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 289, and 10 Ann. Cas. 198. In re MASH. (Civ. 1684.) (District Court of Appeal, First District, California, 1915. 28 Cal. App. 692, 153 Pac. 961.) Petition for revocation of the order admitting Samuel Lawrence Mash to practice law. LENNON, P. J. The respondent herein, Samuel Lawrence Mash, was by an order of this court made and entered on the 13th day of July, 1913, admitted to practice law in all the courts of this state, upon motion made in open court and the presentation of a license to practice law in the state of Utah granted and issued to said Mash by the Supreme Court of that state on or about the 1st day of July, 1909. Thereafter, on May 28, 1915, the bar association of the city and county of San Francisco presented to and filed with this court a verified accusation against the respondent herein, charging him with knowingly and intentionally failing to reveal to this court upon the hearing of the motion for his admission to the bar of this state the fact that he had been previously disbarred from the practice of the law and convicted of several infractions of the law in other jurisdictions. * In our opinion, the failure of the respondent at the time he made. application to be admitted as a practitioner of the law in this state, to reveal the fact of his several convictions of offenses against the law and his subsequent disbarments in other jurisdictions, constituted a fraud upon the court. Under the somewhat lax procedure provided in this state for the admission of applicants to practice law here upon the presentation of a license from a sister state, the good moral character of the applicant need be established only by the assurance of local sponsors, who, as a rule, are unacquainted with the applicant before his arrival in this state to take up his residence here, and are rarely, if ever, acquainted with his professional standing in the community from whence he comes. No other means of ascertaining the applicant's good or bad character are provided; and as a consequence we take it that there is cast upon the applicant the obligation to reveal to this court at the time of his application any circumstances connected with his past professional life which must necessarily influence the court's judgment in determining whether the applicant is or is not a person of good moral character. The only defense that the respondent would make, if permitted, to the charges contained in the accusation, is, as foreshadowed by the allegations of his answer, that it was his opinion at the time he made. his application that the criminal and disbarment proceedings prosecuted against him in other jurisdictions were neither bona fide nor just, and that therefore the court would have granted his application regardless of such proceedings; in other words, having convinced him self that he was innocent of the charges previously preferred against him, he concluded that, even if the court had been informed thereof, it would have treated them as matters of little or no moment. If we were to concede the sufficiency of such a defense, we would practically oust ourselves of jurisdiction to pass on the moral character of an applicant to practice law. Regardless of whether the charges previously preferred against the respondent were well or ill founded, we hold that it was his duty to reveal to this court the fact that they had been preferred and prosecuted and had resulted in his conviction and disbarment. His failure to do so cannot be regarded as other than a willful deception which requires this court, if it is to give effect to that provision of the law permitting only persons of good moral character to be licensed to practice law in the courts of the state, and to maintain the dignity and decency of its bar, to revoke the license previously granted to him. Upon the admitted facts, and for the reasons stated, it is ordered that the license to practice law in this state heretofore granted to the respondent by this court be, and the same is, hereby revoked and canceled, and that respondent's name be stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law in this state." In re TILLINGHAST. (Supreme Court of the United States, 1830. 4 Pet. 108, 7 L. Ed. 798.) The admission of Tillinghast to the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States was moved on the ground of his admission in New York and in spite of the admitted fact that he had been struck off the rolls of a United States district court for contempt.* MARSHALL, C. J. The court has had under its consideration the application of Mr. Tillinghast, for admission to this bar. The court finds that he comes within the rules established by this court. The circumstance of his having been stricken off the roll of counsellors of the district court of the northern district of New York, by the order of the judge of that court, for a contempt, is one which the court do not mean to say was not done for sufficient cause, or that it is not one of a serious character; but this court does not consider itself authorized to punish here for contempts which may have been committed in that court. ** On consideration of the motion it is ordered by the 5 On the disbarment of lawyers for fraud in securing admission, see notes in 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 531, and in 20 Ann. Cas. 212. This statement is substituted for the one in the original report. |