merely an endowed church-a church whose min- | body, neither restrained nor supported by the demoisters are either salaried by the state, or allowed cratic element, either deposes the monarch and by the state to possess property in their corporate, reigns, as in Venice, a pure aristocracy; or, as is not in their individual character, but which re- more frequently the case, is itself deposed by him, ceives from the state no other patronage or prefer- and the result is a pure monarchy; or is forced to ence. Such is the Presbyterian church in Ire- share its power with the monarch and the people, or land; such are the various churches of Canada. with the people alone, and the government falls into If the bishops should be removed from the house one of the two remaining mixed forms. The mixof lords, diocesan courts and church-rates abol- ture of the aristocratic and democratic forms is not ished, and the universities and the few offices uncommon. With the exception of Neufchatel, from which they are now excluded opened to dis- which is purely monarchical, this is the constitusenters-events some of them certain, and all tion of all the Swiss cantons. It is the form into probable-the Church of England will cease to be which the constitution of every country which a privileged church, but will continue an endowed rejects the monarchical principle seems naturally one. Now, we see no reason for thinking that a to fall. The most common, however, of mixed church endowed, but not privileged, is inconsistent governments is the fourth, that in which the three with democracy; and we are inclined to think elements are combined and, what is more imthat such a church may possess nearly all the portant, it is the form of government to which all advantages which belong to an establishment in nations seem to tend as they advance in greatness Lord Brougham's sense, and be free from almost and in political knowledge. all its disadvantages. But we now come to a set of cross divisions. Governments must be considered not merely according to the elements which they admit, but according to the mode and degree in which each Secondly, we do not perceive the incompatibility of even a privileged church with democracy. Some of the most democratic portions of Europe, Belgium, Norway, and parts of Switzerland, pos-element is admitted. The individual in whom sess such churches. They are inconsistent, not with democracy generally, but with a democracy in which there is no one preponderant sect. And lastly, Lord Brougham appears to us to take too English, and too Protestant a view of the voluntary system. The two countries in which that system prevails most extensively, are the United States and Ireland. In neither of them is there any want of religious teachers. The instruction may not be good, but it certainly is abundant. Again, throughout the Roman Catholic world, though the people may pay the priest, they neither elect, nor can they remove him. He is dependent on their favor for only a portion of his income. This dependence, indeed, has been sufficient, under peculiar circumstances, to render the Irish priest a most mischievous agitator; but such is not its necessary effect. In the United States, there is no clerical agitation. Everybody there is a politician, except the religious instructor. On the whole, although we agree in Lord Brougham's preference of even a privileged church to the voluntary system, we do not think that the latter is open to all the objections which he has made; or that the former is necessarily incompatible with democracy. the monarchical principle resides, may be hereditary or elected. If elected, he may be appointed for life, or for a term of years, or annually. The constituency that elects him may be aristocratic or democratic. If elected for a period, he may, or he may not, be reëligible. Some portion of the legislative power he must have; but he may have the initiative of all measures, or of some, or of none. He must have a veto; but it may be absolute or suspensive. He must be irresponsible while his power continues; but after it has ceased he may or may not be legally accountable for his conduct while in office. He may be authorized to exercise his powers personally, or only through his ministers. His ministers may or may not be responsible for his acts. Their offices may admit them to the legislative assemblies, or exclude them, or have nothing to do with their presence there. So the body in which the democratic principle resides, may reserve some portion of direct legislative power, as in the case in the United States, where the constitution cannot be altered except by a convention, in which the electoral body becomes legislative; or it may part with the whole, as is the case in the British constitution. It may appoint its deputies for life, or for any shorter period. We have now arrived at the fourth and last It may appoint them directly, or be authorized class of governments, those in which two or more only to appoint electors. It may or may not be of the three elements, the monarchical, the aristo-restricted in the selection of either the one or the cratic, and the democratic-or, in other words, of the legislative powers of one, of a few, or of many -are combined. It is obvious that such governments are divisible, according to the elements which they admit, into four. A mixed government may combine only the monarchical and democratic elements, or only the monarchical and aristocratic, or only the aristocratic and democratic, or may unite all three. The first of these is almost peculiar to small uncivilized tribes. As soon as such a tribe has swelled into a nation, the direct and constant exercise of power by the mass of the people becomes so difficult, that the chief makes himself absolute, and the government ceases to be mixed; or some smaller body is either substituted for the people, or appointed to share its power, and the constitution assumes one of the three other forms of mixed government. Nor is the mixture of monarchy and aristocracy common. A small select other. It may or may not be empowered to bind its deputies by instructions. These remarks are applicable, with little variation, to the body constituting the aristocratic element. There might be some pedantry, but there would be no impropriety, if we were to subject aristocratic bodies to the same division to which we have subjected governments; and to term a select legislative body appointed by the sovereign monarchical, an hereditary or self-perpetuated one aristocratic, one created directly or indirectly by the people democratic, and one in which two or more of these modes of creation or succession should concur, mixed. Again, there is almost an equal variety in the modes in which the executive power may be distributed or collected. The monarch may have the whole, or some part of it, or none. In England, the aristocratic legislative body is also the highest The judicial power may be exercised by judges -hereditary, or appointed for life, or for a given period, or at the will of the appointer, or for one particular case. They may be appointed by the sovereign, or by a select body, or by the people, or by lot. Every one of these varieties may be found in one country. In fact, they all coëxist in England. legal court of appeal. The initiative, and the de- oftener. This example has been generally foltails of arbitrary executive acts, belong principally lowed. No president has served more than eight to the democratic body, and occupy, under the years; but every one has been a candidate for rename of private business, a very large portion of election at the end of his first term of four years, its time and attention. In the United States, the and many of them have succeeded. The consearistocratic legislative body shares with the mon-quence is, that the first business of every presiarch the power of making treaties, and of appoint-dent is to secure his reëlection. To raise his own ing some of the highest officers; and there are party and to depress his opponents-to dismiss the few modern constitutions in which the principal whole body of executive officers, and supply their executive powers are not divided between the dif- places with his own partisans to support slavery ferent legislative authorities. if he be strong in the south, or abolition if his strength lie in the north; to be a free-trader in the one case, and a protector of domestic industry in the other; to favor the great monied institutions if they support him; to destroy them, at the risk of paralyzing the whole commerce and industry of the country, if they oppose him; to be litigious, insolent, and warlike in his diplomacy, if his friends lie among the dealers in arms or in privateers, or among manufacturers anxious to engross the home market; to be pacific if he rely on the importers of plantation supplies, and the exporters of cotton or tobacco; but under all circumstances, to adopt the language, stiffen the prejudices, inflame the passions, and obey the orders of the When the number of combinations is so vast, it mass of the people.-Such are the occupations in appears to us to be dangerous to ascribe to the which every president spends the first four years mixed form of government any qualities as univer- of his reign, and, if he be not reëlected, the whole. sal, or even as general. A distinction, apparently To the influences which thus corrupt and degrade* trifling, of law, or of mere administration, may the person who is both her chief magistrate and affect the whole working of a constitution. Eng- her prime minister, we attribute much of the deland is, we believe, the only country in the world terioration of the public, and, we fear we must in which the sovereign is not present at the meet-add, the private character of America-the blusings of his own cabinet. There is, perhaps, no ter, the vanity, the rapacity, the violence, and the other single cause which has tended so much to fraud, which render her a disgrace to democratic weaken the monarchical element in the English institutions, and a disgrace to the Anglo-Saxon constitution. But it is no part of that constitution; race. it is a mere usage, which sprang up accidentally, Again, every mixed government is more or less exclusive, from that of France, where only about three persons out of a thousand have legislative power, direct or indirect, to those in Switzerland, in which every male above the age of sixteen is an elector, and for some purposes a legislator. But if Washington had refused to be reëlected, in consequence of George the First's ignorance of it is probable that this frightful source of misgovEnglish. Important as it is, and now we trust ernment and demoralization would never have unalterable, the fact of its existence is little known broken out. The interests, and, what is more out of the British islands, and perhaps is not noto-important, the passions of all parties, the jealousy rious even there. of competitors, the inconstancy of the people, and the unpopularity which is unavoidably acquired in four years of supreme administration, would have effectually prevented any of his successors for asking for an honor and a power of which even Washington had not thought himself worthy. And though the constitution of America would have remained the same, its practical working would have been essentially altered. Again, in France, no proceedings can be taken against any officer of the government for any official act, unless by the permission of the government; a permission which the government can refuse at its discretion, and in a large proportion of cases does refuse. This law can scarcely be said to affect the French constitution as a form of government. It does not render it more monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic; but its first effect Although, therefore, we have ventured to asis to deprive all the inhabitants of France of any cribe certain qualities to the three pure constitulegal security against the oppression of their gov- tions, or rather to the influence of the monarchiernment. Its second effect is to drive them to cal, aristocratic, and democratic elements respecsupply, by illegal resistance, the want of a legal tively, we are afraid to give any general character remedy. In England, if a tax-collector should to the indefinitely various forms in which those endeavor to enter a house in order to count the elements may be combined. All that we can afwindows, the owner, after warning him of the firm is, that it appears to be probable, first, That consequence, would quietly submit, then bring his by combining the three elements, or at least two action, and be amply recompensed by damages. of them, a form of government may be obtained The collector knows this, and nothing of the kind which, in ordinary circumstances, will be more takes place. In France, such an occurrence occa- favorable to the welfare of the people than any sioned, a year or two ago, deplorable scenes of vi- one of the simple forms. Secondly, That the olence and bloodshed. The collectors and the in-forms under which there has been the greatest habitants both believed that the government would moral and intellectual progress, and, we are inprotect its officers. The collectors tried to force clined to think, the greatest happiness, have been their way into the houses, the inhabitants to repel them, and the consequence was a petty civil war. Again, the American president is elected for only four years, but is then reëligible. Washington allowed himself to be reëlected once, but not mixed. And Thirdly, That the very worst forms of government, forms which, like that of Poland, after having rendered nations for centuries misera [* See a proposition, at the end of this article, for a conservative change of the constitution.-L. A.] ble in themselves, and a source of misery to their | If we had adopted the nomenclature of Lord neighbors, have utterly destroyed them, or been Brougham, and had included among pure democdestroyed themselves, have also been mixed. racies all governments in which the legislative Lord Brougham is bolder. He states, that a authorities are elected directly or even indirectly mixed government possesses over all others, three by the people, we should scarcely have ventured great advantages, namely, first, "That it protects to attribute to mixed government even the qualithe public interest from rash, ill-concerted coun-fied superiority which we have assigned to it. If sels; secondly, That it secures the freedom and the president and the senate of the United States the rights of all classes in the community; and were elected for life; if the president could act lastly, That it maintains the stability of the polit-only by the advice of his ministers, and those ical system.' ministers were responsible, and instead of being Now it is certain that the introduction of the excluded from Congress, were ex-officio members aristocratic element has a tendency to diminish the the constitution would still, according to Lord rashness, passion, and short-sightedness which belong sometimes to a pure monarchy, and always to a pure democracy; but it is by no means certain that the introduction of the democratic element would produce the same effect in a pure monarchy, or even in a pure aristocracy. The Venetian government, the most prudent that has ever existed, was a pure aristocracy. That of Prussia, also eminently prudent, is a pure monarchy. The conduct of France was far more pru-ter in which Lord Brougham anticipates the condent, her councils far less ill-concerted, before the revolution of 1789, than they have been since she substituted a mixed government for an absolute monarchy. Again, the protection of the rights of all classes of the community, depends not so much on the government being mixed or pure, as on the degree in which it is exclusive. The excluded classes are always in danger of oppression, and many mixed governments have been eminently exclusive. It was the mixed exclusive government of England that enacted the penal laws against Roman Catholics. It was from the mixed exclusive government of Denmark that the people fled for refuge to an absolute king. The Austrian monarchy is pure in Lombardy and mixed in Hungary. But in Lombardy it is non-exclusive: no class has any privileges or immunities at the expense of the community. In Hungary, four fifths of the inhabitants are excluded from all political and from most social rights. Mixed government has not saved them; as it did not save the Roman Catholics of Ireland, from a degree of oppression to which no class is subject in any of the absolute European monarchies, except Russia and Turkey, if these monarchies are to be called European. Brougham's nomenclature, be not a mixed gov- peo We have now to consider an institution which is treated by Lord Brougham as compatible with every form except pure monarchy and aristocracy, and by us as confined to mixed government-representation. Representation, however, is not a subject to be discussed in a couple of pages. We shall shortly sum up the most important of Lord Brougham's conclusions, without expressing dissent or concurrence. Where we agree with him, the mere expression of our assent could add nothing to his authority; and where we disagree, the mere expression of our dissent, unsupported by argument, would be dogmatical, and, indeed, presumptuous. The substance of Lord Brougham's canons of representative government is this: Lastly, There are reasons for doubting the superior stability of mixed governments. Pure democracies, indeed, are necessarily unstable. They must be destroyed by the mere increase of territory or of population; but many pure monarchies have endured for centuries undisturbed by any serious internal commotion. So have some pure The power of the people is to be transferred for aristocracies. Perhaps, when we consider the a period exceeding one year, but not exceeding rarity of that form of government, and the fre- three years, to their representative. They are not quency of the mixed form, the former has exhib-to attempt to resume it during that time, or to fetited as much stability as the latter. On the whole, ter him by instructions. There should be no we are inclined so far to disagree from Lord qualification of eligibility; and all persons of full Brougham as to think, that a pure monarchy, or age, unconvicted of infamous offences, who have a pure aristocracy, is more stable than any mixed received a good plain education, should be elecform admitting only two elements; but so far to tors. The election should be direct, and by open agree with him as to believe, that the greatest voting, but in such a manner (how is not specified) amount of stability is to be obtained by the union as to protect the voters' independence. of all three. stituencies should consist, not of mere towns or counties, but of electoral districts so large as to prevent corruption-from five thousand to six thousand electors being the minimum-and so arranged as to secure representatives of all the great Throughout this discussion we have adhered to our own nomenclature, and have included among mixed governments those in which the body of the people act through their representatives. XLVII. * Vol. iii., p. 158. LIVING AGE. VOL. V. 2 * Vol. iii., chap. xx. The con classes in the community, but not giving to any one large town a proportionate and therefore a very numerous representation. only to the most recent history-to the Emancipation act, carried against the deliberate will of George the Fourth; to the Reform act, carried To these canons Lord Brougham allows no ex- against the deliberate will of the house of lords; ception. He does not propose them merely as to much subsequent legislation, disapproved of by the theoretic principles of the best form of repre- both the crown and the peers; and to Lord Grey's sentative government, but as the principles to ministry-the most powerful at home and abroad, which every such government ought to be made to the strongest in every way that modern times conform. Many years ago, in his Letter to Lord have seen-ruling not merely without the support John Russell, he recommended their adoption, so of both houses, but opposed in one of them by a far as they have not been already so adopted, into decided and constantly-increasing majority. If it the British constitution. It is therefore Lord be said that in these cases the consent of the soveBrougham's deliberate advice that the British reign and of the peers, however reluctant, was in house of commons should be triennial; and fact given, the answer is, that it was given beshould be chosen in large electoral districts by the cause the constitution itself prevented its refusal. suffrage of all persons who have received a good The sovereign acts only through his ministers, and plain education; which in a short time must prac-no minister would have dared to advise George the tically be universal suffrage. Now, without in-Fourth to veto the emancipation bill. The majorfringing our rule of expressing on the subject of ity of the house of lords knew that a few pieces representation neither assent nor dissent, we may of parchment could convert it into a minority. remark that such a change would be a revolution They believed that the expedient would be used; -using that word to signify not a violent anarchi-and though they refused their consent to the Recal movement, but a change in the depositaries of form bill, they neglected to record their dissent. power. It would greatly increase the democratic If the constitution had willed, "that the individpower, and it would place that power in the hands ual monarch should be a substantive part of of those who have now no share in it, or a share the political system as a check on the other so small as to leave them almost without influ- | branches,"* it would have allowed him liberty of ence. It would exceed in magnitude the changes action. It would not have required that to give effected by the Reform act-at least as much as validity to his acts other persons should adopt those changes exceeded all that was proposed by Mr. Pitt or by Mr. Brougham. We have now reached the last of the portions of Lord Brougham's work which we have selected for criticism-his view of the existing British constitution. It is to be observed that his exposition is not merely legal, but also practical; that the states not merely the theory of the constitution, but its actual working. them, and assume their responsibility. The fact is, that the influence really exercised by the sovereign is unconstitutionally exercised. The constitution supposes the crown to take no part in legislation, until the proposed law has passed through both houses. In the rare cases in which the sovereign has interfered in legislation, he has done so by preventing the introduction into parliament of the measures to which he was opposed, and we "The great virtue," he says, of the constitu- doubt whether such a case will ever occur again. tion of England, is the purity in which it recog-"If he can find any eight or ten men," says nizes and establishes the fundamental principle of Lord Brougham, "in whom he has confidence, all mixed governments; that the supreme power of the state being vested in several bodies, the consent of each is required to the performance of any legislative act; and that no change can be made in the laws, nor any addition to them, nor any act done affecting the lives, liberties, or property of the people, without the full and deliberate :assent of each of the ruling powers.* Consistently with this view, he holds that the constitution wills that the opinions of the monarch "should have a sensible weight, even against the most conflicting sentiments of the people and of the peers, and should operate as a check on the other branches of the system. And he further maintains, that the government cannot be carried on for any length of time, unless the ministers of the day have the decided support of both houses of parliament. who are willing to serve him, and whom the houses will not reject, he has the choice of those to whom the administration of affairs shall be confided." Certainly; but in general it is found that there are only eight or ten men in the kingdom who are willing to serve him, and whom the houses will not reject. It has frequently happened that these were not the eight or ten men in whom the sovereign had confidence; but he has been obliged to continue, or even to appoint them ministers. His right of choice is that given by a congé d'élire. Again; if the framers of the constitution had intended "the separation and entire independence of its component parts;" if they had intended that the house of lords should possess a real "veto upon all the measures that pass the commons," it seems inconceivable that they should We venture to question this view both in theory have subjected that house to absolute dependence and in practice. It appears to us that important on the crown-that they should have allowed the legislation has taken place in past times, and is sovereign to pack it at his pleasure:-to give it a likely to occur in future times, against the delib-tory, a whig, or a radical majority, as often as he erate will of one, and sometimes of two, of the may think fit. Nor can it be said that this power ruling bodies; and, further, that the government is obsolete, or even dormant. It was used by can be carried on for an indefinite period with a Lord Oxford-it was used by Lord Broughamdecided majority in only one house of parliament; it was abused by Mr. Pitt. He packed the Irish and, lastly, we believe that those who gradually house of lords, by adding to it more than one introduced the usages, the aggregate of which hundred and fifty peers-forty-six of them in one forms the British constitution, intended that this year; and then to make this gross injustice irreshould be the case. For the facts, we need refer * Vol. iii., p. 295. † Ibid., p. 302. Ibid., p. 315. *Vol. iii., p. 302. + Ibid. parable, prohibited by the act of union its further intended purposes, they may effect them at a sacriincrease. He found the British house consisting fice which would not have been submitted to, if it of only two hundred and ten temporal peers; in had been foreseen. We do not believe, indeed, thirteen years he added to it eighty-five. When that peerage reform would produce so great a the tory reign ended with Lord Liverpool, one change as is expected by its enemies, or by its hundred and seventy-eight British peers, and friends; but the change would be great, and that twenty-eight Irish, all belonging to one party, is a sufficient reason for avoiding, or, at all events, had been added to it. If it be true that no gov- for deferring it, as long as it can be deferred. But ernment can be carried on unless the minister we cannot think that it is a senseless project. We have a decided majority in the house of lords, cannot but feel that a state of circumstances is either the government of the party now in power possible, we trust not probable, in which it may is immortal, or the accession of a liberal minister be beneficial and even necessary. While the must be accompanied by the creation of two hun-house of lords plays no part in the great game of dred peers. political power-while it contents itself with perIf we reason with respect to the British con- forming the important but subordinate duties of a stitution as we do with respect to every other court of revision, in which the legislation of the elaborate contrivance ;-if we infer the intentions commons is reconsidered, improved, suspendedof its framers from the results which they have and, when the popular will is not decidedly exeffected-it appears clear that differences of opin-pressed, even rejected, it will continue unaltered in ion between the three legislative bodies were fore- form, and, unless some profligate administration seen, and means taken to give a decided prepon- should repeat Mr. Pitt's profuse creations, underance to that which should have the support of altered in substance; but, if in an evil hour it the people. We say, which should have the should assume equality with the commons-if it support of the people; because the house of com- should attempt to share the sovereignty which that mons, unless decidedly supported by the people-house now exclusively exercises-if it should try that is to say, by the constituencies-is not merely to dictate what party and what persons shall be the weakest of the three estates, but is absolutely our governors, the days of its apparent indepenpowerless; but supported by the people, it rules dence are numbered. easily if one of the other two estates assist it; and rules, though not without difficulty, even if the other two oppose it. Thus the commons and the crown united, can at once trample under foot the opposition of the lords; the commons and the lords united are practically in no danger of opposition from the crown, and if opposition were to take place, could terminate it by depriving the Sovereign of his ministers. But the crown and the lords united, are impotent against a house of commons backed by its constituencies. All that they can do is to dissolve; and a reëlection sends them back only a more numerous and a more determined opposition. It must have been for the purpose of producing this result, that the power of creating new boroughs was gradually withdrawn from the crown. While that power existed, the commons were as much at the mercy of the crown as the lords are now. As soon as it ceased, they became as independent as the lords would have become, if the bill which restricted the power of creating peers had passed. Those who deprived the crown of the power of increasing or packing the house of commons, and those who continued to the crown the power of increasing and packing the house of lords, must have intended, that in the British constitution the democratic element should be supreme. There is no proposal for constitutional change that Lord Brougham dismisses so contemptuously, as an alteration in the constitution of the house of lords "It deserves," he says, "to be noted, that all these senseless projects have long since been abandoned by their thoughtless authors, who, a few years ago, considered the safety of the empire to depend upon what they termed Peerage Reform."* He believes that the consequences of a large creation in 1832 would have been dreadful; that it would inevitably have ruined the constitution. Now, we dread all great changes simply because they are great changes-because we know that their whole results never can be anticipated-and that even if they effect their We will explain our views by supposing a possible, though certainly not a probable, state of circumstances: Suppose that, in the last session, the public opinion of the constituent bodies had been decidedly in favor of a ten hours' bill-that Sir Robert Peel had resisted, had dissolved, and had been met by a house of commons with a hostile majority of 300, and had endeavored to govern with only 150 supporters-had endeavored, in short, to treat the house of commons as more than one minister has treated the house of lordsthe commons would have passed a vote of want of confidence. If that produced no effect, they would have addressed the crown to remove its ministersif that failed, they would have stopped the supplies. As the hostile majority would have been unassailable, as a fresh dissolution would only have increased its numbers and its determination, the crown must have complied, and appointed a new administration. If now the house of lords had followed the precedent set by the commons-if it had resolved that the new cabinet had not its confidence-had requested its removal-and had enforced that request by rejecting the money bills and the mutiny bill, the necessary consequence would have been, not that the commons or the erown would have yielded, but that the hostile majority of the peers would have been neutralized by a large creation; and the result of one or two such occurrences must be peerage reform. The house of lords would soon become too large to act as a deliberating body; and the course which has been twice taken to meet that difficulty would be repeated. At the time of the Union with Scotland, it was supposed that the introduction of all the Scotch peers would form too large an accession to the house; they were required, therefore, to select representatives out of their own body. The same objection was removed by the same expedient on the Union with Ireland. The distinctions between British, Irish, and Scotch peers, now become useless, would be abolished; and on every new parliament the whole peerage would be required to select a representative body. Such a body, if persons filling or who had filled certain |