every council-he must exercise his own judg-absolute monarchy elective, we should hold that ment on every important measure-he must, in form of government, bad as it is, to be more conshort, be the chief of his own cabinet. But if the ducive to the welfare of the people than an absoexercise of the art of government-the most im- lute hereditary monarchy. It secures the object portant, the most complicated, and the most diffi- of monarchy-the management of public affairs by cult of arts-the art which requires most knowl- one strong will and one sagacious intellect. No edge, most intellect, and most virtue-is advisedly English monarch equalled Cromwell or William to be thrown upon a person appointed by accident, III.-no French monarch Napoleon or Louis and, as Lord Brougham has well remarked, prob- Philippe. Absolute hereditary monarchy secures ably rendered by education even less fit than he nothing-not even, as we have seen, undisputed was by nature, some vast advantage must counter- succession. But, excepting in one peculiar case, balance these enormous evils. no absolute monarchy can remain elective. The Lord Brougham finds this advantage in a diminu- monarch has, by supposition, the power to render tion of the chances of civil war. But does this his throne hereditary; for, if he have not that advantage really exist? If Europe possessed a power, he is not absolute. If he have it he will universal, a well-known, and an unalterable law exercise it. Even Marcus Antoninus delivered of hereditary royal succession, and if the facts call- the whole civilized world to Commodus. The ing that law into operation were always certain and difficulty was long ago stated by Aristole-“ It always notorious, so that, on the decease of a king, has been supposed," he says, "that a king havthere never could be a doubt as to his legitimate ing the power to make his son his successor, may successor, we should have, what Lord Brougham not exercise it. But this cannot be believed. It terms, "the hereditary principle of succession would be an act of virtue of which human nature in perfection." But it is obvious that such a law is incapable."-(Pol., lib. iii. cap. xv.) does not exist, and cannot exist. In some abso- The exception to which we have referred, is lute monarchies, the law of succession excludes that of the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical monfemales-in others it excludes foreigners-in all it archies. Of these monarchies, so numerous until excludes bastards—and in all it necessarily can be the end of the last century, we believe that the altered by the reigning monarch. If the Salic be Papacy alone remains. It is the only one which the existing law, and the monarch has only daugh- Lord Brougham has thought worthy of his attenters, he abolishes it, like Ferdinand VII. of Spain. tion; and yet the others deserve to be mentioned, If it admit females, and the reigning monarch on account at least of their number and their duwishes to exclude them, he abolishes it, and intro-rability. In Germany alone there were seventy duces the Salic law, like Philip V. of Spain. In up to the close of the last century. Many were each case a civil war is probable. If he have no considerable-three were Electorates. In many issue, he adopts-if his issue be illegitimate, he of them the succession of archbishops or bishops, legitimatizes it. Even if it be legitimate, its or abbots, or abbesses-for in several of them the legitimacy may be contested, and the peace of the ruler was a nun-lasted for more than one thousand kingdom may depend on a mixed question of years, uninterrupted by foreign violence or by law and fact, in which every element of the deci- revolution. And yet nothing could be more absion may be doubtful. The children of kings gen- surd than the system of election. A man qualierally make royal marriages, and the party who fied himself for the exercise of the highest legislaascends, or becomes likely to ascend a foreign tive and executive functions by renouncing the throne, is generally required, before he leaves his world, by studies which have no connexion with own country, to renounce all claims to its succes- its affairs, by unacquaintance with men and with sion. Is such a renunciation binding on the re-things. The electoral body consisted in general nouncing party? Is it binding on his issue? of persons similarly educated, and so did all the Those who might claim if there had been no re- executive functionaries; so that unfitness seemed nunciation, always maintain that it is not-those to be the qualification for office. who claim against it, that it is; and the conse- These strange governments, however, were not quence is, as in the case of the Spanish succession unpopular. It was thought good to live under after Charles II., a complication of foreign and the crosier. They were regretted while those civil war. Again, most monarchies are compos- who had experienced them lived. The elective ite, and the different parts are subject to different laws of succession. Females succeed in Jutland, and are excluded in Holstein. If the prince-royal of Denmark should die, as will probably be the case, without male issue, will the kingdom of Denmark be dismembered? If kept entire, will it be at the expense of civil war? Or will the result be an unopposed usurpation, like the retention of Sardinia and Montserrat, both female fiefs, by the present king of Piedmont, in disregard of the Lord Brougham defines aristocracy to be the claims of his predecessor's daughter? If we com- form of government in which. the supreme pare the wars of succession, foreign and civil, power is in the hands of a portion of the commuwhich have laid waste Europe, between the Nor-nity, and that portion is so constituted, that the man Conquest and the French Revolution, it will rest of the people cannot gain admittance, or can be found that they exceed all other wars put to- gain admittance only with the consent of the segether in number, and still more in duration. A lect body."-(Vol. ii., p. 1.) He does not lay war of succession is the most lasting of wars. The hereditary principle keeps it in perpetual life-a war of election is always short, and never revives.

On the whole, if it were possible to keep an

sovereign must in general have been a man of some distinction. He had not been spoilt by the early possession or the early prospect of power, and he was often anxious to dignify, by some acts of permanent utility, a dynasty which began and ended with himself.

Omitting, for the reasons already given, the remainder of the first volume as historical, we proceed to the second, which treats of aristocracy.

down any ratio of the governing, to the excluded portion of the community, as essential; and as he admits that the exclusion of the Roman Catholics, by the penal laws, did not render the government of Ireland an aristocracy, and that the exclusion

of slaves did not render Athens, and does not ren- shapes. Their industry is confined to the occupader Virginia aristocratic, it follows, that he does tions which give play to the bad passions. Innot consider a government an aristocracy, although trigue, violence, malignity, revenge, are engenthe supreme power is in the hands of a minority dered in the wealthier members of the body and relatively small, if the number of persons constitut- the chiefs of parties. Insolence towards the peoing that minority be positively great. But it must ple, with subserviency to their wealthier brethren, be admitted that the words of Lord Brougham's are engendered in the needy-too proud to work, definition are more extensive; and so are the not too proud to beg; mean enough to be the inwords of every definition of aristocracy that we struments of other men's misdeeds, base enough have seen. We believe that the best corrective to add their own."-(Vol. ii., p. 55.) of the established nomenclature would be to intro- He adds, that it is the tendency of aristocracy duce a cross division, and to divide governments to produce among the people a general dissolutenot only into monarchical, aristocratic, and demo- ness of manners, eagerness in the pursuit of cratic, with reference to the possession of power wealth, and extravagance in its employment; and by one, by few, or by many; but also into exclu-"not only to vex and harass, but to enslave men's sive and non-exclusive, with reference to the ad- minds. They become possessed with exaggerated mission to power, or exclusion from it, of particu- notions of the importance of the upper classes; lar classes. Pure monarchies are, in one sense, they bow to their authority as individuals, not the most exclusive, since all power is concentrated merely as members of the ruling body-transferin the prince. In another sense they are the ring the allegiance which the order justly claims, least so, since he can delegate, or even transfer it, as ruler, to the individuals of whom it is comas he pleases. All other forms are more or less posed; they ape their manners, and affect their exclusive. Wherever slavery prevails, slaves are society. Hence an end to all independent, manly excluded. With a very few exceptions, one of conduct."-(Vol. ii., p. 57.) which occurs in an Anglo-American state, women are always excluded. In most governments, persons bound by a foreign allegiance are excluded, though there is now an example in Europe of a person who is a king in one country and a peer in another-who exercises in one, supreme legislative and executive authority, and in the other, can merely vote and protest. In many countries, all who do not profess a particular form of religion are excluded; in many, all who do not belong to a certain race; in still more, all who do not possess a certain amount of property or income. The representative institutions of France are democratic, but highly exclusive. They are democratic, because they give political power to a very large number of persons. They are exclusive, because they deny that power to a much larger number. The English house of lords is an aristocratic institution-it gives power to a small number of persons. It is very slightly exclusive, since it is open to all males professing Christianity, and born in the British allegiance.

The most convenient definition of a pure aristocracy then is, the form of government in which the whole legislative power is vested in a small number of persons, without any legal control by the people at large, or by any individual. Such aristocracies are, as Lord Brougham remarks, rare; but as the aristocratic element is widely diffused, it is an important subject of investigation; and the best mode is that which he has adopted, namely, to ascertain the qualities of a pure aristocracy, and thence to infer the influence of the aristocratic element in mixed governments. The vices ascribed by Lord Brougham to aristocracy are, that it places the government in the hands of persons, 1. irresponsible; 2. uninfluenced by public opinion; 3. affected by interests differing from those of the community at large; and, 4. peculiarly unfitted by education for exercising the high functions of their station.

"The training," he says, "of patricians, next to princes, is peculiarly adapted to spoil them. They are born to power and preeminence, and they know that, do what they will, they must ever continue to retain it. They see no superiors; their only intercourse is with rivals, or associates, or adherents, and other inferiors. They are pampered by the gifts of fortune in various other

We regret that the necessity of curtailment has prevented our inserting more of this passage. Much of the great vigor and vividness of the original depends on its developments and illustrations. But we have extracted enough to show its great merit rhetorically as well as philosophically; and it has the additional value of being testimony. The author belongs to the class which he describes he paints those with whom he lives. But if we examine the picture in detail, it will be found that many of its features belong not to the institution itself, but to the forms which it has most usually assumed, particularly in modern times: or to other institutions with which it is only occasionally and accidentally connected. Thus the distinctness of the interests of the ruling body from those of the community at large, belongs to all governments in proportion, not as they are aristocratic or democratic, but as they are exclusive. It was its exclusive, not its aristocratic character, which occasioned the Protestant government of Ireland to be mischievous. So the slave legislation of the Southern Anglo-American Statesperhaps the legislation by which the interests of the great majority of the inhabitants of any country have been most cruelly and most shamelessly sacrificedis the legislation of a government eminently democratic. So Lord Brougham treats as aristocratic the unjust advantages given by British legislation to landowners; but they arise from the exclusive. not from the aristocratic elements in the British constitution-not from power being in the hands of a few, but from almost all who do not possess land being excluded from it.

If we suppose the supreme power to reside in a senate sitting only for life, but itself, as was the case with most of the ancient senates, filling up its vacancies-such an institution would be aristocratic; but, as it would not be necessarily exclusive, it would not necessarily be governed by interests distinct from those of the community at large. Nor would "the education of the rulers be such as peculiarly to unfit them for worthily exercising the high functions of their station." This was not true of the Roman senate. It is not true of any aristocracy which is not hereditary. Nor would the tendency of such an aristocracy necessarily be to promote general dissoluteness of manners, self-indulgence, and extravagance; or,

on the other hand, rapacity. Indeed, the opposed, but not inconsistent, vices of prodigality and rapacity, seem to belong more to democratic governments, in which wealth is the great source of distinction. No community is so stained by them as Anglo-America. And lastly, as it appears that "insolence, selfishness, and luxurious indulgence" do not necessarily belong to an aristocracy, it is not necessarily subject to the odium which, according to Lord Brougham, (p. 56,) these vices inflict on it.

In fact, nearly all these censures affect not aristocracy but a privileged order-an institution which may exist under any form of government except a pure democracy, and need not possess power legislative or even executive. The noblesse of France, while her monarchs were absolute, had all the qualities which Lord Brougham has described as patrician. It was ill-educated, selfish, and luxurious, born to preëminence, insolent to its inferiors and submissive to its master, and became to its fellow-countrymen an object of admiration and of imitation; but at the same time, of hatred so intense, that the main purpose of French legislation for the last fifty years has been to prevent its reëstablishment. But though such an order could not have existed unless it had once possessed political power, yet at the time of which we are speaking that power was gone. All that remained were some traditionary rights, which as 800n as they were attempted to be employed melted away. Its immunity from taxation, its social distinctions, its monopoly of the higher military, diplomatic, and household offices, its pensions and its ribands, it owed merely to custom, and to the will of an absolute master that the custom should continue. It was not an aristocracy, or even an aristocratic institution. On the other hand, the French Chamber of Peers is an aristocratic institution. It is a small body of persons possessing a portion of the supreme legislative power. But of the six aristocratic defects enumerated by Lord Brougham, only the first, the absence of individual responsibility, belongs to it. Lord Brougham now proceeds to inquire whether the aristocratic institution possesses any virtues to be set in opposition to so many imperfections.

tions from a regard for the interests of their own order, many measures of crude and hasty legislation would have passed in almost every parliament."-(Vol. ii., pp. 57, 58.)

To these merits of aristocracy he adds that it is pacific, partly from dislike of change, partly from military unfitness, partly from jealousy of military eminence, and partly from the want of individual ambition; that it encourages genius in arts and in letters; that it excites and preserves the spirit of personal honor; and that it is favorable to order and subordination.

To a certain degree it appears to us that Lord Brougham again attributes to aristocracy, as a form of government, effects-such as a high sense of honor and refined taste-which are the results of the existence of a privileged order; an institution which, as we have already remarked, is as consistent with an absolute monarchy or a mixed government as with an aristocracy. An aristocratic government without a privileged order would not contain persons sufficient in number to affect materially the general tone of society. If its members sat only for life, they would carry into it the feelings of the classes from which they were taken. Nor do we agree with him as to the beneficial influences of aristocracy on the fine arts or on letters. The greatest works of the arts which address the eye belong to absolute monarchies, the next greatest to democracies. The Pharaohs built Thebes and the Pyramids, the Moguls Agra and Delhi, a Roman emperor the Coliseum, a Democracy the Pantheon. Of the Italian works of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, referred to by Lord Brougham, the greatest belong to the absolute monarchy of the Popes. The poorest period in English history, that which produced the fewest men eminent in arts or in letters, was the period during which the aristocratic element was predominant-the reigns of the first three Georges.

That an aristocratic government is pacific is true; it is pacific, not only from the reasons mentioned in the text, but also from its prudence and its want of passion. It is equally true that it is eminently firm, steady of purpose, and averse from change. These are the qualities which ren"There cannot," he says, "be any doubt that der the aristocratic element a necessary part of a the quality of firmness aud steadiness of purpose well-framed government. It gives bone to the belongs peculiarly to an aristocracy. The very constitution. But in politics as in physiology, vices which we have been considering lead natur- there is no disease more certainly fatal than ossifially to this virtue, and it is a very great merit in cation. Lord Brougham uses our house of lords any system of government. A system of admin- as an example of the utility of a body in peristration, a plan of finance, a measure of commer-petual resistance to change. Admitting, as he cial or agricultural legislation, a project of crimi- fairly does, that it has frequently stood in the way nal or other judicial administration, may seem to of improvements, constitutional, economical, and have failed, yet the patrician body will give it a administrative, he seems to think that great adfurther trial. They adopted it on mature delibera-vantage has arisen from "its having had, during tion, and not on the spur of a passing occasion; they will not be hastily driven from it. Akin to this merit is the slowness with which such a gov- That the house of lords has prevented much ernment is induced to adopt any great change. evil there is no doubt. But how much good has Indeed, resistance to change is peculiarly the it prevented? How much evil has it prolonged? characteristic of an aristocracy; and the members How much has it created? Without referring to of the ruling body and their adherents obtain at the long period in which, under the domination of all periods, in a greater or less degree, the power Lord Eldon, it steadily defeated almost every of stemming the revolutionary tide. This makes legal and administrative improvement, it is to the them equally resist improvements; but it tends to house of lords that we owe the present state of steady and poise the political machine. The Ireland. Had it allowed the house of commons history of our own House of Lords abounds in in 1825 to grant Catholic emancipation, and a examples of these truths. But for their determi- provision for the Catholic clergy, the British nation to resist measures which they deemed det-islands would now have been morally as well as rimental to the state, or to which they had objec- legally an united kingdom. One of the worst

the last ten years, a preponderating share in the government of the country."-(Vol. ii., p. 59.)

effects of this hostility to change, is its tendency number of persons. Lord Brougham reäffirms to produce the most complete of all changes-a that the constitution is not the less democratic, revolution. With one remarkable exception, that because the people legislate only through repreof Venice, pure aristocracies have been the most sentatives. We must repeat our dissent. The short-lived of governments. They are barriers delegation of legislative power is, pro tanto, a behind which abuses accumulate until the whole suspension of it. It substitutes, pro tanto, the structure suddenly gives way. will of a few for that of many. In proportion to It is remarkable that, in his statement of the the period of delegation, the opinions and wishes virtues of aristocracy, Lord Brougham includes of the delegates, however complete may have only its moral virtues. He gives it no credit for been their coincidence, at the time of delegation, peculiar talent, knowledge, or skill. This may with those of their then constituents, are likely to arise in part from his generally assuming it to be deviate from those of their constituents for the hereditary. But the members of even an heredi- time being. The first reformed house of comtary aristocracy are likely to possess far more mons represented the feelings and wishes of its than average political knowledge. Politics con- existing constituents more completely, probably, stitute their profession; and we agree with Lord than any previous, or indeed any subsequent, Brougham, that they are the only class among house. But, if it had been entitled to sit for fourwhom it is to be wished that the political profes- teen years, would it now represent them? Delesion should exist. The selected members of an gation certainly does not destroy, but it weakens aristocratic body-and there are many such bodies the democratic principle; and we consider all in which all, and very few in which none, are governments in which it prevails, as aristocratic selected are generally men of eminent talent. or mixed. Aristocratic, if the delegating body be The most distinguished body in the United States a small one, as was the case in Venice; mixed, is the Senate, in France the House of Peers, and, if the delegating body, though perhaps itself a according to Lord Brougham, the British House minority, be large, as is the case in France and in of Lords possesses a general superiority "in ca- the American slave-states. Consistently with his pacity, in learning, in calmness, and in statesman-own nomenclature, Lord Brougham has consid-. like views of both foreign and domestic policy." ered the subject of representation under the head -(Vol. iii., p. 65.) of democracy. In pursuance of ours, we reserve it until we come to mixed governments.

To this must be added experience; not merely the personal experience of its members, most of whom have passed a political life, but the experience which belongs to the body itself. A legislative body which never dies, which is recruited by insensible additions and substitutions, acquires a traditional wisdom exceeding that of the individuals who compose it. The correct appreciation, too, which those individuals obtain of one another, gives the lead to those who are best fitted for it. A newly constituted assembly is likely to exhibit less, an ancient one to exhibit more, than the average intelligence and knowledge of its members.

We now proceed to the third of Lord Brougham's great divisions-democracy. He defines democracy to be," the constitution which allows the superior power to reside in the whole number of citizens, having never parted with it to a prince, or vested it in the hands of a select body of the community, from which the rest are excluded."(Vol. iii., p. 2.) Inattention to the cross division of exclusive and non-exclusive, which, as we have remarked, runs through all forms of government, as it rendered Lord Brougham's definition of aristocracy too wide, renders this too narrow. It comprehends no exclusive form. Lord Brougham endeavors to meet this difficulty by considering democracies as less or more pure as they are more or less exclusive. But, for scientific purposes, though there may be degrees of impurity, there cannot be degrees of purity. Whatever is not perfectly pure is impure. If a definition of pure democracy be necessary, we think that the most convenient one would be-the government in which supreme legislative power is vested in a large number of persons, without any participation or any control on the part of any other body, or of any individual. But, as we have already said, such governments, if they have ever existed, are so rare, that we prefer considering, not democracies, but the democratic principle; which we have already defined to be the possession of legislative power, directly or indirectly, by a large

Lord Brougham sums up the virtues of the purely democratic system under nine heads. Of these, five-namely, its tendency to render administration pure, to promote political discussion, to diminish civil expenditure, to render the resources of the state available for its defence, and to force individuals to respect public opinion-must be at once admitted. The remaining four we will briefly consider, using Lord Brougham's words, but somewhat changing his arrangement.

"1. The fundamental peculiarity," says Lord Brougham, "by which this is distinguished from other forms of government is, that the people having the administration of their own concerns in their own hands, the great cause of misgovernment, the selfish interest of rulers, is wanting; and if the good of the community is sacrificed, it must be owing to incapacity, passion, or ignorance, and not to deliberate evil design. The sovereign in a monarchy pursues his own interest; the privileged body in an aristocracy that of their order, or of its individual members. No such detriment can arise in a purely popular government. least the chances are exceedingly small, and the mischief can only arise from some party, or some individuals, obtaining so much favor with the people at large as to mislead them for their own ends; a thing of necessarily rare occurrence, because there will always be a conflict of parties, and the people are prone to suspicion of all powerful men.

At

"2. No risk is run of incapable or wicked men holding the supreme direction of affairs, either in the legislature or in an executive department. No infant in the cradle, no driveling idiot, no furious maniac, no corrupt or vicious profligate, can ever govern the state, and bring all authority into hatred or contempt.

"3. The course of legislation must always keep pace with the improvement of the age. The people always communicate to the laws the impression of their own opinions. No sinister interests can interfere to check the progress of improve

ment. No prejudices of one class, no selfish | superior to any European population. But the views, have any weight. democratic element has become triumphant; and "4. The personal ambition of an individual, his its influence has been shown by popular violence, feelings of slighted dignity, his sense of personal by international litigiousness, by anti-commercial honor, as well as his desire of aggrandizement, Tariffs, and by Repudiation. So far from there have no place under this scheme of polity. Had being, in a democracy, no risk of wicked men the virtuous Washington himself become enamored of military glory, and desired to extend the dominion of republican institutions over Canada or New Spain, the people would have speedily taught him that war is a game the people are too wise to let their rulers play."-(Vol. iii., p. 109—111— 110.)

holding the supreme direction of affairs, we believe that it is a danger to which even absolute monarchy is hardly more exposed. How else has demagogue been a byword of reproach, from the times of Cleon to those of Marat?

He

Lord Brougham's enumeration of the vices of democracy is executed with great spirit; but as We have already stated our reasons for believ- we generally agree with it, and as the substance ing the democratic element to be far more favor- had often been said before, though seldom so well, able to war than either of the others. The refer- we will dwell on only one of its points. "There ence made by Lord Brougham to the United States is one establishment," says Lord Brougham, is unfortunate. They have already extended the "which appears incompatible with democracy, dominion of republican institutions over a portion and that is a system of religious instruction enof New Spain; and if the popular will had been dowed and patronized by law, with a preference omnipotent, would have seized Canada. Nor can given to it by the state over all other systems, and we agree with him in ascribing to democracy a a preference given to its teachers over the teachpeculiar exemption from legislation unjust or unen-ers of all other forms of belief—in other words, a lightened; or from the domination of persons religious establishment.-(Vol. iii., p. 126.) morally or intellectually unfit for power. Where assigns as the grounds of this incompatibility, the democratic element prevails in an exclusive first, the reluctance of the dissenting portion of constitution, laws are often made for the express the community to contribute to the diffusion of purpose of oppressing the excluded classes. And what they believe to be religious error. And, when there is no legal exclusion, a democratic secondly, that an establishment supposes a clerical majority is often a grievous tyrant to the minority. order possessing great personal weight, endowed In the southern states of the American Union, the by the state, but unconnected with the governslaves are oppressed; in the northern states, the ment; and that the existence of such an order is rich; in all, the people of color. In the Swiss can- wholly repugnant to democracy. To ascertain tons, consisting partly of a town and partly of a whether this be a virtue or a vice of democracy, rural district, the popular assembly, if the town he inquires into "the virtues and vices of religious interest prevail, tries to oppress the country; if establishments;" or rather compares their vices the country interest, to oppress the town; and as with those of the voluntary system. the oppression of one portion of the community is always injurious to all, the good of the community is in fact "sacrificed to deliberate evil design." That Lord Brougham, with history open to him, and in fact having studied her pages diligently with Athens and Rome representing the past, and Ireland and Canada the present-should gravely say that the chances are exceedingly small that some party or some individuals will be able for their own ends to mislead the people at large, is incomprehensible.

We admit that the people will always communicate to their legislators the impression of their own opinions; but for that very reason we do not believe that, where the democratic element is the strongest, and still less where it is the only oneand Lord Brougham is now speaking of pure democracies-the course of legislation will keep pace with the improvement of the age. In every country, there are a few individuals whose political wisdom far exceeds that of the mass of their fellow-countrymen. In a monarchy, or in an aristocracy, it is possible that they may guide or even constitute the government. In a democracy, it is not. The majority of every nation consists of rude, uneducated masses;-ignorant, intolerant, suspicious, unjust, and uncandid; without the sagacity which discovers what is right, or the intelligence which comprehends it when pointed out, or the morality which requires it to be done. Does any one believe that the public conduct of America, her ambition, her quarrelsomeness, or her dishonesty, reflect the intellectual and moral advance of the country? That advance is as great in America as in Europe. Their best men are equal to ours. The mass of the people is

He states the objections to an establishment to be three. First, that to be compelled to support a religion which a man conscientiously disapproves, is a serious grievance; secondly, that an establishment always gives to the government secular support, and becomes itself, therefore, subject to secular influences; and thirdly, that it tends to the restraint of freedom of speech and thought, to intolerant practices, and to the destruction of general improvement.

He then enumerates five objections to the voluntary system. First, that if the people were left to supply themselves with religious knowledge, many of them, and among these the classes which most require it, would often remain without it; secondly, that "if the people are to provide for the support of their own pastors, so must they select them also ;" thirdly, that it promotes among the people the most dangerous of all excitements, religious excitement; fourthly, among the clergy religious fanaticism; and fifthly, political agitation. He then decides that the disadvantages of the voluntary system preponderate; and consequently that the absence of a religious establishment is among the defects of democracy.

It is obviously impossible that, within our limits, we should discuss the many questions thus raised; but we cannot refrain from considering a few of them. In the first place, the word "establishment" is ambiguous. It may bear the meaning which Lord Brougham has given to it, of a religious system patronized by law, with a preference given to it by the state over all other systems; and a preference given to its teachers over the teachers of all other forms of belief. That is to say, a privileged church. Or it may mean