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every council-he must exercise his own judg- absolute monarchy elective, we should hold that ment on every important measure-he must, in form of government, bad as it is, to be more conshort, be the chief of his own cabinet. But if the ducive to the welfare of the people than an absoexercise of the art of government—the most im- lute hereditary monarchy. li secures the object portant, the most complicated, and the most diffi- of monarchy—the management of public affairs by cult of arts—the art which requires most knowl- one strong will and one sagacious intellect. No edge, most intellect, and most virtue—is advisedly English monarch equalled Cromwell or William to be thrown upon a person appointed by accident, III.- French monarch Napoleon or Louis and, as Lord Brougham has well remarked, prob- Philippe. Absolute hereditary monarchy secures ably rendered by education even less fit than he nothing—not even, as we have seen, undisputed was by nature, some vast advantage must counter- succession. But, excepting in one peculiar case, balance these enormous evils.
no absolute monarchy can remain elective. The Lord Brougham finds this advantage in a diminu- monarch has, by supposition, the power to render tion of the chances of civil war. But does this his throne hereditary; for, if he have not that advantage really exist? If Europe possessed a power, he is not absolute. If he have it he will universal, a well-known, and an unalterable law exercise it. Even Marcus Antoninus delivered of hereditary royal succession, and if the facts call the whole civilized world to Commodus. The ing that law into operation were always certain and difficulty was long ago slated by Aristole—“It always notorious, so that, on the decease of a king, has been supposed,” he says, “that a king harthere never could be a doubt as to his legitimate ing the power to make his son his successor, may successor, we should have, what Lord Brougham not exercise it. But this cannot be believed. It terms, “ the hereditary principle of succession would be an act of virtue of which human nature in perfection.” But it is obvious that such a law is incapable.”-(Pol., lib. iii. cap. xv.) does not exist, and cannot exist. In some abso- The exception to which we have referred, is lute monarchies, the law of succession excludes that of the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical monfemales—in others it excludes foreigners—in all it archies. Of these monarchies, so numerous until excludes bastards—and in all it necessarily can be the end of the last century, we believe that the altered by the reigning monarch. If the Salic be Papacy alone remains. It is the only one which the existing law, and the monarch has only daugh- Lord Brougham has thought worthy of his attenters, he abolishes it, like Ferdinand VII. of Spain. tion; and yet the others deserve to be mentioned, If it admit females, and the reigning monarch on account at least of their number and their duwishes to exclude them, he abolishes it, and intro- rability. In Germany alone there were seventy duces the Salic law, like Philip V. of Spain. In up to the close of the last century. Many were each case a civil war is probable. If he have no considerable—three were Electorates. In many issue, he adopts-if his issue be illegitimate, he of them the succession of archbishops or bishops, legitimatizes it. Even if it be legitimate, its or abbots, or abbesses-for in several of them ihe legitimacy may be contested, and the peace of the ruler was a nun-lasted for more than one thousand kingdoin may depend on a mixed question of years, uninterrupted by foreign violence or by law and fact, in which every element of the deci- revolution. And yet nothing could be more absion may be doubtful. The children of kings gen- surd than the system of election. A man qualierally make royal marriages, and the party who fied himself for the exercise of the highest legislaascends, or becomes likely to ascend a foreign tive and executive functions by renouncing the throne, is generally required, before he leaves his world, by studies which have no connexion with own country, to renounce all claims to its succes- its affairs, by unacquaintance with men and with sion. Is such a renunciation binding on the re- things. The electoral body consisted in general nouncing party? Is it binding on his issue of persons similarly educated, and so did all the Those who might claim if there had been no re-executive functionaries; so that unfitness seemed nunciation, always maintain that it is not—those to be the qualification for office. who claim against it, that it is ; and the conse- These strange governments, however, were not quence is, as in the case of the Spanish succession unpopular. It was thought good to live under after Charles II., a complication of foreign and the crosier. They were regretted while those civil war.
Again, most monarchies are compos- who had experienced them lived. The elective ite, and the different parts are subject to different sovereign must in general have been a man of laws of succession. Females succeed in Jutland, some distinction. He had not been spoilt by the and are excluded in Holstein. If the prince-royal early possession or the early prospect of power, of Denmark should die, as will probably be the and he was often anxious to dignify, by some acts case, without male issue, will the kingdom of Den- of permanent utility, a dynasty which began and mark be dismembered? If kept entire, will it be ended with himself. at the expense of civil war? Or will the result be Omitting, for the reasons already given, the an unopposed usurpation, like the retention of remainder of the first volume as historical, we proSardinia and Montserrat, both female fiefs, by the ceed to the second, which treats of aristocracy. present king of Piedmont, in disregard of the Lord Brougham defines aristocracy to be the claims of his predecessor's daughter? If we com- form of government “in which the supreme pare the wars of succession, foreign and civil, power is in the hands of a portion of the commuwhich have laid waste Europe, between the Nor- nity, and that portion is so constituted, that the man Conquest and the French Revolution, it will rest of the people cannot gain admittance, or can be found that they exceed all other wars put to- gain admittance only with the consent of the segether in number, and still more in duration. A lect body."-(Vol. ii., p. 1.) He does not lay war of succession is the most lasting of wars. down any ratio of the governing, to the excluded The hereditary principle keeps it in perpetual portion of the community, as essential ; and as he life—a war of election is always short, and never admits that the exclusion of the Roman Catholics, revives.
by the penal laws, did not render the government On the whole, if it were possible to keep an of Ireland an aristocracy, and that the exclusion
of slaves did not render Athens, and does not ren-shapes. Their industry is confined to the occupader Virginia aristocratic, it follows, that he does tions which give play to the bad passions. Innot consider a government an aristocracy, although trigue, violence, malignity, revenge, are engenthe supreme power is in the hands of a minority dered in the wealthier members of the body and relatively small, if the number of persons constitut- the chiefs of parties. Insolence towards the peoing that minority be positively great. But it must ple, with subserviency to their wealthier brethren, be admitted that the words of Lord Brougham's are engendered in the needy—too proud to work, definition are more extensive; and so are the not too proud to beg ; mean enough to be the inwords of every definition of aristocracy that we struments of other men's misdeeds, base enough have seen.
We believe that the best corrective to add their own.”—(Vol. ii., p. 55.) of the established nomenclature would be to intro- He adds, that it is the tendency of aristocracy duce a cross division, and to divide governments to produce among the people a general dissolutenot only into mon
onarchical, aristocratic, and demo- ness of manners, eagerness in the pursuit of cratic, with reference to the possession of power wealth, and extravagance in its employment; and by one, by few, or by many; but also into exclu- not only to vex and harass, but to enslave men's sive and non-exclusive, with reference to the ad- minds. They become possessed with exaggerated mission to power, or exclusion from it, of particu- notions of the importance of the upper classes ; lar classes. Pure monarchies are, in one sense, they bow to their authority as individuals, not the most exclusive, since all power is concentrated merely as members of the ruling body-transferin the prince. In another sense they are the ring the allegiance which the order justly claims, least so, since he can egate, or even transfer it, as ruler, to the individuals of whom it is as he pleases. All other forms are more or less posed; they ape their manners, and affect their exclusive. Wherever slavery prevails, slaves are society. Hence an end to all independent, manly excluded. With a very few exceptions, one of conduct."-(Vol. ii., p. 57.) which occurs in an Anglo-American state, women We regret that the necessity of curtailment has are always excluded. In most governments, per- prevented our inserting more of this passage. sons bound by a foreign allegiance are excluded, Much of the great vigor and vividness of the origthough there is now an example in Europe of a inal depends on its developments and illustrations. person who is a king in one country and a peer in But we have extracted enough to show its great another—who exercises in one, supreme legislative merit rhetorically as well as philosophically; and and executive authority, and in the other, can it has the additional value of being, testimony. merely vote and protest. In many countries, all The author belongs to the class which he dewho do not profess a particular form of religion scribes—he paints those with whom he lives. are excluded; in many, all who do not belong to But if we examine the picture in detail, it will be a certain race ; in still more, all who do not pos- found that many of its features belong not to the sess a certain amount of property or income. The institution itself, but to the forms which it has representative institutions of France are demo- most usually assumed, particularly in modern cratic, but highly exclusive. They are demo- times : or to other institutions with which it is only cratic, because they give political power to a very occasionally and accidentally connected. Thus large number of persons. They are exclusive, the distinctness of the interests of the ruling body because they deny that power to a much larger from those of the community at large, belongs to number. The English house of lords is an aris- all governments in proportion, not as they are aristocratic institution—it gives power to a small tocratic or democratic, but as they are exclusive. number of persons. It is very slightly exclusive, It was its exclusive, not its aristocratic character, since it is open to all males professing Christianity, which occasioned the Protestant government of and born in the British allegiance.
Ireland to be mischievous. So the slave legislaThe most convenient definition of a pure aristoc- tion of the Southern Anglo-American Statesracy then is, the form of government in which the perhaps the legislation by which the interests of the whole legislative power is vested in a small num- great majority of the inhabitants of any country havo ber of persons, without any legal control by the been most cruelly and most shamelessly sacrificedpeople at large, or by any individual. Such aris- is the legislation of a government eminently demotocracies are, as Lord Brougham remarks, rare ; cratic. So Lord Brougham treats as aristocratic the but as the aristocratic element is widely diffused, unjust advantages given by British legislation to it is an important subject of investigation ; and the landowners; but they arise from the exclusive. best mode is that which he has adopted, namely, not from the aristocratic elements in the British to ascertain the qualities of a pure aristocracy, and constitution—not from power being in the hands thence to infer the influence of the aristocratic ele- of a few, but from almost all who do not possess ment in mixed governments. The vices ascribed land being excluded from it. by Lord Brougham to aristocracy are, that it If we suppose the supreme power to reside in places the government in the hands of persons, 1. senate sitting only for life, but itself, as was the irresponsible; 2. uninfluenced by public opinion; case with most of the ancient senates, filling up 3. affected by interests differing from those of the its vacancies such an institution would be aristocommunity at large; and, 4. peculiarly unfitted cratic; but, as it would not be necessarily excluby education for exercising the high functions of sive, it would not necessarily be governed by their station.
interests distinct from those of the community at “The training,” he says, "of patricians, next to large. Nor would “the education of the rulers princes, is peculiarly adapted to spoil them. They be such as peculiarly to unfit them for worshily are born to power and preëminerce, and they exercising the high functions of their station." know that, do what they will, they must ever con- This was not true of the Roman senate.
It is not tinue to retain it. They see no superiors; their true of any aristocracy which is not hereditary. only intercourse is with rivals, or associates, or Nor would the tendency of such an aristocracy adherents, and other inferiors. They are pam- necessarily be to promote general dissoluteness of pered by the gisis of fortune in various other manners, self-indulgence, and extravagance; or,
on the other hand, rapacity. Indeed, the opposed, | tions from a regard for the interests of their own but not inconsistent, vices of prodigality and ra- order, many measures of crude and hasty legislapacity, seem to belong more to democratic govern- tion would have passed in almost every parliaments, in which wealth is the great source of dis- ment."-(Vol. ii., pp. 57, 58.) tinction. No community is so stained by them as To these merits of aristocracy he adds that it is Anglo-America. And lastly, as it appears that pacific, partly from dislike of change, partly from
insolence, selfishness, and luxurious indulgence” military unfitness, parıly from jealousy of military do not necessarily belong to an aristocracy, it is eminence, and partly from the want of individual not necessarily subject to the odium which, ac- ambition ; that it encourages genius in arts and in cording to Lord Brougham, (p. 56,) these vices letters; that it excites and preserves the spirit of inflict on it.
personal honor; and that it is favorable to order In fact, nearly all these censures affect not and subordination. aristocracy but a privileged order—an institution To a certain degree it appears to us that Lord which may exist under any form of government Brougham again attributes to aristocracy, as a except a pure democracy, and need not possess form of government, effects—such as a high sense power legislative or even executive. The noblesse of honor and refined taste-which are the results of France, while her monarchs were absolute, had of the existence of a privileged order; an instituall the qualities which Lord Brougham has de- tion which, as we have already remarked, is as scribed as patrician. It was ill-educated, selfish, consistent with an absolute monarchy or a mixed and luxurious, born to preëminence, insolent to its government as with an aristocracy. An aristoinferiors and submissive to its master, and became cratic government without a privileged order to its fellow-countrymen an object of admiration would not contain persons sufficient in number to and of imitation ; but at the same time, of hatred affect materially the general tone of society. If so intense, that the main purpose of French legis- its members sat only for life, they would carry lation for the last fifty years has been to prevent into it the feelings of the classes from which they its reëstablishment. But though such an order were taken. Nor do we agree with him as to the could not have existed unless it had once possessed beneficial influences of aristocracy on the fine arts political power, yet at the time of which we are or on letters. The greatest works of the arts speaking that power was gone. All that re- which address the eye belong to absolute monmained were some traditionary rights, which as archies, the next greatest to democracies. The
as they were attempted to be employed Pharaohs built Thebes and_the Pyramids, the melted away. Its immunity from taxation, its Moguls Agra and Delhi, a Roman emperor the social distinctions, its monopoly, of the higher Coliseum, a Democracy the Pantheon. of the military, diplomatic, and household offices, its Italian works of the fifteenth and sixteenth cenpensions and its ribands, it owed merely to cus- turies, referred to by Lord Brougham, the greatest tom, and to the will of an absolute master that the belong to the absolute monarchy of the Popes. custom should continue. It was not an aristocra- | The poorest period in English history, that which cy, or even an aristocratic institution. On the produced the fewest men eminent in arts or in letother hand, the French Chamber of Peers is an ters, was the period during which the aristocratic aristocratic institution. It is a small body of per- element was predominant—the reigns of the first sons possessing a portion of the supreme legisla- three Georges. tive power. But of the six aristocratic defects That an aristocratic government is pacific is enumerated by Lord Brougham, only the first, the true; it is pacific, not only from the reasons menabsence of individual responsibility, belongs to it. tioned in the text, but also from its prudence and
Lord Brougham now proceeds to uire whether its want of passion. It is equally true that it is the aristocratic institution possesses any virtues to eminently firm, steady of purpose, and averse be set in opposition to so many imperfections. from change. These are the qualities which ren
" There cannot,” he says, “ be any doubt that der the aristocratic element a necessary part of a the quality of firmness and steadiness of purpose well-framed government. It gives bone to the belongs peculiarly to an aristocracy. The very constitution. But in politics as in physiology, vices which we have been considering lead natur- there is no disease more certainly fatal than ossifially to this virtue, and it is a very great merit in cation. Lord Brougham uses our house of lords any system of government. A system of admin- as an example of the utility of a body in peristration, a plan of finance, a measure of commer- petual resistance to change. Admiting, as he cial or agricultural legislation, a project of crimi- fairly does, that it has frequently stood in the way nal or other judicial administration, may seem to of improvements, constitutional, economical, and have failed, yet the patrician body will give it a administrative, he seems to think that great adfurther trial. They adopted it on mature delibera- vantage has arisen from “its having had, during tion, and not on the spur of a passing occasion; the last ten years, a preponderating share in the they will not be hastily driven from it. Akin to government of the country.”-(Vol. ii., p. 59.) this inerit is the slowness with which such a gov- That the house of lords has prevented much ernment is induced to adopt any great change. evil there is no doubt. But how much good has Indeed, resistance to change is peculiarly the it prevented ? How much evil has it prolonged ? characteristic of an aristocracy; and the members How much has it created? Without referring to of the ruling body and their adherents obtain at the long period in which, under the domination of all periods, in a greater or less degree, the power Lord Eldon, it steadily defeated almost every of stemming the revolutionary tide. This makes legal and administrative improvement, it is to the them equally resist improvements; but it tends to house of lords that we owe the present state of steady and poise the political machine. The Ireland. Had it allowed the house of commons history of our own House of Lords abounds in in 1825 to grant Catholic emancipation, and a examples of these truths. But for their determi- provision for the Catholic clergy, the British nation to resist measures which they deemed det- islands would now have been morally as well as rimental to the state, or to which they had objec- | legally an united kingdom. One of the worst
effects of this hostility to change, is its tendency number of persons. Lord Brougham reäffirms to produce the most complete of all changes-a that the constitution is not the less democratic, revolution. With one reinarkable exception, that because the people legislate only through repreof Venice, pure aristocracies have been the most sentatives. We must repeat our dissent. The short-lived of governments. They are barriers delegation of legislative power is, pro tanto, a behind which abuses accumulate until the whole suspension of it. It substitutes, pro tanto, the structure suddenly gives way;
will of a few for that of many. In proportion to It is remarkable that, in his statement of the the period of delegation, the opinions and wishes virtues of aristocracy, Lord Brougham includes of the delegates, however complete may have only its moral virtues. He gives it no credit for been their coincidence, at the time of delegation, peculiar talent, knowledge, or skill. This may with those of their then constituents, are likely to arise in part from his generally assuming it to be deviate from those of their constituents for the hereditary. But the members of even an heredi- time being. The first reformed house of comtary aristocracy are likely to possess far more mons represented the feelings and wishes of its than average political knowledge. Politics con- existing constituents more completely, probably, stitute their profession; and we agree with Lord than any previous, or indeed any subsequent, Broughain, that they are the only class among house. But, if it had been entitled to sit for fourwhom it is to be wished that the political profes- teen years, would it now represent them? Delesion should exist. The selected members of an gation certainly does not destroy, but it weakens aristocratic body—and there are many such bodies the democratic principle; and we consider all in which all, and very few in which none, are governments in which it prevails, as aristocratic selected—are generally men of minent talent. or mixed. Aristocratic, if the delegating body be The most distinguished body in the United States a small one, as was the case in Venice; mixed, is the Senate, in France the House of Peers, and, if the delegating body, though perhaps itself a according to Lord Brougham, the British House minority, be large, as is the case in France and in of Lords possesses a general superiority “in ca- the American slave-states. Consistently with his pacity, in learning, in calmness, and in statesman- own nomenclature, Lord Brougham has considlike views of both foreign and domestic policy."ered the subject of representation under the head -(Vol. iii.,
of democracy. In pursuance of ours, we reserve To this must be added experience; not merely it until we come to mixed governments. the personal experience of its members, most of Lord Brougham sums up the virtues of the whom have passed a political life, but the experi- purely democratic system under nine heads. Of ence which belongs to the body itself. A legisla- these, five-namely, its tendency to render admintive body which never dies, which is recruited by istration pure, to promote political discussion, to insensible additions and substitutions, acquires a diminish civil expenditure, to render the resources traditional wisdom exceeding that of the indi- of the state available for its defence, and to force viduals who compose it. The correct apprecia- individuals to respect public opinion-must be at tion, too, which ihose individuals obtain of one once admitted. The remaining four we will another, gives the lead to those who are best briefly consider, using Lord Brougham's words, fitted for it. A newly constituted assembly is but somewhat changing his arrangement. likely to exhibit less, an ancient one to exhibit “1. The fundamental peculiarity,” says Lord more, than the average intelligence and knowl- Brougham, “ by which this is distinguished from edge of its members.
other forms of government is, that the people havWe now proceed to the third of Lord Brougham's ing the administration of their own concerns in great divisions-democracy. He defines democ- their own hands, the great cause of misgovernracy to be, “the constitution which allows the su- ment, the selfish interest of rulers, is wanting ; perior power to reside in the whole number of and if the good of the community is sacrificed, it citizens, having never parted with it to a prince, must be owing to incapacity, passion, or ignorance, or vested it in the hands of a select body of the and not to deliberate evil design. The sovereign community, from which the rest are excluded.”- in a monarchy pursues his own interest ; the privi(Vol. iii., p. 2.) Inattention to the cross division leged body in an aristocracy that of their order, or of exclusive and non-exclusive, which, as we of its individual members. No such detriment have remarked, runs through all forms of govern- can arise in a purely popular government. At ment, as it rendered Lord Brougham's definition least the chances are exceedingly small, and the of aristocracy too wide, renders this too narrow. mischief can only arise from some party, or some It comprehends no exclusive form. Lord Brougham individuals, obtaining so much favor with the endeavors to meet this difficulty by considering people at large as to mislead them for their own democracies as less or more pure as they are more ends ; a thing of necessarily rare occurrence, beor less exclusive. But, for scientific purposes, cause there will always be a conflict of parties, though there may be degrees of impurity, there and the people are prone to suspicion of all powercannot be degrees of purity. Whatever is not ful men. perfectly pure is impure. If a definition of pure “2. No risk is run of incapable or wicked men democracy be necessary, we think that the most holding the supreme direction of affairs, either in convenient one would be—the government in the legislature or in an executive department. No which supreme legislative power is vested in a infant in the cradle, no driveling idiot, no furious large number of persons, without any participa- maniac, no corrupt or vicious profligate, can ever tion or any control on the part of any other body, govern the state, and bring all authority into or of any individual. But, as we have already hatred or contempt. said, such governments, if they have ever existed, "3. The course of legislation must always are so rare, that we prefer considering, not de- keep pace with the improvement of the age. The mocracies, but the democratic principle; which people always communicate to the laws the imwe have already defined to be the possession of pression of their own opinions. No sinister interlegislative power, directly or indirecily, hy a large ests can interfere to check the progress of improvement. No prejudices of one class, no selfish | superior to any European population. But the views, have any weight.
democratic element has become triumphant; and “4. The personal ambition of an individual, his its influence has been shown by popular violence, feelings of slighted dignity, his sense of personal by international litigiousness, by anti-commercial honor, as well as his desire of aggrandizement, Tariffs, and by Repudiation. So far from there have no place under this scheme of polity: Had being, in a democracy, no risk of wicked men the virtuous Washington himself become enamored holding the supreme direction of affairs, we beof military glory, and desired to extend the lieve that it is a danger to which even absolute dominion of republican institutions over Canada or monarchy is hardly more exposed. How else has New Spain, the people would have speedily taught demagogue been a byword of reproach, from the him that war is a game the people are too wise to times of Cleon to those of Marat? let their rulers play.”-(Vol. iii., p. 109-111- Lord Brougham's enumeration of the vices of 110.)
democracy is executed with great spirit; but as We have already stated our reasons for believ- we generally agree with it, and as the substance ing the democratic element to be far more favor- had often been said before, though seldom so well, able to war than either of the others. The refer- we will dwell on only one of its points. “ There ence made by Lord Brougham to the United States is one establishment,' says Lord Brougham, is unfortunate. They have already extended the “ which appears incompatible with deniocracy, dominion of republican institutions over a portion and that is a system of religious instruction enof New Spain ; and if the popular will had been dowed and patronized by law, with a preference omnipotent, would have seized Canada. Nor can given to it by the state over all other systems, and we agree with him in ascribing to democracy a a preference given to its teachers over the teachpeculiar exemption from legislation unjust or unen- ers of all other forms of belief-in other words, a lightened; or from the domination of persons religious establishment.—(Vol. iii., p. 126.) He morally or intellectually unfit for power. Where assigns as the grounds of this incompatibility, the democratic element prevails in an exclusive first, the reluctance of the dissenting portion of constitution, laws are often made for the express the community to contribute to the diffusion of purpose of oppressing the excluded classes. And what they believe to be religious error. And, when there is no legal exclusion, a democratic secondly, that an establishment supposes a clerical majority is often a grievous tyrant to the minority. order possessing great personal weight, endowed In the southern states of the American Union, the by the state, but unconnected with the governslaves are oppressed ; in the northern states, the ment; and that the existence of such an order is rich; in all, the people of color. In the Swiss can- wholly repugnant to democracy. To ascertain tons, consisting parily of a town and partly of a whether this be a virtue or a vice of democracy, rural district, the popular assembly, if the town he inquires into “the virtues and vices of religious interest prevail, tries to oppress the country ; if establishments ;” or rather compares their vices the country interest, to oppress the town ; and as with those of the voluntary system. the oppression of one portion of the community is He states the objections to an establishment 10 always injurious to all, the good of the community be three. First, that to be compelled to support is in fact “sacrificed to deliberate evil design." a religion which a man conscientiously disapThat Lord Brougham, with history open to him, proves, is a serious grievance ; secondly, that an and in fact having studied her pages diligently-establishment always gives to the government with Athens and Rome representing the past, and secular support, and becomes itself, therefore, Ireland and Canada the present-should gravely subject to secular influences; and thirdly, that it say that the chances are exceedingly small that tends to the restraint of freedom of speech and some party' or some individnals will be able for thought, to intolerant practices, and to the destructheir own ends to mislead the people at large, is tion of general improvement. incomprehensible.
He then enumerates five objections to the volWe admit that the people will always communi- untary system. First, that if the people were left cate to their legislators the impression of their to supply themselves with religious knowledge, own opinions ; but for that very reason we do not many of them, and among these the classes which believe that, where the democratic element is the most require it, would often remain without it ; strongest, and still less where it is the only one- secondly, that. “ if the people are to provide for and Lord Brougham is now speaking of pure de- the support of their own pastors, so must they mocracies—the course of legislation will keep select them also ;' thirdly, that it promotes among pace with the improvement of the age. In every the people the most dangerous of all excitements, country, there are a few individuals whose politi- religious excitement; fourthly, among the clergy cal wisdom far exceeds that of the mass of their religious fanaticism ; and fifthly, political agifellow-countrymen. In a monarchy, or in an aris- tation. He then decides that the disadvantages tocracy, it is possible that they may guide or even of the voluntary system preponderate ; and conconstitute the government. In a democracy, it is sequently that the absence of a religious estabnot. The majority of every nation consists of lishment is among the defects of democracy. rude, uneducated masses ;-ignorant, intolerant, It is obviously impossible that, within our suspicious, unjust, and uncandid ; without the limits, we should discuss the many questions thus sagacity which discovers what is right, or the raised ; but we cannot refrain from considering a intelligence which comprehends it when pointed few of them. In the first place, the word “estabout, or the morality which requires it to be done. lishment” is anıbiguous. It may bear the meanDoes any one believe that the public conduct of ing which Lord Brougham has given to it, of a America, her ambition, her quarrelsomeness, or religious system patronized by law, with a preserher dishonesty, reflect the intellectual and moral ence given to it hy the state over all other sysadvance of the country? That advance is as tems; and a preference given to its teachers over great in America as in Europe. Their best men the teachers of all other forms of belief. That is ar con 10 ors. The mass of the people is to say, a privileged church. Or it may mean