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will of the select body—and the term democracy | bers of those admitted and excluded, will become to the form in which there is nothing to suspend evident; if we consider what would be the effect or impede the action of the will of the bulk of the if the inhabitants of France were diminished, but community.
the proportions of electors and non-electors preIt follows also, that the only form_which is served. If France contained only three hundred frequently found pure is monarchy. There are and forty thousand persons, of whom one thousand few aristocracies without a doge or a president, elected a legislative body, the institution would be exercising a temporary but real control. Still aristocratic. On the other hand, if the British House more rare is a pure democracy. It is impossible of Commons were elected by the householders of in any state which is not small enough to enable the metropolis, it would still be a democratic, not an all the inhabitants to attend the place of meeting; aristocratic institution, although the metropolitan and even where there are no physical objections, householders constitute a small minority of the the moral ones are generally sufficient to exclude it. inhabitants of the British islands. The Ecclesia
The majority of the forms adopted by the civil- of Athens was a democratic assembly, though out ized world do not belong exclusively to either of of the four hundred thousand inhabitants of Attithese classes, but admit the principles of all. ca, not twenty-five thousand had a right to vote. They are not monarchies, aristocracies, or democ- So far as the conduct of a body depends on their racies, but mixed forms, in which it is often diffi- number, it must depend on their positive number, calt to say whether the monarchical, the aristo- not on the proportion which that number bears to cratic, or the democratic principle prevails. the number of some other class of persons. If
It may be advisable, however, to state more that number be very large, it is subject to the fully what we mean by each of these principles. contagion with which fear and hope, love and
The monarchical principle requires little further hatred-in short, all the passions—are propagated explanation. It consists, as we have already re- from mind to mind, and exaggerated as they are marked, in the subservience of the will of the diffused. It is more generous and more cruelwhole community to that of an individual. It is more sanguine and more desponding-more rash nut essential to monarchical power that this sub- and more easily frightened-more ready to undersurvience should be universal, or even general: it take and more ready to abandon what it has underis not essential even that the individual should taken-more confiding and more suspicious—more have the power to command. If there are any prone to erect idols and more prone to break them acts in which his concurrence is necessary, and than would be the case with the individuals there is no authority that can legally force him to composing it, if they had to feel, and to think, concur, his power to prevent is, for many pur- and to act separately. It is likely, as its number poses, a power to act, just as a power to forbid is increases, to contain a larger proportion of ignooftea equivalent to a power to command. It is, rant, violent, and uncultivated persons. It is likehowever, essential thai he should form a part of ly, in short, 10 possess the qualities—some noble, the legislative body, not merely as a member, but but most of them dangerous, hateful, or conas an independent branch ; or, in other words, that temptible—which belong to a mob. On the other he should have a veto, permanent or suspensive. hand, in proportion as the number is small, it is If he have not, his opposition may at any time be likely to be cool, selfish, and unimpassioned ; to legally got rid of either by a law, or by an arbi- allow its perseverance to run into obstinacy, and its trary executory act. The President of the United caution into timidity ; to be tenacious of old imStates, therefore, has monarchical power; he can pressions and unsusceptible of new ones; to be resist, and indeed often has resisted, the will of steady in its sympathies and in its antipathies ; to be the community. The Doge of Venice had not. sparing of reward and unrelenting in punishment; In his highest functions he was only a member of to be permanently grateful and permanently unfora council, unable to oppose the will of the ma- giving ; to be marked, in short, by the austere, jorily.
respectable, but somewhat unattractive character The aristocratic principle consists in the pos- which we associate with the name of a senate. session of legislative power by a small body of We have followed Lord Brougham in applying persons.
the term “ aristocratic"' to the legislative influence The democratic principle consists in its posses- of a small number of persons; but we should have sion, directly or indirectly, by a large number of preferred, if usage had permitted it, the term persons.
garchical.” The word "oligarchy" is univocal, These definitions are obviously vague. The and is associated with no idea except that which it excuse is, that the ideas which they express are expresses. The word " aristocracy” is often used rague. If we were to define the aristocratic to express mere excellence, without any reference principle as the influence of a minority, the demo- to power—as when we talk of the aristocracy of cratic principle as the influence of a majority of talent or the aristocracy of learning. Derivatively, the people, almost all the institutions which are it means either the government of the best numusually called democratic must be called aristo-bers of the society, or, according to Aristotle, * a cratic. The only legal share in the government government agus tó üglotov Tij zóhel—a government of France possessed by the people, consists in which endeavors to promote the welfare of the their right to elect the Chamber of Deputies. community, or the objects in the attainment of This is always held to be the democratic portion which the community thinks that its welfare conof the French constitution. But out of the thirty- sists. It has almost every defect, therefore, which four million inhabitants of France, not more than an appellative can have. It is equivocal, it is assoone hundred thousand are electors. Without doubt, ciated with an extraneous idea, and its derivative the democratic element would be increased if the meaning differs from both its received meanings. franchise were extended. But that the difference Its use, however, to express government by a few, between the aristocratic and democratic principles is so established, that we think it, on the whole, consists rather in the positive number of the persons best to retain it. admitted to power, than in the proportional num- i
* Pol., lib. iii. cap. vii.
In the remainder of the first volume, Lord | fear of revolt, or the danger of being conquered, Brougham treats of pure or absolute monarchy-force them into quiet." - Vol. i., p. 151.) that is, of the form of government in which there That the monarchs who govern barbarous nations is no legal restraint whatever on the will of the are prone to war, is true; and so are the rulers, reigning individual. He divides pure monarchy and indeed the people in barbarous nations, whatinto Oriental or despotic, and European or consti- ever be the form of government. Uncivilized man tutional. In each, the monarch is absolute-in is a beast of prey. The early history of every neither is there any direct legal check to his will; nation, democratic, aristocratic, or monarchical, is in each, therefore, the checks are indirect, but in perpetual war. But when Lord Brougham attrithe former the only indirect checks are religious butes a peculiar tendency towards war to the opinions, and the fear of resistance; in the latter, monarchical principle-when he maintains that to these checks are added habits and feelings when a single individual has to decide on peace or among the people, the results of a former preva- war, he is more likely than an aristocratic body or lence of the aristocratic or democratic principle, a popular assembly to decide for war-we dissent now obsolete or abolished, and institutions which from him. the monarch, though he has legally the power What are the results of experience? Are the to destroy them, does not venture actually to de- modern European nations pacific in proportion to stroy.
their freedom? Is the peace of the world more We doubt the convenience of this distinction. endangered by Austria or by Prussia, than by It is a distinction founded on the nature, not of the France or by England ? Have democratic instituforms of government in question, but of the people tions produced peace in America ? who are subject to them. It is like the distinction The motives to war are two-ambition and drawn by Aristotle between Baoilea and Tupurrış-vanity. The one shows itself in the desire of an the former being the absolute rule of one for the extension of territory or of influence ; the other in good of all, the latter, the absolute rule of one for the desire to acquire glory or avenge insult. his own benefit. Under the Antonines, as well as The English people are free from ambition ; perunder Commodus, the Roman constitution was haps they are the only great people that ever has expressed by the maxim, Quod principi placuit legis been so. An English writer naturally associates habet vigorem; so, in Denmark as well as in the unambitious with the popular character of the Turkey, the will of the reigning individual cannot government, and supposes that the former quality be legally opposed. The accidental circumstances, is the result of the latter. But the government of that the personal character of the monarch induced France is as democratic as that of England, perhaps the Antonines to exercise their will beneficially, more so, and yet she is absolutely mad with amand Commodus to exercise his will mischievously, bition. Nor is this peculiar to the present time. and that the character of the people, and the situa- In proportion as the people of France have been tion of the country, lead the despot, whatever be able to influence their government, they have forced his personal character, to act very differently in it on wars of conquest. The unprovoked conquest Turkey and in Denmark, have nothing to do with of Savoy was one of the first acts of the convention ; the question, What is the form of government? it was immediately followed by the incorporation
We think that the best mode of treating the of Belgium and the subjection of Holland. The subject would have been to consider pure mon- conquests of Napoleon seduced the French to enarchy, whether European or Oriental, as the same dure his oppressions, and make them now idolize form of government, modified in its effects by the his memory. The pacific policy of the restoration character of the people over whom it is exercised. was the great obstacle to its popularity. In the
Lord Brougham's statement of the effects of hope of pleasing the people, the government perabsolute monarchy, when the state of society is petrated the wanton invasion of Spain, and the favorable to their unmitigated development, is, as experiment was succeseful. No sooner did the might be expected, eloquent and full. He describes Revolution of 1830, lead the people to believe the people as brutalized by fear, the despot by their influence supreme, than they demanded war dominion, and all improvement as arrested by the and conqucst, the boundary of the Rhine and the jealousy of power. He inquires, whether pure retention of Algiers. Even within the last year, monarchy have any redeeming qualities, and, with the government obtained some popularity by enthe single exception of a promptitude of decision gaging in the war with Morocco, and lost it again and action, denies that it has any. But these he by dictating a triumphant but reasonable peace. treats as doubtful 'merits, generally balanced by That France is not now at open war in any part evils of the same kind with the advantages ; promp- of the globe except Africa—ihat in Europe she is titude of decision being often precipitate, and incurring only that portion of the evils of war promptitude of action being impaired by want of which consists in the waste of the national resources means, occasioned partly by the deteriorating on fortifications, armies, and feets, and the diseffects of despotism, and partly by its inability to couragement of industry and commerce by the call forth rapidly and fully the resources, such as doubtfulness of the future—is altogether owing to they are, of its subjects. He does not exempt the prevalence in her councils of the monarchical from his censure the influence of despotism even over the democratic principle. on the foreign concerns of a nation-its intercourse If there be any portion of the world in which the with other states, its treaties and alliances, on the desire of conquest is peculiarly irrational, it is maintenance of peace, or the prosecution of war. America, where a population not greatly exceed“ To go no further," he says, " than the tendency ing that of France is scattered over a country more of such governments towards war at all times, if than four times as large as Europe ; and yet, in every other respect they were faultless, this throughout that hemisphere, ambition has been the would be their condemnation. War is emphati- curse of every state in which the influence of the cally the game of kings, and they will always love people has become dominant. The democracy of it, and, if absolute, will never cease to play at it, ihe United States bullied Spain out of Lousiana, until the exhausted resources of their states, the bullied Mexico out of Texas, rose en masse along their northern frontier in the hope of seizing the demagogues, is generally popular in proportion to Canadas, and is now ready for war, in the hope of the violence and the mischievousness of its counappropriating the Oregon country, two thousand sels. miles from their own back settlements. As for It is true that an undue tendency to war, or at the southern republics, no sooner had they freed least an insufficient dread of its evils, is frequent themselves from the monarchical influence of Spain in every government-whether the monarchical, the and Portugal, than they began to fight with one aristocratic, or the democratic principle prevail ; another for frontiers; and that in a country where but so far from believing that this defect belongs the great evils are the paucity of people and the peculiarly to monarchical government, we believe extent of territory.
ihat form of government to be, on the whole, less If popular governments are prone to wars of am- subject to it than any other, except perhaps a pure bition, still more are they to those of vanity. Let aristocracy. any practical diplomatist say, whether it be easier We now proceed to consider the other of the to induce a minister who represents the will of an two branches with which Lord Brougham has subabsolute monarch, or one who depends on the divided pure monarchies, namely, the monarchies majority of a popular assembly, to repair or even which he terms constitutional—ihose in which the lo confess a wrong, or to accept equitable terms of authority of the sovereign, though legally unfetsatisfaction or compromise. The reasons for this tered, is moderated by popular habits or feelings, are numerous, and, we fear, not likely to be re- the relics of lost privileges, or by institutions moved or even weakened. In the first place, the which he cannot venture to abolish. Of these insecrecy which covers the negotiations between stitutions the most important is an hereditary nomonarchs saves their vanity. A concession is bility. Lord Broughain treats it as the test which easily made where its only real evil depends on its distinguishes constitutional monarchy from pure publicity, and that publicity can be prevented. A despotism. victory is of little value when it is recorded only We extract from Lord Brougham's statement in the archives of a state-paper office. A popular of the effects peculiar to this form of government, government lives in the face of day, and has to the small portion for which we have room-apologize to its own subjects for every act of pru- “A monarchy is naturally extravagant—it is dence or of justice. In the second place, an indi- splendid and it is expensive-it is reckless of the vidual can generally be forced to hear both sides general suffering from the burdens of taxation ; of the question. There are few disputes in which and it is prone to consider only the interests and each party is not in some degree in the wrong, or enjoyments of courts and persons in authority. A in which he can avoid perceiving that he is so ; if richly endowed hierarchy-numerous governments once he be compelled to give a deliberate attention of towns and provinces—a large military staff—in to all his opponent's arguments. The instant that maritime countries expensive colonies-must all this discovery, has been mutually made, if there be kept up to provide for the nobles and their be no mala fides—that is to say, if the controversy families, and their followers. arise not from ambition but from vanity, if it be “ The maintenance of a standing army, numerthe cause of quarrel, not its mere pretext-an acous, expensive, and well disciplined, is another commodation is almost inevitable. A nation does charge upon all monarchies. Large armies are not listen to reason. It cannot be forced to study incompatible with the genius, almost with the exboth sides of a question, and never does so volun- istence, of a commonwealth. With the institutarily. It reads only its own state-papers, its own lions of a pure monarchy they square perfectlynewspapers, and its own pamphlets; it hears only they are in complete harmony with its spirit. its own speakers, it accepts all their statements of ". The whole arrangements of the state are facts and of law; and holding itself to be obviously modelled upon the monarchical footing. In a and notoriously right on every point, believes that country where the public are wholly excluded it would be dishonored in the face of all Europe from the administration of state affairs, they cannot by the slightest concession. Again, every popular safely be admitted to manage even their own local government is infested by faction. It always con interests, because the habit of acting in these lains one party, sometimes more than one, whose would inevitably beget the desire to interfere in great, and sometimes whose principal object is the the affairs of the community at large. subversion of the existing ministry. The foreign 6. The influence of the monarchical principle, policy of a ministry is generally its most vulnera- but especially when combined with aristocracy, ble point. It is the subject about which the mass as in European monarchies it ever must be, tends of the people always understand least, and some to the establishment of a division of property, not times feel most. Ii a minister be bold, the oppo- very wholesome for public liberty, or for the sition halloo him on to make extravagant demands, character of the people, though attended with in the hope that he may be entangled by war or some redeeming consequences : we allude to the disgraced by retreat; if he be prudent, they accuse rule of primogeniture. The law of entails is the him of sacrificing the interests or the honor of the abuse of the law of primogeniture ; and their concountry, of surrendering to foreign ambition, or sequences are prejudicial to the happiness of famiquailing before foreign insolence. And lasıly, lies, as well as to the wealth and commerce of the there is in every nation in which the democratic country. element prevails, an important power whose im- “ The will of the court and upper classes bemediate interests are opposed to peace, external as comes the law, and their habits the example for well as internal, and that is the daily press. A all. Court favor and the countenance of nobles Dewspaper lives on events. It lives by taking of are the objects of universal pursuit. No spirit of those events the view that agrees best with the free speech or free action can be said anywhere passions and prejudices of the people. It pleases to exist. Among the upper classes, those who ihein best hy stimulating their pride, their vanity, are brought into immediate contact with power, their resentment, and their antipathies. It is the fear prevails almost as much as in pure despotdemagogue of a nation of readers; and, like other isms. The alarms, the suspicions, the precautions, prevalent in the society of the superior of patronage. An absolute monarch can give classes in Italy and Germany, are almost equal to money, and that is always the cheapest way of any which can be observed in the courts of the rewarding or buying. In a mixed government, a East.
place is created or retained, duties are attached 10 “ The vigor of the monarchical government, it-generally useless, often mischievous; still, as both at home and abroad, is the quality most they are troublesome, they must be remunerated, boasted of by its admirers ; and to this it can lay and a claimant who would have been satisfied with claim from the unity of its councils, and the undi- £100 a-year as a pension, must have £300 on the vided force which it brings to their execution. But condition of residence and employment. It is thus there is one virtue which this constitution and all that England retains its three hundred Ecclesiastimonarchy possesses beyond any other the fixed cal Courts. Every one admits that two hundred order of succession by inheritance. In this respect and ninety-nine of them are instruments for the it excels both despotisms and commonwealths. creation of trouble, delay, and expense. An absoThe former are constantly subject to revolution lute government would sweep them away by a and violence; the latter are unstable from opposite decree of ten lines. Every year the mixed govcauses; but monarchies, established by law and ernment of England attacks them, and is reaccompanied with regular institutions, have the pulsed. hereditary principle of succession in perfection. Second, the amount of the standing army of a That this rule leads to great occasional mischiefs, nation seems to depend little on the form of its there can be no doubt. Nevertheless, the dangers government. The largest in proportion to its which are sure to result from suffering the place population is that of Holland; the next is that of of chief magistrate to be played for by intriguing, France ; the smallest is that of China. When or fought for by ambitious men, are so formidable Spain and Portugal were absolute monarchies, as to make reflecting persons overlook all lesser their standing armies were trifling, and so are risks in the apprehension of the worst of calami- those of most of the Italian monarchies. Ireland, ties, civil war. This is the redeeming quality of with eight millions of people, requires a standing monarchy ; it is far enough from leaving the ques- army more than twice as large as is necessary in tion all one way, but upon the balance it gives a Great Britain, with a population of above twentygreat gain."-(Vol. i., p. 357 to 363.)
one millions. We have already remarked that pure democracy Third, again, with respect to centralization. is impossible in any country larger than an ordi- France, under a mixed government, is incomnary English parish ; and there is no case in parably more centralized than she was under an Europe, modern or ancient, in which any nation absolute monarch. The local administration of on the scale of the great European monarchies, Spain under her absolute kings was almost demohas adopted enough either of the aristocratic or of cratic. So was that of Norway, when she formed the democratic principle, to entitle its form of a part of the absolute monarchy of Denmark : so is government to be described as an aristocracy or as that of India, though she has been ruled by absoa democracy, and has retained that form for a lute monarchs for twenty-five centuries. An period sufficient to enable us to estimate its perma- Indian village scarcely knows the existence of its nent effects. The modern American States, in- monarch except through his revenue-officers. The deed, are essentially democratic ; but the situation fortunes and lives of the inhabitants are at his of the United States, without a formidable neigh- mercy; but while his taxes are paid, he abstains bor, is too peculiar; and the independence of the from all interference. The tendency of the British others is too recent, to allow them to be used as government is at once towards democracy and fair objects of comparison. It is impossible, there centralization ; and every advance towards the fore, to infer from actual experiences, whether, if former is generally accompanied by a much greater thirty, or twenty, or ten millions of persons consti- advance towards the latter. So far from believing tuted one nation, with a government essentially that the exclusion of the people from political aristocratic or essentially democratic, and sur- power is likely to exclude them from the managerounded by other powerful states, that government |ment of their local interests, we are inclined to would have a less tendency to extravagance, to think that an absolute governinent, partly to avoid the maintenance of large standing armies, to cen- trouble, partly to avoid expense, and still more tralization, or to primogeniture, than is now the from carelessness, is more likely than any other to case with Austria or Prussia. As direct proof is abandon to the parishioners what it considers the unattainable, we will inquire into the results, on trifling matters of the parish. each point, of analogical reasoning.
Fourth, primogeniture is natural only in a pecuFirst, as to extravagance. The mixed govern- liar state of society, that in which the possession ments of Europe, those which are distinguished of land gives political power, proportioned in some from its absolute monarchies by a strong infusion measure to its extent or value; and even then selof the aristocratic or democratic principle, are in dom exists except among the owners of land. It general also distinguished by their greater public is essentially an aristocratic custom. In Oriental expenditure. The expenses of the Danish, the despotisms, therefore, where the land is generally Prussian, or even the Austrian court, are insignifi- the property of the sovereign, it is unknown. It cant, compared with those of the courts of England is rare in the United States of America, except in or France; or indeed, if the extent of territory and the Southern States, where a proprietor can vote population be compared, of Holland. The amount for his slaves. It is rare in the British islands, of the annual taxation compared with the popula- excepting among the high landed aristocracy. No tion, is more than three times as great in each of man with a fortune consisting of £20,000 in the the three mixed governments, as it is in any of the funds, or even of a landed estate worth only three absolute governments. There is, indeed, £20,000, thinks of making an eldest son. Even one great source of expense in mixed govern- if it were lawful in France, it probably would be ments, from which absolute governments are com
The aristocratic element is so weak paratively free-the creation of offices for the sake in France, that the slight amount of political power which a man could secure to his son by leaving to in Berlin than in Edinburgh or in London ; but him his whole property, would seldom be sufficient there are other subjects on which there is much to conquer his natural feelings of parental justice. more ; and we believe that it would be safer to talk The prevalence of primogeniture in the absolute Chartism in Naples than Abolition in New OrEuropean monarchies, arises from the former prev- leans. alence among them all of the aristocratic element. We fear that we shall be thought paradoxical if The monarchs have always endeavored to restrain we suggest some doubts as to the superiority it. In England, perpetual entails were abolished which Lord Brougham ascribes to the principle of by the Tudors, the race under whom the monar- succession, over that of election, in absolute monchical element was strongest. In Seotland, where archies. In limited monarchies, where the king the aristocratic eleinent has always been more reigns but does not govern—where he has only to powerful than in any other part of the British accept the ministers who can obtain a parliamenislands, a larger proportion of the land is subject tary majority, to sign whatever they lay before to perpetual primogeniture than in any country him, and to receive their resignations when they in Europe, except perhaps some parts of Ger- find it necessary to retire—there is scarcely any many.
drawback to the advantages of hereditary succesWe cannot think, therefore, that either extrava- sion. The sovereign's great office is to be a keygance, standing armies, centralization, or primo- stone, merely to fill space-to occupy the supreme geniture, flow naturally from the monarchical station, in order to keep others out of it. He principle. And we must add, that even if we may be—perhaps it is beiter that he should beihought monarchy peculiarly favorable to these the person in his kingdom who knows least, and three latter institutions, we should not treat that cares least, about politics. His personal charactendency as necessarily a vice. Standing armies, ter is comparatively unimportant. We say comindeed, may be too large, and centralization may paratively; because, even in the most limited be excessive ; and such is generally the case on monarchy, the social influence of the sovereign the continent of Europe. But they each may be for good or for evil is considerable. His habits deficient. The standing army of America is insuf- and tastes are always matters of notoriety, and ficient to keep her at peace at home or abroad, to often of imitation. Access to his society is alprevent her inhabitants from injuring one another, ways coveted. He may give that access in a or from attacking her neighbors. The local manner useful, or mischievous, or absolutely inauthorities of England are the seats of ignorance, different. He may call to his court those who selfishness, jobbing, corruption, and often of are most distinguished by genius or by knowloppression. Every diminution of their power has edge; or those whose only merit is their birth or been an improvement; and, if we had room, we their station; or parasites, buffoons, or profligates. could show that the case is the same as to primo- Even in the appointmeni of ministers, he may geniture. Both the power to entail, and the wish sometimes exercise a sort of selection. He is to exercise it, may certainly be excessive, as we sometimes able to delay for a short period the fall think they both are in Scotland and in Germany; of those whom he likes, and the accession of those but both or either of them may be deficient, as whom he dislikes; and he can sometimes permawe think they both are in France and in Hin- nently exclude an individual. But even these dostan.
powers he can seldom exercise unless in a state We agree with Lord Brougham that the influ- of balanced parties. If one party have a decided ence of absolute monarchy, even when tempered ascendency in the legislative assemblies, and in by European civilization, is unfavorable to the the constituencies, the limited sovereign is little character of its subjects. We agree with him more than a phantom; and there can be no doubt that it is destructive of free action, and, to a cer- that it is better that a phantom should be hereditain degree, of free speech, and that it impairs tary. An absolute king always is, or ought to be, most of the manly and independent virtues. But a substance. Supposing such a inonarch to covet we do not believe that “the alarms, the suspi- the leisure, the quiet, and the irresponsibility of a cions, and the precautions prevalent in the society limited king—to desire that the fittest persons of the superior classes in Italy and Germany, are should be his ministers, and manage public afalmost equal to any which can be observed in the fairs without his interference-how is he to discourts of the East. That where every man of cover who are the fittest persons ? How is he to eminence is conscious that he hates the existing avoid appointing or retaining persons positively government, and is anxious to subvert it, he unfit? He has no parliament to direct his choice should be always on his guard against betraying -no opposition to expose the errors of those his feelings and his wishes to the distributors whom he has chosen ; he cannot mix in society, of punishment and favor—and that the govern- and hear the independent voice of public opinion. ment itself, knowing that all the ground beneath it Even the press gives him little assistance : first, is mined, should be always on the watch for an because a free press probably cannot exist–cerexplosion-all this is inevitable in countries which tainly never does exist—in an absolute monarchy; have been recently the scenes of revolutionary and secondly, because the press is never a wellmovement; and where the sovereign owes his informed, an impartial, or even an incorrupt adpower to conquest, or to foreign support, or to viser. A king governed by newspapers would repromises treacherously evaded or shamelessly semble a judge who should allow himself to be inbroken. But this state of mutual alarm, suspi. fluenced by anonymous letters.
There is one cion, and precaution, is not a necessary incident mode, and only one mode, by which he can satisfy to the absolute European monarchies. It does himself that his ministers are fit for their office; not exist in Prussia, or in Denmark, or in the and that is, by giving up his scheme of non-interGerman provinces of Austria, or, in fact, in any ference, and performing himself a great part of their portion of Europe, except parts of Russia, Po- functions. Every absolute king who is an honest land, and Italy." On political subjects, without man, must be in constant communication with the doubt, there is less freedom of speech in Vienna or heads of every department—he must take part in