plaintiff recovered a large verdict at the circuit, which was affirmed at the general term. The Court of Appeals has just reversed these decisions, and holds that a common carrier is not liable for any delays occasioned by a resisting force or mob over which it has no control.

The Court, amongst other things, spoke as follows: "A railroad carrier stands upon the same footing as other carriers, and may excuse delay in the delivery of goods by accident or misfortune, not inevitable or produced by the act of God. All that can be required of it in any emergency is that it shall exercise due care and diligence to guard against delay, and to forward the goods to their destination, and so it has been uniformly decided.

"In the absence of special contract, there is no absolute duty resting upon a railroad carrier to deliver the goods entrusted to it within what, under ordinary circumstances, would be a reasonable time. Not only storms and floods and other natural causes may excuse delay, but the conduct of men may also do so. An incendiary may burn down a bridge, or a mob may tear up the tracks, or disable the rolling-stock, or interpose irresistible force or overpowering intimidation, and the only duty resting upon the carrier, not otherwise in fault, is to use reasonable efforts and due diligence to overcome the obstacles thus interposed, and to forward the goods to their destination.

"While the Court below conceded this to be the general rule, it did not give the defendant the benefit of it, because it held that the men engaged in the violent and riotous resistance to the defendant were its employees, for whose conduct it was responsible, and in that holding was the fundamental error committed by it. It is true that these men had been in the employment of the defendant; but they left and abandoned that employment. They ceased

to be in its service, or in any sense its agents, or for whose conduct it was responsible. They not only refused to obey its orders, or to render it any service, but they wilfully arrayed themselves in positive hostility against it, and intimidated and defeated the efforts of its employees, who were willing to serve it. They became a mob of vicious law-breakers, to be dealt with by the government, whose duty it was, by the use of adequate force, to restore order, enforce proper respect for private property and private rights and obedience to law. If they had burned down bridges, torn up tracks, or gone into passenger-cars and assaulted passengers, upon what principle could it be held that as to such acts they were the employees of the defendant for whom it was responsible? If they had sued the defendant for wages for the eleven days when they were thus engaged in blocking its business, no one will claim that they could have recovered." *

As the law relating to strikes and the obligations and liabilities devolving on railroad companies in connection therewith can scarcely be considered to be finally settled, this case is reassuring to the investor in railroad securities.

22. Some observations have been made above [90-109] as to the importance from the investor's point of view of the powers conferred on railroad commissions as factors in the general railroad situation of to-day. The enquirer may not unreasonably say that, in order to form any adequate judgment on the subject, it would be convenient to have before him a typical example of an act conferring such powers, together with the remedies, penalties and general provisions included therein. In order to meet this requirement, the Act of Georgia constituting its Railroad Commission is subjoined in the form of an ap* Railway Age, July 8, 1886.

pendix. Measured by the average standard of railroad legislation, this may be considered a stringent act.

The law of Massachusetts is considered by many competent critics to occupy the highest place as a precedent or model for railroad legislation in America, and is com paratively well known to foreign investors. A short extract showing powers reserved to the Commonwealth is subjoined.

CHAPTER XIX.

SOME NOTES ON THE INTER-STATE COMMERCE ACT.

SINCE the above pages were written, a bill addressed to the regulation of Inter-state commerce has passed into law. That legislation in this direction would be carried through both Houses at no very remote period was confidently anticipated by competent observers of the railroad situation. No serious doubt existed as to the power of Congress to institute an appropriate tribunal for the regulation contemplated by the Constitution. But there existed a conflict of opinion as to the legitimate scope of the powers which could lawfully and wisely be conferred on the Commission of the future. It is too early in the history of the recent Act to predict, with any semblance of confidence, the effect which it will produce on the commerce and trade of the country, because it is necessary to take into account elements which are at present unknown quantities. Forecasts based on the operation of the laws of supply and demand are liable to serious disappointment. This branch of the subject involves many complex and obscure conditions, and is, at the best, very imperfectly understood. As has been noted above, these laws do not readily lend themselves to arbitrary control. Their beneficent operation may easily be retarded by rash legislation, but can very rarely be materially accelerated by heroic measures. Again, the cordiality or dislike, with which the new legislation may be accepted by the railroad

companies on the one hand and by the outside public on the other, are also unknown quantities. Sociology is not sufficiently advanced to enable the observer to measure and define the undercurrents of motive and feeling which may, to an appreciable extent, affect the calculation. Although however elaborate prediction as to net results may be dismissed as futile, the Act contains certain known elements which may be regarded as tending to produce definite effects, and these are the legitimate subjects of criticism. If this be so, it may not be wholly uninteresting to note a few points which occur in connection with the history and tenor of the Act, provided such notes be suggestive-not didactic-in character.

Having regard to the immense complexity of the interests involved, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the legislation embodied in the recent Act has been somewhat over-hasty. Investigation of the more searching kind has followed, instead of preceding, enactment. The amount of light which experts have thrown upon the bill since its passage became a foregone conclusion has greatly exceeded that which was shed upon it in its earlier stages. To use a metaphor, the patient's disease was complex in character, and its symptoms were obscure and misleading. But his condition was not immediately critical, and his life and health were matters of immense public importance. As his disease was confessedly not understood, would it not have been wiser to prolong the process of diagnosis than to administer a kill-or-cure remedy, and trust to a post-mortem examination for the explanation of the malady? In the writer's opinion, the case called for a special commission, in order that its legal, commercial and social conditions might be adequately investigated, and that the direction and scope of