THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

MARVELLOUS as were the political changes wrought in the last century a century that altered the map of Europe with such frequency that an atlas was useless almost before it had passed from the hands of its publishers into the hands of the public, a century that gave new work to the cartographers in the Caribbean Sea and made charts of the Pacific valueless the opening years of the twentieth century have witnessed an even more startling political event. It is an event of the first magnitude; it is an event fraught with such tremendous possibilities that at this time the wisest observer cannot correctly estimate the influence it may have on world politics. Important as it is politically, it is not less important sociologically. For the first time in history a white race and a yellow race have concluded a treaty defensive and offensive. When Lord Lansdowne and Baron Hayashi on January 30, 1902, affixed their signatures to the Anglo-Japanese agreement intended to maintain the status quo in the Far East, Great Britain turned her back on the past, forsook the traditional policy of "splendid isolation" that has been the pride of English statesmen, and brought into the council of nations a people who eight years ago were so uncivilized, according to the ideas of Western civilization, that Western nations refused to permit their subjects to be tried in native courts and insisted on exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction. In all the history of the world nothing has ever been seen like the rise of Japan.

A dozen motives may be found for the British Government's alliance with Japan, but two are all-sufficient. When Lord Lansdowne signed the treaty it was a public confession of England's weakness; it was equally an admission of Japan's strength. Ten years ago any English statesman proposing an alliance with Japan would have destroyed himself and his party. Five years ago such a suggestion would not have been given serious consideration. To-day it is an accomplished fact. England receives the news "with equanimity if without enthusiasm," in the words of a leading London newspaper. In Japan the news was received with the utmost enthusiasm, as might naturally have been

imagined. There were torchlight processions in Tokyo, the ministers were serenaded, and there was almost as much excitement as if a great victory was being celebrated. And a victory it really was. Japan's diplomacy and navy had admitted her as a partner on equal terms in the great Western firm. The strongest naval power in the world had joined fleets with hers. That compensated for the humiliation of having to submit to the Russo-French-German coalition that deprived Japan of the fruits of her victory over China. Had England lifted her finger then to-day's alliance probably would have been unnecessary. England did then what she has consistently done during the last quarter of a century when the opportunity has been presented to her to make a diplomatic blunder. As usual she blundered, and as usual her enemies profited by her folly. To repair that folly she now has to make the present treaty. Mr. Gladstone, it is reported, used to say that the best political barometer was the price of consols. The publication of the treaty did not affect the price of consols one way or the other, but Japanese four per cents went up three points on the London stock exchange. Evidently, then, the commercial barometer was set fair for Japan, but remained stationary for Great Britain.

In fact, one may properly ask what England gains by an alliance with the islanders of the East, what Japan gains by becoming the British agent in the Pacific, what all the rest of the world gains or loses by this most remarkable union, and especially how it affects the United States, now an Eastern as well as a Western power, now as much interested in the Pacific as in the Atlantic.

The prestige of England, for many years the predominant power in China, has been gradually waning, owing to the crass folly of her diplomatists, the ineptitude of her statesmen, and the audacious and unscrupulous policy of her great rival, Russia. While English diplomacy has been marked by vacillation and timidity, that of Russia has been distinguished by consistency and boldness. England, for the last quarter of a century at least, has had no fixed objective. Russia has: in one word, the Russianizing of Asia. So long ago as 1864 Prince Gortschakoff issued a circular note to the ministers of Russia stationed in the European capitals, in the course of which he used this significant language:

Bien souvent durant ces dernières années on s'est plu à assigner pour mission à la Russie de civiliser les contrées qui l'avoisinent sur le continent asiatique.

That ought to have been warning sufficient to the men to whom the destinies of Great Britain were entrusted, but apparently they gave it no heed. While England was doing little or nothing to maintain her pres

tige, Russia was carrying on her self-imposed "mission" of spreading civilization upon the Asiatic continent by the help of Cossacks and those peculiar methods that Russia alone, of all the supposedly civilized powers, knows how to employ.

English diplomacy is proverbial for its inability to take the long look ahead, which is the one reason more than any other that has made Russia the great power that she is. English prestige in the Far East rested for many years on the belief generally entertained in the superiority of her great naval and military strength. If England can be said to have had any policy, it was to maintain military supremacy in the East. For that reason she cried check whenever Russia made a move; but while there ran through the minds of English statesmen the nebulous idea that to maintain British supremacy there must be no other military power, Russia was slowly gaining her end. In the mean time there arose a new force. Japan, geographically to the mighty continent of Asia what Great Britain is to the continent of Europe; Japan, like Britain, a little patch on that vast tumult of waters; Japan, an island people with all the strength, mental and physical, that is the heritage of a nation cradled on the sea; Japan, by the necessities of her environment compelled to appreciate the importance of sea power; Japan, in short, the Britain of the Orient, was to rewrite history and be a factor in the world's development.

With astonishing adaptability and power to absorb Western ideas and civilization that have made Japan the marvel of the world, she leaped at once from the scientific barbarism of the East into the civilization of the West. England watched, not without a feeling of concern, the growing power of Japan. Here was a power that might threaten her supremacy. China was not to be feared. China was a corrupt, inert body hopelessly throttled by the traditions of ages, sleeping under the magician's spell from which she could not be awakened. Russia was always to be feared, but her progress might be stayed and many obstacles could be thrown in her path. Japan was self-contained, on her own territory, not easily attacked. Given time and the money with which to develop herself and she might prove no mean antagonist.

When in 1894 Great Britain revised her treaties with Japan and abandoned her right to extra-territorial jurisdiction, treating Japan as an equal and not an inferior- an example that was soon followed by all the other great powers the word had been pronounced that made Japan from that time on to be reckoned with as one of the elements always to be taken into consideration in the solution of that insoluble enigma, the Eastern Question. Little could any one imagine that eight years later

Great Britain and Japan would be allies. I dwell upon that fact because it is the romance of history. Conceive, if one can, an independent Filipino republic and the United States making a treaty of alliance, the purpose of the treaty being to safeguard American interests in the Pacific against the encroachments of Russia, or Germany, or Great Britain, or all three combined. A novelist who would so preposterously draw upon his imagination would receive just chastisement at the hands of the critics, and would be scored for not giving an air of verisimilitude to his narrative. The Cinderella among nations had been clothed in cloth of gold, and was fit to be wooed by the prince.

The year 1894 was a memorable one for Japan, and scarcely less memorable for all the rest of the world. Not only had Japan been recognized as a sovereign power, with all the rights and privileges accorded to other sovereign powers, but she was preparing to embark on that victorious military and naval war that should show to all the world how these islanders in the Pacific could fight on land and sea, and what their friendship or enmity meant. It is not necessary, for the purposes of the present article, to enter into the causes that led Japan to go to war with China over Corea, or to follow that campaign. It is important, however, to point out that at that time England was given another opportunity to reassert herself as the dominant power in Eastern affairs, and that as usual she seized the opportunity to exhibit her folly. England tried to prevent the war, no doubt realizing that it could have only one ending and would make Japan so powerful both on land and sea that it might destroy the delicate equilibrium that was forever in danger of being disturbed. The history of that time is typical of English diplomacy. Great Britain attempted to induce the other great powers to bring such pressure to bear upon Japan that she would relinquish her purpose. But the powers refused to take an active part; England did not consider it politic to undertake the task single-handed; and Japan was permitted to go ahead. And a very good job she made of it. The Chinese were whipped to a standstill, and the treaty of Shimonoseki, of 1895, made another map necessary.

The powers had watched the humbling of China with some little apprehension not unmixed with pleasure. If China was to be pulled to pieces, some of the fragments might be gathered up by the ever outstretched hands. There was, of course, always the danger to be feared of Japan getting more than her proper share of the plunder; but that was a matter that could be easily attended to at the proper time. And the proper time came when China signed the treaty of peace by which

Japan gained, as part of the spoils of war, the great naval stronghold of Port Arthur. At once Russia, France, and Germany appeared as the protectors and friends of China, and tore from Japan the fruits of her victory. England did not join the coalition, neither did she lift a finger to help Japan. She was simply an unmoved spectator. One word from England would in all probability have destroyed the coalition, earned the eternal gratitude of Japan, and restored the prestige of England that was merely a memory. That word was not spoken.

Japan yielded as gracefully as the circumstances demanded, and with true Eastern philosophy bided her time. She gained much by the war. She gained the respect of the great powers, she gained territory, and she wrung from her conquered foe a heavy indemnity. The latter she proceeded with all due diligence to convert into weapons of war. Her army was strengthened and provided with the most improved weapons. Heavy orders for warships were placed in Europe and America. The world realized that Japan was in a fair way to become the strongest naval power in the East. Both Russia and England showed their appreciation of this fact by strengthening their Asiatic squadrons.

Japan desires above everything else to control Corea. It is the natural Japanese outlet. Russia has also covetous eyes on the Hermit Kingdom. While following her fixed policy of dominating China, converting Manchuria into a Russian dependency, and securing naval and commercial bases on the Chinese mainland, Russia was also endeavoring to fasten her grip on Corea. As a result of the Chinese-Japanese war, a protocol was signed in Moscow by Count Lobanow and the Marquis Yamagata, on May 28, 1896, by which the number of troops Japan was permitted to keep in Corea was fixed; and it was also agreed that "if as a result of admittedly indispensable reforms it should become necessary to have recourse to foreign loans, the two Governments will lend by mutual accord their assistance to Corea.” Two years later a more definite and binding agreement was entered into between the two Governments regarding Corea. This agreement, signed at Tokyo, on April 13, 1898, by Baron Rosen on the part of Russia and by Baron Niski for Japan, is as follows:

Article I.-The Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan recognize definitely the sovereignty and entire independence of Corea, and pledge themselves mutually to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country.

Article II.-Desiring to remove all possible cause of misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan pledge themselves mutually, in the event of Corea having recourse to the advice and assistance either of Russia or Japan, to take no measure in respect to the appointment of military instructors or